

URBANIZATION, REFUGEES AND IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN IRAN, 2017

شهرنشینی، پناهندگان و مهاجران نامتعارف در ایران

Kaupungistuminen, pakolaiset ja epäsäännölliset siirtolaiset Iranissa

التحضر، اللاجئين و المهاجرين الغير موثقيين في ايران

Урбанизация, беженцы и нелегальные мигранты в Иране

Urbanization, refugees and irregular migrants in Iran

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research project

Urbanization, refugees and irregular migrants in Iran is a research project designed to study the intertwining of urbanization, rural development, migration and immigration processes in the Islamic Republic of Iran (later, Iran). The specific focus is on people who originate from Afghanistan and are currently in Iran. There are more than 3 million Afghans, including registered refugees, Afghan passport holders with Iranian visas and undocumented migrants in Iran (UNHCR 2017b). This research project utilizes information from earlier studies regarding refugees and urbanization in Iran and also uses empirical field material that was collected in Iran in October 2017.

The research was conducted in cooperation with the University of Turku (Finland) and Shahid Beheshti University (Iran). The main responsible researchers were Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen (Finland) and PhD candidate Davood Eyvazlu (Iran). In addition, research assistants were used in the collection and analysis of the material.

To conduct the research in Iran, the important support from the Ministry of Interior of Iran is acknowledged as well as the financial support from the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland (research consortium URMI). We are grateful to all people who responded to our survey and let us interview them.

This research report illustrates briefly the general background of the project, key findings from the survey and suggestions. However, we will continue with the more detailed analysis.

1.2. Research questions

The main questions of the research are:

1. What is the impact of the Afghan immigrants in Iran on rural development and employment in studied less-central areas of Iran?
2. If the Afghan immigrants living in less central-areas of Iran intend to migrate and to where do they intend to migrate?
3. What is the impact of social media on if, where, when and how the Afghan immigrants living in less-central areas migrate?
4. What is the impact of the Afghan immigrants in Iran on urbanization, both nationally and locally?

The research questions are answered based on the empirical material collected during the field research. Afghan refugees and migrants responded according to their own views; the results indicate both their perspectives and our interpretation of them.

1.3. Research material and methods

The research report is based on earlier studies and information about urbanization, refugees and irregular migrants in Iran (see, e.g., Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005; Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2016; Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2015; Araghi & Rahmani 2011; Bani-sadi, Zare & Varmazyari 2013; Hugo, Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2012; Mahmoudian & Ghassemi-Ardahaee 2014; UNHCR 2017b) and on empirical field material that the report authors collected in Iran October 3–19, 2017. To collect the empirical material, Kerman, Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan provinces and the more precise locations there were suggested and facilitated by Iran's Ministry of Interior.

In Iran, the specific settlements for refugees (in Farsi مهمانشهر) are usually translated in English as “guest cities.” However, in this publication, we use the term “guest settlements.” Instead of cities, these locations are rather small and compact areas, up to a few square kilometers, hosting normally up to a few thousand Afghan refugees. Earlier, due to their provisional character, they were also called refugee camps. Over decades, their infrastructure has been enhanced, and they have become rather permanent settlements.

In the field research, 644 persons with Afghan background responded to our survey comprised of 79 questions, of which 50 were structural, 17 were semi-open and 12 were open questions. All survey respondents remained anonymous. Of them, 546 (85%) lived in one of the four studied guest settlements of Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam and the remaining 98 (15%) lived in urban areas and villages in the provinces of Kerman, Khuzestan and Razavi Khorasan (Figure 1).

Besides the survey, interviews were also conducted. During the fieldwork, 72 Afghan refugees and irregular migrants were interviewed in different sites of the study areas. Each interview took 5–20 minutes. Interviews had themes that were connected to the survey and facilitated a more in-depth understanding of the issues. Furthermore, interviews were also conducted with 54 stakeholders related to the refugees and irregular migrants. These included regional authorities such as representatives of the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BA-FIA; located in Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan) of the Ministry of Interior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, office located in Mashhad); public authorities in districts, municipalities and villages within the study areas; managers and council members in the four studied guest settlements; other public authorities; and private-sector representatives. We thank all respondents for helping us.




Figure 1. Study areas in Iran.

All survey responses were analyzed quantitatively in the SPSS program. Main methods included descriptive statistics, cross tables, cluster analysis and regression. The interviews were analyzed qualitatively in the N-Vivo program and quantitatively in the SPSS program. The main methods included content analysis and descriptive statistics. We thank the research assistants in helping in the analysis.

1.4. Research highlights

- The urban population in Iran is growing by 1 million inhabitants per year.
- Afghan immigrants—irregular immigrants, refugees and other Afghans—number over 3 million in Iran. They have an important impact on urbanization and rural development, both nationally and locally. They are also a significant community of international interest.

- Employment among Afghans in Iran varies from long-term unemployment, low-skilled seasonal work in agriculture and hard work in industry and construction to successful business in trading and industry; by the time of survey in the autumn 2017, two out of three responded Afghan men and one out of five Afghan women had an employment.
- In some localities in Iran, Afghans have a high share in seasonal work in agriculture, construction and industry and thus have a substantial impact on rural development and employment in studied less-central areas.
- Approximately one out of five Afghan respondents in the provinces of Kerman, Khuzestan and Razavi Khorasan stated that they will likely stay the rest of their lives in Iran, and approximately one out of three respondents did not know; however, fewer than one out of ten respondents intended to stay in their current area, and approximately four out of five respondents hoped to live in Mashhad.
- Afghans living in Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam refugee guest settlements were more likely to state that they would likely live the rest of their lives in Iran than were Afghans living elsewhere in Iran.
- Those Afghan respondents who stated that they would likely stay the rest of their lives in Iran were often either 50–64 years old (usually those who came to Iran over 20 years ago from Afghan villages and who had family members in Iran) or younger Afghans (particularly those who originated from towns and cities, had spent 10–20 years in Iran, and lived in refugee guest settlements with their spouses and children).
- The Afghans' desire to stay in Iran for the rest of their lives was higher if they were satisfied with their current accommodations and social networks and if they had good relations with their neighbors.
- Roughly two out of four respondents agreed that they would like to go back to Afghanistan: of men, almost every second and of women every third would like to return; however, only one out of six mentioned Afghanistan as their most preferred country.
- Approximately half of respondents hoped to migrate to Europe, Australia or Canada, and about four out of five respondents had a university degree.
- The more young an Afghan in Iran is, the more likely s/he wants to migrate abroad, but very few younger Afghans want to migrate to Afghanistan, which they perceive as insecure.

- Information from the Internet and social media has an impact on where, when and how the Afghans who lived in less-central areas of Iran hoped to migrate abroad or within Iran; younger Afghans in particular use the Internet and social media for migration-related information and planning.
- Approximately half of Afghan respondents in refugee guest settlements were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations; however, satisfaction levels varied substantially among guest settlements. Approximately three out of five respondents in guest settlements agreed that they had enough toilets and showers for their use.
- The physical and social environments of refugee guest settlements can be enhanced.
- The research-based results about the Afghan refugees and irregular migrants can help Iranian officials to design efficient evidence-based policies that have a successful impact on individual communities and on Iranian society as a whole, so this research should be continued.

2. URBANIZATION, REFUGEES AND IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN IRAN

2.1. Urbanization

Urbanization is about two connected issues. First, urbanization means the increase of population living in urban areas compared to the total population of a country. In practice, this signifies how many people live in cities and towns in Iran compared to Iran's total population. Such urbanization is achieved through demographic and migration processes. Natural growth of urban population means that the number of births in towns and cities exceed the number of deaths. Positive migration balance means that more people migrate from rural to urban areas than vice versa. Often in more advanced societies, in the urban areas, natural population development becomes negative, but due to the positive migration balance, the population in the urban areas grows.

Secondly, urbanization means a change in a society in which the economic and social roles of cities and towns increase. Urbanization means a development toward more efficient and advanced utilization of resources and technology in a society, in this case, in Iran. For example, Mahmoudian & Ghassemi-Ardahaee (2014, 49) indicate that the higher a province's developmental level is in Iran, the higher is its urbanization rate.

Urbanization and migration are key processes in the societal transformations of the 21st century. They also have significant impacts on rural development. Globally, between 2010 and 2030, the number of urban dwellers will grow by 1,800 million inhabitants (United Nations 2015). This is one of the most significant changes in the history of the world. The urbanization rate in most economically advanced countries is more than 75% (i.e., more than three out of four of these countries' citizens live in cities and towns).

Iran is transforming into a strongly urbanized country, as many other developed countries are. In general, urban and rural conditions in Iran have improved as compared to the period before the Islamic Revolution. However, differences between the capital city (Tehran) and other cities have increased (Fanni 2006). The urban population in the country has grown by an average of 1 million inhabitants per year. According to the United Nations (2015), the number of urban dwellers in Iran was 11.8 million in 1970, 31.7 million in 1990 and 52.6 million in 2010. The number of urban dwellers is estimated to grow to 72.4 million by 2030 (Figure 2).

Subsequently, the urbanization rate grows in Iran. About half of all Iranians lived in urban areas by 1981, and about three out of four citizens are expected to live in urban areas by 2019 (United Nations 2015). Consequently, Iran's




Figure 2. Development of urban dwellers in Iran, 1970–2030. Source: United Nations (2015).

rural population has started to diminish in the past ten years, and economic opportunities in rural areas are becoming sparser. However, the impact of migration and urbanization in Iran is complex. According to Mahmoudian & Ghassemi-Ardahae (2014), the data from Iran's 2011 census revealed that two-thirds of all migrations in Iran took place between urban areas (i.e., people moved from one urban area to another). They also claim that during 2006–2011 in Iran, about 100,000 people moved from urban to rural areas. During that period, migration actually decreased the urbanization rate at the national level. However, the issue is more complex, since sometimes the administrative areas that belong to a functional urban region are counted as rural areas. Globally, broader suburbanization is a common trend near to economically developing larger cities. Wide areas beyond the administrative urban areas are functionally and actually urbanized regardless of their administrative status (Jauhiainen 2013).

Furthermore, not all migration by the irregular Afghan migrants are covered in the census. In addition, one part of the urban–rural migration in Iran consisted of men ending their military service: they returned from cities and towns to rural areas in which they lived before entering military service (Mahmoudian & Ghassemi-Ardahae 2014, 39). In 2016, Iran had eight cities with over 1 million inhabitants and 18 cities with over 500,000 inhabitants (Table 1; Figure 3).

Table 1. Largest Iranian cities in 2016.

Name	Province	Population
1. Tehran	Tehran	8,694,000
2. Mashhad	Razavi Khorazan	3,001,000
3. Isfahan	Isfahan	1,961,000
4. Karaj	Alborz	1,592,000
5. Tabriz	East Azerbaijan	1,559,000
6. Shiraz	Fars	1,566,000
7. Qom	Qom	1,201,000
8. Ahvaz	Khuzestan	1,185,000
9. Kermanshah	Kermanshah	947,000
10. Urmia	West Azerbaijan	736,000
11. Rasht	Gilan	680,000
12. Zahedan	Sistan and Baluchestan	588,000
13. Hamadan	Hamadan	554,000
14. Kerman	Kerman	538,000
15. Yazd	Yazd	530,000
16. Ardabil	Ardabil	529,000
17. Bandar Abbas	Hormozgan	527,000
18. Arak	Markazi	521,000

Source: Population Census of Iran 2016.

2.2. Refugee

Refugee is formally defined by the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 protocol. The convention Article 1(A)(2) states that a refugee is any person who

“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (United Nations 1951).

Such a definition means that to gain an official status, all refugees need to be outside of their country of nationality or former habitual country, such as Afghans in Iran. A usual practice is that to gain the status of a refugee, a person must apply for asylum. In specific cases and contexts, refugees can be defined directly by the authorities. Asylum seekers can also obtain a temporary or permanent residence permit in a foreign country without the status of refugee. In these cases international conventions and regulations on refugees do not con-



Figure 3. Largest cities in Iran.

sider them. In everyday language, many immigrants and asylum seekers of foreign background are incorrectly called refugees.

The large number of asylum seekers to Europe in 2015 led to lively debates about the roles and impacts of asylum seekers and refugees and also of irregular migrants in the host societies (De Genova 2017). Against the prevailing discussion about refugees as a burden, Betts & Collyer (2017) and Betts et al. (2017) presented an alternative vision in which empowered refugees help themselves and contribute to their host societies. It was also seen as possible that they would rebuild their countries of origin. Furthermore, Wissel (2017) claims that refugees do better when they are structurally, economically and socially integrated with the local population, but this leaves the option of not being integrated by force.

For this, refugee policies work best for the host country and the refugees when refugees are able to live outside of camps and can be employed in cities.

According to UNHCR (2017a), 65.6 million forcibly displaced people exist, of whom 22.5 million are refugees. Nearly half (42%) of the refugees come from three countries: Syria (5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million) and South Sudan (1.4 million). All these countries have been subjects of war. The countries hosting the most refugees are Turkey (2.9 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Lebanon (1.0 million), Iran (1.0 million), Uganda (0.9 million) and Ethiopia (0.8 million). These are the neighboring countries of those countries from where the asylum seekers came.

2.3. Irregular migrant

An *irregular migrant* is a person who stays in a foreign country without legal grounds. They are people who might have entered the country without permission, thus they did not have even right to enter the country. However, there are also people who had the permission to come but they stay in this country after their valid permission has expired. The number of irregular migrants in a country is difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, it is assumed that all countries have irregular migrants. Usually they hide from authorities, are seldom traced in censuses in their entirety. They may also cross national borders irregularly, e.g. to come, leave and return irregularly.

Irregular migrants are also defined as undocumented migrants. Some authorities prefer to use the term “illegal migrants,” emphasizing that their presence in a given country is not legally permitted or that their right to stay are substantially legally constrained. In general, there are two viewpoints on irregular migrants. One is that they should be expelled from a country and that, before their expulsion, their access to public services should be limited – if any access is given at all. Another viewpoint is that irregular migration is a permanent phenomenon in all countries and it cannot be avoided. Therefore irregular migrants should be given access to public health care, social services and livelihoods, and their legalization should be the responsibility of the public sector. The debate over irregular migrants and the ways of defining them are political (McNevin 2017). For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has not been successful in its attempts to balance humanitarian concerns with apparent objective of quick removal of irregular migrants from the European Union territory (Peers 2015).

Irregular migrants illustrate how contemporary migration has become a continuum of between forced and voluntary migration. Therefore, a processual perspective on migration has become a more common approach. There asylum-related migration is seen consisting of stages, from leaving to journey and transit, continuing further to arrival and settlement and eventually finishing with return or onward migration, until the process cycle begins anew with various push and pull factors (Erdal & Oeppen 2018; Van Hear et al. 2018).

2.4. Refugees and irregular migrants in Iran

The history and the politics of Afghan refugees and irregular migrants in Iran is not the topic of this research (see, e.g., Rajaei 2000; Calabrese 2016; Christensen 2016). However, to understand the current context in Iran, a brief description is presented here in this research report.

Iran has been hosting Afghan refugees for decades. Following the coup d'état in Afghanistan in 1978, the establishment of a communist regime there and the military invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, Afghans started to escape to Iran in large numbers. The Afghans were welcomed by the government of Iran. In less than a decade, by the mid-1980s, the number of Afghan immigrants in Iran had risen from 0.5 to 2 million (Hugo, Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2012, 265). Before and after 1978, there have been also Afghans migrating to Iran for economic reasons, such as when a drought in the 1970s devastated agriculture in Afghanistan and when the rising oil extraction boom in Iran necessitated a labor force (Stigter 2006),

Most Afghan refugees entering Iran were initially called *mohajerin*, and they were given the right to remain in Iran indefinitely. Such an “open door” policy for refugees exiled for religious reasons was practiced beyond the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989. It was also connected to the development of the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. Afghans had the same access as Iranian citizens to subsidized food, health care and free primary and secondary education. However, Afghans' right to work was limited mostly to low-wage positions in agriculture and construction (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008).

From 1992 on and after the fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah government of Afghanistan, the government of Iran started to encourage Afghans to return to Afghanistan to redevelop their country of origin. At that time, up to 300,000 Afghans were in the refugee camps, and the remaining 2.5 million lived mostly in the urban areas. The policy in Iran was to accommodate Afghans mostly outside of specific refugee camps (Strand, Suhrke & Harpviken 2004). The earlier policy of welcoming *mohajer* Afghans became more often defined as *panahandegan* Afghans (Rajaei 2000, 56–58). The government of Iran no longer automatically granted Afghans permanent residence rights and the status of refugee. Iran, Afghanistan and the UNHCR negotiated about the immediate repatriation of up to 700,000 Afghans. However, the unrest in Afghanistan led to a civil war, and later, the Taliban took over most of Afghanistan. In addition, there was not enough financial support to operationalize the repatriation to the extent that had been planned (Calabrese 2016, 138). The Afghans continued to arrive to Iran, which the Iranian authorities tolerated. However, in the 1990s, Iran started to reduce public services to Afghans, especially educational and medical services (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2016, 24).

After the fall of the Taliban power in Afghanistan in 2001, the government of Iran limited acceptance of arriving Afghans as refugees and supported the re-

turn of Afghans residing in Iran. In addition, beginning in 2003, Iran introduced a re-registration system *Amayesh* identification card for all Afghan nationals who had been granted residency rights in Iran based simply on their Afghan nationality in the 1980s and 1990s. They were granted short-term residence permits that Afghans needed to extend regularly. Furthermore, the policy change led later to an increasing implementation of Afghan-free zones, such as provinces, cities or urban spaces in which Afghans are prohibited from residing in or visiting, or where their presence is strongly regulated and restricted. Afghans were authorized to move freely within their designated province of residence. However, to travel to other provinces, refugees are required to inform the authorities and obtain a travel permit before they travel. In addition, Afghan refugees were also only allowed to work within their areas of residence and in specific jobs.

Iran has been, since 1976, a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and to its 1967 Protocol (United Nations 1951). However, the government of Iran considers the stipulations contained in articles 17, 23, 24 and 26 as being recommendations only. Therefore, the limitations in the free movement and employment of refugees in Iran have not been implemented as if they were agreed upon internationally in the 1951 Convention, since Iran made reservations in Articles 17 (employment) and 26 (freedom of movement of refugees; Farzin & Jadali 2013).

The vast majority of Afghans arriving in Iran since 2003 have not been allowed to register for an *Amayesh* card or to become asylum seekers or refugees. The 1 million officially recognized Afghan refugees are those who have the *Amayesh* card, and they have clearly defined access to selected public services. Furthermore, in the 2000s and 2010s, legally residing Afghans' access to public services has been expanded in Iran. The international politics matter as well. According to Christiansen (2016, 23) since 2012, the United States- and European Union-imposed "economic sanctions [on Iran] have affected the Afghan refugees tremendously; both in terms of their financial situation, and in terms of levels of discrimination and the amount of international aid and humanitarian assistance they have been able to receive."

The repatriation of Afghans became more efficient in the early 2000s. In 2002, Afghanistan and the UNHCR signed an agreement for the repatriation of Afghans. Since then, the UNHCR has assisted in repatriating almost 1 million Afghan refugees from Iran. Most of them returned in 2002–2005 (UNHCR 2017a). Also, in the same period, hundreds of thousands of Afghans returned without the assistance of UNHCR. However, the worsening security in Afghanistan substantially has diminished the number of returners down to a few thousand annually. Not all Afghan repatriations have been voluntary, and the authorities have repatriated hundreds of thousands of Afghans annually (Christensen 2016, 16). In 2012, the governments of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan and the UNHCR

adopted the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR). It outlines the need for increased voluntary repatriation and also for enhanced resettlement (Westerby et al. 2013, 57). However, the national regulations allow the expulsion of over 1.5 million undocumented migrants from Iran. The managing director of BAFIA, Ahmad Mohammadi-Far, argued in early 2018 that “2.5 million foreign national residing illegally in Iran were identified and repatriated in the past four years, including 630,000 illegal foreign nationals in the current Iranian year [started March 21, 2017]” (The Iran Project 2018).

Despite the repatriation efforts, Adelkhah & Olszewska (2007) argued that the Afghan presence in Iran appears to be irreversible. Their presence satisfies economic needs, reflects the intensity of commercial exchanges between Iran and Afghanistan and in itself constitutes a complex trans-border reality. Yarbakhsh (2017) claimed that there has been some considerable movement back by Afghans across the border. Facing challenges and insecurity in Afghanistan, they have reassessed their initial decision to return to Afghanistan. In fact, Majidi (2018) claimed that deportees may find themselves in situations of greater threat in Afghanistan than they experienced before their migration, so it adds to their reasons to leave again. Furthermore, based on a study of Afghans in Tehran, Mansourian & Rajaei (2018) indicated how the quality of life of Afghans improved significantly after their immigration to Iran, especially in the fields of security and education. There have been challenges as well, especially with the decrease in economic growth in Iran over the recent years. Therefore, Monsutti (2008) was critical of the solutions to the problems of Afghans suggested by the UNCHR, namely voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan, integration in Iran or resettlement in a third country. He claims that for Afghans, back-and-forth movements between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and beyond is a key mobility-based livelihood strategy. Furthermore, among many security issues, the demographic security of Afghanistan is also challenging (Rodriguez & Monsutti 2017).

In 2017, Afghans comprised the largest group of irregular migrants in Iran. In total, more than 3 million Afghans reside in Iran, including registered refugees, Afghan passport holders with Iranian visa and undocumented migrants (UNHCR 2017b). Over 70% of these refugees are from the Hazara and Tajik populations (Westerby et al. 2013, 58). Those who are registered as refugees with the UNHCR, about one million people, have access to primary health services similar to those available to Iranian citizens (Shamsi Gooshki, Rezaei & Wild 2016, 736).

In addition, about 1 million Afghans legally hold resident permits. They are entitled to receive work authorizations in Iran, and they can purchase health insurance on their own initiative (Shamsi Gooshki, Rezaei & Wild 2016, 736). The government of Iran has offered to legalize irregular Afghan migrants' presence in Iran. The basic requirements for a working permit are a valid Afghan passport and an Iranian visa. Over 500,000 Afghans have regularized, at least temporarily, their presence in Iran.

Furthermore, there are irregular Afghans in Iran who do not have formal access to public services. Their number varies from week to week, but it is most likely the largest of the Afghan groups in Iran.

According to UNHCR (2017a), Iran is globally one of the countries with highest number of refugees. In Iran, there are around 1 million refugees, of which Afghans make up more than 95%. The majority of them are second- and third-generation refugees who live in protracted displacement and with no imminent solutions. Another substantially smaller refugee group is composed of Iraqis. Approximately 97% of the registered refugees live in urban areas, while 3% of them reside in 19 guest settlements (UNHCR 2017b). The refugee settlements are located in different parts of the country (Figure 4).



Figure 4. Specific settlements for refugees in Iran in 2017. Modified from UNHCR (2017b).

The majority of refugees resided in Tehran (33%), Khorasan Razavi (16%), Esfahan (13%), and Kerman (8%) provinces, and the remainder (30%) were dispersed in the other provinces where Afghans are allowed to live (European Commission 2017). Especially large numbers of Afghans lived in Mashhad and Tehran. Some Afghans also lived in smaller towns.

However, in Iran, foreigners and Afghans are not allowed to reside everywhere. In 2001, the Supreme National Security Council of Iran declared some provinces and some cities within specific provinces as no-go areas (NGAs) for foreign nationals, including refugees, on the grounds of national security, public interest and health (Farzin & Jadali 2013). Afghan refugees are allowed to neither reside within nor travel to these NGAs, or they need especial permissions for it, so the Afghans' settlement patterns are influenced by Iran's national policies. Of the 31 provinces in Iran, 17 are full NGAs, and 11 are partial NGAs (Figure 5). This NGA policy has been implemented since 2007.

There are various viewpoints on the situation of Afghans in Iran. The government and the people of Iran have been acclaimed widely for their contribution in hosting Afghan refugees in Iran for decades (European Commission 2017; UNHCR 2017c). For example, international Human Rights Watch (2013) expressed that

“There have been significant benefits for the millions of documented and undocumented Afghans who live in Iran. Many have been able to earn wages which, although at subsistence level or below, provide for a higher quality of life than they would have been able to attain in war-torn Afghanistan. Registered refugees have been allowed to access educational opportunities often of a higher standard than that available in Afghanistan.”

In addition, they concluded that “Afghan women and girls in Iran enjoy a number of freedoms denied to them at home. In particular, they have greater freedom of movement, access to quality education, and ability to seek divorce than do women and girls in Afghanistan.” (Human Rights Watch 2013). In 2017, the representative of the UNHCR in Iran mentioned that “UNHCR believes the Islamic Republic of Iran has been an exemplary host to refugees.” (UNHCR 2017c).

The situation of undocumented, irregular Afghans is more difficult, because they are not eligible for most of the assistance provided to refugees. However, their situation has been improving. For example, Iran's Supreme Leader's decree in May 2015 stated that all children in Iran are allowed to access formal education regardless of their legal status. This right to education was thus extended also to irregular Afghan children (European Commission 2017).

However, concerns and criticism have been expressed over the situation of Afghans in Iran, especially that of irregular Afghan migrants (Human Rights



Figure 5. Restricted areas (“no-go areas”) in Iran in which Afghans are not entitled to live or travel without specific permissions.

Watch 2013; Rohani & Rohani 2014; Christiansen 2016). It is regularly debated in the international media and by the pro-migrant organizations and activists. The European Commission (2017) stated that “many, particularly those [Afghans] who do not hold the Amayesh registration card, face constraints and limitations on access to livelihoods, healthcare, and other essential services.” However, according to the analysis of published research by Shamsi Gooshki, Rezaei & Wild (2016, 737), undocumented migrants can sometimes access public health servic-

es. They are actually rarely refused health services, but files are not necessarily always kept on these visits (Tober, Taghdisi & Jalali 2006, 55).

For children of irregular Afghan migrants, “there are still some financial barriers to access, as undocumented children need to obtain a blue card to enroll, in addition to cultural impediments.” (European Commission 2017). Assumingly, by blue card is meant here the status as involuntary migrant who has an indefinite permission to stay in Iran. There have been also claims of discrimination toward Afghans in Iran, claims that Afghans have only a limited access to employment and education and claims that many children born in Iran with an Afghan father have problems obtaining Iranian citizenship (Rohani & Rohani 2014; Christiansen 2016). In all, the issue of Afghans in Iran is complex and challenging in the local, national and international contexts.

3. MAIN RESULTS

3.1. Respondents' background

The survey respondents comprised 644 Afghans in Iran, both officially designated Afghan refugees and irregular Afghan migrants, in Kerman, Khuzestan and Razavi Khorasan provinces. Of the respondents, 546 (85%) lived in the four studied refugee guest settlements of Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam; 98 (15%) lived elsewhere in the abovementioned provinces of Iran (see Figure 1, page 7).

The majority of the respondents were legally in Iran and had the necessary documents for residence permission, health care and other public services. Some migrants had earlier received legal permission for an extended stay in Iran but, for various reasons, later failed to prolong the validity of their residence permission with BAFIA. Some Afghans in guest settlements and elsewhere in Iran had failed to receive or prolong the validity of their identification cards and insurance. The respondents also included Afghans who had come to Iran illegally to work seasonally or for longer periods and who were thus ineligible for most public services.

In general, all respondents considered themselves of Afghan origin. Practically all (over 99%) considered Afghanistan to be their country of origin; less than 1% named Iran. Of all respondents, about half (52%) were male and half (48%) were female. The age distribution was as follows: 15–18 years (13%); 19–29 years (31%); 30–49 years (39%); 50–64 years (12%); and 65 years or older (5%). The number of Afghan migrants in the oldest age range was higher in guest settlements than elsewhere (Table 2). Of the respondents, nine out of ten (90%) came to Iran before 2003, i.e., before the changes in the national policies that limited the number and permanence of arriving Afghans. According to interviews, many men who were adults before leaving Afghanistan worked in agriculture or construction while there. The women respondents had rarely been employed and mostly stayed at home.

Table 2. Demographic background of respondents (%).

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
15–18 years	16	11	13	72	12	16	14	13	15	12	13	85
19–29 years	24	34	29	157	45	32	41	40	28	33	31	197
30–49 years	35	44	40	217	26	49	33	32	34	45	39	249
50–64 years	16	9	12	66	15	3	11	11	15	8	12	77
65+ years	9	2	6	31	2	0	1	1	8	2	5	32
Total	100	100	100	543	100	100	100	97	100	100	100	640

There are several generations of Afghan refugees in Iran, and there are generational differences. The first generation came to Iran as adults before 2002, mostly in the 1980s and 1990s. Some came with small children; later, their children were also born in Iran. The latter became second-generation Afghan refugees. In 2017, the age of the second-generation Afghans varied between 25 and 40 years, depending when their parents came to Iran and when they were born. Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2012) generalized that the first- and second-generation Afghans in Iran had different values and economic aspirations. Those who came to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., the first generation) had different perspectives on life in Iran and Afghanistan. In general, the second generation was brought up in a more liberal social and religious environment than the first generation, but there are exceptions. However, Yuval-Davis (2011) illustrated how belonging – as an emotional feeling of being “at home” – is a much more complex issue. Belonging is rarely consistent even within a generation. Belonging to something – for example, a nation, a country or a home – is also political. Some political projects aim to create belonging for particular groups, such as Afghans in Iran.

Nevertheless, there is a huge difference in literacy rates between the first and second generations of Afghans in Iran. According to Iran’s 2011 census, among first-generation Afghan migrants who were 25–34 years old, slightly less than half could read and write. Among the second-generation Afghan migrants of the same age, approximately four out of five could read and write (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2016, 25). Obviously, the site where these Afghans grew up in Iran had an impact; for example, a guest settlement with a relatively stable, fully Afghan social environment differs from a large Afghan neighborhood in a city and from a place where Afghans are a clear minority in the neighborhood. Attending Afghan-only or mixed schools had a huge impact as well. There is also a third generation of Afghans in Iran: the children of Afghans who were very small when they came to Iran or who were born in Iran. Most of the third-generation Afghans migrants were young; the oldest were around 20 years old, but the majority were younger. There were also a few fourth-generation Afghan migrants who were small children and babies in the autumn 2017.

Of the respondents living in guest settlements, slightly more than two out of five (42%) originated from villages or rural areas in Afghanistan; almost three out of five (57%) came from towns or cities there; and 1% listed a refugee camp as their place of origin. Of the respondents living elsewhere in Iran, nearly two out of three (64%) originated from villages or rural areas in Afghanistan, and more than one out of three (36%) came from towns or cities there. In Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s, educational opportunities were less common in rural areas than in cities and towns. According to the interviews, most respondents from rural Afghanistan had received only a few years of basic education, if any. However, there was a gender issue as well, as Afghan women had lower educational levels.

3.2. Current living place

The current living place of the Afghan respondents is defined here as their physical and social environment in the autumn 2017. It consists of the house where they live and the immediate neighborhood, including the facilities provided there and their social relationships in the neighborhood and beyond.

Of the guest-settlement respondents, a strong majority (87%) had lived in their current place for over 20 years; 12% had lived there for 11–20 years; 1% had lived there for 5–10 years; and none had been there for fewer than 5 years. Thus, all respondents were very familiar with their living places. In addition, in some guest settlements, many residents originated from the same village or area of Afghanistan. Many came to Iran together decades ago. Therefore, in these guest settlements, everyone knows each other, or at least recognizes each other's faces. The residents rarely change the actual houses where they live, except when one gets married or leaves the guest settlement permanently. The latter is a rather rare event. Physically, the territory of these settlements is small, often a few square kilometers or less.

One of the studied guest settlements was established a few years ago; its population thus has moved there only since that time. This settlement was established due to the 2007 implementation of the NGAs for Afghans. The implementation of the NGAs was legally well-founded. The refugees could opt for relocation to other areas of Iran (as designated by the government) or for repatriation to Afghanistan. In the newly established guest settlement, the residents who were brought together mostly came from one province in Iran. Nevertheless, only a few had known each other before moving there. In addition, their social backgrounds were sometimes very different. Farzin & Jadali (2013) indicated that the relocation of Afghans was generally problematic because, before the relocation, the Afghan refugees had often lived in their areas for years and had established social and emotional ties and economic networks. Therefore, the formation of social networks is still taking place in the new guest settlements.

A major difference between guest settlements and the other living places that Afghans have in Iran is that access to guest settlements is strongly regulated. Elsewhere in Iran, Afghans have more flexibility to select their nearby environments and to move in and out—financial and other matters permitting. The respondents from elsewhere in Iran generally had lived for shorter times, both in Iran and in their current living places, as compared to those in the guest settlements. Nearly one out of four (23%) had lived in their current place for less than 5 years, but nearly half (47%) had lived in the same place for over 20 years (Table 3).

In guest settlements, half (50%) of respondents agreed that they were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations. Men were slightly more satisfied than women. There were large differences between the four studied guest settlements. Of the respondents in the Bani Najjar and Rafsanjan guest set-

Table 3. Length of respondents' residence in current living place.

	Guest settlements		Other areas		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0-5 years	0	0	23	14	5	14
6-10 years	1	3	10	6	3	9
11-20 years	11	28	20	12	13	40
21- years	88	215	47	29	79	244
Total	100	246	100	61	100	307

tlements, one out of five (20%) and roughly half (51%), respectively, stated that they were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations. The lower rate of satisfaction in the Bani Najjar guest settlement is related to a situation in which the current inhabitants had to move from elsewhere in Iran to that guest settlement. The Rafsanjan guest settlement also needs improvements in its physical environment. Almost three out of every four respondents in the Bardsir guest settlement (72%) and the Torbat-e Jam guest settlement (71%) were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations.

Compared to those living in guest settlements, the respondents who lived elsewhere in Iran were generally more satisfied with their current accommodations: approximately seven out of eight (88%) were fully or partly satisfied. The men were slightly more satisfied than the women (Table 4). One out of ten Afghans in guest settlements (10%) and about two out of five (41%) Afghans elsewhere stated that they were fully satisfied with their current accommodations. However, some irregular migrants lived in very precarious conditions outside the guest settlements. However, we do not describe the various kinds of accommodations we saw during the fieldwork.

Satisfaction is related to how a person feels about the availability and quality of physical and social amenities. In general, the houses where which the respondents lived were small, and their quality varied from one guest settlement to another. However, over the years, the basic facilities of the guest settlements have improved, often with the help of international donations (see, e.g., Norwegian Refugee Council 2017). The residents had also enhanced the interiors of their houses and the small attached yards. In addition to the houses for the in-

Table 4. Respondents' satisfaction with current accommodation.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
Fully	11	9	10	54	49	33	44	43	19	12	15	97
Partly	41	37	39	210	39	54	43	42	41	39	40	252
No	48	54	51	269	12	13	13	12	40	49	45	281
Total	100	100	100	533	100	100	100	97	100	100	100	630

habitants, there are also public facilities, such as schools and health care centers, inside the settlement. In addition, there are shops and employment and management offices. Each settlement also has a building that functions as a mosque. We visited all four guest settlements, but in this report, we do not describe them or their facilities in detail.

With regard to physical amenities, three out of five (61%) respondents in guest settlements and nine out of ten (91%) of those living elsewhere in Iran stated that they have enough toilets, showers and other facilities for their use (Table 5). In the Bani Najjar (79%) and Torbat-e Jam (74%) guest settlements, around three out of four respondents agreed with this statement; in the Bardsir (42%) and Rafsanjan (45%) guest settlements, over two out of five agreed. In general, those who did not have sufficient facilities were more likely to be dissatisfied with their current accommodations. In fact, three out of five (59%) of those who were not satisfied with their current accommodations did not have enough toilets, showers and such for their use. In guest settlements, the toilets were commonly located outside of the houses in a separate building that was shared among very many inhabitants.

Table 5. Enough toilets, showers and other facilities in use for respondents.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man	woman	all	N	man	woman	all	N	man	woman	all	N
	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
Agree	63	58	61	316	92	87	91	86	69	61	65	402
Don't know	5	5	5	25	2	0	1	1	4	4	4	26
Disagree	32	37	34	180	6	13	8	8	27	35	31	188
Total	100	100	100	521	100	100	100	95	100	100	100	616

The issue of satisfaction goes beyond the immediate house and its physical amenities. Social issues are also important. Over the years, Afghans have created extended social and family networks in Iran. Very few respondents (4%) had no family or relatives in Iran (Table 6).

Table 6. Respondents' family and relatives in Iran.

	Guest settlements		Other areas		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Spouse	8	44	7	7	8	51
Children	3	18	0	0	3	18
Spouse and children	11	59	2	2	10	61
Spouse, children and relatives	37	194	54	53	39	247
Spouse and relatives	2	11	5	5	3	16
Children and relatives	1	7	0	0	1	7
Relatives	35	186	17	17	32	203
No	2	9	14	14	4	23
Total	100	528	100	98	100	626

Almost all of the respondents in the guest settlements (95%) had family in their current living place, but this share was slightly smaller (88%) among respondents who were living elsewhere in Iran (Table 7). Typically, those who did not have any family in their current living place were men under 30 years old who had come to Iran less than 5 years ago to work in Iran. Many of these men were irregular migrants who worked in difficult jobs.

Table 7. Respondents being in current place with some of the family.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
Agree	96	94	95	495	85	97	88	84	94	94	94	579
Don't know	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Disagree	4	5	5	24	15	3	12	11	6	5	6	35
Total	100	100	100	521	100	100	95	100	100	100	616	

Of the respondents in guest settlements, almost all (91%) agreed that they had at least some friends in the neighborhood (Table 8). These friends were typically Afghans, as only 11% had Iranian friends in the neighborhood. This is understandable because Iranians do not live in guest settlements. In general, men had more neighborhood friends than women had (Table 8). Furthermore, four out of five (79%) respondents were in contact with Afghan people elsewhere in Iran.

Table 8. Respondents' friends in current neighborhood.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
Many	60	45	52	275	49	32	44	41	58	43	51	316
Some	32	45	39	201	29	43	33	31	31	45	38	232
No	8	10	9	49	22	25	23	21	11	12	11	70
Total	100	100	100	525	100	100	100	93	100	100	100	618

Of respondents living elsewhere in Iran, eight out of nine (89%) agreed that they had made friends in Iran, and more than three out of four (77%) had at least some friends in the neighborhood. The men had more friends than the women had. Fewer than half (46%) of the respondents who were living elsewhere in Iran had Iranian friends in their neighborhoods. The Afghans living outside the guest settlements were much more likely to have Iranian friends than were those inside the guest settlements. Nevertheless, few Afghans had Iranian friends due to limited positive social relationships between the Afghan respondents and the surrounding Iranians. Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi (2015) indicated that approximately one-third of Afghan immigrants had adapted to Iran and that another third had separated into their own ethnic group. In general, there were no

differences between men and women or between age groups regarding friends in the neighborhood (Table 8). Furthermore, four out of five (81%) respondents in areas other than guest settlements were in contact with Afghan people elsewhere in Iran. This share was slightly higher than for the respondents in guest settlements, indicating that Afghans who do not live in guest settlements have slightly more intensive social networks than those who do.

In guest settlements, nearly three out of five (58%) respondents stated that they were satisfied with their current neighborhood. Men were slightly more satisfied than women were (Table 9). In general, in guest settlements, the satisfaction with the neighborhood was higher than that with the current accommodations. In the interviews, it became evident that the social networks inside the guest settlements were dense. All respondents were aware of everyone in the settlement—whether they liked that or not. This also created a feeling of security inside the guest settlements. The inhabitants under 30 years old were the most dissatisfied with their current guest-settlement neighborhoods, and men were slightly more dissatisfied than women were. Those who were dissatisfied were also more interested in migrating to Europe and had felt misbehavior by Iranians. Katouli et al. (2016) found that Afghan refugee youths in one of the refugee guest settlements that we studied had significantly higher scores for hopelessness and significantly lower scores for self-efficacy when compared to Iranian native youths.

The respondents living elsewhere in Iran were more often (75%) satisfied with their current neighborhood than were those in guest settlements. The men were slightly more satisfied than the women were (Table 9). Nevertheless, there was a strong variation among the respondents; some were fully satisfied, but a few were not at all satisfied with their current neighborhood. Some were so intensively engaged with their work that they did not have any time to consider their neighborhood. Nevertheless, there were only a few living outside the guest settlements who were most dissatisfied with their current neighborhood.

Table 9. Respondents' satisfaction with current neighborhood.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Agree	62	310	54	310	76	310	74	310	75	310	72	310
Don't know	28	155	30	155	17	155	23	155	19	155	18	155
Disagree	10	69	16	69	7	69	3	69	6	69	6	69
Total	100	534	100	534	100	534	100	534	100	534	100	534

Afghans in Iran engage with many activities in their everyday lives (Table 10). However, these activities depend on each individual's character and general life conditions, such as gender, age, employment, living place, identification card and work permission.

There were substantial differences in everyday activities between the male and female respondents. Men were much more often engaged in paid employment and activities outside of the immediate home environment, including attendance at religious services. Women were substantially more engaged with children and the home. This reflects the prevailing cultural and societal tradition among Afghans even though, in Iran, the Afghan women are more oriented toward work and society than they were in Afghanistan (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008; Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2015). In Iran, Afghan women have often overcome some of their traditional gender-related challenges (Human Rights Watch 2013). In general, older adults were more intensively engaged with religious practices than were those of the younger generations.

The largest differences between the guest-settlement respondents and those from elsewhere in Iran were that the respondents in the guest settlements used most of their time in a normal day housekeeping or working and (to a lesser extent) studying, entertaining or engaging in religious activities. The respondents elsewhere in Iran regularly spent much more time working, entertaining and engaging in religious activities and spent less time housekeeping. Surfing the Internet was a common everyday activity among 10% of respondents who lived outside the guest settlements but was not common among those living inside those settlements (Table 10).

Table 10. Respondents' everyday activities.

Guest settlements	%	Other areas	%
Housekeeping	39	Working	62
Working	36	Entertaining (TV, book, etc.)	31
Studying	12	Housekeeping	30
Entertaining (TV, book, etc.)	12	Religious activities	24
Religious activities	11	Socializing	13
Parenting	10	Surfing the Internet	10
Socializing	7	Parenting	4

% of respondents mentioning the activity

The respondents also listed the best and worst aspects of their lives in Iran. These were connected to how Afghans in general, and the individual respondent in particular, felt about Iran. The respondents' living places, neighborhoods, jobs and social networks were also part of these aspects. As has often been mentioned, despite decades in Iran, most Afghans, especially those of the first generation, live rather separately from Iranians (see Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2016).

The aspects of their lives in Iran that respondents from the guest settlements mentioned most frequently as being the best were safety and security. These Afghans had escaped from Afghanistan to Iran, thus becoming refugees to whom Iran provided safety and security. One out of four (26%) respondents appreciat-

ed having a common religion, and one in eight (13%) appreciated the opportunity to go on pilgrimages to holy places in Iran. When listing the worst aspects of their lives in Iran, the most commonly mentioned aspects (each cited by about one out of five respondents) were guest settlements, misbehavior by native population and racism, and limitations and restrictions for Afghans (Table 11; Table 12). Many respondents perceived negative aspects related to their background as Afghans. Among the respondents living elsewhere in Iran, a majority (52%) emphasized safety and security as the best aspect of living in Iran. Work was the second-most mentioned best aspect, and family was third. The most commonly mentioned worst aspect of their lives in Iran were misbehavior by native population and racism, mentioned by one out of four (25%) respondents, followed by their immigrant or refugee status and the restrictions on Afghans (Table 11; Table 12). Many respondents who were not living in refugee guest settlements also experienced negative aspects originating from their Afghan background. The best and worst aspects are thus both often related to individual circumstances as well as to broader issues and Iranian society. In addition, almost all (94%) respondents agreed that they needed more money to improve their current situation.

Table 11. Best of respondents' life in Iran.

Guest settlements	%	Other areas	%
Safety and security	44	Safety and security	52
Common religion	26	Work	17
Pilgrimage to holy places	13	Family	14
City	11	Common religion	10
Family	9	Good treatment	9
Common language	7	Common language	7
Education	7	Access to facilities	7

% of respondents mentioning the aspect

Table 12. Worst of respondents' life in Iran.

Guest settlements	%	Other areas	%
Camps and guest settlements	21	Unfair behavior and racism	25
Unfair behavior and racism	21	Being an immigrant/refugee	17
Restrictions for Afghans	20	Restrictions for Afghans	17
Being an Afghan	16	Being an Afghan	12
Financial situation	14	Hard working conditions	12
Unemployment	11	Unemployment	11
Being an immigrant/refugee	11	Lack of official papers	11

% of respondents mentioning the aspect

Among Afghans, satisfaction and both good and less-good aspects of Iran influence on how they see the future. The youngest and oldest respondents saw the future more often positively than did the middle-aged respondents. In gen-

eral, there were no major differences between men and women. However, in general, slightly more of the respondents living elsewhere in Iran saw the future positively (66%) than did the respondents in guest settlements (60%), and slightly more respondents in guest settlements (21% vs. 19%) saw the future negatively (Table 13).

Table 13. Respondents seeing the future positively.

	Guest settlements			Other areas				Total		
	man	woman	all	man	woman	all		man	woman	all
	%	%	% N	%	%	% N		%	%	% N
Agree	59	62	60 310	62	73	66 63		60	63	61 373
Don't know	22	19	21 107	17	7	13 13		21	18	20 120
Disagree	19	19	19 98	21	20	21 20		19	19	19 118
Total	100	100	100 515	100	100	100 96		100	100	100 611

3.3. Migration

There are approximately 3 million Afghans in Iran. Afghans may return to Afghanistan voluntarily or via deportation. They may also move abroad elsewhere, mainly to Western countries such as Australia, Canada and nations in the European Union, but also to Pakistan and other nearby countries. They may move inside Iran except to the NGAs. They also may opt to stay where they are. Not all Afghans migrate in the same way.

In addition, there is a continuous flow of Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan and back. These are sometimes the same people, but at other times, they are new people coming into Iran (see also Monsutti 2008). Migration in search of a livelihood is the primary reason for Afghans' migration to cities in Afghanistan or to neighboring countries. This migration occurs through rural-urban migration within Afghanistan or through circular migration, as Afghans cross into Pakistan and/or Iran. Afghans use their social networks to find low-skilled work in cities or neighboring countries (Mirlofti & Jahantigh 2016). The migration patterns involving Iran are a complex issue of local and national importance. Individual, familial, social and political factors all matter.

As in all migration patterns, some factors drive Afghans from their living places in Iran. However, some factors related to other potential migration destinations and to Iran attract Afghans. These push and pull factors change over time and vary by region, and they differ depending on the Afghans' backgrounds and experiences. Furthermore, as Afghans are already in a country other than their native country, several regulations affect their formal and informal migration. As noted above, there are many NGAs where Afghans are not allowed to live. In addition, the repatriation programs mean that the authorities regulate the migration of Afghans back to Afghanistan. In some years, hundreds of thou-

sands of Afghans have been transferred from Iran back to Afghanistan (Monsutti 2008; Christensen 2016).

According to traditional migration theories, individual migration decisions are based on migrant networks; families' migration norms; migrants' gender roles, expectations and values; and satisfaction regarding the living place. Furthermore, behavioral issues; earlier experiences; and resources such as money, work and policies matter as well (De Jong et al. 1981; Massey et al. 1993). Afghans are a noteworthy group in this regard, as approximately three out of four have experienced some form of displacement during their lifetimes (International Organization of Migration 2016b).

In our survey, all respondents considered themselves of Afghan origin even though more than two out of three respondents had lived in Iran for over three decades or were not even born in Afghanistan. Therefore, the feeling of being an Afghan was not primarily related to the time spent in Iran. Of the respondents in guest settlements, very few (4%) had arrived since 2002, when the arrival and residence permissions began to be more strictly regulated. Therefore, almost all have an indefinite right to stay in Iran by prolonging their short-term resident permits each year, at least as long as this policy does not change. The respondents in the guest settlements arrived in Iran earlier than did the respondents living elsewhere in Iran, of whom roughly two out of five had arrived after 2002 (Table 14).

Table 14. Respondents' time of migration to Iran.

	Guest settlements		Other areas		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Until 1980	7	18	5	3	7	21
1980–1989	69	169	26	16	60	185
1990–1999	17	42	23	14	18	56
2000–2009	7	16	18	11	9	27
2010 and later	0	1	28	17	6	18
Total	100	246	100	61	100	307

3.3.1. Return migration to Afghanistan

The return migration of Afghans from Iran has been a common topic of study for scholars and organizations recently. However, these studies have focused on the experiences of returnees in Afghanistan and therefore fall outside the scope of this research report (see, e.g., Morrison-Métois 2017; Majidi 2018).

The issue of the Afghan refugees' and irregular migrants' migration to and within Iran is complex. In an earlier study, Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2015) concluded that about one-third (35%) of Afghans living in Iran do not intend to return to Afghanistan or otherwise migrate away from Iran (see also Abbasi-Shavazi et al.

2005). However, that study included Afghans living in Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and Qom, so its results may be different from those of our survey, which did not focus on those cities. With regard to the respondents' potential migration out of Iran, one out of four (24%) did not think that they could freely choose where to go, but over half (53%) thought that they were free to choose their destination.

The Afghan refugees' desires and plans to return to Afghanistan varied (Table 15; Table 16). Iran's official national policy is to support the return of Afghans to Afghanistan. In addition, international programs support the return of Afghan refugees from Iran to Afghanistan and their reintegration there (International Organization of Migration 2016a). However, in the recent years, this assisted organized return has taken place only very slowly (UNHCR 2017c). Compared to the total population of Afghans in Iran, very few have utilized this official returning system.

Nearly two out of five respondents (41%) hoped to return to Afghanistan. Almost half of men (46%) and one-third of women (34%) wished to return. Slightly more respondents from guest settlements (32%) wanted to return, when compared to those living elsewhere in Iran (30%). Six out of seven (86%) among those who wanted to return missed the landscape of their former home region.

However, asking in an open question what country the respondent prefer the most, one out of six (16%) mentioned Afghanistan. There are more Afghan respondents who would like go back to Afghanistan than those Afghans who actually prefer Afghanistan among all countries. Over two out of five (43%) respondents disagreed with the statement that they would like to return to Afghanistan (Table 15). There are more pushing than pulling factors to return to Afghanistan.

Over two out of three (71%) of younger Afghans, e.g. those between 15 and 30 years old, prefer other countries than Afghanistan and Iran. Very seldom they want to move to Afghanistan. As the interviews revealed, many younger respondents had never been in Afghanistan or had left Afghanistan at such a young age that they did not have any direct experiences of it. For them, Afghanistan had existed mostly through the narratives of their parents and other older relatives. In recent years, they received additional information through the Internet and social media. Therefore, although most young respondents considered themselves culturally Afghans, or Afghans in Iran, for them, Afghanistan was a country they did not know and was more foreign than Iran, where they had lived for most or all of their lives

Kemal (2010) and Geller & Latek (2014) have observed how, among the Afghan youth in Iran, a potential visit to Afghanistan is complex and difficult. Furthermore, McMichael et al. (2017) argued that, although, for young refugees, such visits would provide a valued opportunity to negotiate and develop their homeland connections, they would not necessarily create an unambiguous feeling of

homecoming or a sense of belonging to the former homeland. Therefore, a visit to Afghanistan would not necessarily lead to a wish to resettle there permanently.

For questions more precisely about the respondents' plans to return, the answers confirmed the Afghans' general reluctance to return to Afghanistan. Nearly one out of three (31%) respondents planned to move to Afghanistan. In addition, about one out of five (22%) considered migrating back to Afghanistan a possibility. However, according to our interviews, it was very rare for a resident of a guest settlement to have visited Afghanistan, at least in recent years. Nearly half (47%) of the respondents did not plan to move back to Afghanistan.

Slightly more respondents from guest settlements (32%) than those living elsewhere in Iran (30%) were planning to return. Slightly more women (33%) than men (30%) were planning to return. Women were equally likely to hope to return and actually plan to return (34% vs. 33%, respectively), whereas more men hoped to return than planned to return (36% vs. 30%). This is interesting with regard to the patriarchal Afghan culture in which men are expected to make the most important decisions in each family.

Of Afghans who both would like to and actually plan to migrate back to Afghanistan instead of to other countries, two out of three (66%) originated from villages, and practically none (2%) had a university degree. Furthermore, nearly two out of three (65%) felt that they had not learned anything useful in Iran, even though three out of four (76%) had lived in Iran for over 20 years. Thus, certain factors were pushing respondents to move out of Iran even if there were not necessarily many factors pulling them toward Afghanistan. Those who did not plan to return to Afghanistan were typically over 30 years old and residents of guest settlements; they typically had family members in Iran and had arrived in Iran more than 10 years ago. The oldest man in each family had the most substantial impact on migration-related decisions. The younger generation had to take this into account when considering a return to Afghanistan.

Table 15. Respondents liking to return to Afghanistan.

respondent	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	Don't Agree		Dis-know	Dis-agree	Don't Agree		Dis-know	Dis-agree	Don't Agree		Dis-know	Dis-agree
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
15–18 years	42	5	33	68	17	17	66	12	33	22	45	80
19–29 years	36	15	49	152	54	14	32	40	42	14	44	192
30–49 years	28	20	52	206	17	35	48	30	26	22	52	36
50–64 years	33	22	45	61	9	46	45	10	29	26	45	71
65+ years	33	34	33	30	100	0	0	1	36	32	32	31
Total	32	20	48	517	30	26	44	93	31	22	47	610

Table 16. Respondents with plans to return to Afghanistan.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
Yes	28	36	31	88	35	13	30	19	30	33	31	107
Maybe	22	19	21	58	31	13	26	17	24	19	22	75
No	50	45	48	133	34	74	44	28	46	48	47	161
Total	100	100	100	279	100	100	100	64	100	100	100	343

3.3.2. Migration of Afghans to abroad elsewhere than Afghanistan

Some Afghans in Iran want to migrate to foreign countries other than Afghanistan. In fact, Afghans are one of the most globally dispersed nationalities. Afghan refugees are found almost everywhere in the world, especially in Western countries in recent years (Morrison-Métois 2017). In addition, since the massive 2015 asylum migration to the European Union, Afghans' migration experiences in their journey to Europe have been addressed in many studies (see, e.g., International Organization of Migration 2016b; Dimitriadi 2018). However, these studies have not specifically discussed the migration wishes and intentions of Afghans in Iran.

With regard to potential migration abroad, almost none of the respondents had ever visited countries other than Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, very few had any direct experience regarding potential migration-destination countries such as Australia, Canada or the European Union nations. However, some respondents had relatives, friends or acquaintances living in those countries. Some of these people previously left Iran through legal routes facilitated by the UNHCR and various national resettlement agreements. Others left Iran illegally, especially in 2015, when the European Union received a very large number of asylum seekers. People of Afghan origin were at that time the second-largest group of asylum seekers in the European Union (Morrison-Métois 2017, 1). Very few of those who left for the European Union have returned to Iran; however, some did return for various reasons (see also McMichael et al. 2017). This indicates the processual and cyclical character of contemporary migration, which exists on a continuum between voluntary and forced migration (Erdal & Oeppen 2018).

Of the respondents, three out of five (59%) wished to leave Iran but not return to Afghanistan. A substantially higher proportion (63%) of guest-settlement respondents than those living elsewhere in Iran (37%) wanted to do so. By age group, the desire to move to another foreign country was highest among the youngest group (15–29 years old), of whom nearly half (48%) wanted to move abroad but not to Afghanistan. Every second (49%) responded young Afghan indicated that his/her preferred country is in the European Union. The most well-educated Afghans were very motivated to move abroad; over four out of five (82%) of respondents with university degrees wanted to move outside Iran and Afghanistan, mostly to Europe.

Work is a major motivator for Afghans moving to Europe. Of the respondents who planned to migrate to the European Union, almost all (92%) hoped to work in Europe. The main goals for such work were to do or learn something new (58%), to earn money (42%) and to continue the career one has in Iran (18%); other reasons (15%) included to start one's own business or to improve one's livelihood.

In an open-ended question, we asked the respondents where they would like to be 3 years from the time of the survey (i.e., in 2020). Of all the respondents, almost three out of five (57%) mentioned a locality or country outside of Iran. Of those who wanted to move abroad but not to Afghanistan, one in three (34%) wanted to move to Europe, one out of seven (15%) sought to move to Australia, a few (5%) desired to go to North America and one out of nine (11%) targeted another location abroad. These results are similar to those on an earlier study in which Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2015) found that two in five (39%) Afghans in Iran have considered migration to Europe and that almost a fourth (23%) have considered migration to Australia. However, that study only included Afghans from major cities: Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and Qom.

We also asked specifically if the respondents were planning to move to the European Union. One out of three (33%) answered yes, one out of five (19%) said maybe, and nearly half (48%) said no. Slightly more male (36%) than female (31%) respondents were planning to move to the European Union. In guest settlements, men were more likely to consider migrating (61% answering yes or maybe) than women were (51% answering yes or maybe) (Table 17). A traditional gender issue might apply here, as in Afghan families, the men often bear the main responsibility for major decisions such as migration to Europe. In general, the male respondents from the guest settlements were the most eager to move abroad, and the female respondents living elsewhere in Iran were the least eager to do so. Of all respondents, those younger than 30 years old were the most likely to be planning to move to the European Union. The countries that were most often mentioned were Germany, Australia, Finland and Sweden. The cities that were most often mentioned were Berlin, Paris, London, Stockholm and Vienna. In 2015, Afghans were the second-largest group coming to Europe as asylum seekers. In 13 of the 28 European Union countries, including in Germany, Finland and Sweden, Afghans were among the three largest groups to arrive (Eurostat 2016).

Table 17. Respondents with plans to move to the European Union.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
Yes	40	33	36	192	17	17	17	16	35	31	33	208
Maybe	21	18	20	103	17	7	14	13	20	17	19	116
No	39	49	44	232	66	76	69	65	45	52	48	297
Total	100	100	100	527	100	100	100	94	100	100	100	621

We asked a separate question regarding whether the respondent would seek a residence permit in Finland. In that country, Afghans make up the second-largest refugee community; in 2015, they were the second-largest group of asylum seekers to arrive (Jauhiainen 2017a). Two out of five (39%) respondents answered yes to this question, one out of three (34%) said maybe, and more than one out of five (22%) said no; a few (5%) did not answer.

The typical person who responded in the affirmative was young (less than 30 years old), male and living in a guest settlement; two-thirds did not have relatives in Iran. Of those who answered that they would potentially seek residence permission in Finland, six out of seven (86%) were hoping to work in Europe. In addition, half (49%) had at least some command of English, and one out of nine (11%) had studied at the university level in Iran. More than one out of four (27%) used the Internet on a daily basis, and nearly half (46%) did so at least weekly. Half (50%) searched the Internet for information about routes to reach Europe or about places to live there. However, one out of three (34%) did not use the Internet. Those who did not consider seeking a residence permit in Finland were generally adults (over 30 years old) with spouses, children and other relatives in Iran (Table 18).

The interviews revealed that some residents in the guest settlements had family members or friends living in Finland. Some were even in contact with these residents of Finland through social media. The Finnish authorities had selected many of the Afghans currently in Finland through the resettlement program, as per the quota of refugees that Finland takes in annually. However, Finland recently withdrew from this Afghan resettlement program.

Table 18. Finland is a country in which the respondent might to seek a resident permit.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	yes	maybe	no	N	yes	maybe	no	N	yes	maybe	no	N
respondent	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
15–18 years	37	46	17	70	9	27	64	11	33	43	24	81
19–29 years	50	35	15	151	30	30	40	40	46	34	20	191
30–49 years	49	35	16	203	15	41	44	32	44	36	20	235
50–64 years	38	30	32	60	20	30	50	10	36	30	34	70
65- years	21	38	41	29	0	0	100	1	20	37	43	30
Total	45	36	19	513	21	33	46	94	41	35	24	607

3.3.3. Migration of Afghans inside Iran

As mentioned before, the migration patterns of Afghans inside Iran are of local and national importance, and they are also a complex issue. Four major groups of Afghans exist in Iran. In addition, 30,000–50,000 Afghan refugees live in guest settlements in Iran, and 900,000–950,000 Afghan refugees live in Iran outside of guest settlements. Their number does not change much from year to year. In addition, about 2 million Afghans are without proper definite legal status in

Iran and are not considered refugees. Their number changes from year to year depending on the efficiency of the repatriation programs, the voluntary return of Afghans and the legal immigration of Afghans to Iran. Furthermore, some irregular Afghans are illegally in Iran, but their number is difficult to estimate.

With regard to general migration trends in Iran, Mahmoudian and Ghassemi-Ardahaee (2014, 31, 40) indicate how in Iran, men are more prone to migrate, and those most keen on migrating within Iran are 20–29 years old. They generally seek employment and education opportunities. Meanwhile, people under 15 and above 50, and especially those over 60 years old, are less mobile than average. Normally, these groups' migration is tied to other people, such as family members. In Iran, tied migration, for example, a wife or family moving due to husband's migration, is the major source of all migration, but it decreases along the older age cohorts. On the contrary, securing better housing as the reason to migrate increases with the age of the migrant. It is the most important migration motivation for people above 60 years.

The migration of Afghans living in guest settlements is strongly regulated. For example, in some guest settlements they need permission to move in or out. In other guest settlement, the inhabitants can leave the settlement freely but they need permission if they intend to leave the province or sometimes the county. Many of those currently living in guest settlements moved there when it became obligatory for them. According to the interviews, not all were satisfied when they had to move in. Especially those who had to move in rather recently, for example, fewer than 10 years ago, often expressed dissatisfaction. Their everyday lives and routines were changed, and for many, their employment and career opportunities narrowed. Furthermore, some were concerned about the difficulty with moving out of guest settlements. However, in total, the number of Afghans living in guest settlements is only 2–3% of all Afghans in Iran. Therefore, societally, their migration impact is mostly of local concern and in the vicinity of guest settlements.

However, more than 3 million other Afghans are present in Iran. The number depends on how actively Afghans return – voluntarily or forced – from Iran to Afghanistan and how many Afghans move—legally or illegally—to Iran as mentioned above. How and where they migrate is obviously a local issue as well, but it is also a substantial national and even international issue. Policies exist for directing the migration of Afghan refugees and other Afghans who are legally in Iran. Namely, the authorities have designed NGAs—places in Iran where Afghans cannot live in (see Figure 4). Furthermore, general national policies help to direct the population's migration and the development of urban and rural areas.

Nevertheless, limited possibilities exist for directing the migration of irregular Afghans who are illegally in Iran. Sometimes their presence is toler-

ated. For example, seasonal workers from Afghanistan migrate for weeks to months to specific sites in Iran at which their workforce is demanded. Examples of these can be found in many areas of Iran, for example, during harvesting seasons in agriculture and in areas where one needs a workforce in heavy industry and construction, for example. Illegal Afghans can be found in large cities, smaller towns and even villages, as we also observed during our field research.

Of all respondents, more than two out of five (42%) said that they were most likely to live the rest of their lives in Iran. This may mean a wish to live in Iran or a realistic view that Iran will be the country where they will live—even if they one day can move back to Afghanistan or to other countries abroad. Those living in guest settlements agreed less often (40%) than did those living elsewhere (54%) that they would live the rest of their lives in Iran (Table 19). Afghans' desire to stay in Iran for the rest of their lives was higher when they were satisfied with their current accommodations and social networks and if they had good relations with their neighbors in Iran. Of those who thought they would live the rest of their lives in Iran, more than three out of five (63%) were older than 30. Of Afghan guest-settlement respondents between 15 and 49 years old, one out of three (34%) planned to live the rest of their lives in Iran; most (63%) of those were 50 years or older. Of respondents between 15 and 49 years old who were living elsewhere in Iran, half (49%) said they would live the rest of their lives in Iran, almost all (91%) of whom were older than 50.

Table 19. Respondents agreeing to most likely live in Iran for the rest of life.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	man		woman		man		woman		man		woman	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Agree	40	201	40	201	56	56	52	51	43	41	42	252
Don't know	32	177	38	177	17	17	34	21	29	38	33	198
Disagree	28	128	22	128	27	27	14	21	28	21	25	149
Total	100	506	100	506	100	100	100	93	100	100	100	599

The number of Afghans who did not plan to return to Afghanistan or who did not want to migrate abroad was rather small. Of all of the respondents, only one out of ten (10%) expressed no desire to move abroad and simultaneously did not plan to return to Afghanistan. Two clear groups were keen on staying in Iran. One group consists of those who were 50–64 years old, who came to Iran more than 20 years ago from Afghan villages, and who had family members in Iran. These people had settled their lives firmly in Iran. Another group consists of younger Afghans who lived in guest settlements with their spouses and children. Most originated from cities and had spent 10–20 years in Iran. For many of them, their family-oriented lives impeded their migration.

Having a clear desire to stay in Iran did not mean that these Afghans would not move inside Iran. In fact, only a few (8%) of the respondents preferred to remain where they currently live. In our survey, we asked about the migration destinations in Iran in four ways.

First, the respondents indicated their most-preferred regions, cities or places. For the provinces in Iran, approximately two out of five (42%) respondents mentioned Razavi Khorasan, followed by Tehran (17%), Khuzestan (14%), Kerman (11%) and Isfahan (7%). For the cities in Iran, approximately one out of three (36%) mentioned Mashhad, followed by Tehran (16%), Isfahan (6%), Ahvaz (6%) and Rafsanjan (5%). The respondents living in guest settlements mentioned Mashhad (36%) most often, followed by Tehran (16%), Isfahan (6%) and Ahvaz (6%), and the respondents from elsewhere mentioned Mashhad (38%) most often, followed by Tehran (14%).

Of the respondents living in Razavi Khorasan province, three out of four (74%) mentioned this as their most-preferred place. Of the respondents living in Kerman province, about one out of four (23%) mentioned this as their most-preferred place. Of the respondents living in Khuzestan province, about half (52%) mentioned this as their most-preferred place. In the interviews, many respondents mentioned religious reasons for their preference for Mashhad or Qom over other places in Iran. In addition, Glazebrook and Abbasi-Shavazi (2007) noticed how Afghans, especially Hazara, were keen on staying in Mashhad, which allowed them to visit and pay tribute to the Imam Reza there. For some respondents, a preferred place in Iran is an abstraction because, in reality, due to financial, family or other constraints they cannot live there, and many did not actually know what it would be like to live there.

One out of three (34%) respondents mentioned as their most-preferred places those that they had directly experienced – places where they had lived or worked. Among the respondents, more than one out of four (28%) had lived their entire lives in Iran, in the same place where they were located at the time of the survey; three out of five (61%) had lived in one or two places aside from their current place; and one out of nine (11%) had lived in more than two other places.

Second, we asked in an open question about where the respondents would like to be in three years from now (i.e., in 2020). This was a question about their near-term futures. Of all Afghans who responded to this question, approximately one out of three (32%) mentioned a locality in Iran. Their most-desired destination was Mashhad for one out of three (33%) respondents. It has to be taken into account that our respondents' home provinces are Razavi Khorasan (27%), Kerman (48%) and Khuzestan (25%) provinces. The most-desired destinations of the respondents from Razavi Khorasan province are Mashhad (70%) and Kalzarkesh (11%). The most-desired destinations of the respondents from Kerman province are Rafsanjan (29%), Bardsir (21%) and Mashhad (20%). Meanwhile, the most-de-

sired destinations of the respondents from Khuzestan province are Tehran (39%) and Dezful (19%). For some, these locations are where they would like to be in three years, but they will not take any steps to realize these wishes. Others may take action to make these dreams a reality in the next several years.

Third, we listed a number of large and other Iranian cities and asked in which of them the respondent would like to live (Table 20). The most-desired cities for living (answering “yes” to the question) are Mashhad (73%), Tehran (45%) and Shiraz (40%), and if “maybe” answers are also considered, then these cities further include Mashhad (78%), Tehran (56%) and Shiraz (47%). The cities mentioned most often as places that the respondents would not like to live (answer “no”) are Birjand (65%), Tabriz (61%) and Kerman (58%) (Table 18). Similarly, as mentioned above, the respondents’ current provinces impacted the answers. The respondents mentioned more often cities that are in the same province. In addition, many respondents were clear that they do not wish to live in certain places. Many Afghans want to live in certain places in Iran, not just anywhere in Iran.

Table 20. Respondents’ wishes to live in selected cities in Iran.

	Guest settlements					Other areas					Total				
	yes	maybe	no	dk	N	yes	maybe	no	dk	N	yes	maybe	no	dk	N
Tehran	45	12	38	5	501	46	3	41	10	90	45	11	38	6	591
Mashhad	73	4	21	2	513	77	6	9	8	92	73	5	19	3	605
Isfahan	32	13	46	9	492	30	2	49	19	90	32	11	47	10	582
Tabriz	10	12	62	16	492	9	1	58	32	91	10	10	61	19	583
Karaj	18	13	54	15	488	10	1	58	31	90	17	11	54	18	578
Shiraz	42	8	41	9	497	31	1	43	25	90	40	7	41	12	587
Kerman	22	9	60	9	493	31	1	49	19	91	24	8	58	10	584
Ahvaz	28	11	46	15	490	10	1	57	32	91	25	9	48	18	581
Semnan	23	9	55	13	498	7	2	59	32	91	20	8	56	16	589
Birjand	8	7	66	19	490	10	2	59	29	91	8	7	65	20	581
Other	32	0	0	0	158	20	0	0	0	25	30	0	0	0	183

Other = Qom; dk = don't know

Fourth, we asked separately if the respondent would like to move to the capital Tehran. In many countries, the capital is the place that attracts the most immigrants. Of all of the respondents, two out of five (41%) agreed that they would like to move to Tehran, whereas almost half (48%) disagreed. Younger (under 30 years old) would like to move to Tehran slightly more than other age groups would. Furthermore, more people from guest settlements would like to move to Tehran compared with those living elsewhere in Iran (Table 21). It is rather easy to express that one would like to move to Tehran even if this is not a realistic option. The desire to move to the national capital does not necessarily mean a person would ever move there.

Table 21. Respondents wishing to move to Tehran.

respondent	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	don't agree		dis-know	dis-agree	don't agree		dis-know	dis-agree	don't agree		dis-know	dis-agree
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
15–18 years	38	14	48	69	25	08	67	11	36	13	51	81
19–29 years	44	14	42	153	45	02	53	40	45	11	44	193
30–49 years	39	12	49	203	28	09	63	32	37	12	51	235
50–64 years	53	12	35	60	30	10	60	10	50	11	39	70
65- years	37	10	53	30	0	0	100	1	35	10	55	31
Total	42	13	45	515	34	06	60	95	41	11	48	610

3.4. Employment

Employment among Afghans in Iran varies greatly. Many are without employment. In addition, some have part-time jobs, seasonal jobs or irregular working periods. In addition, some Afghans work regularly, for example, five days a week. In addition, some Afghans, often irregular ones, work seven days a week for 10–14 hours every day. In general, both the national and local authorities in Iran and the private sector recognize the significance of the Afghan workforce.

The reasons for being less engaged with employment vary: some are too old or too young to work, and others have health problems or stay home as housewives. Many irregular migrants do not have formal permission to work, and the permission for regular Afghans to work covers only certain professions. Furthermore, Afghans' access to public sector employment in Iran is limited. As mentioned, Iran has regulated refugees' right to employment by making reservations to the Article 17 (employment) of the 1951 Convention.

Some Afghans were employed in Afghanistan before leaving the country. Most often they worked in simple agricultural jobs or construction. However, many came to Iran more than two decades ago, so they have not been employed in Afghanistan for a rather long time. Nevertheless, the interviews revealed that some Afghans continued to work in Iran in similar jobs to the ones they had had in Afghanistan, for example, in agriculture and low-skilled jobs. Of the 9% of the respondents who came to Iran after 2002, 37% were employed in Afghanistan prior to leaving there, 4% were seeking jobs there, 19% were at home as housewives, 15% were self-employed, 7% were students and 18% others.

Of the respondents, one out of three (35%) have worked while in Iran: three out of four (74%) of men and one out of four (26%) women living in guest settlements, and almost all (92%) men and almost none (8%) women living elsewhere in Iran. Six out of seven (87%) respondents who had been employed in Afghanistan had also worked later in Iran.

In our sample, of the respondents between 15–70 years of age, over half (54%) had some kind of employment in autumn 2017. Almost every second (48%) of

those living in guest settlements were employed, and five out of six (83%) of those living elsewhere in Iran. The most common places to work are generally larger settlements, such as Mashhad, or smaller towns and agricultural sites near their current living places.

Of all employed, one out of ten (10%) were employed in enterprises, one out of four (21%) were self-employed with their own businesses, one out of four (25%) had mixed employment and self-employment and two out of five (44%) had other types of employment. Afghan women participate in employment much less: one out of five (20%) Afghan women had a job, but two out of three (64%) Afghan men worked in the autumn 2017.

In general, a huge gender bias can be found in the labor force participation rate among Afghans. In 2006, according to the census, more than nine out of 10 Afghan men ages 25–39 years worked. No major differences were found between the first- and second-generation Afghan men in their employment participation. However, of Afghan women ages 25–39 years, only one out of eight of the second-generation women worked, and one out of 12 of the first-generation women worked. From 50 years onward, the labor force participation rate began to decline among both men and women. However, still, around every one out of two Afghan men older than 65 years worked, and only one out of 20 Afghan women did the same (Hugo, Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2012, 273). Similarly, in our sample, the frequency of working diminished substantially among respondents older than 65 years: only a few (8%) of men and none of women worked at least part-time (Table 22).

Table 22. Respondents' employment in the autumn of 2017.

respondent	Guest settlements			Other areas			Total		
	yes %	no %	N	yes %	no %	N	yes %	no %	N
15–18 years	36	64	72	77	23	13	54	46	85
19–29 years	51	49	157	90	10	40	59	41	197
30–49 years	55	45	217	72	28	15	57	43	249
50–64 years	53	47	66	100	00	11	60	40	77
65- years	10	90	31	0	100	1	09	91	32
Total	48	52	546	83	17	98	54	46	644

Most who are employed work in rather simple low-skilled and hard jobs in construction, agriculture or industry. These are often jobs that the local Iranians do not prefer, at least according to the workers and employers in the interviews. The Afghans who have attended school for more years and who have more than very basic education tend to have better jobs. Besides educational skills, accumulated working experience also matters in the development of their working careers. Among the 6% of the respondents who have studied at the university

level, the most common occupations are in sales (11%), personal care (7%), mining or construction (7%) and elementary jobs (7%).

Six out of seven (85%) male respondents above 30 years old have worked in Iran. The respondents have been most commonly employed in crafts and related trade (21%), elementary jobs (12%), building and related trade (9%), mining or construction (9%) and sales (8%). Some respondents have worked in several occupations, and a few have had two simultaneous jobs in different occupations.

Being active and present in a society and community means that one learns new things that are useful for life. Of the respondents, almost every second (46%) mentioned that they have learned in Iran at least something they consider useful for their futures. The most frequently mentioned issues are working skills for those almost three out of four (73%) who said they have learned useful things in Iran. One out of four (24%) mentioned also practical skills and one out of five (21%) general education or studying topics. The same amount of men and women felt to have learned useful things. Most often they were 19–49 years old, many had started to use the Internet in Iran and almost half (46%) had at least some command of English. However, more than every second (54%) mentioned that they had not learned anything useful in Iran. Four out of five (78%) did not have any command of English and two out of three (69%) did not use the Internet.

For respondents in guest settlements, the common places to work are nearby agricultural fields and towns. Regular unofficial transfer services exist from the main gate of a guest settlement to the working sites and also to those jobs in distant larger cities. Employment can also be found within guest settlements. Most of these jobs are related to the everyday needs of guest settlement inhabitants, such as grocery stores selling daily goods, bakeries selling bread, butchers selling meat and shops selling house maintenance items. Specialized shops are also present, for example, those for selling and repairing electronics, mobile phones and related items. In addition, one can find engineering-related jobs. Common also are jobs that were outsourced from outside to inside guest settlements. These include, for example, the cleaning of saffron to be sold outside as well as the sewing of clothes, bags and souvenirs to be sold outside, even in Tehran. These jobs often employ women living in guest settlements. In general, men and women worked in different working spaces.

Various self-made businesses also exist in which the goods and final products are sold to the purchasers outside of guest settlements. In one guest settlement, the people from outside could come and buy items directly from the shops of the guest settlement. Some employment in guest settlements bring very little money to the employed. Others are economically successful, and the person involved in the business could become wealthy, at least in the local context. The expansion of successful businesses is limited because Afghans have many constraints, for example, limitations in opening bank accounts, getting loans from banks, pos-

sessing vehicles needed for transport, having registered mobile phones or being alone in business as property owners. Such constraints have been recognized in earlier studies as well (Christensen 2016, 13–14). Nevertheless, the national policy supports the idea that Afghan refugees economically self-manage guest settlements. This has increased entrepreneurship and employment in guest settlements, by necessity and voluntarily.

The monthly salary of Afghan respondents who worked varies a lot, and the median is 5,780,000 Iranian Rials (125 EUR) per month. Differences can be found in the salaries. For agricultural work, the salaries are lower than they are in construction. In agriculture, the median salary is 6,940,000 Iranian Rials (150 EUR) per month, in construction 7,770,000 Iranian Rials (168 EUR) per month and in industrial jobs 3,880,000 Iranian Rials (84 EUR) per month. According to the interviews, Afghans are paid substantially less than Iranians are – something that earlier studies have also recognized (see Wikramasegara et al. 2006). Salaries are paid in cash on a daily or weekly basis due to the seasonal and irregular character of the employment.

The respondents mentioned the best and the worst aspects of their current employment (Table 23). Among all respondents, who were working, one out of twelve (8%) did not find anything bad in their current job whereas one out of five (19%) did not find anything good in their current job. Those employed, who mentioned best aspects, mentioned most often income (23%), personal satisfaction with work such as I like my job (15%) and independence in their employment (8%). Those employed, who mentioned worst aspects, mentioned most often hard working conditions (41%), low salary (24%), insecurity on having or not having a job (9%) and health conditions (6%) in their current job.

Table 23. Best and worst in respondents' current work.

Best things in current work	%	Worst things in current work	%
Income	23	Hard working conditions	41
Personal satisfaction	15	Low salary	24
Independence	8	Employment insecurity	9
Helping family	7	Health conditions	6
Easiness of job	7	Mistreatment and bad behavior	5
Being close to my family	6	Delayed salary	2
Social relations	6		

Most respondents who work have Afghans as fellow workers. To have Iranian fellow workers is much less common. The respondents living in guest settlements do not have fellow Iranian workers as often compared with those living elsewhere. Every second (50%) employed from guest settlements does not have Afghan fellow workers. That amount is very small (10%) among those living elsewhere in Iran. Over three out of four (77%) employed from guest settlements

do not have Iranian fellow workers. That amount is substantially smaller (42%) among those living elsewhere in Iran (Table 24). Most often a respondent has Iranian fellow workers, if s/he works in mining, construction, elementary occupations or trading. Very few Iranians work inside guest settlements, for example, mainly managerial staff.

Table 24. Respondents with Afghan and Iranian fellow workers in current work.

	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	Afghan		Iranian		Afghan		Iranian		Afghan		Iranian	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Many	23	92	6	25	35	28	9	7	25	120	7	32
Some	27	110	17	69	55	43	49	39	31	153	22	109
No	50	205	77	308	10	8	42	34	44	213	71	342
Total	100	407	100	402	100	79	100	80	100	486	100	483

Besides having generally lower education and employment skills compared with Iranians, formal legal constraints exist for Afghans who do not hold valid passports, visas and work permits. The laws in Iran prevent that foreigners would be employed in governmental jobs or that they would be land owners. Align with this, Afghans in Iran cannot execute activities requiring official registration with national identification cards or birth certificates. Among these are governmental jobs, buying or selling land, enjoying public health care, opening bank accounts or registering cell phones. An official Afghan refugee can open a bank account in certain bank but such possibility depends also on local decisions and practices. These create obstacles for them to be more engaged in employment and for moving forward with their employment careers.

Nevertheless, Afghans who have moved forward in their employment careers were also interviewed. The interviews revealed that Afghans have become team leaders in construction sites, wholesale mediators for agricultural goods, professionals in restaurants or tailoring, or informal owners of small industries, for example. Often they have employed other Afghans, creating specific employment-related networks among Afghans. Sometimes these networks extend to Afghanistan as well. In addition, interviewed were successful businesspersons outside of guest settlements in many entrepreneurial activities, such as clothing. Many of these Afghans have become wealthy in the local context.

The growing importance of Afghans in the local economy, and their relative economic success have created tensions among some Iranians in some Iranian localities as well. In fact, according Hugo et al. (2013), members of the second generation of Afghans tend to move societally upward if they stay in Iran. In their critical review, Mirlofti and Jahatigh (2016) concluded that Afghan immi-

grants who reside in the eastern-border areas of Iran influence negatively the physical development of their immediate rural environment. However, on the other hand, some local economic activities, such as seasonal jobs in agriculture, basic jobs in the construction sector and hard jobs in selected industries, rely substantially on the Afghan workforce. Therefore, they also have a positive impact on the development of selected areas in Iran.

3.5. Social media

The mobile phone is a common tool for exchanging information among Afghans in Iran. However, it is less common for Afghans to have smartphones with Internet access. Of the Afghan respondents living in guest settlements, approximately half (54%) possessed a mobile phone with Internet access, and this figure is about the same (52%) for those living elsewhere in Iran. Younger respondents were more likely to have mobile phones with Internet access than were older respondents (Table 25). Men (61%) had mobile phones more often than women did (45%). In addition, Iran has restrictions on Afghans' purchasing of mobile telephone SIM cards and their Internet access (Christensen 2016, 13-14).

Table 25. Respondents having own mobile phone with Internet access.

respondent	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	agree	don't agree	know	dis-agree	agree	don't agree	know	dis-agree	agree	don't agree	know	dis-agree
	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	N
15-18 years	64	9	27	70	42	0	58	12	61	7	32	82
19-29 years	69	4	27	153	62	0	38	39	68	3	29	192
30-49 years	53	2	45	201	31	0	69	32	50	1	49	233
50-64 years	27	3	70	60	60	0	40	10	31	3	66	70
65- years	14	3	83	29	0	0	100	1	13	3	84	30
Total	54	4	42	513	48	0	52	94	53	3	44	607

In guest settlements, one out of five (20%) Afghans used the Internet daily and almost two out of five (37%) used it at least weekly. In addition, social media is becoming increasingly common among Afghans. This is not peculiar because social media use has become popular among almost everyone in Iran. This development is common among irregular migrants and refugees in many countries, including Afghan asylum seekers (Jauhiainen 2017b).

Younger Afghans used the Internet and social media more frequently than did older Afghans; this is also a common worldwide trend. In Iran, approximately three out of four respondents in the 15-18 years old (73%) and 19-29 years old (74%) groups used the Internet. About half (48%) of those aged 30-49, one out of seven (15%) aged 50-64, and only a few (4%) of those

aged 65 or older used the Internet. Furthermore, in Iran, Afghan men (57%) more frequently used the Internet than did Afghan women (50%). Nevertheless, Internet and social media usage has grown substantially among Afghan women.

The frequency of Internet use varies greatly (Table 26). In general, younger Afghan respondents used the Internet more often than did older respondents. Of those 19–29 years old, almost all (94%) used it at least several times a week. In addition, young Afghans were more likely to be daily social media users than old Afghans were. However, exceptions do exist: A few Afghans who were 50–64 years old used the Internet almost daily. This was often related to the need for frequent contact with family members or friends living elsewhere. These respondents also included information technology workers who needed social media for professional purposes. Older respondents (those over 65 years old) typically did not use the Internet.

Table 26. Respondents' frequency of the Internet use in Iran.

respondent	Guest settlements					Other areas					Total				
	A	B	C	D	N	A	B	C	D	N	A	B	C	D	N
15–18 years	29	18	32	21	227	21	14	12	53	51	28	17	29	26	278
19–29 years	31	16	33	20	156	23	15	13	49	39	29	16	29	26	195
30–49 years	18	8	24	50	213	13	6	13	68	31	17	8	23	52	244
50–64 years	6	2	8	84	62	0	9	0	91	11	5	3	7	85	73
65+ years	4	0	0	96	25	0	0	0	100	1	0	0	4	96	26
Total	20	11	25	44	529	16	11	11	63	95	20	11	23	46	624

A = daily, B = many times a week, C = less often, D = never

In general, among the respondents, Internet and social media use was less common among those living elsewhere in Iran than among those in guest settlements. There were several reasons for this. Many respondents were irregular migrants with hard jobs and no time or opportunities for Internet or social media use. Moreover, for some, the price of Internet use was not affordable. In guest settlements, technical reasons also exist for the non-use of the Internet—for example, poor network coverage.

Respondents used social media to keep in contact with relatives and friends in Iran, in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in other countries. According to the interviews, Telegram and WhatsApp were the most common programs for social media. Among all respondents, approximately two out of five (44%) agreed that Internet and/or social media used made their lives in Iran easier. Of those who had the opportunity to use the Internet, almost two out of three (64%) agreed on this issue. In general, these respondents tended to be less than 30 years old (Table 27), and five out of six (83%) had mobile phones with access to the Internet.

Table 27. Social media makes respondent's life easier in Iran.

respondent	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	don't agree	know	dis-agree	N	don't agree	know	dis-agree	N	don't agree	know	dis-agree	N
	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
15–18 years	55	19	26	65	33	0	67	12	52	16	32	77
19–29 years	58	16	26	145	46	5	49	39	55	14	31	184
30–49 years	42	18	40	198	28	3	69	32	40	16	44	230
50–64 years	21	18	61	56	40	10	50	10	24	17	59	66
65- years	21	12	67	24	0	0	100	1	20	12	68	25
Total	45	17	38	488	38	4	58	94	44	15	41	582

The use of social media has become extremely important to migrants' aspirations and practices (Dekker & Engbersen 2014), including those of irregular migrants (Jauhiainen 2017b) and less-skilled foreign immigrants. Among Afghans, social media has been used to acquire information about possible destinations. Some have used social media for detailed planning of potential migration routes. Some Afghans have also created or belonged to specific social media groups that discuss various topics, such as employment and migration opportunities. For migration inside Iran, two out of five (41%) respondents with Internet access used it to search for information about where to live in Iran (Table 28).

Social media can provide accurate information, but it is also characterized by disinformation and rumors. International migration and refugee organizations, along with asylum seekers' potential destination countries, such as Finland, have begun to use social media to provide more accurate information about the perils of migration journeys and about realistic opportunities for obtaining residence permits in destination countries.

Table 28. Social media facilitates respondents to where to move in Iran.

respondent	Guest settlements				Other areas				Total			
	don't agree	know	dis-agree	N	don't agree	know	dis-agree	N	don't agree	know	dis-agree	N
	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
15–18 years	48	30	22	69	10	10	80	10	43	28	29	79
19–29 years	52	15	33	151	18	13	69	39	45	14	41	190
30–49 years	44	13	43	202	16	7	77	31	40	12	48	233
50–64 years	29	15	56	61	11	33	56	9	27	17	56	70
65- years	21	10	69	29	0	0	100	1	20	10	70	30
Total	44	16	40	512	15	12	73	90	40	15	45	602

Those who intend to move abroad need updated information about where and when to move. Of the respondents, many had used the Internet when considering their possible outmigration to Europe. Two out of five (41%) respondents had used the Internet to search for information about places where they

could live in Europe. Almost the same number had searched online for about their rights (35%) and about their work opportunities (38%) in Europe. Those who were planning to migrate to Europe appeared to be more active in searching for information about Europe on the Internet.

In addition, slightly over two out of five (42%) respondents had used the Internet to search for information about the current situation in Afghanistan. According to survey, the respondents who most actively used the Internet to learn about the situation in Afghanistan were those who had family members in Iran (97%), those who had arrived in Iran more than 10 years ago (89%) and those who were 19–49 years old (80%). Of those who used the Internet to search for information about Afghanistan, almost half (45%) wanted to return to Afghanistan, and two out of three (65%) wanted to move elsewhere abroad.

4. CONCLUSIONS

More than 3 million Afghans living in Iran have a significant impact on the social and economic development of many cities, towns and rural areas in Iran. The impact of Afghan immigrants on urbanization in Iran is nationally and locally significant both qualitatively and quantitatively. Furthermore, a political dimension must be considered as well. Iran is globally one of the countries with the highest number of refugees and is among the most significant when it comes to the Afghan refugees. The issue of refugees in Iran is also of broader international interest. Many Afghans are present in Iran, and many different Afghans exist. This should be taken into account when designing more specialized policies with regard to the Afghan population in Iran.

The results for this report derive from surveys and interviews in Iran in October 2017. In total, 644 people with Afghan backgrounds from the provinces of Kerman, Khuzestan and Razavi Khorasan responded anonymously to the survey. Of them, 546 (85%) live in the refugee guest settlements of Bani Najjar, Bard-sir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam, and the remaining 98 (15%) live in urban areas and villages in the abovementioned provinces. In addition, 72 Afghan refugees and irregular migrants were interviewed. Interviews were also conducted with 54 stakeholders, such as representatives of the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA in Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan) of the Ministry of Interior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR in Mashhad); public authorities in the districts, municipalities and villages of the study areas; managers and council members in the studied guest settlements; and other public authorities and private sector representatives.

Half (50%) of Afghan respondents in guest settlements said they are fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations, and three out of five (61%) agreed that they have enough toilets, showers, and other related facilities to use. The possibility thus exists to enhance the quality of accommodations in guest settlements. Of the responding Afghans living elsewhere in Iran, nearly all (91%) agreed that they have enough toilets, showers, and other related facilities, for their use, and compared with guest settlement respondents, many more (88%) were satisfied with their accommodations. However, irregular migrants in highly precarious accommodations were dissatisfied.

Hundreds of thousands of legal and illegal Afghan workers are present in Iran. Employment among them varies greatly, but many are without jobs or have part-time, seasonal or irregular jobs. Of the respondents ages 15–70 years, almost two out of three (64%) Afghan men work currently, but far fewer women do: one out of five (20%). The traditional division of labor prevails among many Afghan families, for example, women focus on the family, children and house, and men have paid work elsewhere.

Many Afghans work in hard jobs that Iranians do not prefer. Many rural areas need their labor forces, especially seasonally in agriculture. In towns and cities, the construction sector is dependent on Afghan workers. Among Afghans are specific employment networks that reach many parts of Iran and up to Afghanistan. Some Afghans have progressed substantially in their working careers and have become wealthy. Wealthier Afghans in industry, construction and trade employ other Afghans regularly. In some localities, the job opportunities and career progress of Afghans have created among local unemployed Iranians unnecessary criticism toward Afghans.

Of the Afghan respondents, slightly over two out of five (42%) think they will live the rest of their lives in Iran. In general, Afghans in guest settlements think less often that they will live the rest of their lives in Iran. It is not always their desire, but it is a realistic idea about their futures. Afghans who plan to stay the rest of their lives in Iran are usually 50–64 years old and usually came to Iran more than 20 years ago from the Afghan countryside. These individuals also currently have family and relatives in Iran. Another group with similar thoughts consists of younger Afghans who originate more often from towns or cities in Afghanistan, have spent 10–20 years in Iran and live in guest settlements with their spouses and children. The desire of Afghans to stay in Iran for the rest of their lives increases if one is satisfied with the current accommodations and social networks and has good relations with one's neighbors.

The potential exists for a large-scale migration of Afghans from the less central areas of Kerman, Khuzestan and Razavi Khorasan provinces to Mashhad and Tehran. Less than one out of 10 (8%) of the respondents mentioned their current living places as their preferred places in which to live. Of the respondents who plan to live the rest of their lives in Iran, four out of five (79%) would like to live in Mashhad. The next most popular places are Tehran (46%) and Shiraz (42%). Older Afghans do not want to migrate much, but younger ones are eager to move for employment or religious reasons.

Of the respondents, one out of three (34%) would like to move to Europe and one out of five (20% together) to Australia or North America. Every second (48%) younger Afghan wants to move abroad elsewhere than Afghanistan. The more young an Afghan in Iran is, the more s/he would like to migrate abroad. However, very few younger Afghans want to migrate to Afghanistan that is perceived insecure (see also Rodriguez & Monsutti 2017; Majidi 2018). Instead, they prefer to live in Iran in which they have settled their life or to migrate to the Western countries.

Two out of five (41%) respondents agreed that they would like to go back to Afghanistan. Of men, almost every second and of women every third would like to return. However, only one out of six (16%) mentioned Afghanistan as their most preferred country. Return migration to Afghanistan is preferred among almost

one of three (31%) Afghan respondents. Of the respondents, one out of three (34%) would like to move to Europe, and one out of five (20% together) want to move to Australia or North America. Almost half (48%) of younger Afghan wants to move abroad. The younger an Afghan in Iran is, the more he or she would like to migrate abroad. However, very few younger Afghans want to migrate to Afghanistan, which is perceived to be instable and insecure (see also Rodriguez & Monsutti 2017; Majidi 2018). Instead, they prefer to live in Iran, where they have settled down, or to migrate to Western countries. For every second (49%) younger Afghan, the preferred country is in the European Union.

Internet and social media use are becoming increasingly common among Afghans. Younger Afghans use the Internet and social media more commonly than older Afghans do, which matches the worldwide trend. Of the responding Afghans who were 15–18 years old, almost three out of four (71%) used the Internet and social media, whereas only about one out of seven (15%) of those 50–64 years old and even fewer (4%) of those 65 and older used social media. Limited financial resources and poor network coverage constrain the use of the Internet and social media, both inside and outside of guest settlements. Some young Afghans are daily users of social media. Of the Afghans who intend to migrate, many use social media to acquire information about possible destinations. Some use social media for more detailed migration planning. In addition, some Afghans use specific social media groups to share information about employment, housing and migration opportunities.

5. SUGGESTIONS

First, it is important to conduct proper academic research on Afghan refugees and irregular migrants in Iran. Their impact on social and economic development locally and nationally is significant. The research-based results help to design evidence-based policies that are efficient and have an impact on communities and on the society in Iran. It is suggested that besides this study, the empirical data collection regarding Afghans in Iran is extended to other guest settlements and to other areas in Iran, including Tehran and Mashhad, to provide a broader representative sample leading to more accurate and representative research results for policymaking.

Second, many physical and social aspects of guest settlements could be improved. For this, a rapid comprehensive analysis is needed, taking into account the viewpoints of the residents as well. Although Afghans living in guest settlements make up 1-2% of all Afghans living in Iran, their welfare is of both national and international interest. To finance the needed improvement, some guest settlements could be used as pilots for special economic areas. For example, means to finance guest settlement improvement could be facilitated through the expansion of economic activities, profit-oriented employment, enterprise loans, etc., in these pilot sites. The revenues from an increase in economic activity in guest settlements could potentially cover much of the needed finance. The outcomes of the pilot would be then analyzed to consider broader evidence-based policies regarding all guest settlements.

Third, improving the education level and professional training of Afghans in Iran will lead to their better participation in the employment sector. This would generate more added value to the local and national economies. Besides the general basic education that is currently expanding, the need also exists to place more focus on the professional training of Afghans. Through this, job opportunities would be generated for Afghans as well. This is especially important in guest settlements and in their nearby localities that often have constraints in economic development. However, such improving of vocational and other employment skills of Afghans must be implemented carefully with national and local policies that enhance the employment opportunities and specialized niches for both Afghans and Iranians.

Fourth, benefits and constraints deriving from many restrictions, for example, limited access to driving licenses, mobile communication networks, property, bank loans, etc., for Afghans who are legally living in Iran should be analyzed to verify their positive and negative impacts on Afghans and on local and national development in Iran. If Afghans can generate more wealth in local communities, less friction may exist between the Iranian and Afghan communities living in the same localities.

Fifth, a regular annual meeting among the key stakeholders of all guest settlements (managers, council members, teachers, medical staff, etc.) in Iran would facilitate the sharing of experiences and good practices. Along with these meetings, expertise from the UNHCR, other global refugee camp and settlement management expert organizations, and the researchers of these topics could be used.

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7. URBANIZATION, REFUGEES AND IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN IRAN

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Afghan immigrants – refugees and irregular immigrants – number over 3 million in Iran. They have an important impact on urbanization and rural development nationally and locally, and they are also a significant community of international interest. There are many types of Afghans in Iran. This should be taken into account when designing more specialized policies with regard to the Afghan population in Iran.

The research “Urbanization, refugees and irregular migrants in Iran, 2017” was conducted in cooperation with the University of Turku (Finland) and the Shahid Beheshti University (Iran). To conduct the research in Iran, important support from the Ministry of Interior of Iran is acknowledged, and the financial support from the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland (research consortium URMI, www.urmi.fi) is acknowledged as well.

The main questions of the research are: what is the impact of the Afghan immigrants in Iran on rural development and employment in studied less-central areas of Iran?; if Afghan immigrants living in less-central areas of Iran intend to migrate and to where do they intend to migrate?; what is the impact of social media on if, where, when and how the Afghan immigrants living in less central areas migrate?; and what is the impact of the Afghan immigrants in Iran on urbanization, both nationally and locally?

The analysis is based on earlier research findings as well as on specific surveys and interviews conducted for this research in Iran in October 2017. In the field research, 644 persons with Afghan background from the provinces of Kerman, Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan responded anonymously to the survey. Of them, 546 (85%) Afghans lived in the four studied refugee guest settlements of Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam, and the remaining 98 (15%) Afghans lived in urban areas and villages in the provinces mentioned above. In addition, 72 Afghan refugees and irregular migrants were interviewed. Interviews were conducted also with 54 stakeholders, such as representatives of the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA; located in Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan) of the Ministry of Interior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, office in Mashhad) as well as public authorities in districts, municipalities and villages of the study areas, managers and council members in the four studied refugee guest settlements and other public authorities and private sector representatives. We are grateful to all of the people who responded to our survey and let us interview them. Research assistants provided help in collecting and analyzing the research material. The main researchers

responsible for this report are Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen (University of Turku) and PhD candidate Davood Eyvazlu (Shahid Beheshti University).

Over 3 million Afghans living in Iran have a significant impact on the social and economic development of many rural areas, towns and cities in Iran. According to our survey, those Afghans who intend to stay the rest of their lives in Iran are often 50–64 years old Afghans who came to Iran over 20 years ago from the countryside of Afghanistan and who currently have family members in Iran. Another group consisted of younger Afghans who originated more often from towns and cities in Afghanistan, have spent 10–20 years in Iran and who live currently in refugee guest settlements with their spouse and children. The desire of Afghans to stay in Iran increases if they are satisfied with their current accommodations and social networks and if they have good relations with their neighbors.

Less than a tenth of the respondents mentioned the place in which they currently lived as a preferred place of living. Of those who wished to stay in Iran, from the respondents of Razavi Khorasan province approximately four out of five wanted to live in Mashhad. The next most popular place was Tehran. Many respondents from the guest settlements would like to live in a town near to the guest settlement.

Two out of five respondents agreed that they would like to go back to Afghanistan. Of men, almost every second and of women every third would like to return. However, only one out of six mentioned Afghanistan as their most preferred country. Roughly one out of three hoped to move to Europe, and one out of five hoped to move to Australia or North America. About half of young respondents wanted to move abroad, but these individuals rarely sought to move to Afghanistan, which they perceived as insecure.

About half of the respondents in the refugee guest settlements were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations, and about three out of five respondents agreed that they have enough toilets and showers, etc. Of the respondents living elsewhere in Iran, nearly all agreed that they had enough toilets and showers, and approximately seven out of eight were satisfied with their accommodations. Nevertheless, some irregular migrants lived in very precarious accommodations at the fringes of urban areas.

Of the respondents who were 15–18 years old, approximately three out of four used the Internet and social media in Iran, whereas only about one out of seven of those who were 50–64 years old (and even fewer of those 65 and older) used the Internet. Many respondents who intend to migrate used the Internet or social media to acquire information about possible destinations.

Of the respondents who were 15–70 years old, approximately two out of three men work and one out of five women work. Many men work in the difficult, low-skill jobs that Iranians do not prefer. In some localities in Iran, many Af-

ghans are employed in seasonal work in agriculture, construction and industry. There, they have a substantial impact on the development of rural areas and towns as well as on employment in the less-central provinces such as Kerman, Khuzestan and Razavi Khorasan.

It is important to conduct proper academic research about the Afghan refugees and irregular migrants in Iran. The research-based results help to design evidence-based policies that are efficient and have a planned impact on individual communities and society as a whole in Iran.

Many physical and social aspects in refugee guest settlements could be improved. For this, it would be useful to conduct a comprehensive analysis of guest settlements, including the viewpoints of the residents.

8. KAUPUNGISTUMINEN, PAKOLAISET JA EPÄSÄÄNNÖLLISET SIIRTOLAISET IRANISSA

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Afgaaneja – pakolaisia ja epäsäännöllisiä siirtolaisia – on Iranissa yli kolme miljoonaa. Heillä on suuri merkitys kaupungistumiseen ja maaseudun kehitykseen kansallisesti ja paikallisesti, ja he ovat myös kansainvälisesti merkittävä yhteisö. Afgaaneja on paljon ja monenlaisia. Tämä tulee huomioida suunniteltaessa erityisiä politiikkoja, jotka koskevat afgaaniväestöä Iranissa.

Tutkimus “Urbanization, refugees and irregular migrants in Iran, 2017” toteutettiin Turun yliopiston (Suomi) ja Shahid Beheshti yliopiston (Iran) yhteistyössä. Tutkimuksen toteuttamista Iranissa tukivat Iranin sisäministeriö ja taloudellisesti Suomen Akatemian strategisen tutkimuksen neuvoston tutkimuskonsortio URMI (www.urmi.fi).

Tutkimuskysymykset ovat: mikä on afgaanisiirtolaisten vaikutus maaseudun kehitykseen ja työllisyyteen tutkituilla vähemmän keskeisillä alueilla Iranissa?; aikovatko vähemmän keskeisillä alueilla Iranissa elävät afgaanit muuttaa ja minne?; mikä merkitys sosiaalisella medially on vähemmän keskeisillä alueilla Iranissa elävien afgaanien muuttoliikkeeseen ja siihen, miten ja minne he muuttavat?; mikä on afgaanien vaikutus kaupungistumiseen kansallisesti ja paikallisesti Iranissa?

Analyysi perustuu aiempiin tutkimustuloksiin sekä kyselyyn ja haastatteluihin, jotka toteutettiin tätä tutkimusta varten Iranissa lokakuussa 2017. Kyselyyn vastasi 644 afgaanitaustaista henkilöä nimettömänä Kermanin, Razavi Khorasanin ja Khuzestanin provinseissa. Heistä 546 (85%) asui neljässä pakolaisille tarkoitettussa asutuskeskuksessa, jotka olivat Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan ja Torbat-e Jam, ja loput 98 (15%) asuivat kaupunkialueella ja niiden osissa edellä mainituissa provinseissa. Tämän lisäksi haastateltiin myös 54 viranomaista ja muuta afgaaneihin liittyvää toimijaa. Heitä olivat muun muassa edustajat organisaatioista BAFIA (Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs, Razavi Khorasan ja Khuzestan), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mashhad) sekä julkisen ja yksityisen sektorin edustajia, neljän tutkitun pakolaiskeskuksen johtajia ja niiden valtuuston jäseniä. Olemme kiitollisia kaikille kyselyyn vastanneille ja haastatelluille. Tutkimusavustajat auttoivat aineiston keräämisessä ja analyysissä. Päättäjöinä tätä raporttia varten olivat professori Jussi S. Jauhiainen (Turun yliopisto) ja tohtorikoulutettava Davood Eyvazlu (Shahid Beheshti yliopisto).

Yli kolme miljoonaa Iranissa elävää afgaania vaikuttavat oleellisesti monien maaseutualueiden ja kaupunkien sosiaaliseen ja taloudelliseen kehitykseen. Kyselymme mukaan ne afgaanit, jotka aikovat jäädä Iraniin loppuelämäkseen ovat joko 50–64-vuotiaita, jotka tulivat Iraniin Afganistanin maaseudulta yli 20 vuotta sitten ja joilla on nykyään perhe ja sukulaisia Iranissa. Toinen ryhmä koostuu

afgaaneista, jotka ovat useimmin kotoisin kaupungeista. He ovat olleet Iranissa 10–20 vuotta ja he elävät nykyään vaimon ja lasten kanssa pakolaiskeskuksissa. Afgaanien halu jäädä loppuelämäkseen Iraniin kasvaa, jos he ovat tyytyväisiä nykyiseen asuntoonsa ja sosiaalisiin verkostoihinsa sekä jos heillä on hyvät suhteet naapureihinsa.

Alle joka kymmenes vastaajista arvioi mieltänsä nykyisen asuinpaikkansa Iranissa. Niistä, jotka aikovat jäädä Iraniin, neljä viidestä Razavi Khorasan provinssin vastaajasta haluaisi asua Mashhadissa. Seuraavaksi suosituin paikka oli Teheran. Monet pakolaiskeskusten vastaajista haluaisivat asua lähimmässä kaupungissa.

Vastaajista kaksi viidestä olivat sitä mieltä, että he haluaisivat mennä takaisin Afganistaniin. Miehistä melkein joka toinen ja naisista joka kolmas haluaa palata Afganistaniin. Vain joka kuudes piti Afganistanista eniten kaikista maista. Joka kolmas haluaisi muuttaa Eurooppaan ja joka viides Australiaan tai Pohjois-Amerikkaan. Joka toinen nuori kyselyyn vastanneista haluaa muuttaa ulkomaille, mutta harvoin turvattomaksi miellettyyn Afganistaniin.

Joka toinen pakolaiskeskuksessa vastanneista oli täysin tai osittain tyytyväinen nykyiseen asuntoonsa ja kolmen viidestä mielestä hänellä oli riittävästi saniteettitiloja. Muualla Iranissa asuvista vastanneista lähes kaikilla oli riittävästi saniteettitiloja, ja seitsemän kahdeksasta oli tyytyväinen nykyiseen asuntoonsa. Osa epäsäännöllisistä siirtolaisista asui hyvin alkeellisessa majoituksessa kaupungin reuna-alueilla.

Vastanneista käytti Internetiä ja sosiaalista mediaa Iranissa kolme neljästä 15–18-vuotiaista, mutta yksi seitsemästä 50–64 –vuotiaista ja paljon harvemmat heitä iäkkäämmistä. Monet heistä, jotka aikoivat muuttaa, hyödynsivät sosiaalista mediaa hankkiakseen tietoa mahdollisista muuttokohteista ja -reiteistä.

Vastanneista 15–70-vuotiaista miehistä kaksi kolmesta työskenteli syksyllä 2017 ja yksi viidestä saman ikäisistä naisista. Useat miehet työskentelevät rakenteissa ja vähän koulutusta vaativissa töissä, jotka eivät houkuttele iranilaisia. Joillakin paikkakunnilla Iranissa monet afgaanit työskentelevät maataloudessa, rakentamisessa ja teollisuudessa vuodenaikojen mukaan jäsenyissä töissä. Afgaaneilla on merkittävä vaikutus maaseutuun, kaupunkiin ja työllisyyteen keskusten ulkopuolisilla alueilla Kermanin, Khuzestanin ja Razavi Khorasanin provinseissa.

On tärkeää tehdä aitoa akateemista tutkimusta afgaanipakolaisista ja afgaanien epäsäännöllisestä muuttoliikkeestä Iranissa. Tutkimustulokset auttavat suunnittelemaan ja toteuttamaan tutkimustuloksiin tukeutuvaa politiikkaa, joka on tehokasta ja jolla on suunniteltu vaikutus yhteisöihin ja yhteiskuntaan Iranissa.

Monia pakolaiskeskusten fyysisiä ja sosiaalisia piirteitä on mahdollista parantaa. Tätä varten tulisi tehdä kattava tutkimus pakolaiskeskuksista huomioiden myös asukkaiden näkökulmat.

شهرنشینی، پناهندگان و مهاجران نامتعارف در ایران ۹.

یوسی اس. یاهویانین و داود عیوضلو (jusaja@utu.fi)

جمعیت مهاجران، پناهندگان و مهاجران نامتعارف افغانستانی در ایران بیش از سه میلیون نفر است. آنها تأثیر مهمی بر شهرنشینی و توسعه روستایی در مقیاس ملی و محلی در ایران دارند. در مقیاس بین‌المللی نیز جامعه مهاجران افغانستانی از لحاظ تعداد و اثرگذاری اهمیت دارند. مهاجران افغانستانی در ایران بسیار هستند و از نظر نوع اقامت نیز متفاوت می‌باشند. این موضوع باید در طراحی سیاست‌های مرتبط با مهاجران افغانستانی در ایران مورد توجه قرار گیرد.

طرح تحقیقاتی "شهرنشینی، پناهندگان و مهاجران نامتعارف در ایران، 2017" با همکاری دانشگاه تورکو (فنلاند) و دانشگاه شهید بهشتی (ایران) انجام شد. در انجام این طرح تحقیقاتی، وزارت کشور ایران حمایت‌های زیادی انجام داد و همچنین حمایت مالی آن از طرف "شورای تحقیقات استراتژیک" آکادمی فنلاند (کنسر سیوم تحقیقاتی URMI به ادرس www.urmi.fi) صورت گرفت.

سوالات اصلی این تحقیق عبارت‌اند از: تأثیر مهاجران افغانستانی در ایران بر روی توسعه روستایی و اشتغال در مناطق مورد مطالعه نواحی کمتر مرکزی ایران (کمپ‌های مهاجران و روستاها در مناطق مختلف ایران) چیست؟ مهمترین دلیل مهاجرت مهاجران افغانستانی در این نواحی کمتر مرکزی چیست و به کدام مناطق مهاجرت می‌کنند؟ تأثیر رسانه‌های اجتماعی بر روی تصمیم به مهاجرت، مکان، زمان و چگونگی مهاجرت مهاجران افغانستانی در ایران چیست؟ و تأثیر مهاجران افغانستانی در ایران بر روی شهرنشینی در مقیاس محلی و ملی چه می‌باشد؟

تحلیل‌های این تحقیق بر مبنای یافته‌های تحقیقات پیشین بعلاوه نظرسنجی و مطالعه میدانی و مصاحبه‌های مخصوص این تحقیق که در اکتبر سال 2017 میلادی در ایران انجام شد می‌باشد. در این مطالعه میدانی 644 نفر مهاجر افغانستانی (با پیشینه افغانی) از استان‌های کرمان، خراسان رضوی و خوزستان به صورت بی‌نام به سوالات تحقیق، مصاحبه و پرسشنامه پاسخ دادند. از میان آنها، 546 نفر (85 درصد) مهاجران افغانستانی بودند که در چهار مهمانشهر بنی نجار، بردسیر، رفسنجان و تربت جام زندگی می‌کردند و مابقی آنها یعنی 98 نفر (15 درصد) در مناطق شهری (مهمانشهر) و روستاهای استان‌های فوق‌الذکر ساکن بوده‌اند. بعلاوه، 72 پناهنده و مهاجر غیر متعارف افغانستانی مورد مصاحبه قرار گرفتند. همچنین مصاحبه‌ها با 54 نفر از دست‌اندرکاران و مسئولان از قبیل کارکنان اداره اتباع و مهاجرین خارجی (BAFIA) (در استان‌های خراسان رضوی و خوزستان) و نماینده کمیساری عالی پناهندگی (UNHCR نماینده دفتر مشهد) و بعلاوه مسئولان دولتی ایران در مقیاس بخش، شهرستان و مهمانشهر و روستاهای مورد مطالعه و اعضای شوراهای خودگردان مهمانشهرها و همچنین مدیران مهمانشهرهای فوق‌الذکر و بعلاوه دیگر مسئولان محلی و نمایندگان بخش خصوصی ایرانی (صاحبان کارگاه‌ها، شرکت‌ها و...) و افغانستانی (صاحبان مغازه، کارگاه‌ها و مزارع و... در مهمانشهرها و روستاها) انجام شد. ما از تمام این افراد و مسئولان که در این تحقیق شرکت کرده و به سوالات ما پاسخ و اجازه مصاحبه دادند تشکر می‌کنیم. همکاران و دستیاران تحقیق کمک زیادی در جمع‌آوری و تحلیل مواد تحقیق انجام دادند. محققان اصلی مسئول در این تحقیق و گزارش پرفسور یوسی اس. یاهویانین (دانشگاه تورکو) و دانشجوی دکتری داود عیوضلو (دانشگاه شهید بهشتی) هستند.

بیش از سه میلیون مهاجر افغانستانی در ایران زندگی می‌کنند که تأثیر زیادی بر توسعه اقتصادی و اجتماعی در بسیاری از مناطق روستایی و شهری دارند. بر اساس پیمایش میدانی ما، آن دسته از مهاجران افغانستانی که تمایل به ماندن و ادامه زندگی خود در ایران دارند اغلب شامل افراد مسن (اکثراً بین 50 تا 64 سال) هستند که بیش از 20 سال گذشته از مناطق روستایی افغانستان به ایران مهاجرت کرده‌اند و در حال حاضر در ایران تشکیل خانواده داده و با اقوام و بستگانی در ایران دارند. گروه دیگر که تمایل به ماندگاری در ایران دارند شامل مهاجران افغانستانی جوان هستند که در حدود 10 تا 20 سال از عمر خود را در ایران سپری کرده و در حال حاضر در مهمانشهرها با همسر و فرزندان

خود زندگی می‌کنند. تمایل به ماندگاری مهاجران افغانستانی با افزایش رضایت آنها از میزان خدمات و امکانات، توسعه شبکه‌های اجتماعی و روابط خوب با همسایگان افزایش پیدا می‌کند.

کمتر از یک دهم پاسخگویان مکان فعلی زندگی خود را بعنوان مکان مورد علاقه خود برای زندگی اعلام کرده‌اند. از میان مهاجرانی که تمایل به ماندن در ایران دارند، چهار پنجم آنها تمایل دارند تا در شهر مشهد زندگی کنند. دیگر شهرهای محبوب و مورد انتخاب برای زندگی توسط پاسخگویان به ترتیب شامل تهران و شیراز هستند.

از مجموع پاسخگویان افغانی، یک سوم آنها موافق بازگشت به کشور افغانستان هستند. یک سوم آنها تمایل دارند تا به اروپا و یک پنجم آنها به استرالیا و شمال آمریکا مهاجرت کنند. نصف پاسخگویان مهاجر جوان تمایل دارند تا به کشورهای دیگر مهاجرت کنند اما آنها با فرض ناامن بودن کشورشان به ندرت تمایل به بازگشت به کشور افغانستان دارند.

نصف پاسخگویان در این پیمایش در مهمانشهرها بطور کامل یا تا حدودی از خدمات و امکانات در دسترس برای مهاجران رضایت دارند و سه پنجم پاسخگویان موافق این موضوع هستند که به توالی، حمام و... کافی در مهمانشهرها دسترسی دارند. از مجموع پاسخگویانی که در دیگر مناطق مورد مطالعه (به غیر از مهمانشهرها) زندگی می‌کنند تقریباً همه آنها اعلام کردند که به توالی، حمام و... کافی دسترسی دارند. همچنین یک هشتم این مهاجران از امکانات در دسترس خود رضایت دارند. با این وجود، برخی از مهاجران نامتعارف با امکانات و خدمات بی‌ثبات در حواشی شهرها در ایران زندگی می‌کنند.

از مجموع پاسخگویان در سنین 15 تا 18 سال، سه چهارم آنها در ایران از اینترنت و رسانه‌های اجتماعی استفاده می‌کنند، درحالی‌که یک هفتم پاسخگویان در سنین 50 تا 64 سال و به اندازه کمتری افراد مسن‌تر بیش از 64 سال در ایران از اینترنت استفاده کرده‌اند. بسیاری از پاسخگویانی که تمایل به مهاجرت دارند از اینترنت و رسانه‌های اجتماعی برای کسب اطلاعات در ارتباط با مقاصد احتمالی برای مهاجرت استفاده کرده‌اند.

از مجموع پاسخگویان مهاجر افغانستانی در سنین 15 تا 70 سال، دو سوم مردان در حال حاضر مشغول به کار بوده و یک پنجم زنان در این سنین شاغل هستند. بسیاری از مهاجران مرد در شغل‌های سخت و کم‌مهارت که کارگران ایرانی تمایل به اشتغال در این بخش‌ها را ندارند کار می‌کنند. در برخی از مناطق مورد مطالعه در ایران، بسیاری از مهاجران افغانستانی در مشاغل فصلی در بخش کشاورزی، ساخت و ساز و صنعت به کار گرفته شده و از این جهت تأثیر قابل توجهی بر توسعه نواحی روستایی و شهری و بعلاوه بر اشتغال در نواحی کمتر مرکزی استان‌های کرمان، خوزستان و خراسان رضوی داشته‌اند.

انجام تحقیقات دقیق دانشگاهی در ارتباط با پناهندگان و مهاجران غیرمتعارف افغانستانی در ایران اهمیت زیادی دارد. نتایج تحقیقات مطالعه محور در طراحی سیاست‌های مبتنی بر شواهد در جامعه ایران بسیار کارآمد و تأثیرات مفیدی بر جامعه ایرانی خواهد داشت.

بسیاری از جنبه‌های فیزیکی و اجتماعی در مهمانشهرها امکان بهبود و توسعه را دارند. بدین منظور انجام تحلیل‌ها و نظرسنجی‌های جامع از ساکنین این مهمانشهرها و کسب نظرات آنها مفید خواهد بود.

التحضر، اللاجئين و المهاجرين الغير موثقين في ايران . ١٠

Jussi S. Jauhiainen & Davood Eyvazlu (jusaja@utu.fi)

اكثر من 3 مليون من المهاجرين- اللاجئين الافغان يقطنون في ايران . لديهم تأثير هام في التحضر و التنمية الريفية و طنيا و محليا وهم ايضا مجموعة كبيرة تحضى باهتمام دولي كبير. الافغان كثيرون و متعددون في ايران. و يجب ان يؤخذ ذلك بعين الاعتبار عند وضع سياسات اكثر تخصصا في ما يتعلق بالسكان الافغان في ايران.

مشروع البحث: التحضر، اللاجئين و المهاجرين الغير موثقين في ايران لسنة 2017 كان بالتعاون مع جامعة توركو "فنلندا" و جامعه شهيد بهشتي (ايران).

و من اجل اجراء البحث في ايران، فان الدعم الهام المقدم من وزارة الداخلية في ايران معترف به والدعم المالي المقدم من مجلس البحوث الاستراتيجيه في اكاديمه فنلندا (research consortium URMI, www.urmi.fi).

الاسئلة الرئيسية في هذا البحث هي :

- 1- ما هو تأثير المهاجرين الافغان في ايران على التنمية الريفية و العماله في المناطق الاقل دراسة في ايران؟
- 2- اذا كان المهاجرون الافغان الذين يعيشون في مناطق اقل مركزية في ايران ينون الهجرة ؟
- 3-ما هو تأثير وسائل الاعلام على اذا، اين، متى و كيف المهاجرين الأفغان الذين يعيشون في مناطق أقل مركزية تهاجر؟
- 4- ما هو تأثير المهاجرين الأفغان في إيران على التحضر على الصعيد الوطني والمحلي؟

ويستند هذا التحليل على نتائج البحوث السابقة وكذلك على المقابلات الخاصة التي أجريت لهذا البحث في إيران في أكتوبر 2017. و في البحث الميداني اجاب 644 شخص ذوي الخلفيات الافغانيه من مقاطعات كيرمان، رازافي، خوراسان و خوزستان اجابوا على دراسته الاستقصائية بشكل مجهول، من بينهم 546 (85%) من الأفغان يعيشون في أربع مستوطنات للاجئين المدروسة في بني نجار وباردير ورفسنجان وتوربات – جام أما الباقون البالغ عددهم 98 (15%) يقطنون في المناطق الحضرية و القرى في المقاطعات المذكورة أعلاه. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، أجريت مقابلات مع 72 لاجئا أفغاني و مهاجرين غير موثقين .

وأجريت مقابلات أيضا مع 54 من ممثلي مكتب شؤون الأجانب وشؤون المهاجرين الأجانب (بافيا في خراسان رضوي و خوزستان) التابعة لوزارة الداخلية ومفوض الأمم المتحدة السامي لشؤون اللاجئين (مفوضية الأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين في مشهد). كما ايضا السلطات العامة في المقاطعات والبلديات والقرى في المناطق المدروسة والمديرين وأعضاء المجلس في أربعة مستوطنات اللاجئين المدروسة، والسلطات العامة الأخرى و ممثلي القطاع الخاص. نحن ممنون للأشخاص الذين استجابوا لدراستنا الاستقصائية و دعونا تجري مقابلات معهم. وقد قدم مساعدو البحوث المساعدة في جمع وتحليل المواد البحثية. والباحثون الرئيسيون المسؤولون عن هذا التقرير هم :

الدروفوسور Jussi S. Jauhiainen من (جامعه توركو)

ومرشح الدكتوراه Davood Eyvazlu من (جامعة شاهد بهشتي)

أكثر من ثلاثة ملايين أفغاني يعيشون في إيران لهم تأثير كبير على التنمية الاجتماعية والاقتصادية في العديد من المناطق الريفية والبلديات والمدن في إيران. استنادا الي دراستنا الاستقصائية فان الافغان الذين يريدون البقاء ببقية حياتهم في ايران هم غالبا اعمارهم ما بين 50-64 عام من جاء إلى إيران منذ أكثر من 20 عاما من ريف أفغانستان ولديه حاليا أسر وأقارب في إيران. وايضا هناك مجموعة أخرى من الأفغان الأصغر سنا الذين نشأوا في كثير من الأحيان من المدن والقرى في أفغانستان، قضى في إيران 10-20 عام والذين يعيشون حاليا في مستوطنات الضيوف اللاجئين مع زوجهم وأطفالهم.

وتزداد رغبة الأفغان في البقاء في إيران إذ كانوا راضين عن مساكنهم الحالية و تواصلهم الاجتماعي ولديهم علاقات جيدة مع جيرانهم. وذكر أقل من عشره من الذين اجابوا انهم يفضلون العيش في مكان افضل من الذي يعيشون فيه حاليا. ومن بين الذين يفكرون في البقاء في ايران، أربعة من كل خمسة يرغبون في العيش في مشهد. والمكان التالي الأكثر شعبية هو طهران وشيراز. واتفق اثنان من بين خمسة من المشاركين في الاستطلاع على رغبتهم في العودة إلى أفغانستان: الرجال، شخص من بين اثنين تقريبا، والنساء من بين كل ثلاثة يرغبون في العودة. ومع ذلك، فإن واحدة فقط من بين

سنة ذكروا ان افغانستان هي البلد المفضله لهم. ويود واحد من كل ثلاثة أن ينتقل إلى أوروبا وواحدة من أصل خمسة إلى أستراليا أو أمريكا الشمالية. ويريد كل شاب من الشباب المجيب أن ينتقل إلى الخارج ولكن نادرا ما يتجه إلى أفغانستان التي تعتبر غير آمن.

وكان شخص من بين اثنين من المجيبين في مستوطنات الضيوف اللاجئين راض تماما أو جزئيا عن سكنهم الحالي و 3 من أصل خمسة اتفقوا على أن يكون ما يكفي من المراحيض، والاستحمام، وما إلى ذلك هناك. ومن بين المجيبين الذين يعيشون في أماكن أخرى في إيران، اتفق الجميع تقريبا على أن لديهم ما يكفي من المراحيض، والاستحمام، وما إلى ذلك، وسبعة من أصل ثمانية كانوا راضين عن أماكن إقامتهم. ومع ذلك، فإن بعض المهاجرين غير النظاميين يعيشون في مساكن غير مستقره على أطراف المناطق الحضرية.

من بين 15-18 سنة من المشاركين، ثلاثة من أصل أربعة استخدموا الإنترنت ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية في إيران في حين واحد من أصل سبعة من 50-64 سنة من كبار السن. يستخدم العديد من المجيبين، الذين بنويون الهجرة، الإنترنت ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية للحصول على معلومات حول الوجهات المحتملة. ومن بين الرجال الذين تتراوح أعمارهم بين 15 و 70 سنة، يعمل اثنان من كل ثلاثة رجال حاليا، وواحد من بين كل خمس نساء. فالعديد من الرجال يعملون في وظائف صعبة ومنخفضة المهارات لا يفضلها الإيرانيون.

بعض المناطق في إيران، هناك العديد من الأفغان يعملون في الأعمال الموسمية في الزراعة والبناء والصناعة. وهناك أثر كبير على تنمية المناطق الريفية والبلدات وكذلك على العمالة في المناطق الأقل دراسه في مقاطعات كرمان وخوزستان وخراسان رضوي. من المهم إجراء أبحاث أكاديمية مناسبة حول اللاجئين الأفغان والمهاجرين غير الشرعيين في إيران. وتساعد النتائج القائمة على البحوث في تصميم سياسات قائمة على الأدلة تتسم بالكفاءة والتخطيط للتأثير على المجتمعات المحلية والمجتمع في إيران. ويمكن تحسين العديد من الجوانب المادية والاجتماعية في سكنات الضيوف اللاجئين. لهذا سيكون من المفيد إجراء تحليل شامل للمستوطنات الضيوف بما في ذلك وجهات نظر السكان.

11. Урбанизация, беженцы и нелегальные мигранты в Иране

Юсси С. Яухийнен и Давуд Эйвазлу (jusaja@utu.fi)

В Иране количество иммигрантов из Афганистана – беженцев и нелегальных мигрантов – насчитывает более трех миллионов человек. Они оказывают значительное влияние на урбанизацию и развитие сельской местности как в масштабах страны, так и локально. Более того, афганцы представляют большой международный интерес как сообщество, обладающее рядом уникальных черт. Несмотря на общее происхождение, афганское меньшинство в Иране неоднородно: афганцы могут значительно отличаться друг от друга по разным параметрам. Этот важный момент должен учитываться при планировании политики в отношении афганского населения в Иране.

Исследование «Урбанизация, беженцы и нелегальные мигранты в Иране» было проведено университетом г. Турку (Финляндия) в сотрудничестве с университетом имени Шахида Бехешты (Иран) в 2017 году. Это исследование стало возможным благодаря значительной поддержке Министерства внутренних дел Ирана и финансовой поддержке Совета стратегических исследований Академии Финляндии (исследовательское объединение URMI, www.urmi.fi).

Ключевыми вопросами данного исследования стали:

- Какое влияние афганские иммигранты оказывают на развитие сельской местности в Иране и трудовую занятость в периферийных областях страны?
- Намереваются ли афганцы, проживающие в периферийных областях, продолжать мигрировать, и если да, то куда?
- Влияют ли социальные сети на желания афганских иммигрантов, проживающих в периферийных областях, переезжать? Какое влияние социальные сети оказывают на то, как, куда и когда афганские иммигранты переезжают?
- Какое влияние афганские иммигранты оказывают на урбанизацию в Иране как в масштабах страны, так и локально?

Анализ собранных данных основан как на результатах предшествующих исследований, так и на соцопросах и интервью, проведенных для данного исследования в Иране в октябре 2017 года. В анонимном соцопросе участвовало 644 человека с афганскими корнями из иранских провинций Керман, Хорасан-Резави и Хузестан. 85 % опрошенных проживало в 4 ис-

следуемых поселениях беженцев – Бани Наджар, Бардсир, Рафсанджан и Торбете-Джам. Оставшиеся 98 человек (15%) проживали в городских и сельских поселениях в вышеупомянутых провинциях. В дополнение к этому, у 72 беженцев и нелегальных мигрантов были взяты интервью. Также, интервью были проведены с 54 представителями заинтересованных сторон таких, как Управление по делам иностранных иммигрантов (УДИИ) Министерства внутренних дел в Хорасан-Резави и Хузестан и Управление Верховного комиссара Организации Объединённых Наций по делам беженцев (УВКБ) в Мешхеде; помимо уже упомянутых, нам удалось пообщаться с сотрудниками организаций, занимающихся миграционными вопросами, представителями органов государственной власти и муниципалитетов, управляющими и членами советов поселений беженцев и другими чиновниками и представителями частного сектора. Мы беспредельно благодарны всем, кто принял участие в наших соцопросе и интервью. Мы признательны научным ассистентам, принявшим участие в сборе и анализе исследовательского материала. Главными исследователями, ответственными за данный доклад, являются профессор Юсси С. Яухийнен (Университет г. Турку) и аспирант Давуд Эйвазлу (Университет имени Шахида Бехешты).

Три миллиона афганцев, проживающих в Иране, оказывают значительное влияние на социальное и экономическое развитие деревень и городов страны. Согласно результатам нашего исследования, возраст тех афганцев, которые намереваются остаться в Иране на всю жизнь, часто равняется 50-64 годам. Они прибыли в Иран со своими семьями и родственниками более 20 лет назад из сельских поселений Афганистана. Другая группа желающих остаться в Иране состоит из молодых афганцев, которые приехали, в основном, из городов Афганистана 10-20 лет назад и в данный момент проживают в поселениях беженцев со своими супругами и детьми. Желание афганца остаться в Иране возрастает, если его устраивают жилищные условия, круг общения и отношения с соседями.

Меньше, чем десятая часть респондентов назвала в качестве предпочтительного места для жизни то место, в котором они проживают на данный момент. Из тех, кто может остаться в Иране на всю жизнь, четыре человека из пяти хотели бы жить в Мешхеде. Следующие по популярности города – Тегеран и Шираз.

Каждый третий из всех опрошенных респондентов выразил желание вернуться назад в Афганистан. Каждый третий хотел бы переехать в Европу, и каждый пятый – в Австралию или Северную Америку. Каждый второй молодой респондент хочет переехать за границу, но редко в Афганистан, представляющийся небезопасным.

Каждый второй опрошенный из поселений беженцев был полностью или частично удовлетворен своими жилищными условиями; три респон-

дента из пяти согласились, что в месте их проживания достаточно туалетов и душевых. Среди респондентов, проживающих за пределами поселений беженцев, почти все утверждали, что туалетов и душевых в их местах проживания достаточно; семеро из восьми были довольны своими жилищными условиями. Тем не менее, некоторые нелегальные мигранты жили на городских окраинах в очень плачевных условиях.

Среди респондентов 15-18 лет трое из четырех пользовались интернетом и социальными сетями в Иране в то время, как только один из семи среди опрошенных 50-64 лет имел доступ ко всемирной паутине. Более того, среди респондентов 65 лет и старше число интернет-пользователей оказалось ничтожно мало. Многие афганцы, намеревающиеся мигрировать, используют интернет и социальные сети для поиска информации о возможных местах для переселения.

Среди респондентов 15-70 лет двое мужчин из трех трудоустроены в данный момент, в то время как только одна женщина из пяти работает. Многие мужчины работают в качестве низкоквалифицированного персонала в тяжелых условиях, на которые не согласятся местные иранцы. В некоторых районах Ирана афганцы заняты на сезонных работах в сельском хозяйстве, строительстве или производстве. Там они оказывают значительное влияние как на развитие сельской местности и городов, так и на трудовая занятость в периферийных областях провинций Керман, Хузестан и Хорасан-Резави.

Проведение серьезных научных исследований, посвященных афганским беженцам и нелегальным мигрантам в Иране, имеет очень важное значение: результаты исследований помогают проводить эмпирически обоснованную политику, способную оказывать положительное влияние на социальную жизнь Ирана.

Многие материальные и социальные аспекты жизни в поселениях беженцев могли бы быть улучшены. Представляется полезным проведение комплексного анализа поселений беженцев с учетом мнения их жителей.



**TURUN YLIOPISTON MAANTIETEEN JA GEOLOGIAN LAITOKSEN JULKAISUJA
PUBLICATIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF TURKU**

- No. 1. Jukka Käyhkö and Tim Horstkotte (Eds.): Reindeer husbandry under global change in the tundra region of Northern Fennoscandia. 2017.
- No. 2. Jukka Käyhkö och Tim Horstkotte (Red.): Den globala förändringens inverkan på rennäringen på norra Fennoskandiens tundra. 2017.
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