The spectre of (in)security in Kaliningrad

Anna-Sophie Maass
Dr., Lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy
Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University
UK

President Vladimir Putin’s instigation of a war with Ukraine on February 24th 2022 has marked a new era in European and international Security. In a speech to the European Parliament on March 23rd 2022, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen likened this invasion of Ukraine to a ‘tectonic shift’ to the European security order.

The purpose of this article is to concisely explain the complexity of this tectonic shift by examining the geopolitical security of Kaliningrad. In anticipation of the EU’s eastward enlargement in May 2004, the Russian exclave Kaliningrad situated between Poland and Lithuania has become the concern over visa free travel between Russia and the European Union (EU). The need for Russian citizens to apply for visas from the European Commission to travel between Russia and Kaliningrad has been perceived as an infringement of the right of the free movement of persons by several Russian policy makers and diplomats. Hence, this issue became a sore point in EU-Russian diplomatic relations.

About a decade later, the focus of Kaliningrad has shifted from arguments over visa free travel to increasing security threats stemming from the exclave. Since 2016 the Russian government has been stationing nuclear missiles in the exclave. The stationing of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad with a range of up to 500 km enables them to potentially target several capitals in the EU such as Warsaw and Stockholm, for instance. Lithuania, which directly shares a border with the Russian exclave has reinforced the placement of troops along the borders of Kaliningrad and Belarus.

On March 31st 2022, at the presentation of NATO’s annual report from 2021, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed security threats stemming from Kaliningrad. He responded to a question by a journalist on whether Russia’s potential plans to explore a corridor to Kaliningrad would imply a threat to Poland. Secretary General Stoltenberg stated that NATO protected its allies and the Suwalki corridor, a land border of about 115 km between Lithuania and Poland connecting Kaliningrad with Belarus. All travel on land between Russia and this exclave takes place via this corridor and are regulated with a visa waiver. In his response to the question, Stoltenberg acknowledged that NATO and its member states were facing a new reality. However, he assured that the alliance would ensure that Russia would not use Kaliningrad or another pretext to launch an attack against a NATO member.

Despite Stoltenberg’s assurances, it has to be acknowledged that the security risks stemming from both the Suwalki gap and Kaliningrad are four-fold. First, the Suwalki corridor would in principle provide an opportunity for Russia to launch alleged defences by both land and air. Second, the stationing of Russia’s Baltic fleet in Kaliningrad enhances Russia’s ability to control both the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland (Veebel and Sliwa, 2019). Third, the fact that the Suwalki corridor is bordering Belarus is another potential security threat stemming from this particular region in light of the country’s close alliance with Russia. The most recent example demonstrating Belarus’ cooperation with Russia were its joint military exercises prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022. In September 2021, Belarus alliance with Russia manifested itself in Zapad, the largest Russian military exercise with approximately 200 000 troops carried out jointly with Belarus. Fourth, the stationing of the nuclear missiles of type Iskander in Kaliningrad have wide ranging security implications not only for Poland and Lithuania, but for Europe more broadly speaking due to the extensive range of these missiles.

President Putin’s instigation of war against Ukraine in February 2022 implies an unprecedented threat to European Security. A month after the start of war in Ukraine, an extraordinary NATO summit took place in which Stoltenberg expressed NATO’s response to Russian aggression. He stated that NATO established four new battlegroups in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia in addition to the already existing groups in the Baltic States and Poland. NATO and its member states enhanced spending on defence capabilities in response to Russia’s war-mongering implies a new reality with yet unpredictable consequences presumably exceeding NATO’s Eastern flank.

Email: a.maass@lancaster.ac.uk
Twitter: @annasophiemaass

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