

MIGRANTS, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN JORDAN, 2017

Maahanmuuttajat, turvapaikanhakijat ja pakolaiset Jordaniassa vuonna 2017

المهاجرون، طالبو اللجوء واللاجئون في الأردن، ٢٠١٧

Иммигранты, просители убежища и беженцы в Иордании, 2017 год

Migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Jordan, 2017

Jussi S. Jauhiainen & Ekaterina Vorobeva

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has many migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. There are also many particularities as regards them. On the one hand, Jordan is not a party to the 1951 Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. This means that globally most common international agreements on refugees and the rights of refugees are not legally binding in Jordan.

On the other hand, Jordan has globally the second highest proportion (8.9%) of refugees of the national population. In Jordan, the status of a refugee is in accordance with the government of Jordan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There are refugees who have lived in Jordan for decades and refugees who arrived only recently. The amount of refugees in Jordan has grown substantially in the 2010s due to the war in Syria.

In 2017, about 736,400 registered refugees lived in Jordan (UNHCR 2017). However, in addition, there were almost the same number of “people of concern”. These are mostly Syrians who fled from Syria but have not officially been registered as refugees by the government of Jordan and the UNHCR. However, according to Human Rights Watch (2017b), “in 2017, Jordan did not permit Syrians to enter the country to seek asylum.”

According to the current legislation, the authorities of Jordan require that Syrians register with the Ministry of Interior and are issued a biometric service card. In addition, Syrians should register with the UNHCR. They need to be issued either a proof of registration in formal refugee camps in Jordan or an asylum seeker certificate if they reside in host communities. If a Syrian refugee does not have a valid registration, there are major barriers to legally stay in their current place of residence, access public services and humanitarian assistance or register births, deaths and marriages (Jordan Ingo Forum 2018, 5).

The concept of refugee, however, is complex in Jordan (see Section 2; also Erciyas 2016; Verme & Gigliarano 2016; Human Rights Watch 2017a). Not all people escaping from Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan to Jordan are formally defined as refugees despite the majority defining and calling themselves refugees. In some contexts, even the government of Jordan calls many of those migrants in Jordan refugees. As mentioned above, Jordan is not a party to the 1951 (Geneva) Convention on Refugees and its 1967 (New York) Protocol, so the refugee definitions deriving from these do not apply in Jordan. Furthermore, despite general policies towards refugees and people of concern, Jordan has not enacted comprehensive domestic legislation to deal with refugees.

In 2017, the legal framework for the treatment of refugees was provided by the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding signed between Jordan and the UNHCR. It indicates the major principles of international protection, including the definition of a refugee and the principle of non-refoulement (Memorandum... 1998). Therefore, the everyday lives of refugees in Jordan is in some aspects sim-

ilar to that in many other countries. However, such unclear legality creates local and national particularities. An important issue is temporality, i.e. that there are no certainties as regards the future of refugees in Jordan. The position of the migrants defined as refugees in Jordan has changed over the years from open to narrow and back. There are, thus, many institutional particularities that affect the life of foreign people who have come to seek safety in Jordan.

In recent years, the most acute refugee situation has been close to the border of Syria. The establishment and the development of the refugee camp Zaatari (or Za'atari) in 2012 caught the attention of international media and many international governments and non-governmental organizations (Huynh 2015; Lived Zaatari Project 2015; Dawton & McFarlane 2016; see also Section 3.2.). Many people have lived for years in this large isolated settlement that is considered to be the world's second largest refugee camp. Many of its inhabitants do not know if and when they can start to live a normal life elsewhere.

In 2017, there were three official refugee camps in Jordan, namely Azraq, Emirati-Jordanian and Zaatari (UNHCR 2017a). Earlier studies found that despite the encampment policy in Jordan, most—up to four out of five—refugees live in urban areas outside the camps. Providing an opportunity for a refugee to live in an urban area also reflects the policy of the UNHCR (UNHCR 2015). Refugees who settle in urban and other non-camp areas become more self-sufficient and have better long-term outcomes than refugees in camps. The urban and other non-camp areas usually offer more freedom of movement, employment opportunities, and better provision of services such as education and health care (Culbertson et al. 2016, 12).

Almost all (over 90%) Syrian refugees in Jordan live below the Jordanian poverty line. In addition, four out of five (80%) young refugee children live in multi-dimensional poverty and are deprived from the most basic needs in protection, health and education (European Commission 2018; United Nations 2018). Nevertheless, many refugees have higher education, valuable working experience and skills, developed social networks and some material assets (Carrion 2015). A particular issue is a strict national policy that governs and restricts the right of refugees to work and move in Jordan. Despite this, many refugees look for work and work wherever they can (World Bank 2018). However, from 2016 onwards, more working permits have been issued to Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2018a).

There have been resettlement of Syrian refugees from Jordan to many countries of the world. Following the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011 and the dispersal of Syrian refugees to many parts of Europe, Turkey and the rest of the world, particular networks emerged between friends and families that are sustained and expanded with the help of modern communication technologies, the Internet and social media. The geographical isolation of refugees in Jordan is not always social isolation anymore.

1.1. Research project

This research report about migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Jordan is part of a broader research project about asylum processes in and near the countries of origin of asylum seekers and refugees, and it follows their asylum journey toward their destination countries and in the destination countries (see Jauhiainen 2017a; 2017c; 2017d; Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018; Jauhiainen, Gadd & Jokela 2018). This research belongs to the activities of the research consortium URMI (Urbanization, Mobilities and Immigration, see www.urmi.fi), funded by the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland and led by Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen from the Division of Geography at the University of Turku, Finland.

Earlier published research reports have analyzed the situation of asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants in Finland, one of their destination countries. In the European Union, the amount of asylum seekers reaching Finland is rather small, a few thousand annually. An exception was the year 2015 when over 32,000 asylum applications were received. Even though this amount was only 3% of all applications in Europe, the relative growth in Finland was eight-fold compared to the earlier year and was the largest in the European Union. Also, in Finland, the amount of asylum seekers originating from Iraq was the second largest in the European Union. After the rejection of asylum applications, thousands of them have remained in Finland as undocumented migrants (see Jauhiainen 2017a; Jauhiainen 2017b; Jauhiainen, Gadd & Jokela 2018).

In addition, we have conducted research in asylum seeker hotspots in the European Union, such as in Lesbos (Greece) and Lampedusa (Italy). In the past years, Lesbos and Lampedusa have been the key entry points to the European Union for hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers. After the border control became stricter and the asylum application process slower, these hotspots have changed into sites in which asylum seekers stay at length (Jauhiainen 2017c; Jauhiainen 2017d).

Furthermore, our focus has also been on those countries where many refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants start their journey to the European Union. It is a common phenomenon throughout the world that people seek immediate safety in neighboring countries. Although the initial idea for many is to stay a short period in the first country, the long-term instability in the country of origin means that many migrants will stay there from years to decades. Many will never return to their former home country as, for example, our study about Afghans in Iran indicates (Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018).

Some migrate further to wealthier countries in the European Union. An average protracted refugee crisis lasts from two to three decades (Culbertson et al. 2016). Trying to reach the European Union, many to-be asylum seekers remain stuck in transit for years, even decades, as they search for the legal right to stay in a place that can provide a livelihood for them (see Picozza 2017).

This research report about migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Jordan illustrates briefly the general background of the research project, key concepts and findings from the survey and interviews as well as the project's conclusions. However, we will continue with more detailed analysis. We are grateful to all people who responded to our survey and allowed us interview them. In addition, a number of research assistants provided invaluable help in the collection and analysis of the material.

1.2. Research questions

The main research questions in this research report are:

1. What kind of Syrian refugees live in Jordan?
2. What are the everyday lives of Syrian refugees in Jordan like and how are social capital and networks related to them?
3. What are the migration wishes and plans of Syrian refugees in Jordan?
4. How and for what do Syrian refugees in Jordan use the Internet and social media?

The research questions are answered based on earlier research on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Jordan and especially on the empirical material we collected during the field research in 2017. Migrants, asylum seekers and refugees responded according to their own views; the results indicate both their perspectives and our interpretation of them.

1.3. Research material and methods

The background of this research report comes from many earlier studies that provided information about refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan (see Achilli 2015; Carrion 2015; Turner 2015; Verme & Gigliarano 2015; Fakh & Ibrahim 2016). The original empirical field material was collected in Jordan from March 6–19, 2017. To conduct the field study and to organize the survey, Johanna Puhakka and Johanna Hänninen provided invaluable assistance in Jordan. Besides them, Jussi S. Jauhinainen, Noora Salmela and local assistants also took part in the collection of the field material. We are grateful to all people assisting in the field study.

In the field research, 408 persons with Syrian background responded to our survey comprising 102 questions, of which 58 were structural, 14 were semi-open and 30 were open questions. All survey respondents remained anonymous. Of all respondents, 148 (36%) lived in Zarqa, 96 (23%) in Amman, 60 (15%) in Mafraq, 41 (10%) in Saeediyeh, 31 (8%) in North Bodia close to Zaatari and 31 (8%) in Irbid (Figure 1). We collected our sample from an area in which 95% of Syrian refugees in Jordan live.




Figure 1. Study areas in Jordan.

Of the respondents, almost all (95%) came to Jordan in 2012 or later (i.e., after the war in Syria started). Practically all (over 99%) considered Syria to be their country of origin. The age distribution of the respondents was as follows: Almost two out of five (38%) were between the ages of 18–29 years; over two out of five (45%) were 30–49 years; one out of twelve (8%) were 50–59 years and one out of eleven (9%) were 60 years or older.

The gender distribution of our sample was slightly biased. In Jordan, the registered female Syrian refugees represent 52% of all Syrian refugees both in urban settlements and in the refugee camps (UNHCR 2017a). However, in our sample, six out of ten (60%) were female and four out of ten (40%) were male. We corrected the above-mentioned bias by weighting our sample to correspond it with the actual gender share of Syrian refugees in Jordan. We weighted female respondents with 0.87 and male respondents with 1.19. After this data transfiguration,

the gender and age distribution of our sample complies with the real situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Our findings and tables are calculated applying the above-described computed weight.

Interviews were conducted in addition to the surveys. During the fieldwork, 58 Syrian refugees and irregular migrants were interviewed in different sites of the study areas. Each interview took 5–30 minutes. The interviews had themes that were connected to the survey and facilitated a more in-depth understanding of the issues. Two of the interviews were conducted in focus groups because it was most convenient for these female refugees. Furthermore, interviews were also conducted with 13 stakeholder organizations related to asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. These included non-governmental organizations as well as representatives of private sector enterprises dealing with Syrian refugees in Jordan. These interviews took 15–45 minutes. We thank all respondents for helping us.

All survey responses were analyzed quantitatively in the SPSS program. Main methods included descriptive statistics, cross tables, cluster analysis and regression. The interviews were analyzed qualitatively in the N-Vivo program and quantitatively in the SPSS program. The main methods included content analysis and descriptive statistics. We thank the research assistants for helping in the analysis.

1.4. Research highlights

- There were over 700,000 officially recognized refugees in Jordan in 2017 and almost the same amount of other people of concern without official refugee recognition by the government of Jordan and the UNHCR. Refugees and migrants have an important impact on urbanization in Jordan and are also a significant community of continued international interest.
- Of the 650,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan, almost half (48%) were men and slightly over half (52%) women; every second person (51%) was underage; almost one out of three (29%) were 18–35 years old; one out of six (16%) were 36–59 years old and one out of twenty-five (4%) were 60 years or older.
- Almost all (95%) Syrian refugees live in northern Jordan or the area of Amman that is relatively close to the Syrian border (i.e., within a one-hour car drive).
- One out of five (20%) Syrian refugees in Jordan live in refugee camps (e.g., Zaatari, Azraq and Emirates-Jordanian), and four out of five (80%) live elsewhere in urban settlements.
- According to our sample, which consisted of adult Syrian refugees, asylum seekers and migrants who lived in the spring of 2017 in Jordan elsewhere than in refugee camps, represent a wide demographic of Syrian refugees in

Jordan; they range from the youth to the older population, from people not being able to read to those with a university degree, from the employed to unemployed and from housewives to students.

- The everyday lives of many of the respondents focus on day-to-day survival; social capital and networks help some respondents find employment and other survival means in Jordan and to plan and travel to other countries.
- Almost all respondents stated that they needed money to improve their lives in Jordan; in the spring of 2017, worked one out of four (26%) men and one out of six (17%) women respondents. Some had a work permit, but the majority worked illegally.
- Almost two out of three (65%) Syrian respondents were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations in Jordan; slightly fewer (58%) agreed that they had enough toilets and showers to use.
- Migration wishes and plans of Syrian refugees in Jordan vary. Roughly two out of three (63%) respondents agreed that they plan to go back to Syria; two out of three (67%) men and three out of six (60%) women plan to return; two out of five (39%) women mentioned Syria as the most preferable country in which they would like to live and fewer (31%) men did so.
- Almost three out of four (73%) respondents considered migrating abroad outside Jordan and Syria. Almost every second (47%) individual plans to move there for certain and one out of four (26%) maybe. Especially for younger refugees, Europe is considered also a location where they can move further to other more preferred countries.
- The older a person is, the less s/he is willing to migrate to the European Union.
- Many Syrians, especially the female and older refugee population, have increased their use of the Internet and social media in Jordan.
- Information from the Internet and social media has an impact on where, when and how the Syrians in Jordan migrate abroad; younger Syrians in particular use the Internet and social media for migration-related information and planning.

2. KEY CONCEPTS

2.1. Irregular migrant, asylum seeker and refugee

Among migrants, there are many kinds of people in many kinds of positions. The ways to define irregular migrants are political and widely debated (Peers 2015; McNevin 2017; Crawley & Skleparis 2018). An *irregular migrant* is a person who stays in a foreign country without the full legal permission of that country. They enter the country without permission or stay in the country after their valid permission has expired. They hide from authorities and may cross national borders irregularly. Irregular migrants have mixed motivations to come to their destination countries. It is unclear if the search for political security or economic wealth comes first for irregular migrants (Triandafyllidou 2017). In some countries, irregular migrants are tolerated by the authorities (Düvell 2006b). It is difficult to estimate the exact number of irregular migrants in a country. Not all of them are usually reached in censuses. Irregular migrants are also called undocumented migrants.

Different viewpoints exist on irregular migrants. One viewpoint stresses that irregular migration is a permanent phenomenon in all countries. Therefore, irregular migrants should be given access to public health care, social services and livelihoods, and their legalization should be the task and responsibility of the public authorities. Another stricter viewpoint stresses that irregular migrants should be expelled from the country. Before their expulsion, their access to public services should be limited, if any is given at all. Their presence in a given country is not legally permitted; thus, they are often called “illegal migrants” (see Düvell 2006a). In general, the overall picture of displaced populations globally is fragmented and incomplete. Only during mass migration or crisis events, such as the asylum-related migration in 2015 in the European Union, is light shed on their demography and circumstances (McAuliffe 2018).

Scholars have recently underlined the agency that irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have in various conditions (see Ehrkamp 2017; Triandafyllidou 2017). Furthermore, Crawley and Skleparis (2018) argue that the categories of (irregular) migrants and refugees fail to capture the complex relationship between political, social and economic drivers of migration or their shifting significance for individuals over time and space. Instead, such dichotomized concepts reinforce rather than challenge their problematic foundations. In addition, opinions to understand irregular migrants from a continuum between the above-mentioned legal-administrative and humanitarian positions have emerged. Even some international media have started to pay attention to the terminology. These have started to use more blurred notion of “migrant” (see Dimitriadi 2018, 5–10).

An *asylum seeker* is a person officially seeking asylum, safety and security outside the country of his/her nationality or habitual residence. A person asks for asylum (i.e., the right to be protected in another country). Usually asylum is asked on arrival in that country, and later this person also presents a formal written asylum application. While this application is being processed, the person is called an asylum seeker.

This asylum process can lead to the recognition of the person as a refugee and granting him/her international protection in the country in which the application was presented. If the status of international protection is not granted, the person can also obtain complementary forms of protection and a temporary or permanent residence permit on other legal grounds. However, a negative application decision means the asylum petition is rejected. If no other protection measures are granted, then usually the person needs to leave that country. Otherwise, s/he becomes an undocumented migrant or irregular migrant—see above—and does not have the legal right to stay in that country and his/her other rights are substantially reduced. However, in some countries a rejected asylum seeker can stay and they may receive permission to work and later become legalized (Düvell 2006a). Nevertheless, following the large amount of asylum seekers in Europe since 2015, the Europeanization of migration and asylum policies have increasingly changed toward tendencies of renationalization migration and asylum policies (Brekke & Staver 2018). This means the implementation of stricter policies on (not) granting asylum and stronger measures against irregular migrants. To justify such policies, “Europe” is strategically used or non-used in policy documents and decisions to foster the expulsion of asylum seekers (Slominski & Trauner 2018).

In everyday language, many immigrants and asylum seekers of foreign backgrounds are incorrectly called refugees. However, *refugee* is formally defined by the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 protocol. The convention Article 1(A)(2) states that a refugee is any person who

“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (United Nations 1951).

Following this internationally agreed definition, all refugees need to be outside of their country of nationality or former habitual country, such as the Sy-

rians in Jordan. As mentioned, Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention. Refugees can be defined directly by the authorities, as it is done in Jordan. A person can also achieve the status of a refugee by applying for asylum and receiving a positive decision by the authorities, as explained above. However, the categories between refugee, asylum seeker and migrants are being blurred (Crawley & Skleparis 2018). In 2017, 65.6 million displaced people in the world were forced from home. Among them were nearly 22.5 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18. There were 5.5 million Syrians as refugees (UNHCR 2018c).

2.2. Social capital and networks

Social capital is connected to social networks, norms and trusts, and it influences individuals' positions, opportunities and constraints in a society and community. It refers to those resources that are embedded in social networks (Uzelak et al. 2018). An appropriate social capital helps to get and maintain contacts and social relationships that are important for one's proper fulfillment of life. These are needed for cooperation, use of various kinds of resources and the co-design and mobilization of an individual's and collective's interests and actions (see Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995; Ferragina & Arrigoni 2017). Moreover, social capital may function as a substitute for economic and human capital (Morrisce 2007).

Irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are in a unique situation regarding social capital and networks. On the one hand, many fled from their country of origin and had to leave much of their social networks behind; their social capital diminished from that perspective. On the other, during their journey and especially in the temporary living sites where they spend a slightly longer time, they need to develop new social capital to be able to survive and enhance their positions. According to Uzelak et al. (2018) bonding social capital is created among members of refugee groups. Bridging social capital refers to the connections between individual refugees and outside actors, such as host community or aid agencies.

Refugees build and strengthen social capital by extending social connections and networks and establishing new links in refugee settlements and beyond. The individual capacities of a refugee, community capacities and sociopolitical factors identified by refugees enable refugees and communities to access existing social capital (Pittaway, Bartolomei & Doney 2016). Nowadays, social media is very important in the formation and maintenance of social capital and networks among irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees (Alam & Imran 2015; Jauhiainen 2017c). However, in the situations when vulnerability is more pronounced and immediate needs outweigh any considerations of future benefits, there is a risk that social networks break down completely (Uzelak et al. 2018).

2.3. Migration

Migration is fundamental in the lives of asylum seekers and refugees. Ambrosini (2018) stated that irregular immigration involves interactions and clashes among globalization forces, political strategies, internal interests, humanitarian values, border nostalgia as well as the aspirations, interests and needs of the people involved.

Political, social and economic situations in the world change continuously. Therefore, asylum-related migration has become more complex. The direct linear migration from the country of origin or from the country of habitual residence to a country in which the asylum application is delivered is becoming less frequent. Increasingly, a migrant looking for asylum leaves on a journey without knowing how long it takes and the end destination. For many, the first stop is the neighboring country, where the majority waits for the possibility to return. However, in many cases, the waiting months become years and even decades (Collyer & de Haas 2010).

Some people seeking asylum continue and transit through many countries and places. They may stop during the journey to earn additional money needed for the journey or when the authorities or criminals stop them. Often, another lengthy stay is just outside the target countries, such as Turkey or Libya in the case of people seeking asylum in the European Union. Migrants may have a target country they would like to go to, but circumstances along the journey, changes in asylum-related policies and additional information may change the plans of many migrants (Czaika & Hobolt 2016).

In the European Union, a migrant's asylum application is processed in one country only. That is often the country in which s/he first arrives, for example, Greece or Italy. Continuing the journey becomes more complicated because according to the Dublin regulation, other member states of the European Union return the asylum seeker to the country in which the application was presented (Brekke & Brochmann 2015; Picozza 2017). Without valid passports and visas, migrants cannot officially travel any further. An exception was in autumn of 2015 when hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers came to the European Union, mostly from Turkey to Greece, and were allowed to travel further to other countries, including those in Northern Europe, despite having different rights or being without rights along their journeys (Bilgic & Pace 2017; De Genova 2017; Jauhainen 2017b).

Nevertheless, depending on the results, an asylum seeker may stay legally or illegally in the country in which the application is processed, or s/he may continue forward legally or illegally to a third country. Brekke and Brochmann (2015) have noticed how differences in national receptions in the European Union stimulate the secondary migration of (former) asylum seekers. This challenges the creation of an effective common migration regulation in the European Un-

ion (Cardwell 2018). Asylum seekers whose asylum applications were rejected may also return voluntarily or may be deported by force to their countries of origin. For some returned or deported persons, the asylum journey starts again, sooner or later. It can become a continuous asylum-related migration cycle (Erdal & Oeppen 2017). In addition, even if an asylum seeker gets a residence permit in one country, the person may look for opportunities to migrate to another country (see Brekke & Brochmann 2015; Czaika & Hobolt 2016).

3. MIGRANTS, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN JORDAN

3.1. Refugees in Jordan

Jordan has a history spanning over centuries and decades of welcoming refugees. Circassians and Chechens arrived there in the 19th century and Armenians later in the early 20th century. During the latter part of the 20th century, Jordan took in millions of Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian migrants as refugees. Some of them have stayed in the country, and others have returned to their country of origin or moved further to third countries. There has been and is a continuous presence of refugees in Jordan.

According to the census in Jordan in 2015, the population in Jordan was 9,532,000. Out of that number, 1,265,000 (13.2%) were Syrians of whom half (655,500 persons, i.e., 51.8%) were registered refugees and another half (609,500 persons, i.e., 48.2%) were others (UNHCR 2017b). Of the entire population in Jordan, about 2.9 million (i.e., almost one out of three; 30.4%) are non-citizens. Among the citizens and non-citizens, around 2 million Palestinian refugees came to Jordan following the Arab–Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967. Between 2015 and 2018, the population in Jordan grew by almost half a million, mostly due to arriving refugees.

In 2017, the largest groups of refugees in Jordan were 659,600 people from Syria (89.6%), 63,000 from Iraq (8.6%), 7,900 from Yemen (1.1%), 3,600 from Sudan (0.5%) and 2,300 from other countries (0.3%) (UNHCR 2017a). In mid-2017, the Syrian nationals in Jordan were estimated to be 1,375,715 persons. Of the registered Syrian refugees, 141,000 persons (21.3%) lived in refugee camps, and 519,550 persons (78.7%) lived elsewhere in Jordan (Jordan Response Plan 2018, 17).

Because Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the categorization of migrants into refugees is done nationally and selectively by the national authorities of Jordan. This leads also to the complex legal status of refugees in Jordan. On the one hand, there is flexibility in giving refugee status to many people. On the other hand, not all internationally agreed rights to refugees are applied. However, the issues on refugees are currently implemented in accordance with a memorandum of understanding from the UNHCR (Memorandum 1998). As many examples show, the position of the UNHCR is not necessarily respected by the national authorities in the countries in which it operates. It needs always to negotiate and make compromises with the national authorities, as is the case in Jordan.

Almost all (90%) Syrian refugees in Jordan are poor and live below the Jordanian poverty line (United Nations 2018). Substantial limitations to refugees' involvement in the labor market have fostered those poverty challenges (Con-

nolly 2015). In addition, the political self-organization of refugees in Jordan is substantially restricted by the national authorities. Nevertheless, from 2016 onwards, the Ministry of Labor in Jordan has issued or renewed work permits free of charge and with less administrative requirements to Syrians. The one-year renewable work permits are usually given to refugees for the agriculture, construction, food and beverages and service industry sectors, which require more labor force. In 2017 alone, over 46,000 work permits were issued. Out of those, 13,000 were issued at refugee camps (UNHCR 2018a; Jordan Ingo Forum 2018, 9).

The issuing of work permits started also in the two largest refugee camps. The Zaatari Office for Employment was opened in August 2017, and the Azraq Centre for Employment was opened in February 2018. This facilitates more access to formal work opportunities across Jordan for refugees living in the camps (Jordan Ingo Forum 2018). Consequently, this also helps to improve livelihood opportunities for selected Syrian refugees in Jordan. The action derives from the program “Jordan Compact”, which was launched in 2016 to link international and national humanitarian aid to create jobs and economic opportunities for the Syrian refugees. The idea is that, cumulatively, these measures can provide about 200,000 job opportunities for Syrian refugees while they remain in the country. The program states that this would contribute to the Jordanian economy without competing with Jordanians for jobs (Jordan Compact 2016; UNHCR 2017b).

In addition to having among the highest relative number of refugees in one country, Jordan has also departed the largest number of resettled refugees in the world. In 2016, 21,000 refugees were resettled (i.e., transferred officially from Jordan to another country that granted them permanent settlement in accordance with previously set agreements and plans). Syrian refugees are most often resettled from Jordan to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. However, in 2017, the amount declined rapidly to 5,000 (UNHCR 2018b).

There have been also the return of refugees from Jordan to Syria in the 2010s. The reasons and circumstances for these returns vary. For example, some Syrian refugees or migrants residing in Jordan have not been able to be in contact with their families and relatives in Syria. The latter have been unable to enter Jordan due to stricter restrictions (Achilli 2015). Therefore, some refugees have voluntarily returned to Syria. According to the UNHCR, 8,037 refugees decided to return to Syria in 2017 voluntarily by themselves (Jordan Ingo Forum 2018, 16).

However, there have also been involuntary returns. Many international refugee organizations have criticized this (see, for example, Human Rights Watch 2017a; Su 2017). According to Human Rights Watch (2017b), “During the first five months of 2017, Jordanian authorities deported about 400 registered Syrian refugees each month. In addition, approximately 300 registered refugees each month returned to Syria during that time under circumstances that appeared to be voluntary. An-




Figure 2. Location of refugees in Jordan in 2017. Source: Map modified from UNHCR (2017c).

other estimated 500 refugees each month returned to Syria under circumstances that are unclear.” In total, this would mean about 6,000 refugees returned from Jordan to Syria between January and May 2017. For example, some Syrians in Jordan have been in contact with other people, often relatives, in Syria. The national authorities in Jordan have suspected the reason and content of these contacts. Especially in 2015–2017, fears of possible infiltration by the Islamic State or recruitment of refugees from Jordan to fight in the war in Syria and Iraq were expressed in Jordan. Later, these refugees, who had communicated across the border, were deported to Syria by the authorities. The issue is complex and it is not entirely clear, if some of these returns took place due to physical, psychological or material pressure and how precisely the principle of non-refoulement of international law have been applied in all cases of returning.

In Jordan, refugees are not evenly distributed. In the spring of 2017, over 95% were located in the northern part of the country. According to the Syria Refugee Response's Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, of all Syrian refugees, 177,070 were in Amman, 158,585 in Mafraq, 108,826 in Zarqa and 135,535 in Irbid (Ghazal 2017). The borderland with Syria and the area around the capital Amman were especially densely populated by refugees. Also, the refugee camps located in that area (Figure 2) . Of all the refugees in Jordan, four out of five (81%) were located elsewhere, in places that were not formal refugee camps (UNHCR 2017b). Refugees who cannot prove that they left the refugee camps through the formal bailout procedure and refugees who are caught without a proper identification card are at risk of involuntary relocation to the camps, in recent times, most often to Azraq (Jordan Ingo Forum 2018, 13).

3.2. Refugee camps in Jordan

The war in Syria led to the establishment of several refugee camps in Jordan (Figure 3). Of the large camps, the Zaatari refugee camp was the first opened in July 2012. It was followed by the Mrajeeb Al Fhood (Emirati-Jordanian) refugee camp in April 2013 and later by the Azraq camp in August 2014. Zaatari quickly became one of the largest refugee settlements in the world and also internationally well-known through the media. In 2017, Zaatari had around 80,000 refugees, Azraq around 36,000 refugees and Emirati-Jordanian about 4,000 refugees (Jordan Ingo Forum 2018).

In addition, two camps were in the borderland between Syria and Jordan, namely Rukban and Hadallat. In 2017, they hosted a few thousand internally displaced Syrians. Since 2016, they can no longer enter Jordan. The official status of these camps has varied but the government of Jordan has claimed that these are not its responsibility.

Since nowadays more than four out of five refugees in Jordan do not live in refugee camps, Paszkiewicz (2018) argued that "Jordan does not need refugee camps; a refugee camp plays more of a performative role to show the Jordanian population that the Syrian presence is only temporary, and to demonstrate to the world that despite economic difficulties and a very fragile regional situation, Jordan can still manage to accommodate a large number of refugees without significant problems." In addition, Turner (2015) maintained that encampment has been used by the government of Jordan as a tool to raise funding. Jordan annually receives more than one billion US dollars to help refugees. Furthermore, camps have been used to segregate, control and restrict refugees' labor market participation.

Whether the refugee camps are needed or not, they have been the everyday environment for hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. They also continue to be specific sites in which the mobility of people is limited and controlled. Refugees cannot leave a camp as they wish. To enter a camp, one needs formal




Figure 3. Refugee camps and settlements in Jordan. Source: UNHCR (2018c).

permission. However, the camps have also become sites for tens of international non-governmental and other organizations to help the refugees as well as of active business development. For example, the economic activities in Zaatari generate an annual turnover of hundreds of millions of Euros. More recently, some camps have even become sites for tourism. Short commercial tours are organized for foreign tourists to meet refugees, take selfies with them, donate some small items and “see” the outcomes of global political problems (Bilal 2017).

Zaatari was first opened on July 28, 2012, following the outbreak of the war in Syria in 2011. The refugees started to flee from Syria to the neighboring countries Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. The camp was initially established almost in the middle of nowhere in a very arid area. It is 12 kilometers from the Syrian border, around 10 kilometers east of the town of Mafraq and 45 kilometers north of the




Figure 4. Development of the Zaatari refugee camp in northern Jordan, 2012–2013. Map modified from geodata UNITAR/UNOSAT (2016). Imagery source: Google Earth Pro (2018).

capital Amman. The initial size of Zaatari was 0.9 x 0.9 kilometers (i.e., less than one square kilometer). It had to be expanded soon because of the rapidly growing number of arriving Syrians. The actual size of Zaatari is around 5.3 square kilometers, counting 3 kilometers across.

In autumn 2012, 45,000 refugees were located in Zaatari. When the war reached the southern part of Syria in 2013, the amount of refugees in Zaatari rose quickly




Figure 5. Development of the Zaatari refugee camp in northern Jordan, 2014–2016. Map modified from geodata UNITAR/UNOSAT (2016). Imagery source: Google Earth Pro (2018).

to 156,000. At that time it was the fourth largest settlement in Jordan (Oxfam International 2018). The accommodation was provisional, mostly tents and other elementary shelters. From then, the amount of refugees has gradually declined. Since 2015, it has had around 80,000 refugees in an area of 5.3 square kilometers (Figure 4; Figure 5), thus having a population density of 15,100 persons per square kilometer. The majority of the refugee population in Zaatari is underage.

To better distribute the Syrian refugees, other camps were also opened. The small Mrajeeb Al Fhood (Emirati-Jordanian) camp was opened in 2013 with financial help from the United Arab Emirates. The Azraq camp was re-opened in 2014. Before, the site had been used in 1990 as a transit camp during the Gulf War. In the first year, in 2014, Azraq had 25,000 refugees even though the infrastructure could have hosted more than double that amount. In 2015, the number declined to 14,500 when many Syrian refugees left, legally and illegally, to live elsewhere in Jordan. In 2016, the number rose to 32,000 (UNHCR 2016) but it had the capacity to host over 100,000 refugees.

In the spring of 2017, Azraq had about 35,500 refugees in an area of almost 15 square kilometers. It has an average population density of 2,400 person per square kilometer, but the entire camp area has not been developed. Following the problems of the quickly and rather organically grown Zaatari, the development of Azraq was planned in advance, at least in principle, and instead of tents, refugees were directly placed in prefabricated units (Huynh 2015). The four villages of Azraq are separated by extended unoccupied space. Gatter (2018) argues that this results in a heavily controlled, miserable and half-empty enclosure of symmetrical districts that restricts economic activity, movement and self-expression of its inhabitants. Such planned space is to provide security to the camp by reducing the mobility of the camp residents, prevent their potential collective gatherings as a community and restrict their livelihoods.

Azraq is also the site where illegal Syrian refugees are sent when found. It hosts also a barbed-wire-fenced area known as “Village 5” (V-5). It was established as a secure transit camp section by the authorities of Jordan in 2016. Initially it hosted recently arrived people from Syria, of whom all were considered as potential security risks at the time. By early 2018, the Village 5 has still not been dismantled (Jordan Ingo Forum 2018, 14).

Other refugee camps in Jordan include informal ones at the borderland area with Syria. However, in 2016, the national authorities in Jordan proclaimed that the Jordanian-Syrian border area was a closed military zone in which Syrians from Jordan are not allowed to enter. The government of Jordan officially announced the closure of its border on 21 June 2016, following a suicide-bomb attack at its northeastern border in Rukban (Jordan Ingo Forum 2018). This was an action by the Islamic State against the Jordanian Armed Forces leading to casualties on the Jordanian side.

Zaatari is a site that has been widely documented and discussed in the media and studied by many scholars from various points of view. Since 2012, hundreds of international scholarly articles and reports have been published about it. For this report, we will not summarize these studies and reports but highlight briefly the case of Zaatari with two issues: governance and technology. The Azraq refugee camp has been less studied, but tens of research articles and development

reports have been published, and it has also appeared commonly in the international media. The UNHCR regularly produces fact sheets about the development of both camps.

Zaatari grew very quickly from its establishment on an old military base provided by the government of Jordan in 2012 to 2013 to become the world's second largest official refugee camp. The actual physical size doubled and the population tripled to 156,000 refugees. In the beginning, the infrastructure was provisional. Nevertheless, public spaces for refugees were allowed to form on an organically emergent basis. The non-governmental organizations provided facilities by such as schools, bread distribution centers and medical clinics (Gatter 2018). Later, more solid administrative, commercial and social infrastructure was built.

Zaatari transformed from an emergency refugee camp into an urban refugee settlement. Accordingly, tents disappeared and prefabricated caravans started to appear. According to Huynh (2015), these caravans were a much more durable shelter, less prone to the windy desert conditions and pests, and the doors and locks provided more security for families. However, the surrounding and extension of the caravans were often made of scrap metal and other more cheaply and easily available material (Figure 6). The result was a diversity in the physical appearance of the buildings despite the site and the structure was rather uniform. In addition, locally oriented shops and services were established. Besides around 30,000 small houses or shelters, several schools, hospitals and administration buildings were inside the settlement (Lived Zaatari Project 2015). There is an urban legend of Zaatari in which a mother tells in an evening fairy-tale to her son about a bird that lands on a tree. Surprised, the boy asks from his mother: "What is a tree?" Nevertheless, the camp inhabitants have created many small private gardens and the authorities established larger green gardens in the desert terrain.

The long road inside the camp developed organically into the main shopping area of Zaatari. The UNHCR negotiated with shopkeepers to regulate its size and electricity usage. The road became nick-named as be known as Shams-Elysees. On the one hand, it is a joking version of the prestigious Avenue des Champs-Élysées in Paris, on the other hand, it refers to "al-Sham" meaning Syria in Arabic (Refugees International 2016; Gatter 2018). The road was soon consisted of hundreds of small shops selling food, household goods, and clothes among other things (Figure 7). Along this long street, refugees have created retail spaces for themselves to sell and exchange goods and services (Huynh 2015). The internal location of one's grocery or other shop and service site along the road is important since many similar shops and activities are competing between each other inside the camp.

From the perspective of governance, the development of the refugee camp was top-down regulated and bottom-up practiced. Following the Zaatari Gov-



Figure 6. Inside the Zaatari refugee camp.



Figure 7. The main road inside the Zaatari refugee camp. Photo Credit: Jordi Matas/UNHCR.




Figure 8. Districts inside the Zaatari refugee camp in 2017. Modified from UNHCR (2017c).

ernance Plan of 2013, the camp area was divided into 12 sectors within which accommodations were established and necessary services and resources were provided (Figure 8). The presence and activities of international camp admin-

istration and organizations were also distributed along these sectors. Districts 1 and 2 are the oldest parts of the camp. They were also nicknamed the “Old City”. They benefit from close access to services such as schools and hospitals. These districts are also one of the most densely populated areas inside Zaatari (Lived Zaatari Project 2015). By 2017, there was installed and opened the largest solar plant in a refugee camp with over 40,000 panels (UNHCR 2017d).

Simultaneously with the territorial division, the entire administration and development of Zaatari was hierarchically organized. The national authorities of Jordan and the UNHCR played and continue to play a leading role in the upper management of Zaatari. According to Lived Zaatari Project (2015), the UNHCR tries as much as possible to regroup refugees from the same previous Syrian communities into the same district. This is an attempt to foster a sense of community within each of the 12 districts. However, inside the districts, Syrian tribal leaders make decisions about the camp development with aid workers and upper management (Huynh 2015). The UNHCR and the non-governmental organizations balance between security provision and control and livability of the camp (Gatter 2018).

Over the years, living conditions have improved greatly in Zaatari. The earlier very provisory tents have been replaced with more-or-less consolidated small buildings in which people have created their homes. We did not process our survey in Zaatari, but among our interviewees were people who had lived there. One of them, a man in his 30s, who came to Jordan in 2013 from the Syrian countryside, mentioned bluntly: “I lived outside [the refugee camp in Jordan] and then I was brought in. It was very bad to live there, so I escaped. I don’t have [identification] papers from the United Nations [UNHCR], so I live informally outside the camp. But I have my kids here in Jordan, and I cannot stay in the camp.” According to him, the authorities in Jordan should facilitate issuing personal identification papers and refugee status documents for people to leave the camps. Then refugees could officially leave the camp and receive help from international organizations also outside the camps in Jordan.

Regarding technology, a particularity related to refugees in Jordan are novel technologies used in refugee processes. Before 2017 practically all and in 2017 almost all (93%) registered Syrian refugees were processed using biometric technology. Such technology is based on scanning the iris of each refugee. Furthermore, in 2017, a fifth of the registered refugee population received cash assistance from the UNHCR using iris-scanning biometric technology at cash machines to verify their identities. This has diminished fraud, overhead and waiting time related to aid targeted to refugees. In addition, such technology is much faster compared to traditional identification procedures. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) distributes food vouchers within Jordan’s refugee camps, including Zaatari, through supermarkets that are located in the camps.

The cashiers are equipped with iris scanners that identify customers, payments and the WFP database. A plan exists to expand the iris-scanning system also to refugees living outside the camps in Jordan (UNHCR 2017b; Wong 2017).

Another example of technology is the usage of mobile phones and the Internet in Zaatari. Because refugees do not have the possibility of leaving the site, at least not very often, the need to be in contact through the phone and social media increases. In this respect, the regulated communication practices and policies in Zaatari have changed over time. In 2014–2015, Maitland and Xu (2017) conducted field studies inside the Zaatari camp about the use of mobile phones and related infrastructure. They concluded that the majority of refugees owned mobile handsets and SIM cards. Because of tariff differences, network quality and surveillance issues, a third of their sample respondents had multiple SIM cards. There were also mobile phone sharing practices. The refugees developed various practices for managing network congestion (i.e., some used the mobile phones mostly on weekends and at nights). From one location in the camp, it was possible to reach Syrian mobile networks and use this cheaper option to call to Syria. In addition, some people sent Jordanian SIM cards to Syria so that the phone calls are not so easily traced by the authorities in Syria and Jordan, as noticed by Wall et al. (2015).

During our interviews, a male Syrian refugee who was in his 50s and lived in Zaatari mentioned: “Earlier, I had a mobile phone and sometimes access to the Internet. The connection was bad but near to buildings of some organizations, we could get sometimes access to the Wi-Fi. Over one year ago everything changed. I don’t have any more a mobile phone and for us there is no more access to the Internet from the camp. I think it is something about security. It has been for months since I heard last time from my relatives in Syria. We see sometimes in the television news our villages and our homes but they are now occupied by military people. I have heard that two years ago some people received pictures on Facebook about their home occupied by the military.” Accessing the outside world from Zaatari is challenging.

4. MAIN RESULTS

4.1. Background of respondents

A total of 408 adult persons who were all from Syria responded to the survey. *Section 1.3. Research material and methods* describes the gender and age distribution of the respondents. However, for a better application of the results, we developed our sample further so as to be closer to the gender and age distribution of all adult Syrians who were in Jordan in 2017. Our original sample had a slight over-representation of female respondents and of people older than 50 years.

After this modification and weighting of the data, of all respondents, about half (48%) were male and half (52%) were female. The age distribution of the respondents was as follows: Almost two out of five (38%) were 18–29 years old, more than two out of five (45%) were 30–49 years old, one out of twelve (8%) were 50–59 years old and one out of eleven (9%) were 60 years or older. This distribution corresponds to one that exists among age groups of all Syrian refugees in Jordan. Furthermore, the urban versus rural background of the respondents was rather close to their provenience before the war in Syria.

Differences existed as regards the family and relatives of the respondents. Four out of five (81%) respondents had at least some of their family in Jordan. The one out of five (19%) who did not have family members in Jordan were predominantly younger single adults. Of them, two out of five (40%) had studied at a university. It is a diverse group consisting of former professionals as well as low skilled workers. Three out of four (76%) had relatives abroad. Moreover, out of a group of married people over 30 years old, few (5%) had university degrees. In addition, the group of married people over 50 years old had high school or lower education. All assumed they would spend the rest of their lives in Jordan despite four out of five (81%) planning to return back home to Syria.

Of all respondents, three out of four (73%) had children younger than 15 years old in Jordan. Of these children, six out of seven (87%) attended school in Jordan. According to Human Rights Watch (2017b), “Data compiled by the Jordanian government and published in April [2017] found that only 125,000 out of approximately 220,000 school-age Syrian refugee children [i.e. 57% of them] were enrolled in formal education in Jordan, lower than previous estimates. Jordan implemented programs to reach out-of-school refugee children and waived documentation requirements for them to enroll in school.” The United Nations (2018) estimated that, in 2017, over three out of five (62%) Syrian children were in school. The children of our respondents were more frequently engaged with school than the average Syrian refugee children in Jordan. One out of five (19%) respondents mentioned that their child or children worked in Jordan.

As said, all respondents were from Syria and Arabic was their mother tongue. Almost all (95%) arrived in Jordan after the initiation of the war in Syria. More precisely, one out of twenty (5%) came before 2012, two out of five (40%) came in 2012, almost a half (47%) in 2013, one out of sixteen (6%) in 2014 and very few (2%) in 2015–2017. In total, seven out of eight (87%) respondents came to Jordan in the early part of the war in Syria.

Of the respondents, three out of ten (30%) originated from villages or rural areas in Syria; seven out of ten (70%) came from towns or cities there. In general, no major gender and age differences were seen in people originating from rural or urban areas. In Syria, before the war, 44% of the population lived in rural areas and 56% in urban areas (United Nations 2015).

The education level of the respondents varied. Some persons were without the ability to read and write, and some persons had university degrees. The gender and age differences were visible in education (Table 1). In general, of the people with uncompleted elementary school, almost half (48%) were married people over 30 years old with dependent children. In the spring of 2017, substantially fewer of them (10%) were employed compared to the rest of respondents (24%). In addition, they expressed less often a desire to move to the European Union or to work there. Among another group of young people with uncompleted elementary school, almost four out of five (78%) originated from villages and did not know any English.

The people with the highest education (i.e., attended university) were predominantly male (68%), young (71% under 30 years old), single (75%), originated from cities (82%) and all (98%) had at least some knowledge of English. Of them, almost three out of five (58%) had been students back in Syria. In the spring of 2017, of them substantially more (36%) were employed than the respondents in general (21%). Practically all (96%) of them considered the possibility of moving to the European Union. The largest group of respondents with higher education were 20–40-year-old men.

Table 1. Education level of respondents.

	Elementary and uncompleted school				Middle school				High school				University and college				Total			
	M	W	all	N	M	W	all	N	M	W	all	N	M	W	all	N	M	W	all	N
	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
18–29 years	55	45	20	31	37	63	14	22	40	60	26	39	70	30	40	61	55	45	100	100
30–49 years	40	60	34	59	29	71	23	41	36	64	24	42	44	56	19	33	38	62	100	181
50–59 years	34	66	35	11	65	35	25	7	73	27	22	7	67	33	18	5	53	47	100	34
60+ years	78	22	65	20	73	27	11	3	81	19	15	4	41	59	9	3	71	29	100	36
Total	49	51	31	121	37	63	19	73	42	58	24	93	68	32	15	44	48	52	100	351

Table 2. Respondents' learning of useful things in Jordan for the future.

	Yes %	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	41	Studying 29	Self-control 26	Work skills 22
Woman	49	Self-control 34	Values 24	Work skills 19
18–29 years	52	Work skills 31	Studying 30	Self-control 27
30–49 years	49	Self-control 34	Values 26	Studying 14
50–59 years	28	Self-control 31	Values 31	Studying 25
60+ years	7	Self-control 33	Studying 33	Practical skills 33
Employed	60	Work skills 38	Studying 29	Self-control 28
Inactive	44	Self-control 32	Values 26	Studying 20
Total	45	Self-control 31	Studying 22	Values 21

Usually, the longer one had been in school, the better were one's skills in the English language. In addition, the younger respondents (under 30 years of age) and those coming from towns and cities most often spoke good English. Some had also improved their English in Jordan through employment. The knowledge of English among respondents varied: it was good for one out of nine (11%) of the respondents, moderate for one out of three (35%), little for one out of four (24%) and almost one out of three (30%) did not know English at all.

Those who did not know English at all were most often (60%) married respondents over 30 years old with middle school or lower education. Of them, almost half (45%) originated from villages and still lived in villages in Jordan. Almost all of them feel they can move freely in Jordan (100%), feel they are treated well in Jordan (89%), assume they will stay in Jordan for the rest of their lives (85%) and have not been harassed in Jordan (81%). Only one out of seven (15%) would like to move abroad. There were also younger (18–29 years old) respondents who did not know English at all. Almost all of them had a low level of education, and the majority (56%) of them originated from villages.

An open question was used to determine if a respondent had learned in Jordan something useful for his/her future. Almost half (45%) answered yes, almost a third (29%) answered no and the rest (26%) did not answer to this question. The most commonly mentioned useful issues were self-control skills (31%), studying (22%) and new values (21%; Table 2). It requires enormous patience to be in exile abroad and to be settled in new circumstances in which a refugee's possibilities to influence his or her everyday life and future are substantially constrained.

Of the employed, substantially more (60%) had learned something useful compared to unemployed respondents (44%), and they most commonly learned work skills. More women (49%) than men (41%) expressed having learned useful things. For women, the most important learning was about self-control skills and values (i.e., "softer" issues compared to what most men had learned). Only a few (7%) older people (over 60 years old) had learned useful things in Jordan. In a focus group interview, Syrian refugee women from their early 20s to late 50s

Table 3. Learning something useful according to the respondents' education levels.

Education	Elementary	Middle school	High school	College and university
Learning something useful	16%	20%	24%	40%
Not learning anything useful	63%	13%	17%	7%

mentioned that the most important change was learning that “we have more self-reliance here and we are managing [our] own stuff . Because of the situation there in Syria, we needed to strengthen the social bonds.” A Jordanian women-led organization for Syrian refugee women called Jasmine was the new environment in which these female refugees learned new skills (see also Dlewati 2015).

The higher the level of education a refugee has, the more often s/he is inclined to learn something useful during refuge (Table 3). The ability to learn and accumulate new knowledge even during tough times of forced migration is most common among those who had studied before. Only one out of nine (11%) respondents with college or university degrees did not learn anything in Jordan. Among refugees with uncompleted elementary school, it was over eight times more common to feel one had not learned anything in Jordan; that is, four out of five (81%) responded in that way. Apparently, those with only a limited education have difficulties recognizing opportunities for accumulation of human and social capital in a new environment.

In Jordan, the Syrian refugees, including the respondents, do not represent a similar, clearly definable segment of society. On the contrary, they are from many different backgrounds and generations, and they perform many different practices while in Jordan. Furthermore, many skilled Syrians left Syria, Jordan and Turkey in 2015 for the European Union.

The life of a refugee is often difficult in the country in which they stay. It usually consists of waiting for the opportunity to return home. In the situation of uncertainty and instability—that is how the respondents often characterize the refuge—they have to consider various scenarios for their futures depending on circumstances.

There were differences in the occupations of respondents before they came to Jordan and while in Jordan. In general, occupations depended on many background aspects of the respondents. Among the most obvious aspects are gender, age and education. The employment issues are discussed in the Section 4.4.

Of the respondents, three out of ten (29%) answered that they were fully satisfied with their current lives in Jordan, almost half (45%) answered that they were partly satisfied and one out of four (26%) answered that they were not satisfied with their current lives in Jordan. However, gender, age and occupational differences exist among those who were satisfied and those who were not (Table 4).

Table 4. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with refugees' lives in Jordan as of spring 2017.

	Fully satisfied (%)	Partly satisfied (%)	Not satisfied (%)	N
Man	24	45	31	179
Woman	33	46	21	196
18–29 years	21	52	27	143
30–49 years	34	42	24	167
50–59 years	29	51	20	30
60+ years	33	34	33	31
Employed	18	50	32	78
Inactive	31	45	24	275
Total	29	45	26	375

There were two clear groups of most satisfied respondents. One group (30%) consisted of 30–49-year-old women with children and other family members in Jordan. Another group (17%) consisted of unemployed people over 50 years old with family in Jordan. Of these groups, only one person did not want to return back to Syria. Nevertheless, all assumed that they would stay in Jordan for the rest of their lives.

The least satisfied respondents consisted of three groups. The first group (35%) was 30–49-year-old married people, mostly (89%) with children. Many (32%) of them were employed in Jordan as elementary workers but also as volunteers, tailors or dentists' assistants. However, back in Syria, they had better jobs as managers, trade workers, professionals and technicians. Only a few (6%) of them were fully satisfied with their accommodations, and almost a third (29%) were partly satisfied. Of them, only four people (12%) did not consider migrating to the European Union.

The second group (26%) of least satisfied respondents was young single urban residents of whom five out of six (83%) had high school or higher education. Of them only one person was going to stay in Jordan, and only two people did not want to move to the European Union. One of the interviewed revealed that: "There are a lot of challenges if you have the status as an asylum seeker [or refugee in Jordan]. There is no national ID card, no proper job, no settled future in Jordan, you cannot own anything here as [a] Syrian. There is no possibility to develop oneself. This is not fair, I have to do it behind scenes, no possibility to have a career position, very hard to get to university, no way here in Jordan."

The third group (11%) of unsatisfied refugees consisted of older men with family members in Jordan. Only one of them worked but irregularly. Very many (86%) originated from villages, but in Jordan almost two out of three (63%) lived in cities. No one was fully satisfied with their accommodations, and over a third (37%) were partly satisfied. They all planned or considered moving back to Syria.

The satisfaction with life in Jordan is positively correlated to satisfaction with livelihood conditions: Of those satisfied with their lives in Jordan, all (99%) were

Table 5. Reasons for respondents' dissatisfaction in Jordan.

	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	Livelihood-related 51	Work-related 36	Health-related 11
Woman	Livelihood-related 68	Work-related 35	Family-related 9
18–29 years	Livelihood-related 61	Work-related 49	Education-related 7
30–49 years	Livelihood-related 62	Work-related 34	Health-related 10
50–59 years	Livelihood-related 59	Work-related 24	Health-related 14
60+ years	Livelihood-related 49	Low adaptation 16	No help 8
Employed	Livelihood-related 75	Work-related 42	Education-related 5
Inactive	Livelihood-related 55	Work-related 35	Weak adaptation 11
Total	Livelihood-related 60	Work-related 36	Weak adaptation 8

satisfied with their neighborhoods, almost all had Syrian friends (91%) and Jordanian friends (87%) there and four out of five (80%) were satisfied with their accommodations. The most dissatisfied were more often male (57%), married (63%), 18–29 years old (40%) or 30–49 years old (43%) people who were (self)employed (45%) or students (24%) back in Syria, while only 28% of them had a job in Jordan in the spring of 2017.

The dissatisfaction with life in Jordan correlates to dissatisfaction with living conditions: Of those not satisfied with their lives in Jordan, less than a half (45%) were satisfied with their accommodations, and two out of three (65%) were satisfied with their neighborhoods. In fact, the most frequent reasons for dissatisfaction were bad living conditions, work or health or family problems (Table 5). For instance, if a woman respondent was dissatisfied with something, it was more often bad living conditions (68%) as the burden of housekeeping usually lay on her shoulders. Some (9%) women also expressed worries about family separation whereas men did not mention family issues at all. The older refugees are, the less they are concerned about work-related problems. Instead, they experience more difficulties with health, adaptation and inability to organize their lives without the help of others.

The older people (60 years old or older) most often expressed their dissatisfaction in Jordan; that is, one out of three (33%) did not agree that they were satisfied with their lives in Jordan. Interestingly, of those who were employed, more (32%) were not satisfied with life in Jordan compared to those who were unemployed (24%). Employment seems to lessen the problem of the respondents' adaptation to Jordan, while it increases refugees' vulnerability to work insecurity and bad treatment by others. In addition, almost all respondents (95%) agreed that they needed more money to improve their current situations.

Feeling good or not-so-good is a subjective experience. We asked if the respondents were mistreated in Jordan because they were not Jordanian. One out of five (21%) agreed with this statement, one out of four (26%) did not know how

Table 6. Respondents' feeling of being mistreated because of not being Jordanian.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	18	29	53	168
Woman	24	23	53	190
18–29 years	30	29	41	140
30–49 years	18	24	58	158
50–59 years	15	27	58	31
60+ years	7	15	78	28
Employed	31	27	42	71
Inactive	19	25	56	268
Total	21	26	53	358

to answer and more than half (53%) disagreed (Table 6). Some respondents thus feel that mistreatment is based on their nationality. However, this is a subjective feeling and does not necessarily correspond with the actual reasons for feeling mistreatment or prove that the respondents were mistreated.

Over one out of four (27%) respondents expressed that they had been physically or mentally harassed in Jordan (Table 7). It is difficult to know what different people feel as harassment—it can vary from potentially impolite staring to ugly words and direct physical violence. Not everyone recognizes harassment. Younger respondents especially felt they were harassed. The more educated the refugees were, the more they stated that they experienced harassment. More men (30%) than women (25%) agreed with the statement that they had been harassed in Jordan. Employed people were almost twice (44%) as likely to feel harassed as those who were not employed (23%). This might be because employed people are more exposed to various kinds of contact with people other than Syrian refugees. In addition, some employed people work illegally, thus they are in precarious conditions and may be treated poorly in such conditions. However, we did not ask who harassed the respondents. Besides respondents by themselves mentioning Jordanians as harassing them, fellow refugees and other people might have also caused problems for them.

On the contrary, very few (8%) of the older people expressed that they were harassed mentally or physically. Experiences of mistreatment and harassment tend to decrease with age. Older people experience discrimination and violence less often than young refugees. This can also be a cultural issue in which older people are more respected in Jordan even if they are refugees. Only one out of twelve (8%) of those who experienced harassment in Jordan were fully satisfied with their lives there. Of those who did not feel they were harassed in Jordan, several times more (38%) were fully satisfied with their lives in Jordan.

Those who felt they were harassed in Jordan were identifiable as three groups. The first group (25%) was 25–29-year-old single men with university educations working irregularly in Jordan and planning to move to the European Union.

Table 7. Respondents' feelings of being physically or mentally harassed in Jordan.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	30	11	59	173
Woman	25	13	62	190
18–29 years	33	15	52	145
30–49 years	28	9	63	161
50–59 years	18	7	75	28
60+ years	8	15	77	28
Employed	44	9	47	75
Inactive	23	13	64	269
Total	27	12	61	364

They refused the opportunity to stay in Jordan. It may be also that they are in principle critical towards many aspects in Jordan. The second group (18%) consisted of single and highly educated young women 18–24 years old. They were unemployed in Jordan and considering either staying in Jordan for the rest of their lives or moving to the European Union. The third group (17%) was married middle-aged women (40–49 years old). They had elementary educations and were unemployed. They considered many future options: to stay in Jordan, to return to Syria or to migrate to the European Union.

In our interviews, some of these women who had been harassed mentioned that before the war, Jordanians went to Syria for holidays and Syrians were preferred earlier in Jordan as tourists. However, after the war and the presence of Syrians in Jordan, Jordanians began to think that Syrians received a lot of aid and money that instead of should have been directed to Jordanians. According to these women, Syrians want to dress well even if they do not have very much money (i.e., physical appearance is important to them). Therefore, Jordanians think that many Syrians are rich so they do not need any help in Jordan. A Syrian refugee woman also mentioned that her children suffered because both teachers and fellow pupils treated them badly.

On the contrary, those who had not experienced harassment in Jordan were most often married unemployed women who were 25–29 years old with middle school educations. They also felt that they had not been mistreated in Jordan. In the interviews, some of them mentioned that Jordanians and Syrians are close to each other and that Syrians are the best treated group of refugees in Jordan. Another group that had not experienced harassment consisted of unemployed married men who were 50–59 years old and who had elementary school educations. They also felt that they had not been mistreated in Jordan.

Despite some concerns mentioned above, over four out of five (82%) respondents agreed that they felt safe in Jordan (Table 8). Feeling safe grows with age; young people felt more unsafe than older people. Of those who were employed, fewer (68%) felt safe compared to unemployed people (74%). One out of eleven

Table 8. Respondents' feeling safe in Jordan.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	79	12	9	179
Woman	84	6	10	196
18–29 years	72	14	14	147
30–49 years	87	6	7	164
50–59 years	90	7	3	30
60+ years	90	7	3	33
Employed	68	15	17	72
Inactive	74	19	7	277
Total	82	9	9	375

(9%) people did not feel safe in Jordan, and they were commonly 25–29-year-old single men with college educations. They said that they had been mistreated and harassed in Jordan. They worked irregularly in Jordan, and the majority planned to move to the European Union. Another smaller group who felt unsafe consisted of widowed women who were 40–49 years old. They had middle school educations but were unemployed and planning to move to the European Union. All widowed women of our sample felt unsafe in Jordan. Of those not feeling safe, less than one out of three (30%) were satisfied with their lives in Jordan and less than half (44%) with their neighborhoods.

Feeling safe and feeling one is being treated well are correlated with each other. Of those who felt safe in Jordan, five out of six (83%) felt also that they were treated well. On the other hand, of those who did not feel safe in Jordan, only one out of six (17%) felt that they were treated well in Jordan. Safety is also a gender-related issue. Slightly fewer men (79%) agreed they felt safe compared to women (84%). However, gender difference exists among those who felt they were treated well. Slightly over two out of three (69%) male respondents said that they were treated well as did three out of four (75%) women (Table 9). The older a respondent was, the more often s/he felt they were treated well in Jordan. Such feeling derives from many issues. In general, the older people are more respected and treated well among both Syrians and Jordanians. Also, older refugees are not as often exposed to societal issues in Jordan and spend more time with persons they know. Substantially fewer (56%) of the younger respondents (18–29 years old) felt they were treated well in Jordan. Almost one out of three (30%) of them did not know their safety status, which was many times more than among other age groups.

Religion is a sensitive topic in all countries that have refugees. Not all refugees follow the main religion of the country, and some do not feel religious at all. In Jordan, the State religion is Islam. However, at the same time, the Constitution of Jordan provides for the freedom to practice one's religion and faith. At the same time, the conversion from Islam to other religions and the support for

Table 9. Respondents' feeling well treated in Jordan.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	69	21	10	180
Woman	75	16	9	195
18–29 years	56	30	14	147
30–49 years	80	12	8	165
50–59 years	86	11	3	29
60+ years	90	4	6	33
Employed	62	18	20	75
Inactive	85	7	8	280
Total	72	18	10	375

such activities are prohibited. In Syria, there was also freedom of religion and no official State religion. Most Syrians, about three out of four, are Sunni Muslims.

Of the respondents, almost all (90%) agreed that in Jordan, people are free to practice their religion (not just Islam but other religions, too) or not to practice any religion at all if they do not want to. For matters of sensitivity, we did not ask the respondents other questions about religion or if and what religion they practiced, if they did. However, the answers on freedom to practice religion indicate that religious freedom was not a concern for most respondents. Very few (4%) disagreed about having freedom for religious practices in Jordan. Of them, over two out of five (42%) did not agree that they felt safe in Jordan, almost half (46%) had experienced harassment in Jordan and over half (51%) did not agree that they were well treated in Jordan.

Despite the fact that everyday life for many refugees is challenging, some people are optimistic and look toward the future with trust that life will get better. Of the respondents, three out of five (60%) saw their future positively, whereas one out of twelve (12%) disagreed with such a statement. Seeing or not seeing the future positively can be a life attitude, a result of an in-depth analysis of one's situation or a wishful hope. Seeing the future positively does not necessarily mean that one's life will become positive. Also, what is positive to one person is not necessarily so or at all positive for another person. Furthermore, the future is different to a 20-year-old refugee compared with a 70-year-old person.

There were three groups who most often saw their future positively. The first (29%) group consisted of 25–29-year-old single men with high school educations who worked irregularly, made friends, planned to move to the European Union and wished to work there. The second group (29%) was of married women 40–49 years who had families in Jordan and elementary educations, were unemployed and planned to return to Syria. The third, smaller (12%) group was of young women (25–29 years old) with middle school educations who were unemployed and uncertain about whether to return home to Syria or to migrate further abroad. Of the positively oriented subjects, over four out of five (82%) were satisfied with

their lives in Jordan. Almost all (94%) were satisfied with their neighborhood, and almost three out of four (71%) were satisfied with their accommodations. Many (80%) felt that they were free, in reference to their mobility.

Three groups did not agree that they had a positive future. The first (34%) group consisted of married women aged 40–49 years who had middle school educations, were unemployed in Jordan, had doubts about moving to the European Union or returning to Syria and were unsatisfied with their accommodations and lives in Jordan. The second group (32%) were young single men with high school educations. They had irregular jobs in Jordan and planned to return back home to Syria or migrate to the European Union. They were partly satisfied with their accommodations, neighborhoods and lives in Jordan. The third group consisted of single unemployed young women who had children and who did not want to stay in Jordan but instead wished to return to Syria. In addition, there was a group of pessimistic people—young, mostly single men with university degrees who were mostly employed but unsatisfied with their lives in Jordan. The majority of them did not have relatives in Jordan. All experienced harassment and mistreatment. They may return back to Syria, but all planned to move to the European Union and work there. No one planned to stay in Jordan; moreover, all intended to leave Jordan within one year. Less than half (48%) of the negatively oriented subjects were satisfied with their lives in Jordan, three out of four (74%) were satisfied with their neighborhoods and slightly over half (55%) were satisfied with their accommodations.

Being positive toward the future was also linked with how people trusted other people. Of those who saw their future positively, the majority (60%) agreed that they trusted the people who tried to help them. Of those who did not see their future positively, substantially fewer (i.e., less than one out of four [23%]) trusted the people who tried to help them. A positive life attitude, trusting other people, experiencing satisfaction about one's life in Jordan and feeling well treated are linked together. Of all respondents, half (50%) trusted the people who tried to help them.

The future is also linked to the migrants' and refugees' life goals. Of all respondents, eight out of nine (89%) identified the most important goal in their lives. The most commonly expressed goals were to reach safety and stability (21%), to return home and rebuild Syria (20%) and to provide education for their children (20%). There were differences in the goals as expressed by men and women, by younger and older people and by people who did or did not have children (Table 10). For men in general, the most frequently mentioned (23%) goal in life was to return home to Syria. For almost the same amount (19%) of women, returning to Syria was the most important goal. However, in general, for a greater percentage (24%) of women, the most important was being able to provide education for children.

Table 10. Most important goals in life for respondents.

	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	Return home 23	Safety, stability 22	Good livelihood 17
Woman	Child education 24	Safety, stability 21	Return home 19
18–29 years	Gain education 28	Return home 19	Safety, stability 16
30–49 years	Child education 35	Safety, stability 26	Good livelihood 23
50–59 years	Child education 22	Return home 22	Safety, stability 19
60+ years	Return home 36	Safety, stability 26	Good livelihood 4
Employed	Safety, stability 28	Child education 20	Gain education 16
Inactive	Return home 21	Child education 21	Safety, stability 20
Total	Safety, stability 21	Return home 20	Child education 20

The most frequently expressed constraints to achieve one’s life goals were individual circumstances such as the lack of money or other resources (35%), societal circumstances such as the war in Syria (23%) and the lack of official personal identification papers (7%). Some of these constraints can be removed by an individual respondent. Many constraints are broader societal and international issues, which an individual has very limited opportunity to influence.

4.2. Journey from Syria to Jordan

Jordan is a neighboring country for Syrians, so it is, in principle, geographically and temporally reachable in a rather limited time. However, the war activities created obstacles for people to move quickly out of Syria, depending on the time and situation. There is a geographical division of Syrian refugees. In general, most of those who lived in the northern Syria escaped initially to Turkey, whereas those from southern Syria escaped to Jordan. In fact, among the respondents were many who originated from nearby areas in Syria. In addition, in 2015, hundreds of thousands of Syrians went through Turkey to Greece and other European Union countries as asylum seekers.

The respondents explained why they decided to come to Jordan instead of, for example, Turkey or Lebanon. The most commonly expressed reasons were Jordan’s geographical proximity and safety, the cultural proximity between Jordanians and Syrians and the presence of relatives in Jordan (Table 11). Different people had different reasons. For instance, for an employed man, the social networks in Jordan were of higher value. Many women who dealt mostly with housekeeping had more appreciation for the cultural proximity, which smoothed their path of adapting to the different environment in Jordan. The older people, for whom it may be challenging to get used to a new lifestyle, also appreciated the cultural proximity. Tied migration to Jordan was related to situations in which the head of the family and/or the rest of the family left for Jordan.

Table 11. Respondents' reasons to come to Jordan instead of Turkey or Lebanon.

	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	Geographical proximity 60	Jordan is safe 17	Relatives 13
Woman	Geographical proximity 61	Jordan is safe 18	Cultural proximity 14
18–29 years	Geographical proximity 61	Relatives 14	Jordan is safe 14
30–49 years	Geographical proximity 63	Jordan is safe 21	Relatives 10
50–59 years	Geographical proximity 56	Jordan is safe 29	Cultural proximity 12
60+ years	Geographical proximity 53	Cultural proximity 19	Relatives 17
Employed	Geographical proximity 55	Relatives 21	Jordan is safe 15
Inactive	Geographical proximity 63	Jordan is safe 18	Cultural proximity 13
Total	Geographical proximity 61	Jordan is safe 18	Cultural proximity 12

Before their arrival in Jordan, the majority (59%) had lived in a camp or temporary accommodation. This indicates that people were fleeing from the war and could not come immediately and directly from their homes to Jordan. In 2017, there were still refugee camps on the Syrian side near the border with Jordan. Nevertheless, as Jordan is a neighboring country, only a very few came to Jordan indirectly through another country. In general, those people did not stay in a third country in a camp or temporary accommodation, and if they did, they did not stay there for long.

Of the respondents, only a few (9%) mentioned that someone had tried to prevent them from coming to Jordan. In the survey, we did not ask who had tried to prevent them from migrating. However, in the interviews, it became evident that there was a danger that military or militant forces in Syria might have prevented and stopped escapes, if the respondents had been caught by them. Therefore, some were hiding close to the border. On the Jordanian side, there were no forces preventing them from crossing the border. Nevertheless, soon after they entered Jordanian territory, military and other Jordanian authorities controlled and regulated the mobility of the arrived Syrians. They were registered, and later, many were sent to refugee camps.

Of the respondents, half (51%) said that they had lived in a refugee camp in Jordan and the other half (49%) said that they had not. Of those respondents, who had been in a camp, half (52%) had stayed there less than a month, four out of ten (40%) between month and a year, and one out of twelve (8%) more than a year. Asking about the best thing in the camp, four out of ten (40%) answered “nothing”, one out of six (16%) about safety, security and related issues, one out of eight (13%) about good treatment. Of what was not good in the camp, the respondents mentioned housing facilities (25%), bad living conditions (20%), nothing (12%) and everything (10%).

The government of Jordan, along with the UNHCR, agreed to not issue Asylum Seekers Certificates (ASCs) to those who left the camps without permission

and necessary papers. Not having an ASC in Jordan means that a refugee cannot have access to formally provided aid such as food and money (Achilli 2015). Later, some Syrians were assigned the nationally defined refugee status, but others were not. We also asked their status in the survey. The answers were not accurate and indicate how terminology such as refugee, asylum seeker and migrant is unclear and partially overlapping for the respondents. Of the respondents, almost two out of three (64%) considered themselves as asylum seekers, almost one out of three (31%) as refugees and a few (4%) as a mixture between asylum seekers and refugees and the rest (less than 1%) as residents.

The most common mode to come to Jordan was over land for seven out of eight (87%) respondents. Many of the interviewed had lived in nearby provinces on the Syrian side (e.g., just tens of kilometers away of their current location in Jordan). One out of eleven (9%) had arrived by plane. In the interviews, a Syrian male refugee said that because of the problems in accessing Jordan by land, he decided to fly from Damascus in Syria to another country and from there to Amman in Jordan.

Moreover, one out of three (34%) mentioned that s/he came to Jordan legally, less than one out of three (29%) confessed that they entered the country illegally and another one out of three (33%) did not specify the legality of crossing the border from Syria to Jordan. Among those who came illegally, two out of three (65%) entered through the barbed wire on the border, one out of five (20%) were smuggled in and the rest (15%) just jumped the border fence. Two out of five (39%) mentioned that some of their relatives had been smuggled to Jordan. Two out of three (66%) of those who had been smuggled to Jordan mentioned that their relatives had also been smuggled into Jordan.

The modes of transportation to Jordan changed over the years. In the early years of the Syrian war, it was more common to come illegally (28%) over land (88%). In the latter years, in 2015–2016, the majority came by plane (53%) and legally (54%). There were slight differences among gender and age. Namely, far fewer (9%) men were smuggled compared to women (30%). Women also took planes to reach Jordan slightly more often (11%) compared to men (7%). In addition, younger (less than 30 years old) were more often smuggled (28%) or came by plane (10%) compared to the older people (15% and 4%, respectively).

Over three out of four (77%) respondents came to Jordan directly on the day that they started to leave Syria. Those who arrived in Jordan within 5 days after leaving Syria were predominantly women (54%), married (69%), had dependent children (72%) and were 30–49 years old (51%). People who took at least one year to reach Jordan were mostly male (58%), under 35 years old (69%) and single (55%).

The length of time for the journey from Syria to Jordan varied from immediate arrival to four years. The length time for the journey did not change much

over the years except that with the continuation of the war in Syria, there were fewer people who took a long time to make the journey. Many of those interviewed had lived in the nearby provinces on the Syrian side. In 2012, almost four out of five (78%) respondents came to Jordan immediately after leaving home. Six out of seven (85%) came within a month, and almost all (94%) respondents arrived within a year after leaving Syria. In 2013, almost four out of five (77%) came to Jordan immediately after leaving home. Nearly all (95%) arrived within a month, and almost all (98%) subjects arrived within a year. In 2014, again, almost four out of five (78%) subjects came to Jordan immediately after leaving home, but all arrived within a month. Those few respondents who came to Jordan in 2015 and 2016 came rather quickly and directly.

In general, since the journey was rather short for most people, only a few respondents used Internet/social media/mobile apps during their journeys to Jordan. Of the respondents, one out of seven (15%) did use them. They were most often male (54%), under 29 years old (53%) and with high school or higher educations (69%). Those who had used Internet/social media/mobile apps during their journey to Jordan used it most often for keeping in touch with relatives and friends (65%), navigation (14%) and following the news (6%). The most commonly used programs and applications were WhatsApp (60%), Facebook (30%) and Viber (18%). Of those who had used the Internet during their journey from Syria to Jordan, almost three out of four (73%) arrived immediately at their destinations, one out of nine (11%) arrived in a couple of days, and the rest (16%) took more time.

According to the interviews, for many, the use of mobile phones was complicated and dangerous in the final trajectory just before crossing the border. Mobile telephone network coverage was not always available, and many did not have access to the Jordanian mobile phone network. In addition, there was a fear that the use of the Internet or mobile phones would have been tracked by forces that would have prevented them from crossing the border. Also, general precautions were applied, such as silence (i.e., not talking in a phone) and being invisible (i.e., not showing any light when moving at night).

4.3. Current living place

Syrian refugees in Jordan have different living places. Some live in the capital, Amman, others in smaller cities and towns and some in the north close to the Syrian border. This is the situation in our sample, as well. However, the survey was conducted among people who did not, at the time of survey, live in refugee camps.

The current living place is a physical and social setting. From a physical perspective, it consists of a personal accommodation (e.g., a shelter, flat or house) and its facilities. This accommodation unit is located in a neighborhood that is

the immediate surrounding for everyday life. The neighborhoods vary in size from populations of tens to tens of thousands.

From a social perspective, the current living place is a complex issue. In the survey, we did not address the respondents' social relations inside their accommodations, such as what kind of everyday relations they had in their families. Nevertheless, according to interviews and observations, many respondents had extended families, with relatives nearby. Some of them lived in the same neighborhood, while others lived in other parts of Jordan. Nevertheless, most were very often acquainted with their families. In addition, most had still some relatives living in Syria. Also, many had close family members, more distant relatives and friends who lived in Europe and other countries. Because of the availability of social media and the Internet, some respondents could also be in contact, in their current living place, with families and friends living elsewhere. Therefore, the physical sphere of the current living place is geographically immediate, but the social sphere is both geographically immediate and distant.

This continuum between physical and social environments becomes evident when looking at the best aspects that the respondents mention about their current living places. Of all aspects, the respondents mentioned most often safety and security (40%), family (15%) and friends and neighbors (11%). In addition to the above-mentioned aspects, education, work, cultural proximity and being treated well were frequent answers as well.

Of the best aspects, all were social aspects such as safety, family, friends, work, culture, treatment and freedom. Many were about broader topics that cannot be directly linked to either physical or social aspects in their current living places as well as to life, values and goals. For example, the most common answer of safety and security is relative: it is linked to the living place, its immediate neighborhood and more broadly to Jordan as well as to Syria. From an absolute and relative perspective, the respondents are safer in their current living places than they would have been in Syria. However, the safety of their current living places can be lower than in their living places in Syria before the war.

There were similarities and differences in the best aspects when looked at from the perspective of gender, age and occupation (Table 12). As in the question about reasons to come to Jordan instead of any other country, men demonstrated more inclination to social networks, while women appreciated cultural proximity. Moreover, the more vulnerable a group was (namely, older people and unemployed refugees), the more grateful they were for good treatment in Jordan.

Almost two out of three (65%) of respondents agreed that they were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations (i.e., a house or flat). Slightly more men (30%) were fully satisfied compared to women (23%). More (31%) of

Table 12. Best aspect in current living places of respondents.

	Best (%)	Second best (%)	Third best (%)
Man	Safety and security 33	Friends, neighbors 16	Family 11
Woman	Safety and security 47	Family 18	Cultural proximity 9
18–29 years	Safety and security 31	Family 17	Friends, neighbors 14
30–49 years	Safety and security 48	Family 16	Cultural proximity 11
50–59 years	Safety and security 50	Good treatment 11	Family 6
60+ years	Safety and security 25	Good treatment 10	Family 5
Employed	Safety and security 28	Family 18	Friends, neighbors 16
Inactive	Safety and security 43	Family 14	Good treatment 9
Total	Safety and security 40	Family 15	Friends, neighbors 11

the older people (60 years or older) were fully satisfied compared to the younger (less than 30 years old) generations (24%; Table 13). However, of all respondents, only one out of four (26%) were fully satisfied with their current accommodations. This is fewer (35%) than those who were not satisfied with their current accommodations. There are, thus, some concerns in the respondents' accommodation. However, part of this dissatisfaction is related to their general personal status, everyday life and associated issues as refugees or migrants in Jordan.

The satisfaction between the respondents in the studied areas differs greatly. In Amman, almost three out of four (72%) respondents were fully (22%) or partially (50%) satisfied with their current accommodations. The number of respondents who were fully satisfied with their current living place was higher in all other locations, namely in Saediyeh (35%), Mafraq (29%), Zarqa (26%) and Bodia (26%). However, the combined number of fully and partially satisfied respondents was lower there, at 68%, 71%, 64% and 59%, respectively.

With regard to physical amenities, almost three out of five (58%) respondents agreed that they had enough toilets, showers and other facilities for their use. In general, more men (64%) than women (53%) felt that they had enough toilets, showers, and other facilities. The most satisfied were 50–59-year-old persons, among whom three out of four (74%) were satisfied with these amenities. The

Table 13. Respondents' satisfaction with current accommodations.

	Fully (%)	Partly (%)	No (%)	N
Man	30	36	34	185
Woman	23	42	35	202
18–29 years	24	48	28	146
30–49 years	25	34	41	172
50–59 years	34	32	34	31
60+ years	31	32	37	35
Employed	21	47	32	77
Inactive	25	39	36	283
Total	26	39	35	387

Table 14. Enough toilets, showers and other facilities in use for respondents.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	64	14	22	166
Woman	53	13	34	185
18–29 years	60	16	24	140
30–49 years	54	13	33	157
50–59 years	74	7	19	24
60+ years	53	15	32	28
Employed	63	12	25	68
Inactive	56	14	30	261
Total	58	14	28	351

least satisfied respondents were women and the older people, among whom slightly over half (53%) expressed such satisfaction (Table 14).

In Amman (78%), Mafraq (58%) and Zarqa (52%), the majority of respondents agreed that they have enough toilets, showers and other facilities. In Saeediyeh, less than half (46%) agreed, and in Bodia, less than a third (30%) agreed with this statement. In general, those who did not have sufficient physical facilities were more likely to be dissatisfied with their current accommodations. Over two out of five (44%) of those who were not satisfied with their current accommodations did not have enough toilets, showers and other facilities. In Bodia, men were more often satisfied with their accommodations, and half of them said that there were enough toilets and showers. Women were a majority of those who were dissatisfied with their current accommodation, and nearly all (89%) of them stated that there were not enough toilets and showers for them.

Friends are important for a person's social environment. Of the respondents, four out of five (80%) agreed that they had made friends during their stays in Jordan. Almost all (89%) agreed that they had at least some Syrian friends in the neighborhood, and fewer (78%) but still many had Jordanian friends in the neighborhood. In general, men and women had almost equal numbers neighborhood friends. Of employed respondents, more (44%) had many Jordanian friends compared to inactive refugees (32%; Table 15). This indicates the presence of different everyday practices between employed and inactive refugees (i.e., that the employed are more in contact with Jordanians for joint and shared activities).

On the contrary, two out of three (66%) of those who did not have Syrian friends in their neighborhoods did not have Jordanian friends, either. Of those without any friend in the neighborhood, eight out of nine (89%) did not work in the spring of 2017, although most of them (88%) had arrived at Jordan several years earlier. They were also less often fully (17%) or partially (39%) satisfied in their current lives in Jordan than those respondents who had Syrian as well as Jordanian friends next door (31% and 48%, respectively). In addition, minority,

Table 15. Jordanian and Syrian friends in neighborhoods of respondents.

	Jordanian friends				Syrian friends			
	Many %	Some %	No %	N	Many %	Some %	No %	N
Man	34	44	22	180	40	48	12	186
Woman	37	41	22	197	43	47	10	205
18–29 years	32	40	28	147	42	47	11	152
30–49 years	42	41	17	165	41	51	8	172
50–59 years	26	56	18	31	48	45	7	31
60+ years	23	50	27	33	40	40	20	35
Employed	44	41	15	73	37	58	5	76
Inactive	32	43	25	280	43	46	11	290
Total	36	42	22	378	41	48	11	391

i.e. slightly over two out of five (43%) of them saw their future positively. Among those respondents (26 people) who had neither Jordanian nor Syrian friends in the neighborhood, there were two groups of people: the first consisted of unemployed, married men over 40 years old, and the second group consisted of married housewives with high school or lower educations. The latter were active users of the Internet in Jordan.

There are gendered everyday life spheres of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The most common everyday activities for women are related to their current homes and families. Men more frequently spent some of their free time in the neighborhood socializing with friends (Table 16). In addition, men also worked more often. Besides gender, there were also differences in the everyday activities in the current living place between the employed and the jobless and between younger and older respondents. For example, the older (over 60 years old) were much more often engaged in religious activities than the younger (less than 30 years old) ones, while the latter group studied more often. Employed respondents had less time to spend in their neighborhoods. Except for working, their activities were more focused on specific and limited topics such as housekeeping and communicating with relatives and friends. The working-aged unemployed had more time but fewer possibilities for consumption. Their most common activities were housekeeping, socializing and studying.

Almost four out of five (78%) stated that they could move in and out of their current living places as they wanted. Different people disagreed with this; among them were women, older men, unemployed men and younger men. The reasons for such opinions were not asked directly. However, indirectly, one can find several reasons that are different for people with different backgrounds. For women, it might not have been their decision to stay; the decision might be made by the head of the family, as a majority of these women were married (67%) and had children (72%), or they might have been the sole adult person in

Table 16. Common activities in respondents' neighborhoods.

	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	Socializing 36	Housekeeping 35	Working 15
Woman	Housekeeping 53	Socializing 18	Studying 15
18–29 years	Housekeeping 34	Socializing 32	Studying 18
30–49 years	Housekeeping 55	Socializing 20	Working 12
50–59 years	Housekeeping 45	Socializing 24	Working 18
60+ years	Housekeeping 40	Socializing 30	Religious activity 7
Employed	Working 39	Housekeeping 33	Socializing 28
Inactive	Housekeeping 48	Socializing 27	Studying 13
Total	Housekeeping 45	Socializing 26	Working 13

a family. Moreover, all of them needed more money to improve their current situation. Nevertheless, this limitation in movement raises dissatisfaction and anger, as practically all (97%) of these woman respondents did not want to live the rest of their lives in Jordan, and two out of three (67%) preferred to move to the European Union.

Of younger single men who felt that their movements were restricted and saw the lack of resources as a major challenge in the spring of 2017, only one out of three (33%) of them worked, despite the fact that a majority of them (56%) had a university degree and eight out of nine (89%) were former students. All of them agreed that they needed more money to make their lives better. Moreover, they seemed to encounter other negative experiences in Jordan: only one out of nine (11%) agreed that Jordanians treated refugees well, the majority (56%) had experienced harassment and two out of three (67%) claimed that they were mistreated because they were not Jordanians. The situation of unemployed male refugees seemed similar to that of young single men: they experienced financial difficulties and felt that they were not treated well due to their Syrian nationality.

In general, the respondents were rather uncertain on the possibilities of non-governmental organizations (NGO) abilities to give aid for them. Of the respondents, one out of four (27%) agreed that NGOs can help them, almost a half (48%) did not know about it and one out of four (25%) disagreed that NGOs could help them. Of all respondents, one out of twelve (8%) mentioned that other refugees help them, one out of fourteen (7%) that an individual Jordanian help them, one out of fourteen (7%) that the government of Jordanians help them and one out of six (17%) that others, such as the UNHCR, the Care organization, the Caritas and charities, help them. In general, most respondents could not distinguish from whom they receive help and not even always if they had received help from any organization. Nevertheless, over a half (55%) mentioned that they had received some help. Most often were mentioned cash or vouchers (53%), education (13%) and protection (11%).

4.4. Employment

Employment of Syrian refugees in Jordan is a challenging issue for all parties. Refugees have often been blamed for creating an increase in job competition in the host community, decreasing wages, contributing to the growth of a shadow economy and expanding child labor (Achilli 2015). However, many of the above-mentioned worries have not been verified in studies. The presence of refugees, under certain conditions, may slightly decrease the general wage level, but in Jordan, there should not be too much concern about competition for jobs between Jordanians and Syrian refugees. The refugees mostly compete there with other immigrants, namely Palestinians, Sudanese or Egyptians (Carrion 2015; Turner 2015; Fakih and Ibrahim 2016). Furthermore, Fakih and Ibrahim (2016) demonstrated that there is no direct relation between the influx of Syrian refugees and Jordanian economic circumstances.

Nevertheless, the employment of Syrian refugees has remained undesirable among the wider public in Jordan. The policies of the government of Jordan aimed at reducing its reliance on foreign low-wage labor resulted in negative coping mechanisms among refugees. Excluded from the formal market, refugees had to turn to illegal employment, thus contributing to the rise of the grey economy (Achilli 2015; Turner 2015). Around 2015, about one out of five Syrians were employed illegally in Jordan (Carrion 2015).

Employment among Syrians in Jordan varies a lot. In general, refugees have difficulty accessing employment in Jordan due to individual, institutional, societal and cultural constraints. Therefore, many are unemployed. In Jordan, there are substantial institutional restrictions for Syrians and other refugees who wish to be involved in the labor market. By the mid-2010s, only one out of ten refugees had obtained a work permit in Jordan (Carrion 2015). Moreover, Syrians are allowed to work only in limited employment sectors. In most cases, Syrian refugees cannot access formal employment and are not legally allowed to have access to many jobs. However, from 2016 onward, the government of Jordan has become more active in facilitating work permits to Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2018a).

Societal and cultural issues matter, as well. In general, women have fewer opportunities to work because of the traditional division of gender roles. In practice, men work more often; refugee women are inclined to seek employment in Jordan seven times less often than men (Turner 2015). The result is that women take care of the home, and men work, if they can find a job. However, in Jordan, there are also many examples in which women have become active in the labor market. For example, they have commercialized their otherwise family-oriented skills in sewing, handicraft and food-making. In the interviews, it came out that some Syrian refugee women became emancipated because they had the opportunity and necessity to have paid employment outside home. For many,

it was the first time that they earned their “own” money from their activities. However, Lokot (2018) critically points out that already in Syria some women were heads of households because their husbands were working abroad. Too often Syrian refugee women in Jordan are labelled “traditional”, thus grouping all into a seemingly homogenous collective despite that is not the reality.

Additional individual constraints derive from the low education levels and skills of many Syrian refugees who originate from the countryside. They were, for example, shepherds in Syria, but moving into urban or semi-urban environments in Jordan mean that they cannot work in this field anymore. Also, some refugees are too old or too young to work, and others have health problems or stay home as housewives. In Jordan, majority of Syrian refugees are under-aged (UNHCR 2017a).

Most Syrian men, except for students and the older people, were employed in Syria before leaving the country. Those with limited educations and rural backgrounds often worked in simple agricultural jobs. Those with higher educations and urban backgrounds worked in office jobs, enterprises and public administrations. For highly educated Syrians, including those with governmental job backgrounds, it has been difficult to find similar jobs in Jordan. Nevertheless, the differences in the occupational statuses and occupations of respondents in Syria do not convert directly into differences in the everyday lives of the Syrian refugees in Jordan. In addition, some have part-time jobs, seasonal jobs or irregular working periods. Some Syrians work regularly; for example, some work five days a week. In addition, a few Syrian refugees work almost every day and sometimes for more than eight hours every day.

Of all respondents, one out of five (21%) worked in the spring of 2017, at least irregularly. One out of four (26%) male respondents and one out of six (17%) of female respondents were employed. However, only a few (7%) had full-time employment. The most active people engaged with work were respondents between 30 and 50 years old (Table 17). Of the men, 7% worked full-time, 7% part-time and 12% irregularly. Of the women, 6% worked full-time, 2% part-time and 9% irregularly. Of those who worked in the spring of 2017, almost every second person (47%) had worked for the most of the period they had been in Jordan, one out of seven (14%) had worked a few times and one out of four (24%) had worked little. Of those 78% respondents who were not working in the spring of 2017, only one out of four (26%) had been ever employed in Jordan before, despite having spent years in Jordan. In total, almost three out of five (58%) respondents had never been employed in Jordan. Furthermore, the older a refugee was, the less likely it was that s/he was employed. Of the older people (60 years or more), one out of eleven (9%) was somehow employed.

For a refugee family, it is of substantial help for survival that at least one person works. If more people work, then the family might earn surplus income that

Table 17. Respondents' employment in the spring of 2017.

	Full-time (%)	Part-time (%)	Irregularly (%)	No (%)	N
Man	7	7	12	74	178
Woman	6	2	9	83	196
18–29 years	7	7	12	74	150
30–49 years	6	4	12	78	160
50–59 years	3	0	3	94	29
60+ years	5	0	4	91	33
Total	7	4	10	79	374

can be used for increasing consumption, namely for using money for something other than everyday survival items such as food, water and accommodations. However, sometimes, the family has only one or two persons. Among the respondents, almost every second (47%) case was one in which no one in the family worked. In every fourth case (27%), one person in the family worked. The cases were very rare in which two persons in the family worked (4%) or in which three or more persons in the same family worked (1%). All of these people worked full-time, part-time or irregularly.

Those families in which both spouses worked typically consisted of men and women over 30 years old (70%) with high school or higher educations (70%). In Syria, they were employed as teachers, managers and trade workers. In the spring of 2017, they worked in more or less the same spheres in Jordan. In those families in which no one worked, the spouses were typically aged 30–49 (55%) or over 50 years (30%) with middle school or lower educations (65%). In Syria, they were employed as elementary workers, drivers and sales workers. Of all respondents, every second (50%) one sought from the Internet information about job opportunities in Jordan. Of male respondents less than 30 years old, slightly more (55%) used the Internet to search for jobs in Jordan. Of those who were employed, over three out of five (62%) used the Internet to find other employment opportunities in Jordan, and only one out of six (16%) did not search it at all.

Of those employed in the spring of 2017, over two out of five (43%) were employed in a company, one out of four (25%) were self-employed with their own businesses, almost one out of three (31%) had mixed employment and self-employment and a few (6%) had other type of employment (e.g., freelancer, volunteer or farmer). There were differences by gender, age and education. Men were more often employed by companies (46%) or self-employed (24%) than women (37% and 17%, respectively). On the contrary, men were less-often employed in mixed kinds of employment (21%) than women (40%) were.

The people most often engaged in private sector enterprises had college or university educations (79%), three out of four (75%) were under 35 years old, three out of five (61%) were single and almost two out of three were men (65%). The majority (52%) of this group were employed or self-employed back in Syria. During their

Table 18. Best and worst in respondents' current work.

Best in current work (%)	Worst in current work (%)
Psychological comfort 23	Hard working conditions 28
Income 19	Low salary 17
Volunteering and helping others 17	Employment insecurity 14
Social relations 15	Injustice in working place 13
Learning and new experiences 7	Other reasons 31
Other reasons 19	

stays in Jordan, eight out of nine (89%) had worked before their current employment at least a little. Those who were self-employed with their own businesses were frequently (81%) younger than 35 years. Over two out of three (69%) were men, and slightly over half (53%) had high school or higher educations. Back in Syria, some of them had been managers and professionals, while others were drivers, elementary workers or engaged with trade. During their stays in Jordan, almost all (94%) had worked at least a little before their current employment.

The respondents also answered whether their work had helped them to integrate in Jordan. Of the men, two out of five (41%) agreed fully, and almost two out of five (37%) agreed partially that their work had helped them integrate in Jordan. Over one out of five (22%) answered “no” to this question. Of the women, similarly two out of five (40%) agreed fully that the work had helped them integrate in Jordan fully, and one out of three agreed (32%) partially on this. Over one out of four (28%) did not see work as helping to integrate them.

In general, almost four out of five (78%) said that their work was helping them integrate in Jordan. Those who were most positive toward integration to Jordan through employment were 40–49-year-old married men with middle school educations who felt that they were treated well in Jordan. Another group consisted of 30–39-year-old women with high school educations who also felt treated well in Jordan. The third group was composed of single 24–29-year-old men with college educations who had doubts toward experiences of harassment as well as good treatment in Jordan. Those employed in private companies as well as those employed as teachers, volunteers, doctors, tailors and cooks felt most that their work helped in integration.

The respondents mentioned the best and worst aspects of their current employment (Table 18). Among all employed respondents, one out of seven (14%) did not find anything bad in their current job, whereas around the same amount (13%) did not find anything good in their current employment. Those employed who mentioned the best aspects mentioned most often psychological comfort (23%), income (19%) and helping others with or without volunteering (17%). Those employed who mentioned the worst aspects mentioned most often hard working conditions (28%), low salary (17%) and employment insecurity (14%) in their current jobs.

4.5. Migration wishes and plans

Syrians in Jordan have many kinds of migration wishes and plans. Some want to return to Syria, their country of origin. Others often want to migrate to the European Union, and perhaps later to other countries. In such unstable situations of refuge, respondents have to consider various scenarios for the future.

One out of four (25%) respondents had, at the same time, plans to return home and plans to migrate to the European Union. In addition, European countries may not be the final destination for the refugees. For fewer than half of respondents (44%) who planned to move to the European Union, European countries were the most attractive destinations for settling down. The generally accepted assumption that the European Union is the most desirable living place for Syrian refugees in Jordan must be questioned and tested rather than taken for granted.

The attitudes of respondents toward Jordan differ. Some want to stay in Jordan in the same place in which they are now, while others wish to move to other places inside Jordan. The official migration of Syrians inside Jordan is regulated. There is very little accurate information about how unofficial migration inside Jordan takes place. We do not discuss this in this report at length. Furthermore, in this research report, our focus is on Syrians who do not live in the refugee camps in Jordan. However, we briefly discussed the migration of Syrians in camps in Chapter 3.

An indication of non-migration is thinking that one will remain in Jordan for the rest of one's life. Of all respondents, one out of five (21%) agreed that they would probably live the rest of their lives in Jordan. In general, more than twice as many (34%) people over 50 years old thought they would probably stay in Jordan compared to people less than 30 years old (15%).

Those who agreed most often to remain in Jordan were married women 40–49 years old having elementary education and who had been and were unemployed but who were without any experience of harassment and enjoyed good treatment in Jordan. Another group was young single women 24–29 years old with high school education and who worked irregularly in Jordan. There was also a group of men with middle school or lower education. They did not feel that they were mistreated in Jordan or that they would not be safe. They knew their rights in Jordan, and only one of them had experienced harassment in Jordan.

Inside the group of those who would like to stay in Jordan for the rest of their lives, there is a group of strongly motivated unemployed women less than 50 years old who do not want to return to Syria or migrate to the European Union. They are pretty satisfied with their accommodation, neighborhood and life in general in Jordan. They enjoy free mobility, good treatment and freedom of religion, know their rights in Jordan, trust people who are helping them and feel

Table 19. Respondents agreeing to probably stay in Jordan for the rest of life.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	19	55	26	172
Woman	23	60	17	194
18–29 years	15	58	27	143
30–49 years	22	60	18	158
50–59 years	34	50	16	31
60+ years	33	53	14	31
Employed	23	49	28	74
Inactive	20	61	20	271
Total	21	58	21	366

safe. They made friends during their stay in Jordan, and the majority saw their future positively. Almost three out of four (72%) of those who may stay in Jordan for the rest of their lives wanted to return to Syria. Slightly over one out of four (28%) think about migration to the European Union (Table 19).

Those who did not agree with the statement that they would probably remain the rest of their lives in Jordan were most often men under 30 years old who were most often also single. The majority (72%) of them had college or university degrees. They were partly satisfied or unsatisfied with their lives in Jordan. All were active weekly users of the Internet, the majority had phones with Internet access and they searched on the Internet for ways to leave Jordan or about the situation in Syria. All agreed they might want to move to the European Union to work there, and almost all planned to leave Jordan within one year (i.e., by spring 2018). Of those who did not plan to stay in Jordan, one out of two (51%) had college or higher education. Of them, almost two out of three (63%) planned to move to the European Union, and about the same number (64%) wished to return home to Syria.

Almost one out of three (31%) respondents agreed that they would leave Jordan within one year (i.e., by spring 2018). The typical person to agree with such a statement was a man (57%), under 30 years old (48%), single (45%), who held a college or university degree (40%). Of these respondents, more than two out of three (70%) planned to move to the European Union, and about every second (52%) wished to return back home to Syria.

One out of four (24%) respondents were very consistent in their responses to leave Jordan. Of them, the first group were refugees who did not want to stay in Jordan and planned to return to Syria. The second group consisted of refugees who planned to move to the European Union because they did not want to stay in Jordan. Four out of five (79%) of those who wanted to migrate to the European Union planned to leave Jordan within one year (i.e., by spring 2018). At the same time, every second (52%) respondent hoped to return back home to Syria within this time period. However, since the war in Syria continued, it was impossible.

Almost one out of three (31%) agreed that they could freely choose where they would go after leaving Jordan. Despite there being many pulling factors in the potential and desired destinations, whether in Syria or elsewhere, there were also many constraining factors to reach these countries. These relate to individual and family-related circumstances as well as institutional border controls, travel permissions and residence permissions. Anyway, there are three short-term options: to stay in Jordan, to return to Syria or to migrate to another country. In a focus group interview, four Syrian refugee women around 50–60 years old mentioned that if a Syrian refugee leaves Jordan for abroad, for example, for the European Union, then s/he cannot return to Jordan. It is not clear for us under which circumstances this might be so, but such beliefs also meant that the realization of the option to return to Syria or migrate further to a third country was a fundamental decision, so many still wonder about it and its consequences.

4.5.1. Return migration to Syria

The desires and plans of Syrian refugees to return to Syria varied. Nevertheless, nearly two out of three (63%) respondents confirmed their plans to return to Syria. More men (67%) than women (60%) expressed a plan to return to Jordan. In general, of the older people (over 60 years old), over three out of four (77%) planned to return. Of those who were young (less than 30 years old), three out of five (61%) planned to return. The highest share (80%) of those planning to return were 50–59 years old. In 2017, one out of five (21%) respondents were not sure if they would return or not. The remaining one out of six (16%) were sure that they would not return (Table 20). After several years in Jordan, substantially more still considered returning back to Syria rather than other options.

The respondents in different settlements had different views on returning. In Amman, 61% planned to return and 14% did not. In Mafraq, these numbers were 60% for return and 19% not, in Zarqa 65% for return and 16% not, in Bodiya 88% for return and 7% not, and in Saediye 43% for return and 23% not.

Table 20. Respondents with plans to return to Syria.

	Yes (%)	Maybe (%)	No (%)	N
Man	67	19	14	179
Woman	60	23	17	197
18–29 years	61	24	15	150
30–49 years	59	23	18	162
50–59 years	80	6	14	29
60+ years	77	13	10	32
Employed	64	29	7	75
Inactive	63	19	18	280
Total	63	21	16	376

Different people with different motivations wished to return to Syria. These people included both highly skilled professionals and elementary workers, those having lower education (51%) and those with college or university degrees (25%), and those who plan to move to the European Union (44%) and those who do not to move there (34%). On the contrary, a typical person not planning to return was slightly more often a woman (56%), not employed at the moment (90%) and planning to move to the European Union (61%).

Of the respondents, slightly over one out of three (35%) mentioned Syria as the most preferable country in which to live. Men (31%) mentioned Syria as such a country less often than women (39%). Those 50–59 years old mentioned Syria as the most preferred country over two times as often (48%) as young Syrian refugees (22%) (Table 21). In addition, a majority (56%) mentioned Syria or a more specific place in Syria as the place in which they would like to be in three years (e.g., by spring 2020). In conclusion, over half (56%) would like to be in Syria in three years, but about one-third (35%) mentioned Syria as the most preferred country in which to live. There is the potential for many refugees to migrate further from Jordan since Jordan was mentioned as the most preferred country by only one out of nine (11%) respondents. Also, the war damages make it more difficult to return to Syria despite many respondents preferring Syria over other countries. Syrians have lived a few years in Jordan, and many still consider that it would be possible to return to Syria, their country of origin.

For the younger (18–29 old) respondents, the most preferable countries in which to live are countries other than in the European Union, Syria or Jordan. Among other age groups, Syria is the most frequently mentioned preferred country in which to live. For those who were employed in the spring of 2017 in Jordan, the most often mentioned preferred countries were in the European Union (Table 21). Northern Europe countries are also popular among the younger generation of Syrians and those who are more active users of the Internet and social media.

Table 21. Respondents' most frequently named preferred countries to live.

	Syria (%)	Jordan (%)	In the EU (%)	Other (%)	Don't answer (%)	N
Man	31	8	33	32	12	172
Woman	39	14	22	21	24	183
18–29 years	22	8	32	34	9	141
30–49 years	41	14	25	25	17	150
50–59 years	48	10	24	17	16	28
60+ years	45	10	26	14	6	33
Employed	20	12	40	35	9	72
Inactive	38	11	26	25	10	264
Total	35	11	28	27	13	355

Table 22. Activities in Syria after the respondents' possible return there.

Man (%)	N	Woman (%)	N
Working 21	13	Rebuilding home country 30	31
Rebuilding Syria 19	12	Reuniting with family members 15	16
Living in a safe and stable place 11	7	Working 11	11
Reuniting with family members 8	5	Rebuilding house 10	10

Those who would like to return to Syria in three years (by 2020) would like to be engaged in normal everyday activities there. Their most preferred activities in Syria would be working and rebuilding Syria as well as reuniting with family (Table 22).

4.5.2. Migration abroad elsewhere than to Syria

To migrate further abroad from Jordan is a complex topic for Syrians. In 2017, when the survey was conducted, there was no immediate hope that the war in Syria would end in a short time. Nevertheless, it was still possible that the war would end in a reasonable time. Therefore, many Syrian refugees still considered Jordan to be a temporary place to stay.

In 2015, a very large number of Syrians escaped and traveled to the European Union. In total, 363,000 Syrians presented in 2015 an asylum application in one of the European Union member states. In 12 member states, they were the largest groups of asylum seekers, and in an additional six countries, they were the second- or third-largest group. In Finland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom, they were not in the top three nations (Eurostat 2016). Many Syrians also received a refugee status and a right to stay in one of the European Union member states.

However, access to the European Union was made more difficult in the spring of 2016. The previously rather fast and relatively easy passage through Turkey was made difficult or, in many cases, impossible. From Jordan, it was difficult to reach Turkey, so the other possible route to reach the European Union would be through northern Africa to Libya and further to Italy. However, that route was dangerous, and it had become expensive after the passage through Turkey was nearly closed. In 2016, the number of asylum applications in the European Union by Syrians slightly fell into 335,000. Syrians were not among the top three nations who presented an asylum application in the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom (Eurostat 2017).

Many Syrians had friends, relatives or even family members who had reached Europe during the war, or even before. Of respondents, over two out of three (69%) had family members or friends living abroad. Among the respondents, a young man with higher education working in Jordan most often had friends in the European Union. Another larger group with contacts abroad were married

Table 23. Respondents' friends or family members in the European Union countries.

	Yes (%)	No (%)	N
Man	73	27	180
Woman	66	34	193
18–29 years	74	26	146
30–49 years	66	34	165
50–59 years	69	31	28
60+ years	61	39	32
Employed	73	27	75
Inactive	69	31	277
Total	69	31	373

women 30–49 years old whose spouse worked in Jordan. Friends or family members were found in many countries. Respondents may not have mentioned all European Union member states in which they had friends or family members. The most commonly mentioned countries were Germany (57%), Sweden (13%), the United Kingdom (9%) and the Netherlands (9%). These were also countries in which Syrians had most often presented asylum applications (Table 23). Almost one out of three (31%) respondents did not have any friends or family members in the European Union. These were respondents 30–49 years old with high school or lower education and who lived with relatives in Jordan. In addition, there was also a small group of relatively highly educated young single males with college or university degrees who did not have relatives abroad. All of them had Syrian and Jordanian friends in Jordan.

Almost three out of four (73%) respondents considered migrating to the European Union; almost every second (47%) planned to move there for sure, and one out of four (26%) maybe planned to move there. More than one out of four (27%) were not planning to move to the European Union. The most reluctant to move to the European Union were female (65%) and over 30 years old (73%) with middle school or lower education level (74%). Of them, almost all (93%) planned to or might return to Syria. There were also differences in gender and age of the potential migrants. For example, the older a person was, the less s/he was willing to migrate (Table 24). Moreover, being employed seems to have a positive impact on a desire to move abroad. In all, substantially more men (56%) than women (38%) planned to move to the European Union.

Those who planned to move to the European Union most often mentioned good living conditions (41%), education opportunities (25%), safety and peace (12%) and job opportunities (12%) as reasons to migrate. These are clearly pulling factors. Among those refugees who expressed a desire to move to one specific European Union member state, the countries most often mentioned were Germany (38%), the United Kingdom (31%), Switzerland (14%) and Sweden (13%) (Table 25). Respondents who mentioned Germany as their preferred country in

Table 24. Respondents' plans to move to the European Union.

	Yes (%)	Maybe (%)	No (%)	N
Man	56	25	19	178
Woman	38	27	35	185
18–29 years	51	30	19	142
30–49 years	44	26	30	155
50–59 years	49	20	31	28
60+ years	35	16	49	34
Employed	54	25	21	73
Inactive	45	26	29	266
Total	47	26	27	363

which to live logically also often mentioned it as their destination country. In a separate question, one out of three (34%) respondents agreed that Germany was the most desired destination in Europe, whereas almost the same number (35%) did not agree with that. Germany was mentioned as the first or the second most common destination country among all respondent sub-groups.

There was a small group of respondents who were planning to migrate to the Northern European countries (9%). These were mostly male respondents (71%), young (54% under age of 35), married (63%) and with dependent children (72%). The main reasons for migration were education opportunities (35%) and good livelihood (30%) there. Of them, three out of four (74%) had at least some knowledge of English, and almost the same number (72%) had a high school or higher education level. In Syria, they worked as professionals, trade workers, clerks, drivers and elementary workers. Almost all (94%) would like to continue their professional activities in the European Union. Four out of five (81%) have relatives abroad, mostly in Germany and Sweden. For the slight majority (54%) of them, Europe is the most desirable place of all.

We asked a separate question regarding whether the respondents would seek asylum in Finland. In that country, Syrians were rather few to arrive in 2015. 877 applications were presented, or 2.7% of all asylum applications in Finland, in

Table 25. Respondents' wished destination countries in the European Union.

	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	United Kingdom 41	Germany 32	Switzerland 16
Woman	Germany 46	United Kingdom 18	Sweden 12
18–29 years	Germany 38	United Kingdom 26	Switzerland 15
30–49 years	Germany 34	United Kingdom 33	Switzerland 18
50–59 years	Germany 58	Sweden 35	United Kingdom 26
60+ years	United Kingdom 46	Germany 40	The Netherlands 10
Employed	United Kingdom 36	Germany 35	Switzerland 20
Inactive	Germany 39	United Kingdom 29	Sweden 15
Total	Germany 38	United Kingdom 31	Switzerland 14

Table 26. Finland is a country in which the respondent might seek asylum.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	No answer (%)	N
Man	61	19	20	13	171
Woman	36	33	31	14	183
18–29 years	56	26	18	10	139
30–49 years	42	31	27	14	156
50–64 years	51	13	36	14	29
65- years	40	14	46	21	28
Employed	56	22	22	11	71
Inactive	46	27	27	11	262
Total	48	26	26	13	354

that year (Finnish Immigration Service 2018). In the survey in 2017, over two out of five (42%) respondents answered “yes” that they might seek asylum in Finland, almost one out of four (23%) considered “maybe” for this, and almost one out of four (23%) said “no”; a few (13%) did not answer. Finland is not among the most preferred countries for Syrians to migrate from Jordan.

The typical person who responded in the affirmative about seeking asylum in Finland was young (61% were less than 30 years old), male (61%) and living in Amman or Zarqa. One out of six (16%) of them did not have relatives in Jordan. Of those who answered that they would potentially seek asylum in Finland, seven out of eight (88%) were hoping to work in Europe. In addition, over three out of four (77%) had at least some command of English, and over one out of five (22%) had studied at the university level in Syria. Every second (51%) used the Internet on a daily basis, and more than three out of four (77%) did so at least weekly. Almost half (45%) searched the Internet for information about routes to reach Europe or about places to live there. However, one out of nine (11%) did not use the Internet. Only a few (7%) were ready to use informal or any other illegal ways to reach Europe. On the contrary, the majority preferred to participate in the resettlement program organized by the UNHCR. Those who did not consider seeking asylum in Finland were generally female (62%) and over 30 years old (73%) with spouse, children and other relatives in Jordan (85%) (Table 26).

As mentioned above, in 2017, the access of Syrian refugees from Jordan to the European Union was difficult. Of those who had a strong inclination to migrate to the European Union, five out of six (85%) had decided to wait for the decision from the UNHCR resettlement scheme, and one out of ten (10%) mentioned other means, such as assistance from embassies and NGOs, to reach Europe. Fewer (7%) mentioned waiting for the decision of family reunification with family members already in Europe, and a few (7%) considered using informal or illegal ways to reach Europe.

Out of the few (7%) respondents, a typical person expressing the wish to use smugglers to reach Europe was male (66%), under 35 years old (62%) and single

(49%). Of them, over one out of three (35%) had a university education, and their current employment rate was almost two times (44%) higher than that of the rest of respondents (24%). Only a few (7%) were not considering migration to the European Union. Slightly more than a half (52%) of them had family members or friends who had used smugglers to reach Europe. This number is higher than by the rest of the respondents (44%) in our sample.

4.6. Social media

The mobile phone with Internet access is a common tool for searching and exchanging information among asylum seekers and refugees in many countries (Alam & Imran 2015; Jauhiainen 2017c). Of the Syrian respondents, over two out of three (69%) possessed a mobile phone with Internet access. In an earlier study about refugees in Zaatari camp, Maitland & Xu (2015) found that the majority of refugees had a smartphone.

Younger respondents were more likely to have mobile phones with Internet access than were older respondents (Table 27). Slightly more men (70%) than women had mobile phones (67%). Employed Syrian migrants were more likely to have a mobile phone than unemployed Syrian refugees. Less than every third (29%) older respondent had a mobile phone with Internet access.

Many Syrians were not particularly frequent Internet users in Syria before the war. Of all respondents, one out of six (16%) used the Internet in Syria daily, one out of six (16%) weekly, one out of eight (13%) less often and the majority (54%) never (Table 28). For those who had not used the Internet in Syria, the most common reasons were unavailability of the service (38%), lack of equipment (20%) and that there was no need for Internet use (18%), as many Syrians lived next to their relatives and friends and could reach them in person.

Those who had not used the Internet in Syria were those respondents who were in the spring of 2017 in Jordan married women over 30 years old with middle school or lower education or unemployed men with low education level and

Table 27. Respondents' having own mobile phone with Internet access.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	No answer (%)	N
Man	70	3	27	11	174
Woman	67	6	27	11	190
18–29 years	77	3	20	5	147
30–49 years	71	6	23	14	156
50–59 years	52	4	44	24	29
60+ years	29	3	68	14	31
Employed	88	0	12	9	72
Inactive	64	5	31	8	271
Total	69	4	27	11	364

Table 28. Respondents' frequency of Internet use in Syria.

	Daily (%)	Many times a week (%)	Less often (%)	Never (%)	All (%)	N
Man	20	20	12	48	47	154
Woman	12	14	14	60	53	175
18–29 years	23	28	16	33	43	141
30–49 years	12	9	12	67	42	139
50–59 years	4	8	5	83	7	22
60+ years	7	0	7	86	8	25
Employed	39	20	15	26	22	69
Inactive	10	16	13	61	78	245
Total	16	17	13	54	100	329

living with relatives in Jordan. Those who had been the most frequent Internet users in Syria were among the respondents slightly more often young men with college or university degrees having relatives abroad or young women with high school or higher education working in Jordan and having relatives abroad. In Jordan, they searched the Internet for work opportunities (60%) and possible ways to leave the country (63%).

In Jordan, two out of five (39%) respondents used the Internet daily, over one out of five (22%) weekly, one out of seven (15%) less often and one out of four (24%) never (Table 29). The most common applications used in Jordan were WhatsApp (66%), Facebook (42%), Viber (19%), Instagram (16%) and YouTube (16%). In general, younger Syrian respondents used the Internet more often than the older respondents. Of those 18–29 years old, five out of six (84%) used the Internet at least weekly, whereas among the elderly, one out of six (16%) used it at least weekly. In addition, young Syrians were more likely to be daily social media users than the responding Syrians of 60-years-old or more were. Those who had not used the Internet in Jordan were predominantly people over 30 years old (89%), married (74%) with dependent children (81%) and having middle school or lower education (81%).

Table 29. Respondents' frequency of Internet use in Jordan.

	Daily (%)	Many times a week (%)	Less often (%)	Never (%)	All (%)	N
Man	42	21	14	23	48	176
Woman	36	24	16	24	52	187
18–29 years	60	24	10	6	39	141
30–49 years	30	23	18	29	44	161
50–59 years	18	30	11	41	8	28
60+ years	8	8	27	57	9	31
Employed	64	14	10	12	21	72
Inactive	32	25	17	26	79	271
Total	39	22	15	24	100	362

Table 30. Change in respondents' frequency of Internet use in Jordan compared to Syria.

Internet use	Daily (%)	Weekly (%)	Less often (%)	Never (%)
Man	+22	+1	+2	-25
Woman	+24	+10	+2	-36
18–29 years	+37	-4	-6	-27
30–49 years	+18	+14	+6	-38
50–59 years	+14	+22	+6	-42
60+ years	+1	+8	+20	-29
Employed	+25	-6	-5	-14
Inactive	+22	+9	+4	-35
Total	+23	+5	+2	-30

+ = growth; - = decline

Many respondents started to use the Internet more frequently in Jordan (Table 30). Of those who used the Internet on at least a weekly basis in Syria, almost all (94%) used it with almost equal frequency in Jordan. The most significant change in Internet usage frequency was experienced by women, un-employed refugees and young people. All the groups increased their Internet use in Jordan.

In our interviews, some middle-aged and older Syrian refugee women mentioned that the daily use of social media had become almost a burden for them. They had become a central node in a social network connecting different family members and friends in Jordan, Syria and elsewhere. The once physically connected family had been dispersed into the world. These women had to keep their social media accounts open all the time because, for example, the family members in Syria did not know in advance when and how long they would have access to social media. WhatsApp and Facebook were used many times daily. Some women also argued that they were, through social media, sometimes more connected to their children abroad than they had been in Syria when they lived in the same and nearby cities. In Syria, these women did not use the Internet and social media because they felt that they did not need that. Now, it was very important, so they had to learn to use it.

One out of seven (14%) respondents did not use the Internet in Syria or in Jordan. Only one out of five (19%) of them had mobile phones with Internet access in Jordan. This group consisted of people of over 30 years old (91%), married refugees (81%) with dependent children (85%). They had middle school or lower education levels (87%), almost all (95%) were unemployed in Jordan in the spring of 2017 and three out of five (60%) did not know English at all. They originated from villages in Syria (41%) and still resided in villages in Jordan (37%). Slightly more than two out of five (43%) had relatives abroad, which meant that the Internet access was not so crucial for all of them.

On the contrary, there were people who used the Internet on at least a weekly basis in Syria and kept doing that in Jordan. These people were mostly young

Table 31. Social media makes respondent's life easier.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	72	16	12	154
Woman	64	16	20	189
18–29 years	74	14	12	140
30–49 years	67	18	15	149
50–59 years	62	22	16	27
60+ years	41	17	42	25
Employed	83	6	11	70
Inactive	63	20	17	255
Total	68	16	16	343

(69%), single (57%) and living in cities in Jordan (93%) and had originated from cities in Syria (82%). Practically all (93%) had at least some knowledge of English, and four out of five (79%) had high school or higher education. Almost two out of five (38%) were working in the spring of 2017. Almost four out of five (78%) had relatives in Jordan, and slightly more (81%) had relatives abroad. The Internet usage frequency negatively correlated with age and village residence and positively correlated with higher education, social network and employment.

Among all respondents, two out of three (68%) agreed that Internet and/or social media use made their lives easier in Jordan. Of those who agreed with the statement, six out of seven (86%) had mobile phones with access to the Internet. Of those who had the opportunity to use the Internet, over three out of four (78%) agreed on this issue. In general, these respondents tended to be less than 30 years old (Table 31). An especially large share (83%) agreed on this among those who were employed. Social media and the Internet are also used for work-related issues among Syrian refugees in Jordan.

The Internet and social media provide various opportunities for many kinds of uses. Slightly over one out of five (22%) respondents had used the Internet to search for information from the Internet about places where they could live in Jordan. A substantially larger number of respondents had searched online for information about their rights (37%), and the majority (55%) had sought information about work opportunities in Jordan.

One out of three (32%) respondents had searched information about the possibility of leaving Jordan. Of the Internet users in Jordan, over one out of four (28%) agreed that information and interaction in social media influences his/her decision to go or not to go to Europe (Table 32). Those on whom social media had the most impact were more often young women who had been students or housewives who significantly increased their Internet usage in Jordan. In addition, more active Internet users in Jordan were men with high school or higher education who had relatives abroad. Two out of five (40%) of them were students back in Syria. Those on whom social media had less impact were women with

Table 32. Social media influences respondent's decision to go or not to go to Europe.

	Yes (%)	Don't know (%)	No (%)	N
Man	23	50	27	136
Woman	26	39	35	153
18–29 years	32	46	22	126
30–49 years	21	46	33	120
50–59 years	18	34	48	21
60+ years	10	34	56	21
Employed	34	35	31	61
Inactive	22	45	33	210
Total	28	44	28	227

middle school or lower education as well as unemployed men over 35 years old, of whom the majority did not use the Internet actively.

Two out of five (40%) respondents had used the Internet to search for information about the current situation in Syria. According to the survey, the respondents who most actively used the Internet to learn about the situation in Syria were those who intended to (64%) or may (27%) move back to Syria – in total, almost all (91%) – and those who were 18–49 years old (92%). Of those who used the Internet to search for information about Syria, the majority (56%) agreed that they planned to move elsewhere abroad.

Respondents used social media for work-related topics, information about their possibilities in Jordan and opportunities elsewhere. Obviously, it is used to keep in contact with relatives and friends in Jordan, in Syria and in other countries, often in the European Union. According to the interviews, Facebook and WhatsApp were the most common programs for social media.

The analysis reveals that there is still a digital divide among Syrian refugees in Jordan. Young adults are much more capable and frequent users of the Internet and social media. However, the divide has been diminishing in Jordan. In our interviews, we also talked to people who could not read and write. However, they had learned to use a mobile phone, open a Facebook site and watch the pictures sent to the site by family members and friends in Jordan, Syria and the rest of the world.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Jordan has the second highest proportion of refugees of the national population in the world. There are refugees who have lived in Jordan for decades and refugees who arrived only recently. The number of refugees in Jordan has grown substantially in the 2010s due to the war in Syria and Syrians fleeing to Jordan.

In 2017, there were over 700,000 officially recognized refugees in Jordan and almost the same number of other people of concern without official refugee recognition by the government of Jordan and the UNHCR. Most refugees and migrants are Syrians. They have an important impact on urbanization in Jordan. They are also a significant community of continuous international interest.

In 2017, there were three official refugee camps in Jordan, namely Azraq, Emirati-Jordanian and Zaatari. There were also informal camps on the borderland between Jordan and Syria. Despite the encampment policy in Jordan, up to four out of five refugees live in urban areas outside the camps. This follows the general principle of the UNHCR. However, some refugees have left the camps without permission, and they live in precarious conditions in Jordanian towns. Almost all (95%) Syrian refugees live in northern Jordan and the capital Amman area relatively close (i.e., within a one-hour drive) to the Syrian border. There is an active resettlement of Syrian refugees from Jordan to many countries of the world.

We conducted field research in Jordan March 6–19, 2017. As a result, 408 persons with Syrian background responded to our survey; 58 refugees and migrants were interviewed, as well as 13 stakeholder organizations dealing with migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Jordan.

There are many kinds of Syrian migrants and refugees living in Jordan. The demographic, education and employment background of the respondents varied from young to old, from those not able to read to those with a post-graduate university degree and from legally employed refugees to unemployed migrants and Syrians outside the active labor force such as students and housewives. The concepts of migrant, asylum seeker and refugee are blurred in Jordan, and the positions of individual Syrians vary in these administrative, political and economic processes related to Syrians in Jordan.

Among the whole population of Syrian refugees in Jordan, about half (51%) are underage, but they were not included in our sample. After weighting, our sample was representative of adult Syrian refugees in Jordan. Of the respondents, almost half (48%) were men, and slightly over half (52%) were women. Almost two out of five (38%) were aged 18–29 years; more than two out of five (45%) were 30–49 years, one out of twelve (8%) were 50–59 years and one out of eleven (9%) 60 years or older. The majority came to Jordan in 2012 or 2013. Almost four out of five (78%) reached Jordan within one day after starting their journey toward Jordan. In the early phases of the war, the majority of Syrians could come

relatively quickly and easily to Jordan. Later, access to Jordan became more difficult, and since 2016, the border between Jordan and Syria has become strongly securitized and mostly closed.

According to the United Nations (2018), over 90% of Syrian refugees live below the Jordanian poverty line. A particular livelihood issue for refugees in Jordan is the strict national policy that restricts refugees' access to work. Despite this, many refugees look for work and work illegally wherever they can. From 2016 onwards, the national authorities have issued more work permits to Syrian refugees. Of our sample, one out of five (26%) men and one out of six (17%) women worked in the spring of 2017. Some had a work permit, but the majority worked illegally and irregularly. Only a few (7%) had a full-time job. Almost every other respondent (47%) who worked in the spring of 2017 had worked for most of their stay in Jordan. Of those who did not work in the spring of 2017, only one out of four (26%) had ever been employed in Jordan. Long-term unemployment is common among Syrian refugees.

The everyday life of Syrian migrants and refugees in Jordan is consisted of many challenges. Nevertheless, three out of four (74%) respondents were fully or partly satisfied with their current lives in Jordan. Almost all (90%) agreed that in Jordan they have freedom to practice their religion. Of the respondents, two out of three (65%) were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations in Jordan. Those who were satisfied tended to have family or extended social networks and wished to stay in Jordan. Slightly fewer respondents (58%) agreed that they had enough toilets and showers for their use; especially women were critical on this. Migrants and refugees living in Amman had the best facilities.

Syrians escaped to Jordan to find safety and security there. All groups mentioned safety and security as the best aspect of their current living place. Of respondents, over four out of five (82%) agreed that they felt safe in Jordan. Old people felt safer than young people. Of those who felt safe in Jordan, five out of six (83%) argued that they were treated well. Of those who did not feel safe in Jordan, substantially fewer, one out of six (17%), claimed that they were treated well. Slightly more than one out of four (27%), and of the respondents with 60 years or more, one out of twelve (8%), expressed that they had been physically or mentally harassed in Jordan. Dissatisfaction with life in Jordan is often accompanied with lower satisfaction in accommodations and the respondent having fewer friends in his/her neighborhood.

Some migrants and refugees thought in the beginning that the war initiated in 2011 would not last for long; thus, they would stay only shortly in Jordan. However, in the spring of 2017, there was no sign that the war would end soon. In such unclear circumstances, the migration wishes and plans of Syrian migrants and refugees in Jordan vary. Many consider all options: returning to Syria (63%), staying in Jordan (21%) or migrating elsewhere (73%). Almost three out of four

(73%) respondents considered migrating to the European Union. Germany was the most preferred destination country for about every third respondent. The older a person was, the less s/he was willing to migrate to the European Union. For younger adult respondents, Europe could be a location from which to move to other more preferred countries. Those who prefer to migrate abroad tend to have stronger educational backgrounds and are more often employed in Jordan. Social capital and networks help to plan and realize the journey to a third country.

Simultaneously with considering to move from Jordan to further abroad, two out of three (67%) men and three out of five (60%) of women planned also to return to Syria. Despite Jordan being the most preferred country for only one out of eleven (9%) respondents, one out of five (21%) agreed that they would probably stay in Jordan for the rest of their lives. Of the older people, one out of three (33%) had this opinion. With the continuation of the war, chances to return to Syria are vanishing among the older generation.

Social capital is connected to the social networks, norms and trust that influence Syrian refugees' position, opportunities and constrains in the Jordanian society and community. Leaving Syria behind, Syrian refugees lost many of their social networks. However, mobile phones, the Internet and social media can be partly used to replace necessary face-to-face contacts for this. Syrian migrants and refugees in Jordan use the Internet and social media for various functional, social and informative purposes – besides their obvious leisure use. Many Syrians increased their use of the Internet and social media in Jordan, especially female and older refugee populations. Some of the older people have become social media nodes, passing information about the dispersed family and other relatives to other social networks. Besides searching for jobs in Jordan, younger Syrians use the Internet and social media for migration-related information and planning. Information from the Internet and social media has an impact on where, when and how Syrians in Jordan migrate abroad.

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MIGRANTS, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN JORDAN, 2017

Jordan has the second highest proportion (8.9%) of refugees of the national population in the world. There are refugees who have lived in Jordan for decades and refugees who arrived only recently. The number of refugees has grown substantially in the 2010s due to the war in Syria .

In 2017, there were over 700,000 officially recognized refugees in Jordan and almost the same number of other migrants of concern without official refugee recognition by the government of Jordan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Most refugees and migrants are Syrians. They have an important impact on urbanization in Jordan. They are also a significant community of continued international interest.

Despite the encampment policy in Jordan, up to four out of five refugees live in urban areas outside the camps. In 2017, there were three official refugee camps in Jordan, namely Azraq, Emirati-Jordanian and Zaatari. Over 95% of Syrian refugees lived in northern Jordan and the capital Amman area that are both relatively close to the Syrian border. There is an active resettlement of Syrian refugees from Jordan to many countries of the world.

A particular livelihood issue for refugees in Jordan is the strict national policy that restricts the right of refugees to work. Despite this, many refugees look for work and work illegally wherever they can. From 2016 onwards, national authorities have issued more working permits to Syrian refugees. However, over 90% of Syrian refugees live below the Jordanian poverty line.

This research report focuses on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Jordan. It is part of a broader research project about asylum processes in and near the countries of origin of asylum seekers and refugees and along their asylum journey towards their destination countries and in the destination countries. This research belongs to the activities of the research consortium URMI (Urbanization, Mobilities and Immigration, see www.urmi.fi), funded by the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland and led by Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen from the Division of Geography at the University of Turku, Finland.

The main research questions in this research report are: What kind of Syrian refugees live in Jordan?; What is the everyday life of Syrian refugees in Jordan like, and how are social capital and networks related to it?; What are the migration wishes and plans of Syrian refugees in Jordan?; How and for what do Syrian refugees in Jordan use the Internet and social media?

The field research was conducted in Jordan from March 6–19, 2017, and 408 persons with Syrian background responded to our survey composed of 102 questions, of which 58 were structural, 14 were semi-open and 30 were open questions. The respondents lived in Jordan but not in the refugee camps. In addition, we interviewed 58 Syrian refugees and irregular migrants and 13 stakeholder

organizations related to the Syrian asylum seekers, refugees and migrants in Jordan.

The demographic, education and employment background of respondents varied from young to old, from those not being able to read to those with a post-graduate university degree and from legally employed to unemployed and housewife. In the spring of 2017, 26% of men and 17% of women respondents worked. Some had a work permit, but the majority worked illegally.

Of the respondents, 29% agreed to be fully and 45% partly satisfied with their current lives in Jordan. Almost all (90%) agreed that in Jordan they have the freedom to practice their religion. Of the respondents, 65% were fully or partly satisfied with their current accommodations in Jordan. Of respondents, 58% agreed that they had enough toilets and showers for their use. Migrants and refugees living in Amman had the best facilities.

Of the respondents, 82% agreed that they feel safe in Jordan; young people felt more unsafe than old people. Of those who felt safe in Jordan, 83% felt that they were treated well. Of those who did not feel safe in Jordan, 17% felt that they were treated well. In the survey, 27% of all respondents and 8% of the older people expressed that they had been physically or mentally harassed in Jordan. Less than half (45%) of the respondents felt that they had learned something useful in Jordan for their future.

Migration wishes and plans of Syrian refugees in Jordan vary. Fewer men (31%) mentioned Syria as their preferred country in the world compared to women (39%). Despite this, 67% of men and 60% of women planned to return to Syria. However, at the same time, 73% of respondents considered migrating to the European Union. For younger adult respondents, Europe can be a location to move further to other more preferred countries. The older a person is, the less s/he is willing to migrate to the European Union. Of the respondents, 42% might seek asylum in Finland.

Many Syrians increased their use of the Internet and social media in Jordan, especially the female and older refugee population. Besides searching for jobs in Jordan, younger Syrians use the Internet and social media for migration-related information and planning. Information from the Internet and social media has an impact on where, when and how the Syrians in Jordan migrate abroad.

The everyday lives of Syrian refugees and migrants in Jordan consist of day-to-day survival. Social capital and networks help some to find employment and other means of survival in Jordan and to plan and realize their journey to a third country.

MAAHANMUUTTAJAT, TURVAPAIKANHAKIJAT JA PAKOLAISET JORDANIASSA VUONNA 2017

Jordaniassa pakolaiset muodostavat maailman toiseksi suurimman suhteellisen osuuden (8,9%) yhden valtion kokonaisväestöstä. Maassa on pakolaisia, jotka ovat eläneet siellä vuosikymmeniä ja pakolaisia, jotka ovat tulleet sinne aivan hiljakkoin. Pakolaisten määrä on kasvanut maassa merkittävästi 2010-luvulla, kun syyrialaiset ovat paenneet sinne Syyrian sodan takia.

Vuonna 2017 Jordaniassa oli yli 700 000 virallisesti määritettyä pakolaista. Näiden lisäksi maassa oli lähes saman verran vastaavassa tilanteessa olevia maahanmuuttajia, joita Jordanian hallitus ja UNHCR eivät olleet määritelleet pakolaisiksi. Useimmat pakolaisista ja maahanmuuttajista ovat syyrialaisia. Heillä on merkittävä vaikutus kaupungistumiseen Jordaniassa. He ovat myös jatkuvan kansainvälisen kiinnostuksen kohteena oleva yhteisö.

Huolimatta Jordanian politiikasta sijoittaa pakolaisia leireihin, jopa neljä viidestä pakolaisesta elää kaupunkialueilla leirien ulkopuolella. Vuonna 2017 Jordaniassa oli kolme virallista pakolaisleiriä, jotka olivat Azraq, Emirati-Jordanian ja Zaatari. Yli 95% syyrialaisista pakolaisista asui Pohjois-Jordaniassa ja pääkaupunki Ammanin seudulla suhteellisen lähellä Syyrian rajaa. Jordaniassa olevia pakolaisia myös sijoitetaan aktiivisesti useisiin maihin eri puolilla maailmaa.

Tiukka kansallinen politiikka rajoittaa pakolaisten oikeutta työntekoon Jordaniassa. Tästä huolimatta monet pakolaiset etsivät töitä ja työskentelevät laittomasti missä tahansa he pystyvät. Vuodesta 2016 lähtien ovat kansalliset viranomaiset myöntäneet lisää työlupia syyrialaisille pakolaisille. Tästä huolimatta yli 90% syyrialaispakolaisista elää Jordanian köyhyysrajan alapuolella.

Tämä tutkimusraportti käsittelee maahanmuuttajia, turvapaikanhakijoita ja pakolaisia Jordaniassa. Se on osa laajempaa tutkimushanketta, jossa tutkitaan turvapaikkoihin liittyviä prosesseja turvapaikanhakijoiden lähtömaissa ja niiden lähialueilla, turvapaikkamatkalla kohti kohdemaita sekä kohdemaissa. Tutkimus kuuluu konsortioon URMI (Urbanization, Mobilities and Immigration, www.urmi.fi), jota rahoittaa Suomen Akatemian Strategisen Tutkimuksen Neuvosto ja jota johtaa professori Jussi S. Jauhiainen Turun yliopiston maantieteen osastolta.

Tässä raportissa esitetyt tutkimuskysymykset ovat: Minkälaisia syyrialaisia pakolaisia asuu Jordaniassa?; Minkälainen on Jordaniassa asuvien syyrialaisen pakolaisten arkipäivä ja miten sosiaalinen pääoma ja verkostot liittyvät siihen? Minkälaisia ovat Jordaniassa asuvien syyrialaisen pakolaisten muuttohaaveet ja uuttosuunnitelmat?; Miten ja mihin Jordaniassa asuvat syyrialaiset pakolaiset käyttävät internetiä ja sosiaalista mediaa?

Kenttätutkimus toteutettiin 6.–19.3.2017. Yhteensä 408 syyrialaistaustaista henkilöä vastasi kyselyymme, jossa oli 102 kysymystä. Kysymyksistä oli 58 strukturoitua, 14 puoliavoimaa ja 30 avoimaa. Vastaajat asuivat Jordaniassa muualla kuin pakolaisleireillä. Lisäksi haastattelimme 58 syyrialaispakolaista ja maahan-

muuttajaa ja 13 henkilöä, jotka toimivat turvapaikanhakijoihin, pakolaisiin ja maahanmuuttajiin liittyvissä järjestöissä Jordaniassa.

Vastaajajoukko vaihteli väestön, koulutuksen ja työllisyyden suhteen nuoresta vanhaan, lukutaidottomista yliopistotutkinnon suorittaneisiin, laillisesti töissä käyvistä työttömiin ja kotiäiteihin. Keväällä 2017 työskenteli 26% vastanneista miehistä ja 17% naisista. Enemmistö heistä työskenteli laittomasti.

Vastanneista 29% oli täysin ja 45% osittain tyytyväinen elämäänsä Jordaniassa. Lähes kaikki (90%) katsoivat voivansa harjoittaa uskontoaan vapaasti. Vastaajista 65% oli täysin tai osittain tyytyväinen nykyiseen majoitukseensa Jordaniassa. Hieman vähemmät (58%) olivat sitä mieltä, että heillä on riittävästi vessoja ja suihkuja käytössään. Ammanissa asuvilla maahanmuuttajilla ja pakolaisilla oli paras tilanne fyysisten tilojen suhteen.

Vastaajista 82% tunsivat olonsa turvalliseksi Jordaniassa: useimmat nuoret tunsivat olonsa turvattomaksi iäkkäisiin verrattuna. Niistä, jotka tunsivat olonsa turvalliseksi, 83% sanoi että heitä kohdellaan hyvin. Niistä, jotka eivät tunteneet oloansa turvalliseksi, 17% sanoi että heitä kohdellaan hyvin. Kaikista vastaajista 27% ja iäkkäistä 8% kertoi, että heitä oli ahdisteltu fyysisesti tai henkisesti Jordaniassa. Alle puolet (45%) vastaajista tunsivat, että he olivat oppineet Jordaniassa jotain hyödyllistä tulevaisuuttaan ajatellen.

Syyrialaisien maahanmuuttajien ja pakolaisten muuttohaaveet ja -suunnitelmat vaihtelivat. Harvemmat (31%) miehet kuin naiset (39%) mainitsivat Syyrian halutuinpaikana maana. Tästä huolimatta 67% miehistä ja 60% naisista suunnitteleli palaavansa Syyriaan. Samaan aikaan 73% vastaajista harkitsi myös Euroopan unioniin muuttoa. Nuorille aikuisille Eurooppa voi olla kohde, josta matkustetaan edelleen halutumpiin kohtaimiin. Mitä vanhempi vastaaja oli, sitä vähemmän hän halusi muuttaa Euroopan unioniin. Vastaajista 42% mahdollisesti hakee turvapaikkaa Suomesta.

Monet syyrialaiset lisäsivät internetin ja sosiaalisen media käyttöön Jordaniassa, erityisesti naiset ja iäkkäät. Jordanian työmahdollisuuksien etsimisen lisäksi, nuoret syyrialaiset käyttivät internetiä ja sosiaalista mediaa muuttoa koskevaan tiedonhankintaan ja suunnitteluun. Internetin ja sosiaalisen median tarjoamalla informaatiolla on merkitystä siihen, minne, milloin ja miten syyrialaiset Jordaniasta matkustavat.

Syyrialaisien pakolaisten ja maahanmuuttajien arkipäivä Jordaniassa koostuu selviytymisestä päivästä toiseen. Sosiaalinen pääoma ja verkostot auttavat joitakin löytämään työpaikan ja muita selviytymisen keinoja Jordaniassa sekä suunnitella ja toteuttaa matkan kolmanteen maahan.

المهاجرون ،طالبو اللجوء واللاجئون في الأردن ٧١٠٢.

الأردن هي ثاني دولة في العالم أعلى من حيث نسبة اللاجئين الى السكان الاصليين (٩.٨ ٪). هناك لاجئون عاشوا في الأردن منذ عقود وهناك اللاجئين الذين وصلوا مؤخراً. نما عدد اللاجئين بشكل كبير في العام ١٠٢٠٢ بسبب الحرب في سوريا والسوريين الفارين إلى الأردن.

في عام ٧١٠٢، كان هناك أكثر من ٧٠٠٠٠٠٠ لاجئ معترف بهم رسمياً في الأردن ونحو نفس العدد تقريبا من المهاجرين الاخرين من دون اعتراف رسمي من قبل حكومة الأردن او المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين.(UNHCR) معظم اللاجئين والمهاجرين هم من السوريين. لديهم تأثير مهم على المجتمع الحضري في الأردن. هم أيضا موضع اهتمام كبير ومستمر من المجتمع الدولي .

على الرغم من سياسة المخيمات في الأردن ، يعيش ما يصل إلى أربعة من كل خمسة من اللاجئين في المناطق الحضرية خارج المخيمات . في عام ٧١٠٢ كان هناك ثلاثة مخيمات رسمية للاجئين في الأردن ، وهي الأزرق و الاماراتي - الأردني والزعترى . أكثر من ٥٩ ٪ من اللاجئين السوريين عاشوا في شمال الأردن ومنطقة العاصمة عمان القريبة نسبيا من الحدود السورية. هناك إعادة توطين نشطة للاجئين السوريين من الأردن إلى العديد من دول العالم.

القضية المعيشية الخاصة للاجئين في الأردن هي السياسة الوطنية الصارمة التي تقيد حق اللاجئين في العمل. على الرغم من هذا ، يبحث العديد من اللاجئين عن العمل والعمل بشكل غير قانوني أينما كانوا. واعتباراً من العام ٦١٠٢ ، أصدرت السلطات الوطنية المزيد من تصاريح العمل للاجئين السوريين. ومع ذلك ، يعيش أكثر من ٠٩ ٪ من اللاجئين السوريين تحت خط الفقر الأردني.

هذا التقرير البحثي عن المهاجرين وطالبي اللجوء واللاجئين في الأردن . وهو جزء من مشروع بحثي أوسع حول عمليات اللجوء لطالبي اللجوء واللاجئين في بلدانهم الأصلية والبلدان القريبة منها ، وذلك على طول رحلة اللجوء إلى بلدان المقصد و في بلدان المقصد . ينتمي هذا البحث الجزئي لأنشطة البحث (URMI اوربي :التحضر والتنقلات والهجرة)، انظر (www.urmi.fi) ، الذي يموله مجلس البحوث الاستراتيجية في الأكاديمية الفنلندية ويقوده البروفيسور يوسي س. ياوهيياينين من قسم الجغرافيا في جامعة توركو ، فنلندا.

الأسئلة البحثية الرئيسية في هذا التقرير البحثي هي: ما هو نوع اللاجئين السوريين الذين يعيشون في الأردن؟ مما تتكون الحياة اليومية للاجئين السوريين في الأردن وكيفية ارتباطها بالعلاقات والشبكات الاجتماعية؟ ما هي رغبات اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن وخطط الهجرة الخاصة بهم؟ كيف ولماذا يستخدم اللاجئون السوريون في الأردن الإنترنت ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي؟

خلال البحث الميداني الذي أجري في الأردن ما بين ٦-٩١ اذار (مارس) ٧١٠٢ ، جاوب ٨٠٤ شخصاً من ذوي الخلفية السورية لمسحنا الذي شمل ٢٠١ سؤالاً ، كان ٨٥ سؤالاً منها بنويماً و ٤١ سؤالاً شبه مفتوح و ٠٣ سؤالاً مفتوحاً. عاش المستجوبون في الأردن في مكان آخر غير مخيمات اللاجئين. بالإضافة إلى ذلك ، أجرينا مقابلات مع ٨٥ لاجئاً سورياً ومهاجرًا غير قانوني و ٣١ منظمة لأصحاب المصلحة تتعلق باللاجئين السوريين وطالبي اللجوء والمهاجرين في الأردن.

تفاوتت الخلفية السكانية والوظيفية والتعليمية للمستجوبين من الشباب إلى كبار السن ، من أولئك الذين لا يعرفون القراءة لمن لديهم درجة جامعية عليا ومن العاملين بشكل قانوني إلى العاطلين عن العمل و ربات منزل. في ربيع عام ٧١٠٢ ، ٦٢ ٪ من الذكور و ٧١ ٪ من الإناث عملوا. كان لدى البعض تصريح عمل ، لكن الأغلبية عملت بشكل غير قانوني.

من بين المستجوبين، ٩٢ ٪ وافق على أنهم راضين تماما عن حياتهم الحالية في الأردن و ٥٤ ٪ راضين جزئياً عن حياتهم الحالية في الأردن. تقريبا (٠٩ ٪) اتفقوا على أنه لديهم الحرية لممارسة دينهم في الأردن. ٥٦ ٪ من بين المستجوبين كانوا راضين كلياً أو جزئياً عن أماكن إقامتهم الحالية في الأردن . أقل بقليل من (٨٥ ٪) من بين المستجوبين وافق على أن لديهم ما يكفي من المراحيض والحمامات للاستخدام : كانت النساء أكثر انتقاداً في هذا الشأن. المهاجرون واللاجئون الذين يعيشون في عمان لديهم أفضل المرافق.

من بين المستجوبين ، ٢٨٪ وافق على انه يشعر بالأمان في الأردن : الشباب يشعرون بعدم الأمان أكثر من كبار السن. ٣٨٪ من بين الذين شعروا بالأمان في الأردن ، شعروا أنهم يعاملون بشكل جيد . ٧١٪ من بين أولئك الذين لم يشعروا بالأمان في الأردن ، شعروا أنهم يعاملون بشكل جيد. ٧٢٪ من بين كل المستجوبين و ٨٪ من المسنين عبروا عن تعرضهم لمضايقات جسدية أو نفسية في الأردن. شعر أقل من نصف المستجوبين (٥٤٪) أنهم تعلموا في الأردن شيئاً مفيداً لمستقبلهم.

تختلف رغبات الهجرة وخطط اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن. عدد قليل من الرجال حوالي (١٣٪) ذكروا ان سوريا هي البلد المفضل لديهم في العالم مقارنة ب (٩٣٪) من النساء. وبالرغم من ذلك ، فإن ٧٦٪ من الرجال و ٦٠٪ من النساء يعزّزون العودة إلى سوريا. ومع ذلك ، في نفس الوقت ٣٧٪ من المستجوبين اخذوا بعين الاعتبار أيضا الهجرة إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي. بالنسبة للمشاركين من الشباب البالغين فإن أوروبا يمكن أن تكون وجهة للتنقل إلى البلدان الأخرى المفضلة أكثر. كلما كان الشخص أكبر سناً ، كلما كان أقل استعداداً للهجرة إلى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي. ٢٤٪ من بين المشاركين قد يطلبون اللجوء في فنلندا.

زاد استخدام الإنترنت ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي لدى معظم السوريين في الأردن ، لا سيما لدى اللاجئين من الإناث وكبار السن. بالإضافة إلى البحث عن وظائف في الأردن ، يستخدم الشباب السوريون الإنترنت ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي أيضاً للحصول على المعلومات المتعلقة بالهجرة والتخطيط لها. المعلومات من الإنترنت ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي لها تأثير على كيف وأين ومتى سيهاجر السوريون الذين في الاردن الى الخارج.

الحياة اليومية للاجئين والمهاجرين السوريين في الأردن مكونة من البقاء على قيد الحياة من يوم لآخر. العلاقات والشبكات الاجتماعية تساعد البعض على إيجاد فرص عمل ووسائل أخرى للبقاء في الأردن والتخطيط وتحقيق الرحلة إلى بلد ثالث.

Иммигранты, просители убежища и беженцы в Иордании, 2017 год.

Количество беженцев в Иордании составляет большую долю местного населения (8,9%). Часть беженцев проживает в Иордании на протяжении нескольких десятилетий, часть прибыла в страну совсем недавно. Их число значительно возросло в 2010 году, так как многие были вынуждены покинуть Сирию из-за разгоревшейся войны.

В 2017 году количество сирийских беженцев в Иордании официально насчитывало 750 тысяч. Более того, практически такое же количество иммигрантов остается без признания Иорданским правительством и Верховным комиссаром ООН по делам беженцев (УВКБ) официального статуса беженцев. Подавляющее большинство беженцев – этнические сирийцы. Они оказывают значительное влияние на урбанизацию Иордании. Наконец, они представляют особый интерес в качестве сообщества с уникальными чертами.

Несмотря на иорданскую политику сосредоточения беженцев в лагерях, на данный момент четыре из пяти беженцев проживают в городах вне лагерей. В 2017 году в Иордании было три официальных лагеря для беженцев – Азрак, Эмирато-Иорданский лагерь и Заатари. Более 95% сирийских беженцев проживает в северной Иордании и столице страны Аммане, которая находится в относительной близости от границы с Сирией. Сирийские беженцы активно расселяются из Иордании по странам всего мира.

Одна из основных проблем проживания беженцев в Иордании – строгая национальная политика, ограничивающая права беженцев на трудоустройство. Несмотря на это, многие беженцы находятся в поисках работы или трудоустроены нелегально там, где это возможно. Начиная с 2016 года местные власти увеличили количество разрешений на работу, выданных беженцам из Сирии. Тем не менее более 90% беженцев остается за чертой бедности.

Данное исследование затрагивает иммигрантов, просителей убежища и беженцев в Иордании. Этот труд – часть более широкого исследования о процессах предоставления убежища в соседних по отношению к родине беженцев государствах, а также о пути в страну предоставления убежища, проделанном беженцами, и их проживании в месте нового поселения. Данная работа является результатом деятельности исследовательского объединения URMI («Урбанизация, мобильность и иммиграция», более детально на www.urmi.fi), спонсированного из средств Стратегического исследовательского совета Академии Финляндии. Юсси С. Яухийнен (факультет географии университета города Турку, Финляндия) выполняет обязанности главы объединения.

Главными вопросами, движущими данное исследование, стали: Какими характеристиками обладают беженцы, проживающие в Иордании?; Какова их повседневная жизнь?; Как социальный капитал и социальные связи переплетаются между собой в их жизни?; Какие пожелания и планы в отношении дальнейшей миграции у сирийских беженцев в Иордании?; Как и с какой целью сирийские беженцы в Иордании используют интернет и социальные сети?

Во время сбора данных, проведенного в Иордании с 6 по 19 марта 2017 года, 408 респондентов, обладающих сирийскими корнями, приняли участие в опросе, состоящем из 102 вопросов, 58 из которых были закрытыми, 14 были полукрытыми и 30 – открытыми. Все респонденты проживали в Иордании вне лагерей для беженцев. В дополнение к этому, мы провели интервью с 58 си-

рийскими беженцами и нелегальными иммигрантами и с 13 представителями сторон, заинтересованных в просителях убежища, беженцах и иммигрантах.

Респонденты представляют собой разнородную группу в отношении демографии, образования и трудоустройства; в нашем опросе приняли участие как молодые респонденты, так и пожилые, хорошо образованные и полностью безграмотные, официально трудоустроенные и нелегально работающие. Весной 2017 года, на момент проведения исследования, 26% мужчин и 17% женщин были трудоустроены. Некоторые получили официальное разрешение на работу, большинство же работало нелегально.

Среди респондентов 29% полностью довольны своей жизнью в Иордании, в то время как 45% довольны частично. Почти все (90%) согласились, что в Иордании у них есть возможность свободно исповедовать свою религию. К тому же, 65% было полностью или частично довольны своими квартирами или домами в Иордании. 58% согласилось, что в их квартире достаточно туалетов и душевых для комфортного проживания. Мы выяснили, что у иммигрантов, поселившихся в Аммане, лучший доступ к подобному рода благам.

85% респондентов подтвердило, что чувствует себя защищено в Иордании; молодежь чаще склонна чувствовать себя незащищенно по сравнению с пожилыми людьми. Из тех, кто чувствовал себя в безопасности в Иордании, 83% также заметило, что в Иордании с ними хорошо обращаются. Из тех же, кто не чувствует себя в безопасности в Иордании, только 17% отметило хорошее обращение.

27% утверждает, что они подверглись физическому или моральному насилию в Иордании. Только 8% пожилых людей высказало такое же мнение. Меньше половины (45%) от общего количества респондентов научились чему-нибудь полезному для своего будущего в Иордании.

Пожелания и планы касаются дальнейшей миграции могут значительно отличаться друг от друга среди беженцев. Меньшее количество мужчин (31%) упомянуло Сирию в качестве самой желанной страны для проживания по сравнению с женщинами (39%). Несмотря на это, 73% всех респондентов предполагает мигрировать в страны Европейского союза. Но для молодых респондентов Европа может оказаться лишь транзитной зоной на пути к более желанным местам проживания. Мы заметили, что чем старше беженец, тем он реже выражает желание мигрировать в Европу. Наконец, 42% может попросить убежища у Финляндии.

Многие сирийцы получили более легкий доступ в интернет и социальным сетям в Иордании; особенно это справедливо в отношении женщин и пожилых людей. Кроме поиска работы в Иордании, молодые сирийские беженцы использовали интернет и социальные сети для поиска информации в целях дальнейшей миграции. Сведения из интернета и социальных сетей оказывает значительное влияние на то, куда, когда и как сирийские беженцы будут мигрировать из Иордании в будущем.

Повседневная жизнь сирийских беженцев и иммигрантов в Иордании требует особых навыков выживания. Социальный капитал и социальные связи помогают найти работу и обеспечить себя элементарными средствами к существованию в Иордании, а также спланировать и реализовать переезд в другую страну.



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