

ASYLUM SEEKERS AND MIGRANTS IN LESVOS, GREECE, 2019–2020

پناهجویان و مهاجران در لسبوس، یونان، 2020–2019

Demandeurs d'asile et migrants sur Lesbos, Grèce, en 2019–2020

طالبو اللجوء والمهاجرون في ليسفوس، اليونان، 2020–2019

Magangalyo-doonka iyo muhaajiriinta ku sugan Lesbos, Griika,
sanadada 2019–2020

Turvapaikanhakijat ja muuttajat Lesboksella Kreikassa, 2019–2020

Asylum seekers and migrants in Lesbos, Greece, 2019–2020

Αιτούντες Άσυλο και μετανάστες στη Λέσβο, Ελλάδα, 2019–2020

Jussi S. Jauhainen & Ekaterina Vorobeva

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1. Introduction

1.1 Research project

The research project *Asylum Seekers and Migrants in Lesvos, Greece, 2019–2020* focuses on the everyday lives, migration patterns, aspirations and governance of asylum-related migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean island of Lesvos in Greece. Asylum-related migrants enter the European Union (EU) for various reasons and request asylum as their entry mechanism. The research covers the developments in 2019 and early 2020. In addition, general developments in asylum-related migration in the Greek archipelago are discussed from the 2010s to early 2020.

Lesvos at the EU borderland is located ten kilometers west from the western coast of Turkey. According to its size (1,633 square kilometers), Lesvos is one of the largest islands in the Aegean archipelago. The population of the island is about 90,000, including the largest town, Mytilene, with about 40,000 inhabitants. The location at the EU border makes Lesvos attractive for many asylum-related migrants on their journeys to the EU. The island hosts several reception centers for asylum-related migrants (Figure 1.1.).

During the 2010s, Lesvos became one of the key entry points and EU migration hotspots in Europe for people seeking asylum in the EU (Angeli et al. 2014; Afouxenidis 2017). The year 2015 was particular and popular for migration in the EU as well as in Lesvos. Over half a million asylum seekers traveled from Turkey via Lesvos to mainland Greece and farther to other EU member states. These people made up about 40% of all 1.3 million asylum seekers in the EU in that year (Eurostat 2017). Lesvos gained notoriety as the main gateway to the EU.

The number of asylum seekers diminished abruptly by more than 90% in the spring of 2016. This was related to geopolitical regimes and developments in and out of the EU. The EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 resulted in a substantial reduction of irregular migration via Turkey to Europe. As part of the statement, among other things, Turkey agreed to accept the rapid return of all those migrants who crossed from Turkey to Greece and who were not in need of international protection. Furthermore, Turkey would take back all irregular migrants intercepted in the Turkish waters, including the few-kilometers zone between Turkey and Lesvos. To accomplish this task, the EU would remunerate Turkey with billions of euros (European Council 2016). Such prevention of asylum-related migrants taking a potentially risky journey to the EU has been called “deterrence through protection” to implement border surveillance measures at the EU borderlands supported by these third-country partnerships (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi 2014).

The actualized returns of migrants from Greece to Turkey failed to have an impact on migration. Only 2,001 migrants were returned to Turkey in 2016–2019, and of them, 183 persons in 2019 (UNHCR 2019a). However, the tighten-




Figure 1.1. Lesvos and its main reception centers for asylum-related migrants.

ing border control and interception substantially decreased irregular border crossings. In 2016, the number of asylum-related migrants traveling through Lesvos diminished substantially from the previous year. The control in the Eastern Mediterranean route resulted in a shift in the main migration trajectories, first (in 2017) to the Central Mediterranean route and later (in 2018) to the Western Mediterranean route (UNHCR 2019b). Accordingly, the number of asylum-related migrants arriving to Lesvos was 11,973 in 2017 and 14,969 in 2018 (Aegean Boat Report 2017; Aegean Boat Report 2018). However, while the overall number of asylum seekers to the EU continued to decline in 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean route, with 74,500 arrivals, became once again the most frequented Mediterranean route (62% of all arrivals through the Mediterranean areas) to the EU. The growth of arrivals by asylum-related migrants was considerable in 2019 (Figure 1.2). Lesvos received 27,049 asylum-related migrants in 2019, a growth of 81% from the previous year (UNHCR 2020a). Such growth took place despite the Turkish authorities making in that year over 105,000 inter-

ceptions of irregular migrants in the Aegean Sea and returning them to Turkey (Aegean Boat Report 2019).

The arrivals of asylum-related migrants from Turkey to Greece became complex in 2020. In January and February 2020, more arrivals took place compared with two earlier years (Figure 1.2). The situation from March 2020 onward was influenced, first, by the decision of the Turkish authorities to let the migrants travel toward Greece and not to prevent them from leaving Turkey and, second, by the immediate counter-action by the Greek authorities to push many migrants back and by their decision to not accept any asylum requests (at least for March). The migrants were left into an in-between space between Turkey and Greece. In March, they were gradually returned back from the border area. As regards the passages over the sea, the situation above is discussed in the end of this Section. The developments from April 2020 onward fall out of the time span of this study.




Figure 1.2. Arrival of asylum-related migrants to Greece, January 2018 – February 2020. Source: UNHCR (2020c).

Compared with the year 2015, the overall number of asylum-related migrants traveling through Lesbos has become much smaller, but at the same time, the number of people stuck in the asylum processes in Lesbos has grown substantially. Before the EU-Turkey Statement, asylum seekers were free to travel to the mainland Greece to present their asylum request. Therefore until the spring of 2016, migrants generally passed through the island rather quickly. Usually, their stays lasted from a few days to a few weeks. After the substantial decline of arrivals, the accommodation capacity to host the migrants was almost reached, only

from hundreds to a couple thousand migrants could not be accommodated in the reception facilities. Later, the initial asylum processes (such as identification of individuals, their first hearings and their transfer to the mainland Greece) need to be conducted on the EU hotspots at the border, in this case in Lesvos (Alpes et al. 2017). The ‘hotspot approach’ was launched in 2015 in the EU to manage exceptional migratory flows arriving at the EU (European Commission 2017). As the result, the asylum inspection procedures took substantially more time, and individual migrants were obliged to stay in Lesvos from months to more than one year. As mentioned, at least until early 2020, the immediate return to Turkey did not function as planned, and the resettlement of asylum seekers from Greece to other EU member states did not take place as agreed. The migrant accommodations in mainland Greece were congested, so it was difficult to transfer migrants from Lesvos to the mainland (see UNHCR 2019d).

Asylum-related migrants in the Aegean Sea islands were in January 2019 about 14,680 people and in the end of the year they were 2019 about 41,100 migrants. The increase was 27,000 persons (men +10,700; women +6,000; male children +5,700; female children +4,000). Very much grew the number of Afghans (+14,500 persons), and also of Syrians (+6,600), Somalis (+1,700), Palestinians (+1,400) and Congolese (+1,200) whereas Iraqis were fewer in the end than in the beginning of the year (UNHCR 2020b).

In Lesvos, the reception facilities became very overcrowded during 2019. Almost 17,700 asylum seekers were transferred from Lesvos to the mainland in 2019. Because from the summer of 2019 onward, the new arrivals to the island outnumbered transfers from it, the total asylum-related migrant population grew rapidly (Figure 1.3). While in May, there were 7,000 asylum-related migrants in Lesvos (twice the capacity), their number grew to over 20,000 by the end of the year – over five times the formal accommodation capacity in the island’s migrant reception centers (National Coordination Center 2019a; 2019b). In particular, the Moria reception and identification center became hugely overcrowded – over six times its formal capacity – and thousands of new asylum-related migrants were obliged to stay in provisional accommodations in tents in open air outside the center. The acute state of emergency turned into more continuous challenges to govern and (mis)manage asylum seekers with various techniques (see Chapter 3).

At the end of 2019, the number of asylum-related migrants was equal to more than 20% of the regular resident population of Lesvos, thus having a substantial impact on the island’s activities, economy and media visibility. The overcrowding also gained international media attention, especially when violent activities appeared in Moria in the autumn of 2019 (BBC 2019) and when the public sector in the Aegean islands, including Lesvos, went on general strike in early 2020 to protest the growth in the number of asylum-related migrants and the Greek government’s plans to open by the summer of 2020 large detention centers (closed pre-departure centers) on these islands (Hurst 2019; BBC 2020a; Bell 2020).




Figure 1.3. Arrivals and transfers of asylum-related migrants to and from Lesvos in 2019. Source: Elaborated from Aegean Boat Report (2019).

The international situation escalated in late February–early March 2020, when Turkish authorities let tens of thousands of asylum-related migrants to leave the Turkish territory toward Greece. However, the Greek authorities decided not to let them enter the Greek territory and prevented as much as possible their access to Greece and the EU (BBC 2020b). In fact, new national laws and policies in Greece were designed in 2019 to make possible, from the year 2020 onward, the interception and immediate return of asylum-related migrants from Greece to Turkey, as well as their faster transfer and resettlement from the reception centers of the Aegean islands to mainland Greece. In addition, these laws and policies in Greece would make it possible to close and open the reception sites much faster, if needed, and the conduction of asylum interviews by Greek police and army (Apostolou 2019). In March 2020, the Greek government proclaimed that they will not

accept any asylum requests for a month. Many recently arrived asylum-related migrants were transferred from Lesvos without initiating their asylum process. Furthermore, in the mid-March the Greek authorities suspended the processing of asylum applications (at least for a month) due to health considerations.

The particularity of the situation in February–March 2020 is seen in the sea arrivals from Turkey to Greece from mid-February to mid-March (Figure 1.4). In two weeks (16–29 February) prior to the Turkish announcement of the ‘open borders’ to the EU, 1,256 asylum-related migrants arrived at the Aegean Sea islands and 318 of them (8 boats) at Lesvos. However, then on two days (1–2 March) arrived 1,512 migrants at the Aegean Sea islands and 612 of them at Lesvos. Then Greek authorities implemented a strong prevention of the arrivals. In the following two weeks (3–15 March) 413 migrants arrived at the islands and 99 of them at Lesvos (Aegean Boat Report 2020; National Coordination Center 2020). Meanwhile also Turkish authorities started again to intercept the migrants trying to make the sea passage from Turkey to Greece.




Figure 1.4. Arrival of asylum-related migrants at the Aegean Sea islands and Lesvos from mid-February to mid-March 2020. Elaborated from the data of National Coordination Center (2020).

Even violent pushbacks from Greece to Turkey were practiced both on land and sea (thus, violating the principle of non-refoulement). The EU ministers of interior supported such actions with their collective statement according to which "Illegal crossings will not be tolerated. In this regard, the EU and its member states will take all necessary measures, in accordance with EU and international

law.” (Deutsche Welle 2020). However, by not letting anyone to ask for asylum was against the 1951 Geneva Convention and the related EU asylum legislation. Already earlier the return mechanisms of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey have been criticized due to apparent human right violations (see Alpes et al. 2017). The Commissioner for Human Rights of the European Council made in March 2020 a quick statement to act immediately to address humanitarian and protection needs of people trapped between Turkey and Greece (European Council 2020). This is about biogeopolitics at the EU borderland (see Chapter 2).

The political situations became very tense also in Lesvos in March 2020 when some asylum seeker helping NGOs, journalists and asylum-related migrants were attacked by nationalist Greek individuals and groups. As a result, several NGOs had to suspend their activities in Lesvos, at least temporarily. In addition, an unexpected sudden fire devastated One Happy Family community center for asylum-related migrants.

An additional serious aggravation to the situation of the asylum-related migrants came in the spring of 2020 with the pandemic SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2). The coronavirus disease COVID-19 made the circumstances of these migrants more difficult in various ways. For example, their asylum process was suspended (initially for one month). To make the dispersal of the illness slower, the restaurants, hotels and other accommodation were closed, the camps were temporarily closed for external persons and the full lockdown of the country was exercised. This obviously made more difficult for asylum-related NGOs to arrive and to be present in Lesvos, and especially to be directly in touch with the migrants. Nevertheless, the measures taken to prevent the dispersal of the illness among the asylum-related migrants and to take care of ill migrants were not sufficient. For this reason, the organization Doctors without Borders (2020) required the transfer of asylum seekers from the Aegean Sea islands to appropriate accommodation. That would have been needed to prevent serious outcomes deriving from COVID-19. They also stated that in such circumstances the containment policy regarding asylum-related migrants in Greece could have deadly consequences, especially because many of these migrants were vulnerable and ill. There was a government plan to close the emergency shelter for arriving migrants at the northern coast of Lesvos, and a plan was launched to erect a long floating fence in the sea to prevent migration to Lesvos (Smith 2020). In early 2020, the longer impact of the new legislation, plans and projects on asylum-related migration and migrants and their governance in Lesvos remained to be seen.

1.2 Research questions, material and methods

The main questions of the research are as follows:

1. What is asylum seekers’ and other asylum-related migrants’ everyday life like on the island of Lesvos, Greece?

2. What subgroups exist among asylum seekers and other migrants in Lesbos?
3. What are the migration patterns and aspirations of asylum seekers and other migrants in Lesbos?
4. How are the asylum seekers and other migrants governed in Lesbos?

The main empirical material for the research derives from the field research conducted in Lesbos in November 2019. This material is complemented with information and statistics from various national and international organizations responsible for the governance of asylum-related migrants in Lesbos, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the international and Greek border control authorities. Obviously, earlier academic research about asylum-related migrants in Lesbos is taken into account, including our own (see Jauhiainen 2017). In the past year, tens of articles and research reports have been published about the migrant situation in Lesbos.

The key empirical material for this research consists of responses from 625 asylum seekers and asylum-related migrants to a survey conducted on 1–8 November 2019 in Lesbos. The survey was available in Arabic, English, Farsi, French, Sorani Kurdish, Turkish and Urdu. The respondents were from 21 countries from the Middle East, Africa and Asia, and the largest groups were Afghans and Syrians (for details, see Section 4.1). The survey comprised 66 questions, of which 46 were structural, 15 were semi-open and 5 were open. The structural questions (answer options: yes/no; I agree/I don't know/I disagree) were about the asylum seeker's background (gender, mother tongue, university education, employment, etc.) and journey to Lesbos, as well as feelings and experiences on the island. The semi-open questions dealt with more detailed aspects about their journey to Lesbos (reason for leaving, employment, experiences along the journey, etc.) and their stay at the reception sites (personal experiences on various issues, future plans, destinations, etc.) in Lesbos. The open questions dealt with the respondents' reasons for leaving the country of origin, their daily activities in Lesbos and their broader aspirations and goals in their lives. The survey format was exactly the same as in our survey conducted in Lesbos in 2016 (see Jauhiainen 2017). This allowed for identification of changes in the migrants' situations and perspectives over the last three years (see Chapter 4).

The research ethics issues were followed rigorously. All migrants responded to the survey anonymously, and they were not identifiable in the research. The scope and ethical principles of the research were explained to the respondents and also written on the first page of the questionnaire. In practice, individual asylum-related migrants in Lesbos were approached in the areas where they lived and spent their time. Usually, this was in the immediate vicinity of the Moria reception and identification center or the Kara Tepe reception center, but also in other locations where asylum-related migrants were present. If the approached person agreed,

then the person was provided with the questionnaire form to fill out. If necessary, a pen was also provided. If the person was not willing, he or she was not pressured to take part in the research. The person could also withdraw from filling out the questionnaire at any moment or leave unanswered questions he or she did not want to answer. The survey was conducted in the field by three persons, the authors of this report and a research assistant, usually from the late morning to the early evening. When the questionnaire sheet was returned, usually in 15–20 minutes, we wrote down the date, the location from which the sheet was returned and in which reception facility the respondent lived in Lesvos.

In addition, informal interviews and talks were held with tens of asylum-related migrants. The topics were mostly about their everyday lives in Lesvos, their migration to the island and their migration aspirations. These interviews and talks lasted from a few minutes to more than half an hour, and sometimes the migrants were met over several days. Ad verbatim quotes were written down in specific cases. These direct contacts helped to better understand the everyday challenges, opportunities and aspirations of the respondents and the governance over these migrants, as well as what were the migrants' actions upon them. Furthermore, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with asylum-related migrants were visited and interviews were conducted with them. These NGOs included the One Happy Family community center, the Movement on the Ground foundation, Shower Power, the Lesvos Solidarity Mosaic Support Center, the Hope project, the Mare Liberum and Stand by Me. The topics regarded the main activities of these NGOs and their reflections about the situation of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos. The NGOs provided information that helped to contextualize the survey findings. In the report, however, we do not analyze these interviews. Empirical material also derives from our systematic field observation during the fieldwork. Notes about the interviews, talks and observations were written down on every fieldwork day.

Following each fieldwork day, we discussed among ourselves the main issues and observations that arose during the day's fieldwork. Furthermore, we assigned running numbers to the questionnaire sheets (for example, regarding location, language, gender) that facilitated adjustment of the sample from day to day to be as representative as possible regarding gender, age and ethnic variety of asylum-related migrants present in Lesvos.

Later, when we returned Finland, we coded all responses of the individual survey questions either directly or through the NVivo program. Then, we inserted them into the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists) program, and a database was created. The answers to semi-open and open questions were given in many languages. These answers were translated into English by proficient and experienced translators. Then, these were coded through the NVivo program and inserted into the SPSS database. The consistency of the inserted data

was inspected with systematic checks. The research assistants are thanked for their help in processing the survey data. Later, the survey data were analyzed quantitatively with descriptive statistics and cross tables.

This study is a result of a team effort. Cooperation between various actors enabled the current report, and we thank everyone who directly or indirectly contributed to its creation. We are enormously grateful to all respondents who put in efforts to fill in the questionnaires. We also appreciate the time the interviewees' spent to share their experiences and insights in person. The asylum-related migrants at various sites in Lesvos provided hospitality, friendliness and willingness to cooperate with us. The heads of the Kara Tepe reception center, the One Happy Family community center and the Movement on the Ground foundation in Lesvos receive our gratitude for letting us interview their residents and visitors. We also thank the owners and activists of the NGOs, mentioned in this chapter, who shared their perspectives on the situation in Lesvos. Finally, the invaluable help of research assistants and other scholars involved is greatly appreciated.

1.3 Research highlights

- The island of Lesvos in the Greek Aegean archipelago ten kilometers from the western coast of Turkey is one of the main entry gateways for asylum-related migrants to the EU, especially along the Eastern Mediterranean route.
- In 2015, over half a million asylum seekers passed via Turkey to the EU through Lesvos. Following the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, this migration became more controlled and the number of migrants declined until a substantial growth in 2019, when 27,049 asylum-related migrants arrived at Lesvos.
- The interception and the fast return of irregular migrants from Greece to Turkey were mentioned as key instruments in the EU-Turkey Statement. The return mechanism has not had a quantitative impact on migration, and at most, a few hundred migrants have been officially returned annually. According to official information, in 2019, the Turkish authorities intercepted in the Turkish waters 3,124 boats (63%) and 105,325 people (64%) aiming to cross the border irregularly from Turkey to the Aegean islands.
- In all Aegean Islands, the increase in 2019 was 27,000 asylum-related migrants (men +10,700; women +6,000; male children +5,700; female children +4,000). From January 2019 to March 2020, the number of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos grew from 7,000 to over 21,000. During recent years, the Moria reception and identification center in Lesvos has become notorious for being overcrowded. In the beginning of 2019, it had 4,996 asylum-related migrants, and at the end of 2019, there were 18,640, while the official capacity was 2,840 persons.

- The Kara Tepe reception center, another major (1,250 people) site hosting asylum-related migrants in Lesvos, is much more regulated compared with Moria; it more often hosts families and vulnerable people, and the center's rather stable population is adjusted to its capacity. There is a waiting list for (vulnerable) people to be transferred from Moria to Kara Tepe.
- In Lesvos, there are also smaller organized sites (such as ex-PIKPA and the Iliaktida center) that have hosted asylum-related migrants for many years. There are also several unorganized sites and squatted buildings in which migrants unofficially reside.
- The governance of asylum-related migrants is part of biogeopolitics: developing the preferred geopolitical order at the EU borderlands by biopolitical (mis)management and governance of the asylum-related migrant population.
- Asylum-related migrants' everyday living conditions in Lesvos are poor: The reception sites are overcrowded, they lack hygiene, unrest frequently takes place and the migrants do not know what will happen and when regarding their asylum request.
- Over three out of four migrants escaped war and/or serious human rights violations in their country of origin. Some made the journey to Lesvos within a few weeks, but the majority spent more than half a year on their journeys, some even several years before reaching Lesvos by boat, the final passage facilitated by smugglers at the Turkish coast.
- For many migrants, Germany is their aspired destination country; however, Germany also represents the idea of safety, employment and normal life in the EU. Canada, Finland and the Netherlands were also frequently mentioned as potential destination countries. Most migrants wished to work in Europe, and those becoming adults also wished to study there.
- The majority of asylum-related migrants used the Internet and social media for facilitate to start their asylum-related migration in the country of origin, to continue during the journey and while in Lesvos. Very frequent Internet and social media users utilized these tools for broader and more detailed facilitation of their asylum-related journey.
- Poor inhumane living conditions of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos must be improved, enhancing the reception facilities and making the asylum process transparent, fast and just. Asylum seekers should be transferred quickly to mainland Greece and resettled in other EU member states as agreed, while a meaningful safe return should be provided for those not receiving a living permit in the EU. Complimentary Internet access for asylum-related migrants should be guaranteed during all asylum process stages in Lesvos and elsewhere in the EU.

2. Governance of asylum-related migrants and their migration

Governance is a complex combination of policies, practices and techniques to direct, control and regulate the present and future of those activities, organizations and people who are governed, in the context of this research, asylum-related migrants, their activities and the organizations involved. Power is an inherent part of governance: as a means to direct the actions of these migrants and related institutions, a medium through which these actions take place and a network in which all asylum-related actors are involved. This chapter discusses how governance is connected to asylum-related migration and migrants and the specific role of asylum seeker reception centers ('camps') in such governance.

In the context of this research, asylum-related migrants mean people who (aim to) migrate to the EU to receive a residence permit there and request asylum as a mechanism to be allowed to enter and remain in the EU, at least during the process of their asylum application being inspected (see Jauhiainen et al. 2019). Some of these migrants have legitimate grounds to be accepted as a refugee in an EU member state, thus gaining a residence permit based on the need for international protection according to the related international, EU and national laws. Others may also have legitimate grounds for asylum but are not able to present these properly during their asylum application inspection, so they do not become refugees. However, they might get a (temporary) residence permit based on subsidiary protection, or their stay might be (temporarily) tolerated in an EU member state because of challenges to their return. Asylum-related migrants without proper grounds to gain international or subsidiary protection or fulfilling other requirements of entering and residing in an EU member state receive a negative decision on their asylum application. Usually, their entrance into the country is rejected and they must leave due to ban of entry or because their right to reside in the country expires. According to the prevailing policies, these asylum-related migrants (former asylum seekers) should return to the country of origin or habitual permanent residence. The authorities can also force them to leave the country or deport them. Some remain unauthorized in the country in question and become undocumented (irregular) migrants whose stay might be tolerated in case of their non-deportability but in other cases they just have to live in legal limbo without proper status (Gonzales 2019; Nimführ & Sesay 2019; Jauhiainen & Tedeschi 2020).

In brief, asylum-related migration is the mobility of people to apply for asylum in another country, as well as the aim or plan to enact such mobility. In the context of this research, this usually means their migration to Lesbos, arrival at this island in Greece inside the EU and request for asylum there (or trying to postpone asking for asylum in another EU member state), as well as the aims and plans of these people to migrate farther: to mainland Greece, another EU member state or another country, including the return to their country of or-

igin. Asylum-related migration also includes the mobility of these people even if they never reach Lesvos and the EU (for challenges in defining the length and process of asylum-related journeys, see BenEzer & Zetter 2015). In some cases, the aspiring migrants are not even able to cross the borders of their country of origin.

Regarding governance of asylum-related migration and migrants, it is not only what and who are subjects and objects of these activities but also when and where these activities take place. The movement of migrant bodies is part of the broader geopolitical order in the territories these bodies are acquainted with and the political, social and biological function of these bodies (i.e., it is about the biopolitics of asylum-related migration). The term 'biogeopolitics' is used here for this complex process. Different stakeholders are involved in developing their preferred geopolitical order by biopolitical governance and (mis)management of this population consisting of nonnative migrants in the territories in which they are governed.

Biogeopolitics provides a framework for the circumstances and situations in Lesvos, Greece. There, asylum-related migrants become 'bodily masses' that can be moved, directed and (mis)managed in the attempt to achieve what is aspired as part of broader geopolitical interests. For example, in the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, the EU (represented by the European Council) and Turkey (represented by the highest political regimes of the country) agreed to intervene in the irregular migration via Turkey to the EU (European Council 2016), in this case also through Lesvos. Lesvos was converted to a material reminder that access to the EU is challenging for those from outside the EU. These migrants with flesh and bones in Lesvos aspiring to enter or leave the island became a permanent reference that could be utilized when negotiating about the (geopolitical) relationships between the EU and Turkey, Greece and the rest of the EU; the municipality of Lesvos and the Greek government; different stakeholders in Lesvos; and the migrants themselves. In some aspects, asylum-related migrants had individual or collective agency, in others, not much if any, as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 4.6.

2.1 Governance of asylum-related migration and migrants

Asylum-related migration between Turkey and Lesvos is a combination of international and national institutional regulation and irregular activities connected to various spatial configurations. National and international legislation regulates the right to enter countries and cross national borders, including the border between the EU and Turkey. Asylum legislation regulates the rights and duties of different stakeholders during the asylum process and after the asylum decision. At the same time, such a 'functional' migration management approach can be seen as depoliticization of asylum processes by displacing the asylum-related

migration from the political debate through illustrating it as a simple management issue (see Darling 2016). Furthermore, besides the EU institutions, many international organizations also take part in the governance of asylum-related migration policies and practices. Lavenex (2016) discussed how these organizations, such as the UNHCR and the IOM (that are also present in Lesvos), which complement and correct the EU migration policies, are being outsourced to implement the EU policies and are engaged in transferring the EU rules to third countries, in this case to Turkey.

Many more asylum seekers enter and aim to remain in the EU than the EU member states accept. In 2016–2019, of the first-instance asylum decisions in the EU, 37–59% granted residence permits based on refugee status, subsidiary protection or humanitarian reasons, that is, the application rejection rates varied annually between 41% and 63% (Eurostat 2017; Eurostat 2019). Thus, the majority of asylum-related migrants were not accepted in the member states as internationally protected refugees or persons granted subsidiary protection or due to other reasons. In general, the rejection rates increased over these years, varied substantially among the member states and indicated a considerable difference in the interpretation of the applications. The international asylum legislation and the general principles for granting asylum are the same for every EU member state, but there are differences in how these are applied among the EU member states. Additionally, national policies change over time among the member states. Different national frameworks contradict each other in the governance and management of irregular migration (see Ambrosini 2018), as well as regarding asylum-related migration (that ‘produced’ most irregular migrants) in the EU.

Three major stages are involved in the governance of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos. The first is their arrival to Lesvos (i.e., the journey to the Turkish coast and the sea passage to Lesvos). To reach Lesvos, everyone needs to cross the border between Turkey and Greece/the EU, which is done without the legal consent of the Turkish authorities. The EU-Turkey Statement also indicates that the Turkish authorities need to control irregular migration via Turkey to the EU and prevent the operationalization of new routes for irregular migration to the EU (European Council 2016).

Most migrants (except those originally from Turkey) arriving at Lesvos need to cross at least two international borders. A common passage is first from Syria, Iran or Iraq to Turkey through a land border, then reaching the western Turkish coast and continuing over sea through a maritime border to Lesvos in Greece. Some arrive to Turkey through regular travel and with proper rights to enter the country, including directly by plane to Turkey, and then they continue irregularly to Lesvos. Others irregularly cross more than two borders, such as first from Afghanistan to Iran and then farther from Iran to Turkey and consequently to

Lesvos. Especially those arriving by land from sub-Saharan Africa need to pass several borders to reach Turkey (see Section 4.4). Increasingly, asylum-related migration consists of stages of undetermined length at various places along the journey. During these fragmented journeys (see Collyer 2010), the initial destination countries may change, and the transit countries may become destinations. The governance of asylum-related migrants' journeys and their possibility to cross borders and remain in places along the journey is part of broader geopolitical regimes.

The second stage in the governance of asylum-related migrants is their stay while they are in Lesvos. Following the procedures of the EU migration hotspot approach, the majority of migrants ask for asylum in Lesvos, so their asylum process is started and initially processed while they remain on the island. The asylum process is regulated with the EU legislation. It includes the identification of the asylum applicant, inspecting the reasons for requesting asylum and making the decision over asylum. Each applicant needs to fill out forms and be interviewed to verify his/her claims. Furthermore, applicants' fingerprints are taken and information is inserted into the EURODAC system that shows their asylum status in the EU. Following the principles of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and its Dublin regulation, the first country of arrival is responsible for the asylum process and decision. This creates a major burden to Greece as many arrive to Greece only because of its geographical proximity (Hampshire 2016, 538). In fact, most migrants aim to travel to EU member states other than Greece (UNHCR 2015; Afouxenidis 2017; see also Section 4.4). None of the Aegean islands have facilities for long-term stay of asylum-related migrants, so they need to be removed to mainland Greece at a certain moment in the asylum process. In addition, some of the successful asylum applicants (refugees, those with subsidiary protection or reunified individuals) are later resettled from Greece to other EU member states.

In 2019, the number of migrants arriving at Lesvos almost doubled (+81%) compared to the previous year (UNHCR 2020b). However, the number of staff processing the applications did not grow accordingly, so the processing time for applications increased. Therefore, the length of asylum seekers' stays in Lesvos tended to increase. As discussed in Section 4.2 and evidenced by earlier research, the stay in Lesvos varies from months to even years (Jauhiainen 2017). The congestion in the island's sites resulted in unequal treatment of the migrants. Some were placed inside the Moria reception and identification center with a few thousand other migrants. Others remained outside the center in an improvised area filled with tents for more than 10,000 migrants. Some later found places in more convenient and smaller official reception sites. Others stayed unofficially with a few friends or family in squatted buildings or even in a proper rented flat somewhere in Lesvos. This governance of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos is

related to broader biogeopolitical regimes, as discussed in Section 2.2. Papada et al. (2019) referred to the Lesvos migration situation as a pop-up governance that includes (intentionally) disorganized management of migration based on abruptly introduced practice-based mechanisms. The purpose of such flexible management is to govern a perceived crisis and its specific events and temporary emergency. It does not suspend “normal governance” but facilitates it, filling temporal and spatial gaps in the governance capacity.

The third stage is the resettlement of the asylum seekers from Lesvos to other places, usually to accommodation sites in mainland Greece. In 2019, 17,000 asylum-related migrants were transferred from Lesvos to mainland Greece (National Coordination Center 2019c). Some will later gain resident permit in Greece, others are resettled to another EU member states. However, most will receive a negative asylum decision, meaning that they need to return to their country of origin. Nevertheless, some will remain as undocumented migrants in Greece or try to pass irregularly from Greece to another EU member state. There, they may start another asylum process (with modified claims; otherwise, the application is soon rejected) or they may try other ways to obtain a residence permit. There are large informal asylum-related migrant settlements in Europe in the non-EU member states where the migrants search for possibilities to enter the EU (Doctors without borders 2019). Some will continue to live in the EU as irregular migrants. Their number in the EU is estimated to be millions (Connor & Passel 2019). Some former asylum seekers return voluntarily or are forcibly deported to their country of origin. Nevertheless, some of them restart the asylum-related journey and might turn up in Lesvos again.

2.2 In and out of asylum-related camps

Biogeopolitics is about developing preferred geopolitical order by biopolitical management of the alien population. In Lesvos, it is about governance of asylum-related migrants’ ideas and bodies (‘thought and action’) in and out of reception centers, the ‘camps.’ The use of biopolitics as a concept in studies about asylum-related migration has been criticized because of its overly strict binary use (making live/letting die) that does not recognize heterogeneous practices involved in the migration management nor the migrants’ agency within such management. The issue is also whether biopolitics is about the entire population or individuals within such a population. Racialization is seen to be important in governance of migrants (see Mavelli 2017; Aradau & Tazzioli 2019).

Asylum-related camps have received extensive attention by scholars following the increasing spread of both institutional and makeshift camps hosting refugees, asylum seekers, and other asylum-related migrants in the EU and elsewhere. According to Martin et al. (2019, 4, 18), camps can be defined as “specific geographical formations, having emerged as a modern spatial political technol-

ogy.” The UNHCR (2014, 12) defines a refugee camp (or more precisely, a camp hosting asylum-related migrants) as “any purpose-built, planned and managed location or spontaneous settlement where refugees [and asylum-related migrants] are accommodated and receive assistance and services from government and humanitarian agencies.” Camps are arenas of particular types of governmentality as temporary spaces in which humanitarian relief and protection are provided until a more durable solution to the migrants’ situation is found. While humanitarian agencies and authorities provide migrants with care, they also expose them to “bare lives” without proper human rights and to politicized biological facts of “naked lives,” as discussed below (Ek 2006; Ramadan 2013; Turner 2016). Many current camps bear features of former European colonial camps aimed at territorial protection, oppression, ethnic cleansing, and labor control (Martin et al. 2019).

Camps are physically and socially designed, engineered, and managed. Camps usually have a standardized physical layout with repetitive anonymous prefabricated units (see Katz 2017). This is also true for the Moria and Kara Tepe reception centers in Lesbos. Some sites are constructed in an empty place, but in many cases they are converted former military garrisons (such as Moria), and former prisons or industrial warehouses are also used. Institutional camps usually have many things in common: They are legally governed by different instruments and organizations than the surrounding areas. They are created and managed by international humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR along with the national governments (such as in Moria), and sometimes also by municipal authorities (such as in Kara Tepe) (see Turner 2016; Martin et al. 2019). Informal makeshift camps are less regulated and can contain both (former) fixed and organized space and more organically grown premises. Usually makeshift camps are connected to institutional camps and are sometimes also physically attached to each other (Martin et al. 2019). The site around the gated Moria center is partly a makeshift camp connected to an institutional camp. Kara Tepe is clearly an institutional camp. Many informal sites in Lesbos could be considered small makeshift camps. The ‘archipelagoes of camps’ “generate new political and economic geographies” (Martin et al. 2019, 4, 18) in which camps affect their surrounding regions, borders, settlements and transportation system with their economic, social and cultural activities. This is also clearly evident in Lesbos. This blurs the conventional biopolitical binary of inclusion versus exclusion regarding the heterogeneous migrant population that sometimes becomes an integral part of the surrounding economic system and necessarily part of its broader (geo)political regime.

The main scholarly discussion regarding camps has been, on the one hand, about people inside camps and, on the other hand, on the broader role of camps in society, including the entire society considered a camp. In these discussions,

camp appears to be closely associated with citizenship, problem-solving process, anomaly, emergency, exceptional situation, temporality, instability, violence, extraterritoriality, demarcation, ambiguity, transnationalism, translocality, transition, crossroads, a state of limbo, victimization, constantly questioned legality and order (Ramadan 2013; Turner 2016). The debates have been inspired by philosopher Giorgio Agamben's concept of "state of exception." This describes the situation and condition when normal legal-political order is suspended to resolve situations that endanger the state (Ek 2006). The rapid large arrival of asylum seekers in the EU in 2015 was seen by many European politicians as threatening the EU member states economically and politically, so counter-action was exercised. The political regime of the EU became obsessed with security in migration, combining macro-scale neoliberal governance and micro-scale neoliberal governmentality (Ek 2006).

In the state of exception, asylum-related migrants (and potentially any citizens) are subordinated to the biopolitically organized legal system that decides the extent to which human rights are applied. In the end, all human beings can be reduced to naked life in which their ontological status as subjects can be suspended (Butler 2004; Ek 2006). The political agency, identities and past of these migrant bodies are limited to their simple biological needs (Turner 2016). In the following, we focus on asylum-related migrants in camps and do not extend the discussion to society as a camp.

According to the so-called Agambenian camp studies, camps are "spaces of exception" to deal with populations that disturb the national order of things (Turner 2016). With camps, certain subjects (here, asylum-related migrants) are temporarily contained and fixed in place. Their mobility and social interactions are regulated, keeping them in spatio-temporal limbo. Those interned in camps are reduced to 'bare life': stripped of their political existence, excluded from the proper protections and legal rights, and exposed to violence (Ramadan 2013). As a result, asylum-related migrants are de-qualified from their earlier existence, numbered and reclassified, and finally translated into a biopolitical mass without individuals (see also Aradau & Tazzioli 2019). Everyday life and emergency become indistinct in the slow emergencies of camps, indicating "not simple the slowness of the emergency, but also how the emergency and ordinary life become intertwined" (Anderson et al. 2019, 12). Tightly connected to the notions of "slow death," "attritional lethality" and "slow violence," the phenomenon falls on psychic and bodily harm produced by an emergency situation, which is widely framed as not acute but accumulating over time (Anderson et al. 2019, 2, 5, 11). People endure emergency and cope with terrible living conditions over a long period, gradually turning the emergency into an ordinary case. Slow violence takes gradual forms of harm and damage, often out of sight of the wider public, including the situations inside camps for asylum-related migrants, such as that

of Moria. Asylum-related migrants feel abandoned by law without promise of a future of progress and improvement (Anderson et al. 2019).

Martin et al. (2019) argued that camps have a geopolitical role in specific border functions creating buffer zones. There, asylum-related migrants can be contained outside the normal order of the state suspending and ignoring their presence. Biopolitics sustains, not extinguishes, life, but the asylum-related migrants' sustained life does not qualify as the life of proper citizens. The migrants' basic biological needs and security are taken care of, but their political agency is deprived. The encampment protects the socio-biopolitical body of the titular nation by separating the undesirables – here the asylum-related migrants – from it. Techniques of vision, head counts, situation reports and the management of space and movement coerces, disciplines and produces appropriate refugee subjects and behaviors. These migrants become *homines sacri*, banned from society and denied (all) rights (Ramadan 2013).

A camp as an assemblage of people, institutions, organizations, the built environment and the relationships between them (see Ramadan 2013) is created as a (temporary) response to an emergency, an event to be transformed into normality. The suspended temporality is reproduced by the external juridical-political order of states, international agencies and international law of a geopolitical landscape that awaits the final resolution (Ramadan 2013). These camps pronounced in the emergency situations with determinate temporariness turn into permanent sites of exception and social exclusion (Ramadan 2013; Turner 2016; Martin et al. 2019). There, individuals and collective life are increasingly governed through a variety of techniques, strategies and rationalities of emergency. This is the biopolitical mobilization of emergency producing bare life in which people suffer and are damaged in the name of emergency while pursuing a goal of securing and sustaining the existing socio-ecological order (Anderson et al. 2019).

Temporariness and emergency are instrumental parts in the language of emergency regarding camps. Claiming and naming a situation as an emergency opens up an interval during which the non-emergency everyday life can be restored with various activities (Anderson et al. 2019). Though there is care, there is also collateral (re)production of harmful and damaging conditions (see also Iliadou 2019) that prevent the (forthcoming expected) return of and bouncing back to the situations before the emergency claims. The enduring temporariness of camps signifies that meaningful life is located elsewhere.

However, things do not look so bleak from the 'post-Agambenian approaches' that criticize the passivizing role given to asylum-related migrants and refugees (see also Araudo & Tazzioli 2019). Camps are not monolithic bodies with a single pure identity but diverse, dynamic and at times divided assemblages in constant motion (Ramadan 2013). Camps are also sites of agency, resistance, sol-

identity and new political identity (Martin et al. 2019). Ramadan (2013, 71) claimed that “the camp may become a space of dissent and contestation in which refugee subjects speak and act for themselves in politically qualified ways that resist their dehumanization.” There is an on-going simultaneous exclusion and inclusion of camp residents in which camp becomes a site and space of multiple subjectivities (Oesch 2017). Furthermore, asylum-related migrants are able to resist the top-down standardization of life by being able to transform materially their everyday life environments. By these small everyday issues, these migrants are able to support their bottom-up social and political identities and activities (see Singh 2020).

In fact, the agency that migrants are refused is not ignored, but the legitimacy of this agency is questioned. Portraying them as voiceless and passive receivers of assistance, asylum-related migrants are illegitimate political actors if they go against this socially constructed vision and attempt to exercise their political agency in a camp or country of new residence. These illegitimate political activities might be seen as dangerous, unexpected and inappropriate, by the analogue with terroristic acts, as Ramadan (2013) put it.

Emergency situations and practices in camps deny the promising future; however, there is pluripotency and capability in life to generate radically expanding new becomings of sociality and political agency (Ramadan 2013; Anderson et al. 2019). Social dissolution, disillusion and depoliticization of the asylum-related migrants in the camps simultaneously produce a hyperpoliticized space in which everything is contested (Turner 2016). Bottom-up political movements may coexist with the (inter)national humanitarian top-down management of camps. The precarity of life in camp also regards migrants' thoughts and relationships to the future in their attempts to restore normality. Nevertheless, emergency, with its unknown developments, can become a resource and tactic to claim such a future (Anderson et al. 2019). Important is that individual asylum-related migrants are able to imagine a meaningful future for themselves (Turner 2016).

3. Asylum-related migrants in Lesvos, Greece

Governance relates to asylum-related migrants' arrival at Lesvos, their stay there and their transfer from Lesvos to mainland Greece. Different actors with different motivations are involved. As discussed in Chapter 2, the governance of asylum-related migrants, the reception sites and the whole asylum process is a very complex topic with international policies and (biogeo)politics, management and actions, and (un)intentional negligence and consequences. Furthermore, although these migrants are the target of all these policies and activities, they have their agency as well. Such agency and capacity to progress one's life vary among the whole migrant population.

3.1 Asylum-related migration to Lesvos

The geographical location of Lesvos at ten km from the Turkish coast makes the island a potential site for asylum-related migrants to attempt to access the EU. Asylum-related migrants cannot reach Lesvos through regular migration, so they have to rely on informal irregular migration that takes place on the Turkish coast. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Lesvos is the most well-known island in the EU regarding asylum-related migration. In the so-far peak year of 2015, over half a million asylum-related migrants traveled through it. Later, the number of migrants declined until it rose again in 2019, reaching 27,000 migrants (UNHCR 2020b). The total number of such migrants traveling through Lesvos will soon pass the threshold of one million people.

The yearly number of asylum-related migrants reaching Lesvos depends on how many people attempt to leave Turkey and how many are intercepted before arriving at Lesvos. The EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 was launched to stop irregular migration via Turkey to Europe. Facing the ongoing migration pressure in 2016, the EU was eager to make a deal with Turkey to stop it. According to the statement, "all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands and whose applications for asylum have been declared inadmissible should be returned to Turkey." Turkey accepted "the rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece, and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. Turkey and the EU decided to continue stepping up measures against migrant smugglers and welcomed the establishment of the NATO activity on the Aegean Sea" (European Council 2016).

The statement contained a substantial remuneration to Turkey for these activities and a promise to enhance the procedures for Turkey to get visa-free access to the EU. However, as later developments indicate, the geopolitical situation became much more complex in the Middle East, including in Turkey. Nevertheless, the two partners acted as if they would follow the goals. As men-

tioned in Chapter 1, the return mechanism of asylum-related migrants from the EU to Turkey was never implemented to the expected extent. In fact, in 2019, only 189 migrants were returned from the EU to Turkey as agreed on in the EU-Turkey Statement, and in total, 2,001 have been returned since the spring of 2016 (UNHCR 2019). However, Turkish authorities have claimed that Greece has pushed back to Turkey tens of thousands of asylum-related migrants without assessing their status (i.e., over 58,000 persons between November 2017 and October 2018 alone). Turkish authorities sent these migrants back to their country of origin, except Syrians, who were sent to the location in Turkey in which they were officially registered before their journey (Christides & Lüdke 2019).

The prevention of this irregular migration from the Turkish waters to the Aegean islands, including Lesvos, never became very strong. On various occasions, Turkey has threatened to withdraw from the statement and the prevention of irregular migration to the EU. Such threats have especially been launched in situations when there were critical tones from the EU toward Turkey, for example, in the political aftermath of the potential coup d'état in Turkey in 2016, the formation of the buffer zone to northern Syria by the Turkish military forces in 2018–2019, following other geopolitical activities of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa, and after the attack on Turkish military in Syria in February 2020. In the early March of 2020, thousands of asylum-related migrants (especially Syrians and Afghans) gathered to the land border area between Turkey and Greece. Following the political statements, the Turkish authorities let these people to cross the Turkish border. However, Greek authorities tried in various ways to prevent that these people could enter Greece and the EU territory (BBC 2020b).

Tantardini and Tolay (2019) claimed that the performance and performance indicators mattered only partially and rather little for the political leaders behind the EU-Turkey Statement deal that was concluded and applied in a politicized context. Haferlach and Kurban (2017) argued that the EU-Turkey Statement did not contribute to sustainable and effective policies to handle migration. Instead, it “opened the gates to extortion” in the aftermath of (geo)political actions in Turkey, as well as in Turkey’s geopolitical intervention outside its direct territory. Furthermore, Turkey claimed that the EU never fully remunerated Turkey as agreed in the statement. Nevertheless, despite political disputes between the EU and Turkey, the EU-Turkey Statement was still in force in 2020. Turkey suspended the agreement temporarily in early March 2020. However, the contents of the agreement were renegotiated again between Turkey and the EU in the spring of 2020 (Smith 2020). The migrants – Syrians, Afghans, Somalis and those from other nations – must then take into account the consequences of that statement and accommodate their actions accordingly.

According to our interviews and observations, information about the possibilities for Turkey–Lesvos passage is widely available and advertised on social

media. In the related Facebook groups and on Internet websites are usually misleading descriptions of journeys and further life in Lesvos: The advertisements are filled with pictures of large, comfortable boats and luxury villas as temporary accommodation sites. For migrants residing regularly or irregularly in Turkey, it was easy to get recent information from a peer group who had done the passage and meet the middlemen (usually male persons) who were the link between the migrants and the passage providers. Migrants used smugglers who organized the boat, life vests and specific location and time to start the passage. After the initial arrangements with the middleman, the migrants waited for detailed information regarding when to go and from where. Every day, boats departed from Turkey to the Aegean islands. The price of the passage varied according to the season, number of passengers (group price offers could apply) and specific modes of transport: from fast and more reliable to slow and more uncertain, in terms of both general security and the possibility to get through immediately. Our respondents, on average, mentioned a cost of 1,000–2,000 euro for a sea passage from the Turkish coast to Lesvos. However, in earlier years and different situations, the price was lower, down to a few hundred euro. Usually, boats were standard dinghies with a small motor. There was also a mechanism to inform the smugglers when the migrant reached (or did not reach) Lesvos so that the deposited money was finally transferred to the smugglers.

Due to their geographical location, Lesvos and other Greek islands in the Aegean Sea have been targets along the migrant smuggling route to Europe for many years (Triandafyllidou & Maroukis 2012). Such smuggling became an unprecedented large and profitable business in 2015 when hundreds of thousands traveled irregularly via Turkey to these islands. In 2019, the smuggling business for the Turkey–Lesvos passage had a monthly turnover in millions of euro. In fact, Triandafyllidou (2017) noted how migrant smuggling is nowadays a more professional and global phenomenon. In the attempts to prevent smuggling, the local socio-economic dynamics and contexts, as well as the eradication of the roots of smuggling, have been neglected while focusing on the management of migration through transnational governance. More accurate details about organization of the irregular migration between Turkey and Lesvos is available, but it is not discussed in this research (see also Triandafyllidou & Maroukis 2012; Crawley et al. 2016, 73–94). Nevertheless, in the governance of asylum-related migration between Turkey and Lesvos, many legal authorities, illegal actors and various accommodations, services, employment and transport providers are involved.

In principle, it seems plausible to control and even prevent irregular migration from the Turkish coast over the sea to the Greek waters, but this does not take place. In fact, no boat can pass totally unobserved from Turkey to Lesvos. The border area and the Turkish and Greek waters leading to Lesvos are observed, monitored and controlled by national and international authorities and

their advanced surveillance techniques. Tazzioli (2016) discussed military-humanitarian interventions in the surveillance, rescue and containment of the movement of asylum-related migrant populations in the Aegean Sea. On the one hand, the subjects at risk are being rescued to prevent the loss of human lives. On the other hand, these asylum-related migrants are potentially risky subjects whose entrance into and permanence in the EU should be prevented – by pushing them directly back, fostering their immediate voluntary return and surveilled containment in the reception centers before their deportation.

In 2019, the authorities of Turkey constantly patrolled the territorial waters of Turkey in the Aegean Sea from which they intercepted irregular migrants each day. In the Greek waters, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency FRONTEX was actively present. The activities of the patrolling vessels and the potential rescue activities were observed at sea by an independent NGO (see Mare Liberum 2019) that could file a complaint if something unusual and inaccurate




Figure 3.1. Asylum-related migrants between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea in 2019. Source: Data from Aegean Boat Report (2019).

took place. Furthermore, in Lesvos were observation sites at which volunteers checked during the daylight with analogue instruments if boats were approaching the island. Nevertheless, NGOs also helped in the actual rescue of the arriving migrants, whether at sea or on the Lesvos coast. In 2019, a formal specific site for immediate help to the arrived migrants was also in operation at the northern shore. However, the Greek national authorities suggested closing in early 2020 this first reception transit camp providing basic essentials and rest (Lighthouse Relief 2020).

As discussed below, in 2019, over 60,000 irregular migrants managed to cross the maritime border between Turkey and Greece, while over 105,000 persons were intercepted. This does not mean that over 165,000 different persons would have tried to cross the maritime border irregularly. According to our interviews with asylum-related migrants in Lesvos, it is rather common that people had to try more than once before finally reaching Lesvos. This has been the case for several years already (see Jauhiainen 2017). Usually when irregular migrants are intercepted in the Turkish waters, the Turkish authorities bring them back to the shore. Then, they are moved by the authorities to a specific collection site, where their personal data is inspected. Then, often, NGOs are invited to provide the migrants with water and food, as well as with clothes and small useful items. The intercepted people are then moved to a town in which they are kept for some days and then released. A person might try again after a short while when a suitable occasion appears (see Jauhiainen 2018). In Lesvos, we met people who had tried more than five times before finally managing to cross the border. For many, especially for those unable to swim, this short passage, usually taken at night and lasting up to a few hours, escaping the patrolling Turkish authorities, was an unpleasant if not terrifying experience. The data about casualties among people trying reach the Aegean islands is uncertain. The estimation was that 70 migrants lost their lives at sea between Turkey and Greece in 2019 (UNHCR 2019e).

In 2019, almost 5,000 boats (4,920 precisely) and over 165,000 people (165,754 precisely) irregularly left the Turkish coast toward the Aegean islands in Greece. Turkish authorities intercepted almost two out of three boats (3,124 boats, 63%) and migrants (105,325 people, 64%) in the Turkish waters (Figure 3.1). They were returned to Turkey, as agreed in the EU-Turkey Statement. As discussed above, many of these intercepted people tried later once or even many times to reach the Greek islands. Slightly less than half of the boats (727 boats, 42%) and migrants (27,049 migrants, 45%) arrived at Lesvos (Aegean Boat Report 2019). In 2019, more than a third of boats (37%) and people (36%) who left the Turkish coast were able to travel irregularly to the Greek Aegean islands.

Looking at the situation in Lesvos in 2019 in more detail, on average, each day, two boats and 74 migrants arrived in Lesvos. Over the year, the number of pas-

sengers per boat was usually 35–40, the average being 37 persons per boat reaching Lesbos. In specific cases, there were more than 40 migrants on board, and in fewer cases, under 30 people. During busy days, 5–10 boats arrived, but there were also days on which no boats arrived. Therefore, the number of arrived persons varied daily from zero to more than 500 (Aegean Boat Report 2019). However, in 2015, during the busiest days, several thousand asylum-related migrants arrived, so the migration in 2019 was still modest compared with 2015.

Weather is an important but not determining factor influencing travel by sea from Turkey to Lesbos. The shortest distance is only 10 km, and even starting from a different location, the distance rarely reaches more than 20 km, so it is mostly strong wind and daylight (the latter exposing migrants to the border con-




Figure 3.2. Average number of passengers per intercepted and arrived boat. Source: Elaborated from Aegean Boat Report (2019).

trol authorities) that constrain the passage. The winds are generally stronger in January–February; there can be heavy rain, and the air and sea temperatures are the lowest then. Usually, during the winter months, there are fewer migrants due to worse weather conditions at sea.

In 2019, the coldest air temperatures in the Lesvos area were below zero degrees in January (-2 degrees), and in December, February and March, they were close to freezing (at nights minimum 1–2 degrees). The strongest rain took place in January, with 11 rainy days (in total, 251 mm of rain). In February, there was even a heavy snowfall that remained on the ground, and the sea was the coldest (14 degrees) (Weather Molyvos 2020). On the other hand, from mid-October to mid-February, the dark nighttime lasted over 10 hours within each 24 hours, facilitating a more hidden departure and passage from the Turkish coast. In both January and February, around 800 migrants arrived at Lesvos. In June–August, the daily maximum temperatures in Lesvos reached 35 degrees and the sea was warmest (26 degrees) (Weather Molyvos 2020). On the other hand, the nighttime lasted 5 hours each night from mid-June to the end of July. During the summertime, the number of migrants became manifold compared with that in winter, but it was not due to better weather conditions for the passage.

In 2019, there were three unique arrival periods. The first particular period was from mid-April to mid-May, when the lowest number of migrants arrived at Lesvos. Then came three boats and 77 persons on average per week (0.4 boats and 11 persons per day) – even one week with only one boat arriving that had 27 migrants on board (elaborated from Aegean Boat Report 2019). There were no major weather-related constraints that would have prevented the passage. The interception rates in Turkish waters were similar to other weeks. Also, the number of asylum-related migrants leaving from the Turkish coast to other Aegean islands was typical. However, the share of migrants arriving at Lesvos dropped abruptly to a third compared with the usual share. Furthermore, in those weeks, the boats arriving at Lesvos had substantially fewer passengers compared to the average. This decline suddenly appeared in mid-April and equally abruptly disappeared in mid-May. There was no major growth in the passages to the other islands, so for some reason, during that period, smugglers were able to send substantially fewer migrants to Lesvos.

The second particular period in 2019 was when the highest number of migrants arrived at Lesvos from mid-August to mid-September. Then, more than four boats and 138 persons arrived on average per day. In general, irregular migration toward the Aegean islands started to increase in the latter part of July. However, increased migration toward Lesvos started two weeks later than to other islands, and it became very intensive in the third and fourth week of August, when almost two out of three (62–64%) migrants who arrived to the Aegean Sea islands reached Lesvos, while this share was substantially lower one

week earlier (42%) and one week later (38%). The interception rates in the Turkish waters were constant (64–69%) over these weeks (elaborated from Aegean Boat Report 2019). In addition, in the third week of August, the average number of passengers per boat reaching Lesbos grew from 35 to 42 passengers, then declined to 38 passengers in the fourth week (Figure 3.2). This suggests a rapid growth in demand to reach Lesbos. Because Afghans constitute around 70% of the migrants in Lesbos, this migration in August is related to the mobilization of Afghans to leave Turkey, facilitated again by smugglers.

The third particular period regarding the migrants' arrival to Lesbos was one week in mid-November. At that time, on average, six boats and 235 migrants arrived per day. The number of intercepted boats in the Aegean Sea was substantially lower (45%) during that week compared with one week earlier (56%) or later (64%). In addition, one week before mid-November, proportionally fewer migrants left toward Lesbos. It seems that smugglers were gathering more people who had the intention to travel to Lesbos and then utilized that particular week when interception was less efficient. During that week, the average number of passengers per boat rose immediately from 35 to 44. Something specific took place in the Turkish authorities' interception activities during that November week that had the lowest rate of interception in 2019 after Christmas week. In general, the interception rates gradually decreased from mid-November to the end of 2019 (elaborated from Aegean Boat Report 2019). A more detailed analysis is required to analyze the exact spatial and temporal variation and the causes of asylum-related migrants' mobility from the Turkish coast to Lesbos and to other islands in the Aegean Sea.

3.2 Reception centers and other sites for asylum-related migrants in Lesbos

The number of reception centers and sites for asylum-related migrants in Lesbos has grown and declined over the past ten years, according to the arrival and presence of migrants there (see Figure 1.1). In 2015, several provisional sites were located in several places around the island. Many migrants also stayed outdoors in public space. However, they usually passed through Lesbos rather quickly to mainland Greece, mostly by being transferred by authorities to Athens. Lesbos was also designated officially as one of the EU migration hotspots (Papada et al. 2019). However, following the EU-Turkey Statement in the spring of 2016, the arrivals declined abruptly, and at the same time, existing and arriving asylum seekers were kept at the reception sites in Lesbos until they were registered and the initial phases of their asylum applications were processed. The lengths of their stay in Lesbos changed from days and weeks to months and even years (Jauhiainen 2017; Iliadou 2019).

Table 3.1. Asylum-related migrants' arrivals and transfer to and from Lesbos in 2019.

	Arriving	Transfers	Change	Migrants in Lesbos
week 1	140	54	+86	6,984
week 2	117	380	-263	6,978
week 3	243	216	+27	6,922
week 4	116	184	-68	6,902
week 5	179	219	-40	6,939
week 6	213	168	+45	7,081
week 7	162	137	+25	7,141
week 8	327	243	+84	7,258
week 9	133	236	-103	7,189
week 10	187	199	-12	7,273
week 11	93	509	-416	6,931
week 12	194	96	+98	7,039
week 13	268	343	-75	7,105
week 14	102	324	-222	6,883
week 15	27	138	-111	6,871
week 16	73	149	-76	6,904
week 17	152	136	+16	6,956
week 18	99	99	+/-0	7,036
week 19	43	377	-334	6,866
week 20	49	181	-132	6,786
week 21	299	408	-109	6,622
week 22	196	137	+59	6,779
week 23	535	227	+308	7,204
week 24	272	221	+51	7,348
week 25	409	164	+245	7,681
week 26	312	138	+174	7,909
week 27	419	332	+87	7,927
week 28	695	313	+382	8,494
week 29	478	211	+267	8,825
week 30	486	178	+308	9,209
week 31	473	156	+317	9,550
week 32	761	352	+409	10,046
week 33	803	228	+575	10,621
week 34	1,132	254	+878	11,499
week 35	1,279	285	+994	12,521
week 36	886	1,590	-704	11,943
week 37	892	306	+586	12,837
week 38	1,442	268	+1,174	14,088
week 39	1,321	690	+631	14,861
week 40	839	836	+3	15,166
week 41	835	291	+544	15,814
week 42	696	239	+457	16,424
week 43	530	449	+81	16,568
week 44	1,069	1,010	+59	17,057
week 45	481	432	+49	17,029
week 46	945	745	+200	17,308
week 47	1,646	182	+1,464	18,650
week 48	551	649	-98	19,003
week 49	754	327	+417	19,518
week 50	1,190	309	+881	20,398
week 51	841	573	+268	20,949
week 52	566	785	-219	20,816

Source: Elaborated from information from the Aegean Boat Reports and the National Coordination Center.

Since 2015, two major sites for asylum-related migrants have remained in Lesvos. One is the Moria reception and identification center, governed by the UNCHR and the national authorities, and usually hosting several thousands of migrants. Another is the Kara Tepe reception center, governed by the local authorities, and hosting more than one thousand migrants (Figure 1.1). In addition, there are smaller sites, such as the (ex-)PIKPA site, run by an NGO (Lesvos Solidarity) and hosting tens of migrants. The Iliaktidi center usually has a few hundred mostly vulnerable and underage migrants. Furthermore, in several unofficial sites, such as squatted former factories and warehouses, there usually live a few to more than ten migrants each. A few migrants live in guest houses or hotels converted to accommodate them. At the northern coast of Lesvos is also a site to accommodate for a short term migrants rescued from the sea.

After several years of decline, in 2019, the number of arriving asylum-related migrants started to grow in Lesvos. The balance between the arriving migrants and transferred asylum seekers remained quite equal until the summer of 2019: From Lesvos, in January–June, 743 more migrants were transferred than arrived. However, later, the number of arrived migrants grew, but the authorities were not able to increase the amount of transfers accordingly. In July–December, 10,020 more migrants arrived than were transferred, despite the fact that the transfers doubled in that period. The result was that the total asylum-related migrant population in Lesvos grew significantly, and Moria in particular became seriously congested. Until the beginning of June of 2019, the population of the Moria center was about 150–160% of its official capacity. However, at the end of the year, it was 656% of its capacity. The asylum-related migrant population at other sites in Lesvos remained mostly the same during 2019 (it grew by 9% between January and December) (Figure 3.2; Table 3.1).

3.2.1 Moria reception and identification center

The Moria reception and identification center (often called ‘the Moria camp’ or ‘the refugee camp of Moria’ in the media) is located about 8 km northwest of Mytilene. It is distant from existing urban infrastructure at about 1 km from the small village of Moria. The center is located in a former military garrison in the area surrounded by small hills and olive groves and connected by a road.

The Moria center is run by the Greek national authorities, and the UNHCR is also significantly involved in the actual management. Over the last few years, asylum-related migrants have also been located outside the actual center in open air in tents in the olive grove area in the vicinity. The management of this outside area has varied over the years. In November 2019, the NGO “Movement on the Ground” was operationally responsible for the management of the main outside areas of the site. This is an organization founded by independent business people to provide solutions to the humanitarian crisis. This NGO has a

Dutch and international background but works intensively with locals and volunteers. Furthermore, tens of local, national and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations and other actors are involved in the daily activities of the site.

The actual center (about 500 x 400 meters, 0.2 square km) is surrounded by high walls topped with barbed wire. It has several guarded entrance gates, and the main entrance gate is regulated by the authorities. A specific police force is also usually present outside the main entrance area, especially during the transfer of asylum seekers, but also at other times. If needed, they react to unrest situations inside the center. People working in the center park their cars along the main road, and often there are 50–100 cars parked. The site is also accessible by public transport connecting the center with downtown Mytilene and another asylum seeker reception center, the Kara Tepe. Many migrants use this bus service, and buses are sometimes crowded.

The accommodation capacity of the Moria center has varied between 2,200 and 3,000 persons. Earlier, asylum seekers slept inside the center in buildings as well as in individual or larger tents. In the spring of 2017, the UNHCR replaced the tents with 19 new two-story and nine single-story prefabricated containers (UNHCR 2017c), called 'ISO boxes'. The reconstruction was done because during the cold weather in January 2017, three asylum seekers died in tents where they were accommodated (Al Jazeera 2017). The center is divided into different sections (A, B, C, D, and E) in which the housing infrastructure may vary. The sections used to be clearly defined along ethnic and linguistic groups. Also unaccompanied minors were located separately from others (UNHCR 2016). With the increasing congestion inside the center, these clear-cut divisions have partly disappeared. There are also many administrative and organizational buildings inside the center. In the autumn of 2019, some asylum seekers spent their days inside the center area; others went out and in. Some visited the town of Mytilene by way of buses (public transport) departing from the main entrance of the site. Others walked to the locations nearby (a few kilometers away) such as specific NGOs providing services for asylum seekers or the Kara Tepe reception center, where their friends lived. Usually from morning until evening, one could see 50–100 asylum seekers walking in small groups along the main road leading to and from the Moria reception and identification center.

When the number of asylum-related migrants became more than the accommodation capacity of the actual center, newcomers were accommodated in tents. In 2016, most tents were inside the external walls of the center, along the main internal road. In the spring of 2017, some smaller tents (hosting 1–6 people) and larger tent-like constructions (hosting even tens of migrants) were erected on the hill next to the center. The number of tents was then around 20–40, depending on the month, and they occupied a site of about 100 x 100 meters.

In 2019, the number of asylum-related migrants outside the Moria center started to grow substantially. At the end of January 2019, 2,000 migrants lived in the ‘tent area.’ It grew to 4,000 people by the end of June; at the end of August the number was 7,500, and it increased to 15,000 people in December (calculated from National Coordination Center 2019a; 2019b). Hundreds of smaller and larger tents (usually hosting 2–10 people) were erected in the area around the center. Some areas grew organically, occupying and gradually extending up to the hills. In these areas, tents were placed directly on the ground, which turned muddy with the rains. Toilets, washing facilities and garbage sites were usually several hundreds of meters away. Many tents lacked electricity, or such connections were improvised. Some asylum-related migrants called this area “The Jungle.” In the evenings and nights, less general lightning was available, safety was poorer, and unrest, thefts and fights took place quite frequently. To make food and to keep warm in the winter, some migrants made open air fire places utilizing the wood from the surrounding olive grove. The use of open fire was discouraged by the authorities to prevent the risk of fire inside the tents. However, fire incidents sometimes happened (Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5). At the same time, besides the functional use of such fireplaces to making food or get warmer, they are also manifestations of asylum-related migrants’ capacity for bottom-up activism and creation of visible habitable ‘own spaces’ within the standardized top-down designed environment (see Singh 2020).

Other tent areas around the center were developed according to some planning. For example, first, the land was cleared. Then, gravel was put on the ground, and finally, larger tents were firmly installed. These areas also usually had better facilities (i.e., closer to toilets, showers and designated garbage collection areas). Electricity might have been properly installed and more lights were available in the evenings and nights. However, with the continuous growth of the migrant population, the tents were located farther from the center and its facilities. In November 2019, the tent areas reached about 500 meters from the center walls. In early 2020, the population density in the Moria center and the surrounding area was very high (tens of thousands asylum-related migrants per square kilometer). The site’s population was about 12–15% of registered inhabitants in Lesvos, and about a third of its largest town, Mytilene. The Moria center was de facto the second largest settlement in Lesvos. In such conditions, unrest, incidents and unfortunate casualties occurred among asylum seekers. The interviewed migrants told that sometimes the media reported about such casualties and sometimes not. Asylum seekers, related NGOs and the media have frequently criticized the general conditions at the Moria center (Al Jazeera 2017; BBC 2019; Hurst 2020).

During the time of our research, most asylum-related migrants could leave and enter the center daily regardless of their actual location inside or outside

the walls. However, there was also a small closed detention facility inside the center, from which the detained migrants could not leave. The condition inside this detention facility has been criticized along the years (see Alpes et al. 2017). Complimentary food was provided inside the Moria center, so many people went inside the center for it – although they needed to wait in line for even more than one hour for each meal. There was also a small improvised market selling food, clothing and many kinds of everyday utensils. The small shops were run by individual migrants. Outside the main entrance were two canteens run by Greeks, and a few Greeks came regularly to sell fruits, vegetable and other food, as well as clothing and everyday utensils just outside the center walls. In the tent area, migrants constructed tiny kiosks to sell food or provide various services, from tailors to barbers. In 2019, access to the Moria reception and identification center by people other than migrants, staff and accredited NGOs was strictly restricted, though less strictly controlled than in 2017. Access to the tent area was less regulated, and in practice, anyone could stroll around there. In November 2019, we visited the extended tent areas attached to the Moria center during several days (usually from morning to early evening), conducting the survey there and having interviews and talks with many inhabitants and some NGO volunteers.



Figure 3.3. Moria identification and reception center from above. Photo: Dimitris Tosidis, Fotomovimiento, January 2020.



Figure 3.4. Moria identification and reception center. The main center at the back. Photo: Jussi S. Jauhiainen, November 2019.



Figure 3.5. Moria identification and reception center. Inside the tent area. Photo: Jussi S. Jauhiainen, November 2019.



Figure 3.6. Moria identification and reception center. Extended tent area. Photo: Jussi S. Jauhiainen, November 2019.

3.2.2 Kara Tepe asylum seeker reception center

The Kara Tepe asylum seeker reception center is about 2.5 km northeast of Mytilene by a busy road. The center is located in a former garbage and industrial area on a small hill surrounded by a few abandoned warehouses. Along the road, at a few hundred meters distance, is a supermarket, “Lidl,” frequented by many asylum-related migrants from the Kara Tepe and Moria reception centers (Figure 3.7).

The Kara Tepe center (with the official name “The Hospitality Center for Refugees and Migrants Mavrovouni [Kara Tepe] of the Municipality of Lesvos”) is run by a special organization linked to the municipality of Lesvos. The site has been developed and expanded according to planning and is rather densely built, without the possibility to expand its current territory. The management of the center has its office inside the area, and there are also several small buildings for various NGOs operating there.

The actual center (about 200 x 300 meters, in total 0.05 square km) is surrounded by walls. It has one guarded entrance gate, through which all migrants, staff, NGOs and visitors pass. In 2019, there was one canteen outside the main entrance, but in earlier years there were several canteens. The bus to downtown



Figure 3.7. Typical building inside the Kara Tepe reception center – this ISO Box container for administration purposes. Photo: Jussi S. Jauhiainen, November, 2019.

Mytilene and to the Moria reception and identification center stops in front of the main entrance. There are often also a few cars of the NGO staff and other people parked along the main road.

The accommodation capacity of the center has varied over the recent past years, from below 1,000 to 1,250. Compared with the Moria site, Kara Tepe is focused more on families and vulnerable asylum seekers. Most of its inhabitants come from the Moria center and later continue to mainland Greece in due time. The asylum seekers live in containers that they call “boxes” (ISO boxes). In the spring of 2017, there were 219 containers (UNHCR 2017c). According to the interviews with the center staff, by 2019, the number of containers had reached 290, the maximum number planned for the territory. There are also many administrative and organizational buildings for various purposes inside the center. In 2017, tens of asylum seekers lived in small, newly built temporary emergency shelter houses designed by IKEA – a project that won an architectural design prize in January 2017 (The Guardian 2017). However, these houses were designed for emergency situations; they became inconvenient for long-term stays and later were replaced by more solid containers.



Figure 3.8. Main road between the Kara Tepe reception center and the supermarket “Lidl”. Photo: Jussi S. Jauhiainen, November, 2019.

In the autumn of 2019, some asylum seekers spent most of their days inside the center area; others went out and in. A common activity was to frequent the nearby (a few hundred meters from the center) facilities offered by several NGOs. These sites provided free-time activities, education, get-together places, clothing and food for asylum seekers, or the possibility to address some administrative issues (Figure 3.7). Many people also bought food from the nearby supermarket “Lidl” (Figure 3.8). Some also went to the nearby seashore for picnics, fishing, swimming or to spend time outside the densely built center. Some visited the town of Mytilene by means of a bus (public transport) departing from the main entrance of the site. Others walked or took a bus to the Moria reception center to handle their asylum-related administration process or to meet friends. Usually from morning until evening, one could see a few and up to tens of strolling migrants in small groups along the main road leading to and from Kara Tepe.

In early 2020, the population density in the Kara Tepe center was high but less than that of the Moria center. The site’s population size was less than 2% of the inhabitants in Lesvos and about 3% of its largest town, Mytilene. The Kara Tepe center is frequently discussed in the media, however much less often than

the Moria center and with a much more positive tone. In 2019, following the political change in the local elections, the center's long-term manager, who appeared often in the media, was replaced.

During the time of our research in November 2019, the asylum seekers could leave and enter the center daily. However, there was strong control at the gate. Many asylum seekers in the Kara Tepe center had previously been in the Moria center and had friends there. Some also visited the Moria site a few kilometers away by foot or bus. Food was provided inside the center, as well as various services and activities, often operated by several NGOs working inside the center. Outside the main entrance was a canteen that was less frequented by the migrants. Access to the center by other people than migrants, staff and accredited NGOs was strictly restricted, and the gate security staff even pushed the outsiders to at least 50 meters away from the main entrance. Asylum seekers also spent time outside the camp in the greenery and by the sea, weather permitting. In November 2019, we visited the site inside once and talked with the acting manager. We also spent several days just outside the site conducting the survey and having interviews and talks with some inhabitants and NGO volunteers.

3.2.3 Other sites for asylum-related migrants

In Lesvos, there are also many smaller sites accommodating asylum-related migrants other than the previously discussed large reception centers of Moria and Kara Tepe. One of them is ex-PIKPA (Lesvos Solidarity) located about 5.5 km southeast of Mytilene at the end of a small road deviating from the larger road to the airport. The small site (80 x 80 meters) is located in an area with small cottages, surrounded by a small forest park, a hotel with tennis courts and some private houses. The cottages were earlier used for children's summer camp purposes, and each contains basic facilities.

The (ex-)PIKPA center is run by the "Lesvos Solidarity" NGO that also has an education and free-time center, "Mosaik Support Center," in downtown Mytilene (Lesvos Solidarity 2019). Volunteers are an important part of the everyday activities of the site, which has more of a community-type atmosphere. The center management's office is in one larger building inside the area. There are also about 20 small wooden cottages for inhabitants, usually occupied by a person or a family; a few rooms in the main building area; a few emergency shelters; and a couple of buildings for NGO activities inside the area. In earlier years, there were also some larger tents. There were no walls around the area, and the site could be reached and left without administrative procedures. The site's capacity was about 100–120 persons. There were sometimes a few cars of the NGO staff or other people parked near the site. Occasionally the media covers the site, often in stories written by volunteers who have stayed there. In 2018, some local stakeholders and businesses asked for the closure of the site. It was temporari-

ly closed due to presumed issues of hygiene. However, later, the activities were allowed to continue, but some administrative decisions were still pending that might influence the operation of the site.

Compared with the Moria and Kara Tepe sites, PIKPA felt more like a small community. This NGO defines PIKPA as an open refugee camp based on solidarity, empowerment and active participation (Lesvos Solidarity 2019). There were vulnerable people who were moved there from the Moria or Kara Tepe centers. Asylum seekers could leave and enter the site daily. In 2019, some engaged in activities organized by the NGOs in downtown Mytilene, where some had employment. At the site, activities were also organized during the days, but some also spent their free time outside the site. In November 2019, we visited the site shortly twice and had interviews and talks with some of the staff, including the site manager, as well as some volunteers and inhabitants.

Another site existing for many years is Iliaktida, which is managed by the nonprofit company AKME. It was founded through a partnership between Vostaneio Hospital of Mytilene, the Municipality of Mytilene, the Association of Municipalities and Communes of Lesvos and volunteers. Iliaktida is a UNHCR Accommodation and Protection Partner and UNICEF Child Protection Partner. The actual capacity of the accommodation structure is about 730 people (including places in guesthouses, hotels and tents of other sites). In November 2019, it hosted about 600–700 asylum-related migrants, many of them vulnerable migrants, people with disabilities and children (Iliaktida 2019).

Other sites in Lesvos accommodating asylum-related migrants included many squatted buildings, for example, close to the Kara Tepe center and along the main road to the Moria center. In total, these sites hosted tens of asylum-related migrants. In many cases, the sites had been converted into more or less habitable accommodations by migrants themselves. However, often, they lacked heating and hot water; running water might be only in one room, and toilets and showers could be very basic. Nevertheless, according to the interviews with these migrants, these sites provided more autonomy and were more tranquil than the large reception centers. The sites were occasionally inspected by police or other authorities who then evicted the residents. They nevertheless returned after a while to the same site. Some residents were irregular migrants (i.e., they had pulled out of the asylum process). In these sites lived small groups of men or families. In Lesvos were also other formal specific sites for asylum-related migrants (see Lighthouse Relief 2020), but these were not studied for this research. For example, the first support center at the northern shore of the island was utilized to accommodate, for 1–2 days, those who had just arrived to Lesvos by sea.

4. Main results

4.1 Respondents' background

In total, 625 asylum-related migrants responded to the November 2019 survey in Lesvos. Not all people mentioned their ages, but, of those who responded, two out of three (66%) were 15–29 years old, less than a third (29%) were 30–49 years old and only a few (3%) were at least 50 years old, including very few who were more than 60 years old. Of respondents, almost four out of five (79%) were men, and slightly more than one out of five (21%) were women. In all age groups, at least three out of four (76–84%) respondents were men (Table 4.1).

According to the UNHCR (2020), of the adult asylum seekers in the Aegean Islands in November 2019, 33% were women, and 67% were men. In the autumn of 2019, the general situation in Lesvos was that the majority of asylum-related migrants there were young and middle-aged adults, the latter often with their children. Towards the beginning of the year 2020, the share of women and children grew in Lesvos. In early 2020 in Lesvos, the share of adults was 58%, and the share of underage respondents was 42% (29% were 0–12 years old; 13% were 13–17 years old). The share of male asylum seekers (59%) was higher than that of female (41%) asylum seekers. The proportion of women asylum seekers was higher in Lesvos than in other Aegean Sea islands, mainly because there were many Afghans who often travelled with families in Lesvos.

The age profiles of migrants varied along different ethnic groups. Among Afghans were many relatively (23%) young (15–18 years old) respondents, as well as many proportionally older (at least 40 years old) respondents (12%). Of the Somali respondents, more than three out of four (77%) were young adults (19–29 years old), and the share was lower than among Syrians (63%), Afghans (43%) and those from other nations (49%).

In the Moria reception and identification centre, asylum-related migrants and respondents were generally younger than those in the Kara Tepe reception centre. Of respondents, the youngest (15–18 years) made one out of five (20%) in Moria and one out of seven (14%) in Kara Tepe, and the oldest (at least 50 years old) were generally fewer in Moria (2%) and Kara Tepe (4%). Families were moved from Moria to Kara Tepe, and the parents tended to be older than the many young single male adults in Moria. In other sites, such as in PIKPA and the squatted buildings, the respondents were young adults and middle-aged adults.

There is an under-representation of women in the survey sample due to practical and cultural reasons. First, the female asylum-related migrants in Lesvos were more engaged with children and the everyday maintenance of their accommodations (for example, making food, washing clothes or cleaning), and they had less time to answer the surveys. Second, amongst many respondent

families, the husband was considered the proper person to answer the survey. He was seen to be in charge, making the important decisions considering the family, such as where and when to migrate, and he was the employed person in the family. In some cases, the husband and wife talked together and found a suitable answer for both of them. In other cases, the wife mentioned that it was enough for her husband to fill the survey, and we did not insist she would fill the survey. However, sometimes it was natural that both filled it separately. The strict focus on gender in the responses does not give an entirely precise picture of the opinions by men and women. In total, the over-representation of men in the sample is understandable, as it is the case in many such surveys.

Table 4.1. Demographic backgrounds of respondents (%).

	Moria			Kara Tepe			Other sites			All			%
	man	woman	all	man	woman	all	man	woman	all	man	woman	all	
15–18 years	86	14	95	76	24	17	0	100	1	84	16	113	19
19–29 years	79	21	240	61	39	41	71	29	7	76	24	288	47
30–39 years	81	19	91	72	28	39	67	33	3	78	22	133	22
40–49 years	76	24	21	86	14	21	0	0	0	81	19	42	7
50+ years	73	27	11	100	0	5	0	100	1	82	18	17	3
Total	81	19	471	73	27	124	64	36	14	79	21	609	100

There is a considerable ethnic variation of asylum-seekers between the islands of the Aegean Sea. Lesvos' share of all asylum-related migrants in the islands was 45% in 2019. However, approximately 79% of the Afghans on these islands are in Lesvos. Furthermore, Lesvos has approximately 40% of the migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 20% from Syria, 15% from Iraq, 8% from Palestine and 28% are from other ethnic groups. According to the December 2019 report by UNHCR, the ethnic division of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos was Afghans (70%, 18,934 people), Syrians (12%, 3,246 people), Congolese (6%, 1,623 people), Iraqis (2%, 541 people), Palestinians (1%, 271 people) and other nationalities (9%, 2,434 people). In total, there were people from numerous countries in Lesvos (UNHCR 2019).

Of the survey respondents who mentioned their countries of origin, Afghans made 54%, Syrians 19%, Somalis 10%, Iranians 3%, Iraqis 3%, Congolese 2%, Sudanese 1%, Pakistanis 1%, Kuwaitis 1%, Yemenese 1% and other nationalities 5%. In total, there were respondents from 21 countries of origin including the above-mentioned (and, for example, from Palestine, Burundi, Ivory Coast and South Sudan). As regards the total asylum-related migrant population in Lesvos, it first seems the sample here has slightly too few Afghans and Congolese and too many Syrians and Somalis. However, of the asylum-related Afghans in the Aegean Islands, 48% are underage, while 35% of Syrians are underage. This balances our data: the share of adult Afghans and Syrians in our data is rather close to the actual situation in Lesvos. However, in the data, the share of Somalis is 3–4 per

cent units larger and 2–3 per cent units smaller for the Congolese than they actually were in Lesvos. From November through December of 2019, the number of Congolese shrank, and the number of Somalis grew.

Afghans are a particular group because, of Afghan respondents, 89% mentioned Afghanistan and 11% mentioned Iran as the country of origin. For some respondents, Afghanistan and Iran made a broader common area in which they habitually lived. Some of those who mentioned Afghanistan as the country of origin had lived in Iran for a long time. Some of those mentioning Iran might have been born in Afghanistan but migrated to Iran as a baby or young child. There are also Afghans who regularly migrate between Afghanistan and Iran or between Afghanistan and Pakistan (see Jauhiainen et al. 2020), and they may have indicated a different country of origin. Iran is simultaneously, for many Afghans, a transit space and a destination, as well as a source from where many Afghans born in Iran migrate. The official information that 70% of asylum-seekers in Lesvos are from Afghanistan means, in practice, they are mostly ethnic Afghans from Afghanistan, but at least some of them are from Iran or, to a lesser extent, from Pakistan. An Afghan asylum-seeker mentioning Afghanistan as the country of origin gets advantages in the asylum process compared to those Afghans who mention Iran or Pakistan as the country of origin or habitual residence.

Table 4.2. Demographic backgrounds of certain respondents (%).

	Age (years)					Origins		Education	
	15–18	19–29	30–39	40–49	50–	Urban	Rural	University	No university
Afghan man	27	40	22	7	4	56	44	24	76
Afghan woman	14	52	25	7	3	57	43	16	84
Afghan all	23	43	22	8	4	57	43	22	78
Syrian man	9	60	22	7	2	55	45	29	71
Syrian woman	0	73	27	0	0	64	36	23	77
Syrian all	7	63	23	5	2	56	44	28	72
Somali man	13	76	9	0	2	75	25	40	60
Somali woman	9	82	9	0	0	82	18	8	92
Somali all	12	77	9	0	2	76	24	33	67
Other man	16	43	33	7	1	71	29	37	63
Other woman	17	50	22	11	0	59	41	33	67
Other all	16	44	31	8	1	68	32	36	64
Total	19	49	22	7	3	61	39	25	75

Of the respondents, slightly more than half (53%) were with someone of their family in Lesvos, while more than two out of five (42%) were not and a few (5%) did not know about the family situation in Lesvos (Table 4.3). There was a large gender-based difference: while four out of five (79%) women were with at least someone of their family in Lesvos; for men, a minority (45%) said the same. There was also a clear difference between the reception sites: in Kara Tepe, three out of

four (74%) were with family, in Moria less than half (47%) and in other sites about three out of five (62%). As mentioned, when there is space, families are moved from Moria to Kara Tepe. Of Somalis, particularly few (20%) were in Lesvos with someone from the family, and these migrants usually had low education levels. Somalis with high education levels were in Lesvos without family.

Table 4.3. Respondents having family in Lesvos.

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	N
	%	%	%	
Man	45	6	49	378
Woman	79	4	17	102
15–18 years old	39	8	53	93
19–29 years old	46	6	48	237
30–49 years old	69	2	29	107
50+ years old	59	8	33	12
Urban background	53	5	42	232
Rural background	51	7	42	142
University education	51	3	46	119
No university education	54	5	41	350
Afghan	61	3	36	269
Syrian	46	6	48	81
Somali	20	16	64	44
Other	46	7	47	70
Moria	47	6	47	376
Kara Tepe	74	2	24	104
Other sites	62	0	38	13
–2 months in Lesvos	53	4	43	252
3–10 months in Lesvos	47	6	47	142
more than 10 months in Lesvos	60	2	38	48
Total	53	5	42	493

The activities of respondents varied in the countries of origin (Table 4.4). In general, one out of three (32%) was employed there. The share of employed respondents was particularly high among those at least 50 years old. Of them, almost a half (46–47%) were employed, likewise for those respondents (53%) in Lesvos somewhere else than in Moria or Kara Tepe. The clearly lowest share of employed respondents were among Somalis (12%) and women (15%). Comparing men with women in all age groups, many more men than women were employed in the countries of origin. There were also gender-based differences among the ethnic groups. Of Afghan men, nearly a half (45%) were employed; whereas, of Afghan women, one out of seven (14%) was employed in the country of origin. Of Syrian men, one out of four (26%) was employed; whereas, one out of eight (13%) Syrian women was employed. Among Somalis, the employment participation rates were very small among men (11%) and women (15%).

In the countries of origin, almost one out of five (18%) respondents was a job-seeker. Their share was particularly high among women, of whom a half (50%) mentioned having sought a job when they left the countries of origin. As mentioned, very few women were employed; thus, such a high number is understandable. It also indicates many women respondents were interested in being engaged with economic activities but did not have a chance in the countries of origin. The youngest respondents (8% among those having 15–18 years of age) and the oldest respondents (13% among those with at least 60 years of age) were the lowest shares of job-seekers. Of the youngest, many were still in school; of the oldest, many were already outside the active labour market.

Of the respondents, more than one out of three (37%) mentioned being a 'student' when leaving the country of origin. However, this category also includes pupils in school, as almost two out of three (62%) of the youngest (15–18 years old) respondents mentioned having been 'students'. Almost one out of three (29%) respondents under 30 years of age named education as the main life goal. For instance, one of our informants specified he wished "to study and be successful and independent in the future". Obviously, none of the oldest (60 years of age or older) were students.

Being at home was the response from one out of five (21%) of all respondents. The highest shares (33%) were among the oldest respondents (at least 60 years of age) and among Syrians (29%) and Somalis (26%). Older men were more often employed or taking care of the household in the countries of origin. Of women, only one out of nine (11%) mentioned being at home as the main activity. However, many (50%) women mentioned being job-seekers; many female job-seekers were probably at home despite not perceiving it as the main activity. Also, substantially fewer (one out of six, 16%) middle-aged (30–49 years old) participants responded to being at home as the main activity in their countries of origin.

Of respondents, one out of four (25%) had at least attended university. Of them, two out of five (39%) mentioned being students, one out of three (34%) was employed, slightly more than one out of five (22%) was at home, one out of seven (15%) was seeking a job and a few (8%) were active in something else in the countries of origin. In general, a larger share of men had attended university compared with women. Of men under 30 years of age, one out of four (25%), and fewer (18%) women, had attended university. The same applies to older age groups as well: respondents 40–49 years of age (men 33%, women 24%) and respondents 50 years of age (men 33%, women 0%). Such gender-based differences of having at least attended university were also found in major ethnic groups: Afghans (men 23%, women 16%), Syrians (men 29%, women 23%) and Somalis (men 40%, women 8%). Very few Somali women had even attended university; of men, fewest Afghans had at least attended university.

Table 4.4. Respondents' activity in the country of origin (%).

	Student	Job seeker	Home	Employed	Other	N
Man	39	9	24	36	10	464
Woman	30	50	11	15	7	131
15–18 years old	62	8	22	22	9	111
19–29 years old	36	22	23	30	7	288
30–39 years old	19	23	16	42	13	129
40–49 years old	26	15	23	46	15	39
50+ years old	0	13	33	47	20	15
Urban background	34	19	20	31	8	280
Rural background	45	17	24	23	12	186
University education	39	15	22	34	8	143
No university education	36	20	21	31	9	442
Afghan	36	18	17	37	9	303
Syrian	42	18	29	26	10	110
Somali	37	28	26	12	5	57
Other	30	15	22	32	10	98
Moria	37	18	24	30	10	474
Kara Tepe	35	23	12	38	9	121
Other sites	53	7	7	53	0	15
Total	37	18	21	32	9	610

Among the respondent asylum-related migrants in Lesvos, three groups were identified, and they were half of all respondents. The first group consisted of unemployed men with low education levels (28% of all respondents). Of them, almost two out of three were younger than 30 years old (64%) and in Lesvos with their families (62%); six out of seven (84%) were either at home or seeking jobs in the countries of origin; a third (33%) did not know any English; one out of five (20%) had never used the Internet in the country of origin; they usually had security and family as their main life goals; and very few (3%) wanted to return back to their countries of origin.

The second group consisted of urban residents with high education levels (12% of respondents). Of them, almost all knew English (94%), had used the Internet in their countries of origin (96%) and wanted to work in Europe (92%); less than a half were with family in Lesvos (47%); and many of them were proportionally Arabic (42%) or Somali (20%) speakers, and proportionally fewer were Farsi speakers (21%); and, in Lesvos, approximately one out of four felt treated well (28%) and safe (25%).

The third group consisted of women either studying or who had high education levels (9% of respondents). Of them, four out of five (79%) were less than 30 years old; eight out of nine (89%) were in Lesvos with their families; six out of seven (86%) knew English and eight out of nine (89%) had used the Internet in their countries of origin; almost none (2%) wanted to return back to their countries of origin; security and education were their main goals, and the majority wanted to be in the EU within three years to work or study; and approximately one out of five felt safe (22%) and treated well (18%) in Lesvos.

4.2 Respondents' journey to Lesbos

Asylum-related migrants' journeys to Lesbos are usually complex. They have to make a sea passage (usually taking a few hours) to Lesbos and cross the Turkey–Greece border irregularly. Some make this trip on the first attempt; others have to try several times. They have to pay considerable amounts of money to smugglers for the last part of their journeys to the EU and wait at the Turkish coastal area for the moment of departure. The journey to Turkey and the Turkish coast is often difficult and even dangerous (for Afghans, see Dimitriadi 2018; Kuschminder 2018; Section 3.1). However, there are differences among asylum-related migrants.

In principle, Turkey does not provide international protection and the status of refugee for those other than Europeans because of the geographical limitation of applying the 1951 Geneva Convention (Kuschminder 2018). Many Syrians who have fled the war from Syria to Turkey have a temporary protection status there. Thus, they are legally in the country and do not have to leave Turkey. However, in recent years, the situation for Syrians in Turkey has become more challenging, and still many escape Syria due to the ongoing war (Jauhiainen 2018). Some asylum-related migrants from other countries entered Turkey regularly with visas because Turkey does not require visas from citizens of many countries where asylum-related migrants travel. They might have started their (irregular) travel to Lesbos within the time limits of the visas. Other asylum-related migrants irregularly entered Turkey without legal consent and remained there without the consent of Turkish authorities. This is the case for many Afghans, who are the second largest group of asylum-related migrants in Turkey.

The respondents' reasons to leave for such a challenging journey varied and, in many cases, several reasons combined. It is difficult to name just one reason and exclude other reasons for migration. In fact, Erdal and Oepen (2018) argue that forced and voluntary migration should be understood and analysed as a continuum of experience, not a dichotomy. In all, more than three out of four respondents mentioned having left their countries of origin due to war or serious political or human rights reasons. War in the country of origin was the most commonly expressed reason to leave. War and (political and/or personal) insecurity back at home were the main reasons for immigration, as more than four out of five (82%) of our respondents stated. More specifically, they mentioned "persecution and violence", "sentences to death", "killing the Hazaras and Shiites", "my relatives have been killed by enemies", "Taliban", "injuries", "ISIS", "Bashar al-Assad regime", "enslaved relatives", and so on as their main reasons to leave the countries of origin.

Politics, religion and human rights' policies back at home were criticised by the migrants, such as their "racial treatment", "religious discrimination", "freedom of belief and thought", "ethnic threat", "my tribe is minority", "atheism",

“ideological problems” and “oppression and corruption”. One African migrant claimed the policies of his country of origin regarding the LGBTQ-community were his main motivation for migration. According to him, “[our] government does not accept homosexuality”, so he had to relocate to another country.

War and insecurity were mentioned by the majority of all ethnic subgroups (Syrians 87%, Somalis 71%, Afghans 68% and others 51%). Of Afghans from Afghanistan, six out of seven (86%) mentioned war as the reason to leave; of Afghans from Iran, slightly fewer (78%) mentioned it. Monsutti (2007) discussed international migration of young Afghan adults as a process, in which many consider it a passage to independent adulthood. However, for most, this migration to the EU borderlands is a forced migration without an alternative option for survival. Among the respondents, other than Syrians, Afghans and Somalis, almost one out of three (30%) mentioned political and/or human rights reasons for the journey. Jauhiainen and Eyvazlu (2020) estimated approximately one out of three at least 15-year-old Afghans in Iran (0.3–0.4 million) plan to leave Iran for the EU. They would need to travel via Turkey, but very few Afghans in Iran wished to remain in Turkey. However, the actual migration of these Afghans depends on many pushing and pulling migration factors regarding Iran and Afghanistan, including the possibility to cross the border to Turkey and then to Greece.

The respondents mentioned reasons to leave the countries of origin, other than war or political reasons. Other than war and insecurity, reasons to come to Lesbos were different among ethnic groups. The other reasons included family reasons (Afghans 7%, Syrians 2%, Somalis 0%, others 8%), employment reasons (Afghans 6%, Syrians 2%, Somalis 7%, others 3%), education reasons (Afghans 6%, Syrians 2%, Somalis 3%, others 0%) and various other reasons (Afghans 6%, Syrians 1%, Somalis 14%, others 8%).

Economic situations in the countries of origin were the reason for immigration for some respondents. They stated it was impossible to live in the countries of origin due to “economic issues”, “unemployment”, “poverty” and “lack of education and work opportunities”. Among respondents, a small group (about one out of twenty, 5%) clearly indicated financial problems as their main motivations to leave the countries of origin. Of them, five out of six (84%) were males and young adults (less than 30 years old) and more than two out of three (70%) were Afghans. During the journey to Lesbos, two out of three (65%) of them worked. A half spent less than one year during their journeys, and another half spent more than two years. All wanted to be in Europe after three years, and five out of six (83%) would like to work there.

Another small group (5%) of respondents clearly indicated education-related challenges in their countries of origin as their main motivations to leave. Five out of six (83%) of them were male and young adults (less than 30 years old). Almost

one out of five (23%) had already attended university. To reach Lesbos, all of whom arrived in 2019, almost two out of three (63%) worked during the journeys, which took less than one year for the majority (58%). Almost two out of three would like to study in Europe or North America after three years. In Lesbos, more than a third spent time studying something (39%) or just waiting (36%). Destroyed education facilities due to military conflicts, or the lack of those facilities, also motivated them to look for better places to live in the EU. One interviewee migrated “because of the war, schools have been destroyed, I could [not] study anymore”. They went to look for “secure education”, “education facilities”, “studying possibilities” or “a safe place for studying” for their children in Europe.

However, not just insecurity, violence, unemployment or lack of education opportunities back at home pushed people for asylum-related migration. Some escaped restrictive native cultures. For instance, for some women, migration was to have a voice and to have more control over their lives from the patriarchal and often oppressive native cultures. For instance, one female respondent maintained that “limitation for Afghan women and traditional society of Afghanistan” were the main constraints from making her dreams come true in her country of origin. Another female interviewee said that she had to immigrate “because of forced marriage and racism and women worthlessness” back in her country of origin.

In general, among the respondents about one out of 20 (6%) left their countries of origin due to family-related reasons (i.e. to follow their families). A proportionally high share (43%) of them were women, almost three out of four (72%) were Afghans, and they were from various age groups. Almost a third (31%) of these migrants had attended university in their countries of origin, in which about one out of four (28%) was employed, and the majority (53%) were still at school or studying at a university. According to the lengths of their journeys to Lesbos, they were a divided group: 38% spent less than half a year for the journey and 45% more than two years. In three years, almost all wanted to be in Europe to study (46%) or work (46%) there. In Lesbos, half (50%) of them just waited, and one out of four (25%) studied something, usually English. Five out of six (83%) had positive views on their futures.

The length of the journeys to Lesbos varied (Table 4.5). Of all respondents, one out of six (17%) spent less than one month on the travel to Lesbos. A half (51%) spent up to six months, one out of five (21%) spent 7–24 months, and more than one out of four (28%) spent more than two years in their journeys to Lesbos. The younger the respondents were, the larger their shares were among those who spent less than one month traveling to Lesbos. On the other hand, the older the respondents were, the larger their shares were among migrants who spent more than two years during their journeys. Thus, in general, younger asylum-related migrants came quickly and more directly to Lesbos and the EU, while older mi-

grants tended to spend more time along the journey. In addition, those living in sites in Lesvos, other than Moria or Kara Tepe, usually spent more time in their travels to the island.

Comparing the ethnic backgrounds of respondents to each other, the fastest to arrive were Somalis, of whom almost one out of three (31%) spent less than one month, almost three out of four (71%) up to half a year and only one out of eight (12%) for more than one and a half years for their journeys to Lesvos. This suggests their journey stages were planned in advance, and many also used airplanes at certain stages of their travels, as Somalia is more distant from Lesvos than Syria or Afghanistan. Their differences in journey length are clear with other sub-Saharan respondents, of whom one out of nine (11%) spent less than one month, slightly over half (55%) spent up to half a year and four out of five (39%) spent more than one and a half years for their journeys to Lesvos.

Syrians were a divided group, as regards the length of their asylum-related journeys: slightly more than half (53%) of them arrived within half a year, while almost one out of four (23%) had spent more than two years in travel. Syria and Turkey are neighbouring countries, so some Syrian migrants only recently travelled from Syria and moved quickly toward the EU. Others spent years in Turkey, even with the temporary protection status granted to Syrians in Turkey (see Jauhainen 2018), but then recently decided to leave the country. In 2019, political tensions grew in Turkey to move Syrians away to the northern areas of Syria occupied by Turkey (McKernan 2019). However, many Syrians were unwilling to move there and opted for the EU.

Afghans, who were the largest respondent group in Lesvos, were also a divided group. On the one hand, almost half of them (45%) arrived in Lesvos within six months, though rather few (12%) within one month. In total, the distance from Afghanistan to Lesvos is about 4,000–5,000 km. It takes time to travel first by land to Iran, then to eastern Turkey, then for 1,800 km to reach the western coast of Turkey and finally to cross the sea. On the other hand, one out of three (34%) spent more than two years during the journey, and many also stayed in Iran before traveling to Turkey.

Every respondent came to Lesvos from Turkey. As regards their lengths of stay in Turkey, of all respondents, less than one out of three (29%) mentioned how long they stayed in Turkey. Of those, who responded to this question, two out of three (66%) spent less than half a year in Turkey, and slightly more than three out of four (77%) spent less than one year there. One out of five (20%) did not specify the length of the stay, and a few (4%) spent at least two years, the latter mostly Syrians. Iran was the country through which Afghans travelled to Turkey and further via Turkey to Lesvos. Only a few Afghans specified the length of stay in Iran, but, of them, more than one out of four (27%) mentioned having spent less than half a year there and one out of four (24%) for at least two years, even many years (see

Jauhiainen et al. 2020). There were also respondents from many African countries who had spent years in other African countries on their way to Lesbos. In addition, some respondents had already spent months or even years in the EU member states (i.e. they were on their second or third journey to the EU).

Table 4.5. Length of respondents' journey to Lesbos (in months).

	-1	2-6	7-12	13-24	25-	N
Man	17	32	12	11	28	294
Woman	17	44	7	7	25	72
15–18 years old	23	32	14	8	23	62
19–29 years old	19	34	11	11	25	192
30–39 years old	12	38	8	8	34	76
40–49 years old	13	35	6	10	36	31
50– years old	0	22	0	22	56	9
Urban background	19	32	10	11	28	178
Rural background	20	41	11	9	19	114
University education	18	38	8	11	25	100
Without university education	18	33	12	8	29	263
Afghan	12	33	11	10	34	202
Syrian	21	32	11	13	23	79
Somali	31	40	17	3	9	35
Other	23	39	7	8	23	61
Moria	18	36	11	9	26	297
Kara Tepe	15	32	7	13	33	72
Other sites	13	12	12	25	38	8
Total	17	34	11	10	28	377

The journey to Lesbos did not only consist of traveling. Asylum-related migrants also have a lot of unspecified free-time during their journeys. Some use social media to be in contact with other people, friends and families, and they also meet them face-to-face. Some need or are able to work during the journey. The passage through borders may take place without authorities noticing or otherwise smoothly without being stopped. Others are stopped, may even be detained, and spend time in specific camps for asylum-related migrants.

Of all respondents, seven out of eight (88%) used social media during their journeys to Lesbos, at least at some stages of it (Table 4.6). Almost one third (31%) of the oldest respondents (at least 50 years old) never used social media during the journey, but another one third (36%) used it during the journey. Besides them, the largest share of daily social media users were among the respondents with university education levels (36%) and those from Syria (35%). The use of social media along the asylum-related journey is more common among migrants with higher education levels. Furthermore, Syrians in Turkey are generally frequent users of social media (Jauhiainen 2018; Merisalo & Jauhiainen 2019). Particularly, a large share of social media users during their journeys to Lesbos were Syrians (93%), those with university education (93%) and those having 30–39

years (92%). Compared with Syrians and Afghans, Somalis less frequently used social media along their journeys. However, their journeys to Lesvos were sometimes much longer and also consisted of stages when the social media use was difficult (see also Section 4.5).

In general, almost four out of five (78%) respondents mentioned they made friends during their journeys to Lesvos (Table 4.6). This share was quite consistent among respondents with different backgrounds. There was a slightly larger share of respondents older than 40 years old (83–84%) making friends, and a clearly lower share of two out of three (64%) respondents who were from countries with fewer respondents who were in Lesvos. Friendships during the journey were especially made among one's own ethnic group. Many also travelled with their peer groups from the same country and became friends with them, if they were not already friends from the beginning.

Employment along the asylum-related journey varied between respondents (Table 4.6). In general, slightly over half (53%) of respondents were employed at least shortly during the journey. Of men, substantially more (58%) were employed than women (38%). A particularly high share of the employed was among 40–49-year-old respondents (71%). Of those having at least some university education, more (63%) were employed than of those without a university education (50%), but this is partly explainable by the larger share of respondent men with university backgrounds. Much fewer Somalis (31%) had been employed along the journey compared with respondents from other countries of origin.

Two particular gender-related groups were employed during the journey to Lesvos. One small group (5% of all respondents) consisted of women from many countries of origin who were with family in Lesvos. In their countries of origin, a proportionally higher share (38%) of them were employed, and more than two out of five (44%) were seeking a job. Regardless of such work-orientation, for the majority (57%), family was their main life goal; for more than one out of three (37%), it was education. Almost all (93%) expressed they would not like to return to their countries of origin, and none indicated they would not like to work in Europe. In Lesvos, almost one out of five (18%) mentioned their main activity was to stay with family, one out of five (21%) mentioned studying (78% already had some command of English), and more than one out of three (36%) just waited there.

Another particularly larger group (one out of nine, 11% of respondents) was employed during the journey to Lesvos, consisting of men who had attended university in their countries of origin. They were from many countries of origin, and six out of seven (84%) had 19–39 years of age. In their countries of origin, more (45%) were students than employed (35%). During the journeys, they had various occupations, such as construction workers, service providers, professionals, craftsmen and traders. Almost all knew at least some English (91%) and were users of the Internet in the countries of origin (93%), during the journey

(96%) and in Lesvos (91%). Less than a half (43%) were with someone from the family in Lesvos, in which slightly more (29%) spent time studying something rather than just waiting (25%). In three years, almost all of them aimed either to work (51%) or to study (38%), mostly in Europe.

Table 4.6. Journey of respondents to Lesvos.

	Made friends				Employed			Social media use				Stop at border			
	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Yes	No	N	Da	We	Le	Ne	N	Yes	No	N
Man	79	12	9	369	58	42	443	26	28	35	11	463	48	52	417
Woman	74	6	20	101	38	62	125	23	20	41	16	128	37	63	113
15–18 years old	77	8	15	88	49	51	110	23	22	39	16	111	40	60	102
19–29 years old	78	11	11	234	51	49	280	28	26	35	11	289	49	51	264
30–39 years old	73	16	11	104	53	47	122	25	31	36	8	132	43	57	114
40–49 years old	84	13	3	37	71	29	41	14	35	39	12	43	51	49	39
50+ years old	83	0	17	12	53	47	15	32	6	31	31	16	29	71	14
Urban background	82	10	8	226	49	51	272	27	28	33	12	282	48	52	250
Rural background	71	12	17	145	56	44	169	28	29	36	7	176	50	50	161
University education	73	15	12	119	63	37	138	36	26	31	7	146	48	52	128
No university education	80	10	10	340	50	50	419	21	27	38	14	429	45	55	394
Afghan	81	7	12	246	54	46	296	22	23	41	14	309	32	68	274
Syrian	79	14	7	88	57	43	107	35	34	24	7	109	75	25	102
Somali	80	9	11	46	31	69	51	25	15	48	12	52	45	55	49
Other	64	21	15	77	57	43	95	31	32	27	10	96	62	38	85
Moria	77	11	12	370	52	48	454	26	28	35	11	466	46	54	425
Kara Tepe	83	10	7	100	57	43	116	24	19	42	15	125	43	57	106
Other sites	75	17	8	12	67	33	12	7	14	43	36	14	50	50	14
Total	78	11	11	482	53	47	582	25	26	37	12	605	46	54	545

Agr = agree; Dk = don't know; Dis = disagree; N = number of respondents; Da = daily; We = weekly; Le = less often than weekly; Ne = never. Made friends = made friends during the journey to Lesvos; Employed = was employed during the journey to Lesvos; Social media use = frequency of social media use during the journey to Lesvos; Stop at border = was stopped at any border during the journey to Lesvos

Slightly more than two out of five (43%) respondents answered that they learned something useful during their asylum-related journeys to Lesvos (Table 4.7). The journey is not only about escaping, traveling and waiting for the next stage or the destination. Knowledge creation processes take place, enhancing the competences of some individuals during the asylum-related journeys. Of men, almost a half (47%) mentioned having learned something useful; whereas, substantially fewer women, about one out of four (27%), mentioned so. The majority (55%) of those who learned something useful, mentioned work skills as a topic they learned. Of all men, one out of four (26%) considered having learned useful work-related skills during the journey, and this was expressed by one out of six (16%) women.

There are a few particularities in learning useful things related to work skills. Of those who mentioned they had learned something useful during the asylum-related journey, more women (62%) than men (55%) mentioned work-related skills. This suggests that during the asylum-related journey a much larger share

of women had a possibility or necessity to be employed than in their countries of origin, and almost two out of three women considered this work-related experience useful. It might have been one of their earliest work experiences in their lives. In addition, the older the respondent was, the higher was the share of those who mentioned work-related skills as useful things learned during the journey. Similarly, of those who spent more than one year during their journeys, a larger share (64%) mentioned work-related skills than of those who had spent less than one year (55%). Somalis were the only subgroup who did not mention work-related skills as their most common useful thing learned during the journey (17%). In general, Somalis were not often engaged with work during their journeys.

After work-related skills, the next most important thing was mentioned by fewer people (4–5% of all respondents and 10–11% of those who learned something useful), and this varied a great deal among respondents. Many Somalis (42%) mentioned learning English as a useful skill. Free-time skills were mentioned more often (23%) by those becoming adults (15–18 years old) and Syrians (18%); practical skills (14%) by those with university education backgrounds, and survival skills by those (33%) living in Lesvos, elsewhere than in Moria or Kara Tepe, and those (13%) who spent more than one year in their journeys. Nevertheless, the majority (57%) did not learn useful things during their journeys or did not mention that in the survey.

Table 4.7. Respondents' learning useful things during the journey to Lesvos (multiple choice).

	Yes (%)	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	47	Work skills 55	Free-time skills 12	English 10
Woman	27	Work skills 62	English 15	Practical skills 12
15–18 years old	45	Work skills 33	Free-time skills 23	Values 15
19–29 years old	44	Work skills 55	English 12	Control 11
30–39 years old	43	Work skills 68	Practical skills 10	Survival 10
40–49 years old	44	Work skills 71	English 7	Recreation 7
50+ years old	17	Work skills 100	Practical skills 33	-
Urban background	39	Work skills 51	Free-time skills 15	Survival 9
Rural background	47	Work skills 55	English 12	Free-time skills 8
University education	51	Work skills 64	Practical skills 14	Control 7
Without university education	40	Work skills 53	Free-time skills 13	English 10
Afghan	47	Work skills 54	English 9	Free-time skills 9
Syrian	45	Work skills 62	Free-time skills 18	Practical skills 10
Somali	25	English 42	Work skills 17	Free-time skills 8
Moria	42	Work skills 55	Free-time skills 10	English 9
Kara Tepe	49	Work skills 57	Free-time skills 14	Survival 11
Other sites	25	Work skills 33	Survival 33	Free-time skills 33
–3 months	41	Work skills 54	English 13	Practical skills 12
4–12 months	49	Work skills 54	Free-time skills 11	English 8
over 12 months	55	Work skills 65	Survival 13	Free-time skills 9
Total	43	Work skills 55	Free-time skills 11	English 10

4.3 Respondents' current living place

All respondents lived temporarily in Lesvos: by the time of the survey in the autumn of 2019, some had been there for a few days and others for more than one year. In detail, a majority (56%) of respondents had been in Lesvos less than two months and more than four out of five (82%) for less than half a year. One out of nine (11%) had been in Lesvos for more than one year (i.e. they had arrived in 2018 or earlier). Very few (3%) had been in Lesvos for more than two years (Table 4.8).

Syrians and Somalis had arrived most recently. Of Syrian respondents, three out of four (75%) were in Lesvos for two months; more than two out of three (71%) Somalis were in Lesvos for two months. Of Afghans, about a half (52%) and, of other nations, two out of five (41%) had been in Lesvos for two months. A slightly higher share of men (83%) than women (78%) had been in Lesvos for less than half a year. The share of those respondents who had been in Lesvos for more than two years was the highest among the oldest respondents (14%) and those living in sites other than Moria or Kara Tepe (21%). In Moria, nine out of ten (90%) had been there for less than half a year, and their share was substantially smaller in Kara Tepe (57%). Accordingly, of those in Kara Tepe, a much higher share (22%) had been in Lesvos for about one year or more (since 2018); whereas, their share in Moria was small (7%).

Table 4.8. Respondents' stay in Lesvos (in months).

	0–2	3–5	6–10	since '18	since '17	Earlier	N
Man	57	26	6	8	1	2	385
Woman	54	24	9	10	2	1	108
15–18 years old	57	29	6	7	0	1	89
19–29 years old	61	25	4	6	1	3	249
30–39 years old	56	23	9	11	1	0	106
40–49 years old	36	23	18	18	5	0	39
50+ years old	47	12	20	7	7	7	15
Urban background	58	22	10	9	0	1	230
Rural background	55	30	5	5	2	3	152
University education	57	25	6	10	1	1	119
No university education	56	26	8	7	1	2	365
Afghan	52	28	8	10	1	1	269
Syrian	75	15	6	1	1	2	91
Somali	71	17	5	7	0	0	41
Other	41	37	8	6	3	5	78
Moria	65	25	3	5	0	2	390
Kara Tepe	28	29	21	18	3	1	104
Other sites	29	7	7	36	14	7	14
Total	56	26	7	8	1	2	508

Most respondents could not select their living places in Lesvos. After the initial rescues from the sea or at the coast of Lesvos, they were soon brought to Moria. Those who had arrived earlier in 2019, usually more than a half a year ago, had

been located inside the Moria reception and identification centre where most people lived in containers. After a while, usually several months, some of those who had been in Moria, were relocated to Kara Tepe or ex-PIKPA, especially those with vulnerabilities or having small children. Almost all of those who arrived in the autumn of 2019 were located in the tent areas around the Moria centre.

As the Greek government attempts to control refugees' movements, slightly more than two out of five (42%) respondents felt their movements in Lesvos were restricted. The share of those feeling so dropped from 2016 (54%). One out of three (34%) migrants mentioned that even if they wanted to leave the asylum seeker camp, they he could not do so. Among those who felt especially restricted in their movements were young men and women with higher education levels (35%) and those having at least some knowledge of English (78%). The majority of them were with families in Lesvos (54%). In 2016, a larger share (42%) thought they could not leave the camp. In fact, this change in feeling had diminished in the Moria centre (from 44% in 2016 to 37% in 2019) and particularly in the Kara Tepe centre (from 41% in 2016 to 22% in 2019; Jauhiainen 2017). Not being able to leave and having to wait in Lesvos and its reception sites for an undetermined time, according to Iliadou (2019, 16–17), creates multiple forms of social harm for the asylum-related migrants, as making time and waiting are forms of state violence.

In 2019, one out of four (25%) respondents believed they could freely choose where to go after leaving Lesvos. A larger share of those, who believed they enjoyed such free movement, were people over 30 years old. The share of Afghans in this group was smaller than their overall share among respondents and the share of Syrians and other ethnic groups was larger than among the respondents. Few, but a proportionally larger share (10%), of them mentioned they would like to return home. The minority of these were staying in Lesvos with families (44%). Comparing the responses of asylum-related migrants in 2016 and 2019, fewer (from 36% to 25%) felt they could freely choose where to go after Lesvos in 2019 (Jauhiainen 2017).

Almost all respondents (88% agreed, 8% did not know, 4% disagreed) would like to work in the EU; this share was (87% agreed, 9% did not know, 4% disagreed) practically the same in 2016. The share of those agreeing to like to work in the EU slightly grew from 2016 to 2019 among young adult asylum-related migrants (19–29 years old) in Lesvos (from 86% to 90%). It slightly decreased among the youngest (15–18 years old) respondents (from 85% to 79%) because in 2019 there were more young respondents orienting to studies in Europe (Jauhiainen 2017).

The physical and social environment in different reception sites varied. Some had to stay in small provisional tents with hardly any facilities; others were in larger tents with blankets and cooking options outside the tent. Some were in congested containers and others in more spacious rooms or flats (see Section 3.1). As regards the very basic amenities, of all respondents, slightly more than one out of five (22%) agreed to have enough toilets and showers for their use (Table 4.9).

This indicates well the congestion and lack of basic facilities in Lesvos. In particular, only one out of six (17%) of those living in the Moria centre, and even fewer (14%) of those living in the tent areas, mentioned to have enough toilets and showers. This was agreed by over twice as much, but still only by two out of five (38%) of those living in Kara Tepe or other areas (such as squatted buildings) studied in Lesvos. Those who were the most satisfied with such amenities were the oldest respondents, of whom almost half (46%) agreed to having enough toilets and showers for their use. Those who disagreed the most to having enough toilets and showers were the respondents with university education backgrounds (77%), rural backgrounds (77%) and Somalis (77%). Compared to the situation in the reception centres three years earlier at the end of 2016 (see Jauhiainen 2017), the migrants' perceptions about the basic facilities in the Moria centre has not changed because 16% in 2016 and 17% in 2019 agreed with having enough toilets and showers for one's use. However, in the Kara Tepe centre, there has been a clear improvement from 2016 (22% agreed with having enough facilities) to 2019 (38% agreed).

Practicing religion can be an issue for some respondents, especially if one used to regularly visit religious services. From respondents, more than two out of three (70%) agreed they can practice religion as they wished (Table 4.9). The only group of whom a larger share (38%) disagreed with it were asylum-related migrants from other sites than Moria or Kara Tepe. These sites do not easily provide access to sites for practicing religion. Close to the Moria centre, a small site was built for praying and conducting religious activities. Challenges in practicing religion seem to not be a major issue among asylum-related migrants in Lesvos. Furthermore, the situation has even slightly improved from 2016 to 2019 in the Moria (from 64% to 71%) and the Kara Tepe (from 61% to 66%) centres (Jauhiainen 2017).

Financial burden is a common challenge among asylum-related migrants. According to the EU asylum regulations, they receive a small monthly allowance. However, many respondents mentioned they started to receive it only after being in Lesvos for several months. Their accommodation as such is free, as well as the daily ration of food and water, if one manages to get a ration. However, money is needed to buy additional food, to use the mobile phone and the Internet and to purchase more clothing or personal items. In general, five out of six (83%) respondents mentioned they needed more money to improve their situations (Table 4.9). Save those with university educations (76%) and those who lived in places other than Moria and Kara Tepe, respondents were consistent in their answers. The largest shares mentioning they needed more money were among Syrians (89%) and women (88%). Between 2016 and 2019, the largest negative change took place among young adults (19–29 years old), of whom 72% in 2016 and 84% in 2019 needed more money to improve their situations. The largest improvement of the situation took place among the youngest (15–18 years old) respondents: from 86% in 2016 to 78% in 2019 (Jauhiainen 2017).

Having a mobile phone with Internet access has become a lifeline for asylum-related migrants along their journeys (see Gillespie et al. 2016; Dekker et al. 2018; Merisalo & Jauhiainen 2019; Merisalo & Jauhiainen 2020). They are used for various purposes, for example, to be in contact with family and friends, to follow the situations in the country of origin and in the potential destination country and to acquire information on how to reach the destination (see Section 4.5). Of all respondents, slightly less than two out of three (63%) mentioned having a mobile phone with Internet access (Table 4.9). The situation has remained almost the same in the past three years because in 2016 the number was 61% (Jauhiainen 2017). There was, however, a considerable variation in 2019. While in general young people and young adults are more frequent Internet and social media users in their countries of origin compared with older asylum-related migrants, the lowest share (50%) of such mobile phone holders in Lesvos was among the youngest (15–18 years old) respondents. In fact, in 2016, 33% of this age group disagreed with having a mobile phone with Internet access, and this share rose to 40% in 2019 (Jauhiainen 2017). Many of these young migrants travelled with family, and the father might possess the only mobile phone in use. Somalis had considerably less access to the Internet and less mobile phone ownership (53%). A clearly higher than average share was among those who lived elsewhere than in Moria or Kara Tepe (85%) and among 40–49 years old respondents (80%).

Table 4.9. Living conditions of respondents in Lesvos (%).

	Enough amenities				Mobile phone				Needing money				Practice religion			
	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N
Man	24	9	67	395	63	7	30	390	82	11	7	391	68	14	18	371
Woman	17	10	73	108	62	12	26	101	88	8	4	101	73	15	12	102
15–18 years old	27	8	65	96	50	10	40	95	78	9	13	93	61	21	18	90
19–29 years old	17	10	73	248	63	8	29	241	84	11	5	242	71	15	14	234
30–39 years old	24	10	66	116	69	8	23	113	85	10	5	112	71	12	17	103
40–49 years old	27	5	68	37	80	3	17	35	87	5	8	39	80	5	15	39
50+ years old	46	9	45	11	70	0	30	10	82	9	9	11	85	0	15	13
Urban background	21	10	69	240	63	7	30	232	84	9	7	231	70	14	16	229
Rural background	16	7	77	149	62	10	28	149	85	9	6	157	69	16	15	141
University education	18	5	77	125	63	6	31	116	76	14	10	125	66	16	18	120
No university education	23	10	67	368	62	8	30	365	85	9	6	358	71	13	16	343
Afghan	25	6	69	282	67	8	25	273	81	11	8	265	64	18	18	259
Syrian	15	15	70	88	61	9	30	90	89	8	3	96	79	11	10	86
Somali	14	9	77	44	53	7	40	45	82	7	11	45	83	7	10	41
Other	26	10	64	73	63	6	31	67	87	9	4	69	72	10	18	72
Moria	17	10	73	394	59	9	32	382	86	9	5	391	71	14	15	371
Kara Tepe	38	7	55	109	74	6	20	107	76	13	11	101	66	15	19	102
Other sites	38	8	54	13	85	0	15	13	69	16	15	13	54	8	38	13
Total	22	9	69	516	63	8	29	502	83	10	7	505	70	14	16	486

Agr = agree; Dk = don't know; Dis = disagree; N = number of respondents; Enough amenities = In Lesvos, there are enough toilets, showers, etc. for my use; Mobile phone = In Lesvos, I have own mobile phone with Internet access; Needing money = I need necessarily more money to improve my current situation; Practice religion = In Lesvos, I can practice my religion as I want

Lesvos is not only a physical environment but also a social environment in which asylum-related migrants experience their everyday lives (Table 4.10). Making friends in Lesvos can be very important to feel more comfortable there. More than two out of three (71%) had made friends in Lesvos, and only a small difference existed in this between men (70%) and women (73%). Particularly, a high share of people who made friends in Lesvos were among those living elsewhere (92%) than in Moria or Kara Tepe. Many living in squatted buildings and other provisional sites shared them with their current friends. Another group that had made a particularly high number of friends were 40–49-year-old respondents (87%). Many asylum-related migrants made friends in Lesvos rather quickly. Of those having been in Lesvos up to two months, two out of three (66%) had made friends there. With the length of time in Lesvos, the share of those having made friends increased. Of those in Lesvos since 2018 (from almost one year to almost two years), one out of eight (12%) had not made friends in Lesvos. Regarding social environments and making friends, the situation of migrants in Lesvos has slightly improved in all sites from 2016 to 2019 (see Jauhiainen 2017): from 63% to 67% in Moria, from 67% to 80% in Kara Tepe and from 79% to 92% elsewhere, as well as among men (from 64% to 70%) and women (63% to 73%).

Feeling—or not feeling—safe and treated well are important everyday experiences the asylum-related migrants in Lesvos. Of all respondents, only one out of four (26%) agreed to feeling safe in Lesvos, and almost three out of five (57%) disagreed with such a statement (17% did not know how to answer). Having been in Lesvos a longer or shorter time did not influence the feeling of being safe there—safety is, thus, a more place-based experience. In fact, substantially fewer (23%) felt safe in Moria compared with Kara Tepe (35%). The respondents in other sites were a divided group: whereas, about one out of three (31%) felt safe, about two out of three (69%) disagreed with this statement. Again, this fosters the idea of specific places where people feel safer and other places in which they feel unsafe. Feeling safe did not really differ between male and female respondents. A proportionally higher share of the oldest (50 years or more) respondents felt safe (50%), as well as Somalis (40%). A proportionally low (17%) share of feeling safe in Lesvos was among the sub-Saharan respondents, except Somalis. During our observations, we found many Somalis tended to live and move around in groups consisting of Somalis. In Lesvos were asylum-related migrants from many sub-Saharan countries but only a few migrants per each country, except those from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so they were hardly able to live and move in groups as Somalis did. From 2016 to 2019, there was a minor change for the better among the migrants in the centres in Moria (19% in 2016 and 23% in 2019 agreed with feeling safe; 64% in 2016 and 59% in 2019 disagreed with feeling safe) and Kara Tepe (22% in 2016 and 35% in 2019 agreed with feeling safe; 51% in 2016 and 48% in 2019 disagreed with feeling safe; Jauhiainen 2017).

Slightly more than one out of four (28%) felt treated well in Lesvos. Again, such feeling was almost equally the same among men and women. However, the older the respondent was, the more likely she or he was to feel that she or he was treated well: of the youngest (15–18 years old), one out of six (16%) respondents felt this way, while almost three out of six of the oldest felt similarly (58%). There is probably a cultural issue here: in many cultures, older people are respected more because of their advanced ages. Of Afghan respondents, fewer (21%) felt treated well compared with Syrians (34%), Somalis (30%) and respondents from other nations (37%). However, of the sub-Saharan respondents (excluding Somalis), less than one out of four (23%) felt treated well in Lesvos. There was a statistically significant relationship between feeling treated well and being safe (i.e. those who felt safe in Lesvos also more often felt treated well there). In addition, those who felt safe in Lesvos more likely also trusted people who tried to help them. The change from 2016 to 2019 illustrates a difference among migrants feeling or not feeling treated well. Whereas, for women, the share of those feeling treated well has clearly increased (from 15% in 2016 to 28% in 2019); for men, it has slightly decreased (from 31% in 2016 to 27% in 2019). In the Moria centre, the situation has remained the same (27% felt treated well in 2016 and 26% in 2019), but, in the Kara Tepe centre, the share has dropped substantially (46% felt treated well in 2016 and 34% in 2019), while still remaining above Moria (Jauhiainen 2017).

Feelings of direct discrimination or racism among the asylum-related migrants exist in Lesvos. Racialization of asylum-related migrants occurs. Migrants are often divided into adapt people, 'good' migrants and 'bad' migrants, even in the humanitarian governance of asylum seekers (see Mavelli 2017). Of the respondents, one out of three (33%) agreed with the statement of feeling mistreated in Lesvos because they were not European, one out of four (27%) did not know how to answer and two out of five (40%) disagreed with the statement. More women (37%) than men (32%) felt discrimination due to their ethnic origins and two out of five (40%) of the youngest (15–18 years old) respondents. Somalis were the subgroup who felt less (29%) of such mistreatment. Of the sub-Saharan respondents other than Somalis, slightly more (33%) felt such mistreatment. The longer the respondent had stayed in Lesvos, the larger was the share of those who felt mistreated. However, comparing the year 2016 to 2019, a smaller share of respondents felt mistreated in general (43% felt so in 2016 and 33% in 2019), and such a reduction took place in all age groups. However, there are gender issues here: of women in 2016, 27% felt mistreated in Lesvos because of non-European origin, and this share rose to 37% in 2019; whereas, that of men dropped from 45% in 2016 to 32% in 2019 (Jauhiainen 2017).

Among respondents, there were two smaller groups who had opposing views about their situations in 2019. The small, particularly positive feeling group,

with one out of twenty (5%) respondents, felt safe, treated well and not mistreated in Lesvos regardless of their non-European origins. Of them, seven out of eight (87%) saw their futures positively. They consisted of two different types of people.

The first subgroup of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos who have a positive outlook consisted of male and female young adults with low education levels. They came to Lesvos less than half a year earlier. All made friends during their journeys and in Lesvos. Almost all used the Internet in the country of origin and during the journey, however, in Lesvos the Internet use became more restricted. Only one of them planned to return to the country of origin. None said they would not like to work in the EU.

The second subgroup of positive feeling migrants consisted of middle-aged (30–49 years old) men. They all arrived in 2019 at Lesvos, where they all made friends. All except one used the Internet in the country of origin, all used the Internet during the journey and all except another one in Lesvos, and all except one had a mobile phone with Internet access in Lesvos. Security and/or family were their life goals and all agreed to like to work in Europe.

The particularly negative feeling group of migrants in Lesvos was small but larger than the previous negative feeling group. To this belonged one out of seven (14%) respondents, who did not feel safe or well treated in Lesvos and felt mistreated because of not being of European origins. They consisted of three different types of people.

In the first negative feeling subgroup of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos were young Afghan men who were without families in Lesvos. Their activities varied in the countries of origin, and the majority were employed during the journey. Two out of three made friends during the journey and in Lesvos. A few had not used the Internet in the countries of origin, only one did not use it during the journey and a few did not use it in Lesvos, in which a half of them had mobile phones with Internet access. Two out of three would like to study in the EU, and one third would like to work there. A half did not see anything positive in Lesvos; however, all saw their future positively.

In the second negative feeling subgroup were people living with families in the Moria centre, four out of five of them were Afghans. In their countries of origin, they had different activities. Less than half were employed during the journey. In the countries of origin and during the journeys, very few did not use the Internet; in Lesvos, one out of four were without it. Three out of four made friends during the journey and slightly over half in Lesvos, at which almost all arrived in 2019. Two out of three saw their futures positively, and none planned to return to the countries of origin.

In the third negative feeling subgroup were people from many ethnic backgrounds. Of them, six out of seven were men, and three out of four were less

than 30 years old. Very few were employed during their journeys to Lesbos. Everyone arrived at Lesbos in 2019, in which about one out of four were with family. Almost all used the Internet in the countries of origin and during the journey, but about one of four did not use it in Lesbos, in which a half of them had a mobile phone with Internet access. About half made friends during the journey and fewer in Lesbos, in which very few had learned something useful. No one planned to return to the country of origin.

Table 4.10. Social aspects in life of respondents in Lesbos (%).

	Made friends				Treated well				Feel safe				Mistreatment			
	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N
Man	70	12	18	373	27	17	56	374	25	18	57	377	32	27	41	369
Woman	73	2	25	102	28	21	51	107	26	14	60	102	37	25	38	102
15–18 years old	64	19	17	89	16	19	65	89	22	11	67	87	40	26	34	88
19–29 years old	68	11	21	234	25	18	57	238	23	18	59	238	34	24	42	237
30–39 years old	73	6	21	105	35	22	43	106	30	16	54	109	24	38	38	107
40–49 years old	87	0	13	39	41	18	41	39	28	31	41	39	29	24	47	34
50+ years old	73	9	18	11	58	0	42	12	50	25	25	12	34	33	33	12
Urban background	70	12	18	227	28	21	51	232	28	18	54	230	33	27	40	231
Rural background	71	6	23	142	27	19	54	142	21	19	60	146	34	27	39	140
University education	68	7	25	119	28	17	55	119	21	19	60	118	34	30	36	118
No university education	71	11	18	343	26	19	55	348	26	17	57	350	32	27	41	346
Afghan	76	8	16	250	21	18	61	253	23	13	64	254	34	28	38	262
Syrian	71	12	17	86	34	18	48	88	24	27	49	89	30	29	41	86
Somali	52	15	33	46	30	20	50	44	40	16	44	45	29	21	50	42
Other	63	15	22	76	37	21	42	76	23	25	52	75	34	24	42	70
Moria	67	11	22	371	26	18	56	379	23	18	59	376	33	26	41	376
Kara Tepe	80	8	12	100	34	19	47	99	35	17	48	102	32	30	38	95
Other sites	92	0	8	13	31	15	54	13	31	0	69	13	54	23	23	13
–2 months in Lesbos	66	10	24	249	29	18	53	251	28	17	55	256	31	28	41	249
3–10 months in Lesbos	74	9	17	144	23	19	58	145	22	14	64	147	35	26	39	145
more than 10 months in Lesbos	88	4	8	49	31	20	49	49	26	24	50	46	41	25	34	44
Total	71	10	19	484	28	18	54	491	26	17	57	491	33	27	40	484

Agr = agree; Dk = don't know; Dis = disagree; N = number of respondents; Made friends = In Lesbos, I have made friends during my stay here; Treated well = In Lesbos, I am treated well; Feel safe = In Lesbos, I am safe

One out of three (32%) respondents mentioned having learned something useful in Lesbos—the share was lower than that (43%) of those learning something useful during the journey to Lesbos (Table 4.11). Of men, one out of three (34%) mentioned they had learned something useful in Lesbos; whereas, substantially fewer women, about one out of five (20%), said the same. Among all respondents, English language was the most commonly mentioned useful thing learned: as mentioned by one out of seven (14%) of all respondents and less than half (44%) of those who had learned something useful. English is a language of communication with most authorities and NGOs and is often used between mi-

grants from different ethnic backgrounds. In general, with a longer time spent in Lesvos, the share of those who learned something useful increased. Of those with less than four months in Lesvos, less than one out of four (23%) learned something useful; of those who were in Lesvos more than one year, almost a half (45%) learned something useful.

Substantially fewer respondents mentioned the second or third most common useful thing learned in Lesvos: the former by 4% of all respondents (14% of those learned something useful) and the latter by 3% (11% of those learned something useful). The most frequently mentioned were work-related skills and self-control. However, there was variation among the respondent subgroups.

Table 4.11. Respondents' learning useful things in Lesvos (multiple answers).

	Yes (%)	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	34	English 45	Work skills 16	Control 12
Woman	20	English 41	Practical skills 24	Social skills 12, Studying 12
15–18 years old	39	English 41	Work skills 22	Studying 11, Survival 11, Recreation 11
19–29 years old	26	English 41	Control 16	Practical skills 12
30–39 years old	35	English 58	Control 13	Work skills 13, Studying 13
40–49 years old	44	English 47	Work skills 33	Social skills 20
50+ years old	15	Work skills 50	Helping others 50	
Urban background	29	English 40	Values 12	Control 12, Work skills 12
Rural background	35	English 55	Control 12	Work skills 12
University education	35	English 33	Control 15	Studying 15
Without university education	30	English 48	Work skills 15	Values 10
Afghan	32	English 46	Work skills 12	Survival 10
Syrian	21	English 25	Values 25	Control 17, Practical skills 17, Greek 17
Somali	26	English 55	Control 18	Studying 18
Other	45	English 43	Work skills 29	Control 19
Moria	28	English 40	Control 13	Work skills 10, Studying 10, Freetime skills 10
Kara Tepe	47	English 50	Work skills 20	Greek 17
Other sites	23	Work skills 50	English 50	-
<3 months	23	English 44	Values 13	Control 13
4–12 months	38	English 47	Work skills 16	Practical skills 9, Freetime skills 9
over 12 months	45	English 45	Values 17	Work skills 17
Total	32	English 44	Work skills 14	Control 11

In Lesvos, the asylum-related migrants have a lot of time while their asylum application process slowly moves ahead. They do not know how long the process will take, how long they will stay in Lesvos and whether they can move, for example, from Moria to another place in Lesvos. Meaningless waiting is not just spending time: It can be seen as a tool of control and deterrence posed upon asylum-related migrants, and even a continuing organized, legitimized and routinized everyday violence upon them (Iliadou 2019).

Among respondents, a few (4%) had spent most of their time working in Lesvos. They came from various age groups, but five out of six (83%) were men. Back home, one out of three had been students or were occupied in a profession. They were also socially oriented because all made friends during the journey to Lesvos or while in Lesvos—in Moria, where most live; in Kara Tepe; or at other reception centres (PIKPA). Almost all knew English and used the Internet in Lesvos. All wanted to be in Europe within three years to work or study there. No one disagreed when asked if they see their future positively.

Almost one out of five (19%) respondents mentioned they spend the majority of their time in Lesvos studying. There were very few options to study for an organized way. NGOs provided courses to study the English or Greek language or basic computer skills but sometimes also other specific subjects. However, it was not easy to reach these sites from all reception centres. The age of these study-oriented respondents varied from the youngest to the oldest age groups, and they were found in all settlement types. In their countries of origin, respondents varied in their employment status, from employed, student, job-seeker, to homemaker. Almost all of them knew at least some English (95%) and used the Internet (97%) in Lesvos. In fact, most had to rely on self-study through the Internet, where the study material also tended to be in English. Their focus was to be in Europe or Canada in three years, and almost all (97%) expressed that they do not plan to return to their countries of origin.

Many found it difficult to focus on any meaningful activity in Lesvos. More than one out of five (22%) mentioned that their main activity in Lesvos was just waiting. No one was older than 39 years of age in this group. Almost three out of four (73%) were Afghans, but the remainder are people from other nations. Some were not able to focus on activities yet because almost all (95%) had arrived at Lesvos less than half a year ago and almost three out of four (71%) less than two months before. Because of this, many (90%) lived in the Moria centre. Regarding their skills, the group was divided: one out of four (24%) had studied at a university and a third was employed in jobs requiring basic skills (e.g. construction workers, salespeople, farmers, factory workers, elementary workers). Half (52%) of them were employed during the journey and usually in low-skilled jobs such as being a construction worker, dressmaker, factory worker, farmer, cook, trader or cleaner. Compared with other respondents, of those here fewer (68%) than in other groups knew at least some English. In practice, almost no one planned (1%) or wanted (2%) to return back to their countries of origin. Many (90%), however, expressed a desire to work in the EU, and over two out of three (70%) saw one's future positively.

Respondents' answers to the open question about the best aspect of living in Lesvos provided a critical picture of the situation there. Of all respondents, three out of four (74%) gave an answer. One out of three (30%) responded, "Nothing"

(i.e. that there was nothing that could be considered as the best aspect in Lesvos). Also, the second most common answer (10% of all respondents and 13% of those who responded to this question) said “leaving Lesvos” was the best aspect. Very few mentioned truly positive aspects in Lesvos; these were usually related to the everyday life there (Table 4.12).

Table 4.12. Respondents' best aspect of life in Lesvos (multiple answers).

	Share of answered (%)	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	74	Nothing 31	Leaving Lesvos 16	Many activities 11
Woman	74	Nothing 29	Other 14	Being with family 13
15–18 years old	73	Nothing 46	Many activities 10	Complaints 8
19–29 years old	75	Nothing 24	Leaving Lesvos 17	Many activities 12
30–39 years old	75	Nothing 27	Leaving Lesvos 14	Safety 12
40–49 years old	80	Nothing 31	Leaving Lesvos 17	Safety 14, Different activities 14
50+ years old	65	Nothing 36	Safety 18	Many activities 18
Urban background	74	Nothing 27	Leaving Lesvos 16	Safety 13
Rural background	76	Nothing 30	Leaving Lesvos 18	Many activities 9
University education	74	Nothing 18	Leaving Lesvos 16	Many activities 15
Without university education	76	Nothing 35	Leaving Lesvos 13	Many activities 10
Afghan	83	Nothing 41	Many activities 14	Complaints 9
Syrian	77	Leaving Lesvos 50	Safety 11	Nothing 11
Somali	53	Complaints 26	Future 19	Basic needs 19
Other	68	Nothing 23	Safety 21	Many activities 12
Moria	73	Nothing 31	Leaving Lesvos 15	Many activities 10
Kara Tepe	77	Nothing 30	Many activities 17	Safety 10
Other sites	86	Leaving Lesvos 25	Nothing 25	Safety 17, Future 17, People 17
–2 months	82	Nothing 34	Leaving Lesvos 16	Safety 11
3–10 months	85	Nothing 28	Many activities 16	Safety 10, Leaving Lesvos 10
over 10 months	75	Nothing 26	Future 12	Other 12
Total	74	Nothing 30	Leaving Lesvos 14	Many activities 11

Despite the challenges the respondents encountered in their journeys to Lesvos and in everyday life in Lesvos, more than two out of three (70%) respondents who responded to this question (or 56% of all respondents, including also those who did not answer) agreed that they see their future positively (Table 4.13). This share was constant among all respondent subgroups, except for the oldest (more than 60 years old) respondents (of them, 45%), and the youngest respondents (15–18 years old), of whom less than three out of five (57%) agreed that they see their future positively. However, many among them also did not know how to answer this. Almost four out of five (78%) respondents who are not Afghan, Syrian or Somali regarded their future positively. This share was higher than that among respondents from these three nations. The highest proportion of those who disagreed to seeing their future positively was the Somalis (18%).

Table 4.13. Respondents seeing the future positively (%).

	Agree %	Don't know %	Disagree %	N	Answered to question (%)
Man	70	21	9	385	80
Woman	70	21	9	99	76
15–18 years old	57	27	16	93	81
19–29 years old	73	19	8	240	81
30–39 years old	73	20	7	112	83
40–49 years old	76	16	8	38	84
50+ years old	45	44	11	9	53
Urban background	72	20	8	228	79
Rural background	62	24	14	152	83
University education	70	19	11	120	81
No university education	69	21	10	357	80
Afghan	70	24	6	263	84
Syrian	67	22	11	93	83
Somali	66	16	18	44	76
Other	78	10	12	69	71
Moria	70	20	10	384	80
Kara Tepe	67	25	8	101	79
Other sites	69	16	15	13	93
Total	70	21	9	498	80

4.4 Respondents' migration aspirations and plans

All respondents stated that Lesvos was only a mid-term stage on their asylum-related journey. This location inside the EU allows them to ask for asylum and later gain a residence permit in Greece or in other EU member states if they fulfil the criteria. However, migrants wanted to continue farther into the EU and not remain in Greece, and especially in Lesvos. Kuschminder (2018) discussed how the intended destination of (Afghan) migrants pushed them farther and not remain in Greece if it was not their initial destination country. She illustrated that the less time the migrant had been in Greece, the more likely she or he planned to move onwards. Despite the long and complex asylum process it is not known if they would receive the residence permit based on international protection, subsidiary protection, family reunification or on other grounds – or if they are rejected.

Germany was the most aspired migration destination among the respondents (Table 4.14). When asked an open question about their most preferred place to live, one out of three (32%) respondents who answered mentioned Germany. When asked to indicate their agreement with the statement “Germany is the most preferred country for me in Europe”, almost half (47%) of the respondents agreed with it, one out of four (25%) did not know how to answer and slightly over one out of four (28%) disagreed with the statement Table 4.14). These numbers about Germany were very similar to those of asylum-related migrant respondents in Lesvos in 2016 (49% agreed, 21% did not know and 30% disagreed; Jauhainen 2017). Germany is an important migration destination for Afghans

and Syrians; many of them aspire to reach it during their journey to the EU and while migrating in the EU (Dimitriadi 2018; Kuschminder 2018). Our interviews revealed that many respondents had family or friends in Germany, so many migrants aspired to join them in Germany.

Nevertheless, a substantial number of asylum-related migrants could not express exactly where they would prefer to live, just as long as they were inside the EU or in another welfare country such as Canada. Therefore, “Germany” can also be an expression for any destination providing the qualities the migrants are looking for. There were migrants who could not identify any difference between, for example, the Netherlands and Austria when posed the following sample questions: Is the climate the same in these countries? Are the people friendly there? Is it easy to find employment there? Where are these countries actually located in Europe? Finland and Canada were mentioned also relatively often as preferred places to live. Mallett and Hagen-Zanker (2018) observed that asylum-related migrants’ journeys are the product of a contextual and subjective decision-making process and deeply transformative phenomenon. These guide their perceptions and choices regarding destination and trajectories.

Further, Finland most likely got a ‘boost’ because in the survey, it was written that the study was conducted by a university in Finland and the persons conducting the survey in Lesvos were living in Finland. In fact, Finland was the most preferred place to live among Somali respondents. Somalis have been a refugee community in Finland since the 1990s, and a relatively large one compared with other refugee groups in the country. In a separate statement asked in the survey, the majority of respondents (56%) agreed that “Finland is a country in which I might seek a resident permit”. However, almost a third (30%) did not know how to answer it, and one out of seven (14%) disagreed with the statement (Table 4.14). Many respondents considered Finland a possible destination option, but there was still a very large group of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos who did not even consider it. The Netherlands was mentioned as the most preferred country among Syrian respondents. In the interviews, many Syrians stated that they had received information that it is not easy anymore to find employment in Germany. Seven out of eight (88%) respondents agreed that they would like to work in Europe. That proportion was lower (75%) only among the youngest group (15–18 years old), some of whom indicated that they would like to study there (as well).

Very few (4%) of the respondents planned to return for sure to their countries of origin (Table 4.15). This low percentage is understandable as the respondents only recently reached their first target along their journey, namely the EU, and they do not know yet what their lives will be like in the future. The majority (56%) of Somalis were planning (12% for sure and 44% maybe) to return to their country of origin. However, this proportion was much lower among other sub-Saharan respondents (0% for sure, 19% maybe) as well as other ethnic subgroups:

one out of seven (14%) of Afghans (1% for sure, 13% maybe), one out of four (24%) Syrians (6% for sure and 18% maybe) and less than one out of five (18%) among respondents from other nations (4% for sure and 14% maybe).

Returning to the country of origin is very complex, but it can also be used as a strategy to move forward in their lives, as Van Houte (2017) illustrated in a study about Afghans' return migration from Europe. Very few (4%) respondents in Lesvos planned to return to their countries of origin; most of these were men (84%) and young adults (87%). Half (48%) were, at one point, pupils or students, and one out of three had been employed in occupations such as being a journalist, salesperson, cook, shop owner, hairdresser, ICT worker or sculptor. Two out of three (65%) spent less than one year for their journey to Lesvos, and slightly more (71%) were employed during it. Of those respondents planning to return, one out of three (32%) indicated an actual desire to return, and for many, the return would be something that they would not wish to accomplish. Many did not see their future positively. All those who stated that their migration destination is Europe also expressed a desire to work there. In Lesvos, these people spent their time doing miscellaneous activities (29%), studying (21%) or just hanging around (21%).

The general situation among asylum-related migrants' viewpoints on returning has remained practically the same between 2016 and 2019 (see Jauhainen 2017). In 2016, 6% of respondents stated they would like to return and 5% planned to return, whereas this was 7% and 4% in 2019, respectively. However, a major change had taken place in the Kara Tepe centre; in 2016, 18% planned to return, but by 2019, this share had almost disappeared (3%).

Table 4.14. Respondents' most preferred places to live (of those responded, multiple choice).

	Most preferred (%)	Second most preferred (%)	Third most preferred (%)	N
Man	Germany 30	Finland 17	Canada 12	370
Woman	Germany 37	Canada 17	Switzerland 8	97
15–18 years old	Germany 35	Canada 11	Finland 10	88
19–29 years old	Germany 29	Finland 16	Canada 14	229
30–39 years old	Germany 31	Finland 16	Any country 13	102
40–49 years old	Germany 31	Canada 20	Finland 20	35
50+ years old	Germany 57	Canada 29	Finland 7, Netherlands 7	14
Urban background	Germany 29	Finland 14	Netherlands 12	217
Rural background	Germany 35	Finland 26	Canada 26	145
University education	Germany 25	Finland 18	Any country 13	120
No university education	Germany 35	Canada 14	Finland 14	342
Afghan	Germany 40	Canada 14	Finland 13	260
Syrian	Netherlands 36	Germany 21	UK 12	84
Somali	Finland 33	Germany 17	France 11, Canada 11	36
Other	Germany 25	Finland 17	Canada 16	77
Moria	Germany 28	Finland 14	Netherlands 12	373
Kara Tepe	Germany 45	Canada 20	Finland 19	95
Other sites	Germany 42	Finland 17	Any country 17	12
Total	Germany 32	Finland 15	Canada 13	480

Table 4.15. Migration aspirations in life of respondents in Lesvos (%).

	Germany				Finland				Plan to return to home country				Would like to work in Europe			
	Agr	Mb	Dis	N	Agr	Mb	Dis	N	Yes	Mb	No	N	Agr	Mb	Dis	N
Man	46	24	30	390	60	27	13	392	4	17	79	469	88	7	5	394
Woman	54	27	19	98	38	44	18	99	3	16	81	128	85	11	4	101
15–18 years old	52	20	28	98	52	36	12	98	4	14	82	92	76	11	13	97
19–29 years old	47	28	25	232	53	34	13	239	5	20	75	293	90	7	3	243
30–39 years old	42	28	30	114	64	24	12	113	1	14	85	133	91	7	2	115
40–49 years old	46	16	38	37	61	21	18	38	2	14	84	43	89	8	3	36
50+ years old	64	18	18	11	55	18	27	11	0	20	80	15	100	0	0	11
Urban background	42	30	28	235	56	30	14	232	4	17	79	285	90	8	2	239
Rural background	51	23	26	150	52	35	13	152	3	23	74	180	86	8	6	152
University education	40	33	27	120	60	32	8	120	6	22	72	145	92	6	2	126
No university education	49	23	28	358	55	30	15	362	4	15	81	438	85	9	6	362
Afghan	53	23	24	270	51	36	13	270	1	13	86	308	84	10	6	274
Syrian	40	25	35	95	51	31	18	94	6	18	76	110	91	6	3	94
Somali	46	34	20	41	70	23	7	43	12	44	44	57	93	7	0	43
Other	29	29	42	66	68	19	13	68	4	14	82	97	90	6	4	71
Moria	46	25	29	387	56	30	14	386	4	17	78	473	87	8	5	392
Kara Tepe	54	27	19	103	55	36	9	106	3	14	83	125	89	8	3	105
Other sites	36	9	55	11	62	15	23	13	7	21	72	14	83	8	9	12
Total	47	25	28	501	56	30	14	505	4	17	79	612	88	8	4	509

Agr = agree; Dk = don't know; Dis = disagree; N = number of respondents; Mb = maybe; Germany = My most wished destination in Europe is Germany; Finland = Finland is maybe a country to seek residence permit for me; Plan to return = Do you plan to return to your country of origin?; Would like to work = I would like to work in Europe.

The respondents also mentioned a country where they would like to be in three years (i.e. in 2022) and what they would like to do there. From nearly half to two out of three respondents mentioned that they would like to work in that country (Table 4.16). The only exception was Canada; more respondents wanted to study (41%) than work (30%) there. In general, out of ten respondents, seven to eight wanted to work or study in their preferred destination country so they could make an active contribution to the society there.

Table 4.16. Respondents desiring to move in three years and having activities in that country.

	Work	Study	Better life	Live in peace	Other	N
Germany	48%	29%	11%	6%	6%	135
Finland	58%	24%	9%	9%	0%	58
Netherlands	59%	23%	8%	0%	10%	39
United Kingdom	50%	32%	0%	0%	18%	22
Greece	68%	26%	0%	0%	6%	19
Canada	30%	41%	7%	11%	11%	27

4.5 Respondents' Internet and social media use

The Internet and social media are integral parts of life for most asylum-related migrants in their countries of origin when preparing for their asylum-related journey, during the journey regardless at which stage and in their final destinations (Frouw et al. 2016; Gillespie et al. 2016; Dekker et al. 2018). Asylum-related migrants may use of the Internet and social media differently among themselves, but in general, the digital divide (access, use and impact of the Internet and social media) narrows along the asylum-related journey, especially when the migrants become more stable in the locations they are staying at (Merisalo & Jauhiainen 2019).

Five out of six respondents (85%) had used the Internet in their countries of origin, and seven out of eight (88%) used it during their journey to Lesbos (Table 4.17). One out of seven (15%) never used the Internet in their countries of origin. This percentage of 15% was the same in Lesbos and slightly lower (12%) during the asylum-related journey to Lesbos. There was variation among the respondents on how frequently they used the Internet. One out of five (21%) Afghans and one out of six (17%) Syrians never used the Internet in their countries of origin, whereas only 3% of Somali respondents and 4% of those from other nations stated they had never used it in their countries of origin. In comparing Internet use during the journey and before leaving the country of origin, more Afghans (79% vs. 86%) and Syrians (83% vs. 93%) used the Internet during their asylum-related journey to Lesbos. However, among Somali migrants and those from other nations using Internet during their journeys versus before even leaving the country of origin, the number of Internet users declined (Somali: 97% vs. 88%; other nations: 95% vs. 90%). Comparing those with university education to those without, more respondents with a higher education background were Internet users in the country of origin (92% vs. 82%) and during the journey (93% vs. 86%). Among those who came to Lesbos rather quickly (within one month from departing the country of origin), 14% did not use the Internet compared to the 12% who spent more than half a year travelling on their journey.

In Lesbos, the patterns of Internet use changed depending on the migrants' situation. For instance, the number of Internet non-users clearly declined among some subgroups: 16% to 12% for those 30–39 years old, 16% to 9% for those 40–49 years old, 17% to 13% for the Syrian subgroup and 21% to 17% for the Afghan subgroup. That being said, demographic or ethnic background is not a clear factor, but the length of stay in Lesbos is. Among those who had spent less than two months in Lesbos, one out of six (16%) were Internet non-users, whereas everyone who had spent more than two years in Lesbos used the Internet. This also explains the difference among Internet users in Moria (84%) and Kara Tepe (93%) – migrants are usually moved to the latter after spending some time in the Moria centre. Those asylum-related migrants living in other sites in Lesbos were a divided group: One out of five (21%) did not use the Internet at all, but more than two out of five (43%) used it every day.

Table 4.17. Internet use of respondents (%).

	In home country					During journey					In Lesvos				
	Daily	Weekly	Less	Never	N	D	W	L	No	N	D	W	L	No	N
Man	36	21	28	15	463	26	28	35	11	463	25	25	38	12	417
Woman	32	19	35	14	125	23	20	41	16	128	20	18	38	24	114
15–18 years old	37	16	30	17	112	23	22	39	16	111	21	17	42	20	94
19–29 years old	35	22	30	13	291	28	25	36	11	289	25	22	39	14	269
30–39 years old	35	21	28	16	130	25	31	36	8	132	24	34	30	12	115
40–49 years old	30	19	35	16	43	14	35	39	12	43	28	26	37	9	43
50+ years old	39	8	38	15	13	31	7	31	31	16	8	17	50	25	12
Urban background	38	20	28	14	280	27	28	33	12	282	24	26	37	13	251
Rural background	36	24	28	12	178	28	29	36	7	176	30	24	33	13	162
University education	48	22	22	8	142	36	26	31	7	146	29	28	30	13	134
No university education	30	20	32	18	434	21	27	38	14	429	20	23	42	15	388
Afghan	30	16	33	21	303	21	23	42	14	309	16	22	45	17	279
Syrian	40	28	15	17	107	35	34	24	7	109	37	30	20	13	95
Somali	43	16	38	3	58	25	15	48	12	52	25	12	49	14	49
Other	38	32	25	5	95	31	32	27	10	96	30	29	30	11	87
Moria	36	21	29	14	467	26	28	35	11	466	22	24	38	16	420
Karatepe	29	16	33	22	121	24	19	42	15	125	28	27	38	7	111
Other sites	36	29	21	14	14	7	14	43	36	14	43	0	36	21	14
journey –1 month	47	17	23	13	64	34	20	32	14	65	20	16	40	24	63
2–6 months	38	24	28	10	128	23	30	41	6	128	27	31	33	9	128
7–12 months	28	28	26	18	39	23	21	36	20	39	20	23	37	20	40
13–24 months	36	25	31	8	36	24	54	22	0	37	38	29	27	6	34
25+ months	31	19	25	25	101	26	31	30	13	104	20	20	45	15	103
stay in Lesvos –2m	37	22	29	12	277	26	31	35	8	281	21	21	42	16	277
3–5 months	41	18	30	11	125	28	24	35	13	127	20	29	40	11	126
6–10 months	28	17	28	27	36	20	19	39	22	36	19	28	25	28	36
Since 2018	31	26	25	18	39	17	24	47	12	42	33	26	28	13	39
2017 and earlier	29	21	36	14	14	20	27	33	20	15	65	21	14	0	14
Total	35	20	30	15	602	25	26	37	12	605	23	24	38	15	545

In general, the proportion of everyday Internet users declined by 12 per cent units among asylum-related migrants (Table 4.18). The share of everyday Internet users in Lesvos was lower compared with the country of origin until the respondent had been in Lesvos for about one year. Among those who had been in Lesvos since 2018 (i.e. 10–22 months), the everyday Internet users were more than in the country of origin. In general, the proportion of non-Internet users remained the same when comparing all respondents in the country of origin with those in Lesvos. However, among female respondents, the share of non-Internet users increased in Lesvos compared that with the country of origin (from 14% to 24%). Among all respondents, the share of non-Internet users grew in the first two months in Lesvos (compared with those in the country of origin). Within 3–5 months in Lesvos, the share of non-users was the same, but this share decreased after staying in Lesvos more than 5 months until gradually everyone

became Internet users. At least regarding the first and second digital divide, namely the access and use of the Internet, the digital divides might grow initially while in Lesvos, but they soon began to disappear afterwards.

One out of nine respondents (11%) stated they had used the Internet daily in their countries of origin and were using it daily in Lesvos. At the other end, one out of twenty-five (4%) respondents had not used the Internet in the countries of origin and were not using it at all in Lesvos. Comparing these two groups together, the daily Internet users originated more often from cities and had higher education levels than respondents who never used the Internet. The daily Internet users, as a rule, had mobile phones with Internet access in Lesvos, compared with one out of three (32%) who never used the Internet. Compared with the non-Internet users, more of the daily users (43% vs. 16%) had left their home country quite recently and a larger share of them (42% vs. 13%) had learned something useful in Lesvos, usually concrete skills such as work skills. Compared with the non-Internet users, the daily users were more socially oriented as they tended more often to make friends both during their journeys to Lesvos (85% vs. 63%) and while in Lesvos (69% vs. 56%). None of those who had never used the Internet considered returning back to their countries of origin, whereas 6% of the daily Internet users considered doing so.

Table 4.18. Change in the frequency of Internet use between country of origin and Lesvos (%).

Internet use	Every day	Many times a week	Less frequently	Never
Man	-11	+4	+10	-3
Woman	-12	-1	+3	+10
15–18 years old	-16	+1	+12	-3
19–29 years old	-10	0	+9	+1
30–39 years old.	-11	+13	+2	-4
40–49 years old	-2	+7	+2	-7
50+ years old	-31	+9	+12	+10
Urban background	-14	+6	+9	-1
Rural background	-6	0	+5	+1
University education	-19	+6	+8	+5
No university education	-10	+3	+10	-3
Afghan	-14	+6	+12	-4
Syrian	-3	+2	+5	-4
Somali	-18	-4	+11	+11
Other	-8	-3	+5	+6
Moria	-14	+3	+9	+2
Kara Tepe	-1	+11	+5	-15
Other sites	+7	-29	+15	+7
stay in Lesvos –2	-16	-1	+13	+4
3–5 months	-21	+11	+10	0
6–10 months	-9	+11	-3	+1
Since 2018	+2	0	+3	-5
2017 and earlier	+36	0	-22	-14
Total	-12	+4	+8	0

The respondents used the Internet for various purposes (Table 4.19). In general, the more frequently the respondent used the Internet, the more s/he used it for various purposes. In terms of all asked Internet-use topics, the proportion of daily Internet users was higher compared with those who used the Internet less frequently. Two out of three daily Internet users used it to research the places they wanted to live in Europe (68%) or rights in Europe (67%), whereas these proportions were slightly lower among those who used the Internet many times a week (59% and 67%) and clearly lower among those who used the Internet less often (47% and 56%).

Among these three groups based on Internet-use frequency, the differences were smaller in searching for work opportunities (72% vs. 65% vs. 62%) and travel routes in Europe (62% vs. 56% vs. 53%). The less frequent Internet users used it more commonly for functional purposes such as to search for work or find travel routes. Afghans, in general, did not use the Internet frequently to the topics asked. However, among them, the number of people not knowing how to answer was very high.

Asylum-related migrants used the Internet more to research possible activities in Europe than to follow the current situation in their countries of origin. Internet use thus leaned more towards preparing for their future than following the past. The Internet users among Syrian respondents comprised the largest subgroup to agree to whether they follow the situation in their country of origin. Almost two out of three (62%) Syrians agreed and substantially fewer Syrians (11%) disagreed with the statement that they use the Internet to follow what was taking place in Syria. Of the rest of the ethnic groups, a minority agreed that they follow the current situation in their countries of origin via the Internet (29% of Afghans, 49% of Somalis and 46% of those from other nations agreed).

Compared with men, fewer Internet-using female respondents used the Internet to search for work opportunities in Europe (54% vs. 64%) and about rights in Europe (52% vs. 60%), whereas there was a minor gender difference among female and male Internet users who followed the current situation in their countries of origin (39% vs. 41%). More respondents in Moria (43%) followed the current situation in their countries of origin than those in Kara Tepe (36%). The longer a respondent stays in Lesvos, the more likely s/he uses the Internet to know about European-related issues.

Asylum-related migrants used different social media platforms (Table 4.20). Of the respondents using the Internet very frequently (every day or many times a week), a large share also used various social media platforms. WhatsApp was the most common social media application used by the respondents. More than half (53%) of all respondents, two out of three (66%) of those who used the Internet and more than three out of four Syrians and very frequent Internet users utilized WhatsApp.

The respondents used other social media platforms less. Facebook was used by two out of five (40%) of all respondents and half (50%) of those using the Internet.

Of all respondents, 26% used Instagram and 25% used YouTube (whereas these percentages were 31% for both platforms among Internet users). Only a few respondents generally used Viber (7% of all respondents and 8% of Internet users), Snapchat (5% of both all and Internet users) and Twitter (5% of all and 6% of the Internet users).

Of all respondents, one out of eight (12%) used multiple social media platforms (i.e. they used WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram). Of them, eight out of nine (91%) were men, more than two out of three (70%) were less than 30 years old, eight out of nine (91%) knew English and a third (34%) had attended university. On the other hand, one out of twelve (8%) respondents used the Internet but did not use any social media. Of them, almost three out of four (73%) were less than 30 years old. Comparing them with the multiple social media users, much more were women (31% vs. 9%) or did not know English at all (27% vs. 11%), and much fewer (53% vs. 82%) had a mobile phone with Internet access. The multiple social media users tended to be more social than the non-social media users. That is, a larger percentage of them found friends during the journey to Lesbos (90% vs. 67%) and in Lesbos (80% vs. 66%). Compared with single social media users, more multiple social media users were employed during the journey (69% vs. 34%) and a higher share wanted to be employed in Europe (92% vs. 84%), however, this is related also to the higher share of men among the multiple social media users.

Table 4.20. Respondents' use of social media platforms in Lesbos (all respondent and Internet users, %).

	WhatsApp		Facebook		Instagram		Viber		YouTube	
	all	Int. users	all	Int. users	all	Int. users	all	Int. users	all	Int. users
Man	54	65	46	55	28	34	8	9	27	33
Woman	52	69	20	29	16	22	4	5	15	22
15–18 years old	41	52	32	40	36	44	9	11	23	27
19–29 years old	56	67	43	51	26	32	5	6	29	36
30–39 years old	59	73	42	53	19	25	7	7	19	24
40–49 years old	60	67	40	46	13	15	16	15	22	26
50+ years old	41	67	47	78	24	33	6	11	18	33
Urban background	55	68	43	54	23	29	5	6	26	32
Rural background	58	69	39	47	24	29	9	10	27	33
University education	56	70	49	60	29	35	9	10	31	38
No university education	53	65	36	45	25	31	6	7	24	30
Afghan	47	58	35	41	31	37	10	11	25	31
Syrian	77	94	44	58	17	22	5	5	30	39
Somali	45	60	48	64	12	17	2	2	17	24
Other	57	66	53	62	27	33	5	5	30	34
Moria	52	65	39	49	25	31	7	8	23	29
Kara Tepe	55	66	41	51	27	32	6	7	28	34
Other sites	79	82	57	64	36	36	21	18	57	64
Every day use in Lesbos	76	76	60	60	44	44	9	9	43	43
Many times weekly	81	81	52	52	35	35	9	9	35	35
Less frequently	51	51	41	41	22	22	6	6	21	21
Total	53	66	40	50	26	31	7	8	25	31

Social media can play different roles and functions in the lives of asylum-related migrants. It can be used for social networking; receiving and sharing information about asylum processes, routes to Europe and situations with family and friends at home or elsewhere; or just spending free time (Merisalo & Jauhiainen 2020).

For nearly half (48%) of the respondents, information and interaction on social media were important in making their decision to come to the EU. Although there was not much difference regarding this between men and women, fewer women than men (13% vs. 21%) disagreed with this statement. For the majority of the middle-aged or older respondents, social media was important in deciding to come to the EU. More Syrian respondents (56%) than Afghans (46%), Somalis (37%) or those from other nations (49%) agreed that social media had an important role in deciding to come to the EU.

Social media was also important for many asylum-related migrants during their journey to Lesbos: Three out of five (60%) respondents argued so. The importance of social media grew along with the age of respondents; about half (52%) of the youngest (15–18 years old) respondents and over four out of five (82%) of the oldest respondents agreed. Although, in general, younger populations tend to be more active users of social media, in Lesbos fewer younger migrants had mobile phones with Internet access; thus, their access to social media was more limited, resulting in lower importance of social media for them. During the journey, social media was important for 79% of Syrians, compared with 56% of Afghans, 45% of Somalis and 62% of respondents from other nations.

Social media also played a role in the everyday life of many asylum-related migrants in Lesbos (Table 4.21; Table 4.22). More than two out of five (43%) respondents agreed that social media makes life easier in Lesbos. There was practically no difference between men (43%) and women (42%) on this. For half (51%) of the respondents, social media was an important medium in deciding where to move in the EU. This percentage was slightly higher among men (52%) than in women (48%). A larger share of the older age-group respondents claimed that social media was important for their migration decision-making to the EU.

Table 4.21. Social media in the everyday lives of respondents (%).

	Life easier				To come to EU				Where to move				Important dr. journey			
	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N
Man	43	21	36	380	46	33	21	343	52	33	15	379	60	23	17	366
Woman	42	21	37	94	49	38	13	102	48	33	19	95	59	31	10	97
15–18 years old	33	22	45	89	48	37	15	84	36	47	17	93	52	32	16	86
19–29 years old	41	23	36	236	42	38	20	225	53	32	15	232	58	26	16	227
30–39 years old	49	22	29	106	57	24	19	95	56	30	14	109	65	23	12	106
40–49 years old	66	13	21	38	54	26	20	35	60	24	16	38	68	21	11	38
50+ years old	50	20	30	10	73	9	18	11	60	20	20	10	82	0	18	11
Urban background	43	24	33	233	43	37	20	215	53	27	20	228	60	25	15	220
Rural background	40	24	36	143	51	31	18	139	51	39	10	152	56	30	14	145
University education	48	20	32	120	50	22	28	116	57	30	13	117	58	25	17	111
No university education	41	22	37	127	46	38	16	319	49	35	16	349	61	25	14	342
Afghan	39	18	43	247	46	37	17	229	46	40	14	254	56	30	14	241
Syrian	47	39	14	94	56	25	19	87	64	28	8	96	79	17	4	90
Somali	33	21	46	48	37	28	35	46	39	22	39	41	45	24	31	42
Other	60	10	30	67	49	31	20	69	66	21	13	70	62	19	19	74
Moria	41	22	37	380	49	33	18	351	52	33	15	378	61	24	15	362
Karatepe	52	22	26	94	44	34	22	92	48	37	15	96	57	29	14	100
Other sites	46	9	45	11	33	25	42	12	39	23	38	13	50	17	33	12
Daily Internet use at CoO&Les	61	18	21	51	67	13	20	54	57	27	16	51	75	13	12	56
Weekly use of Internet at CoO&Les	44	24	32	55	37	39	24	51	58	36	06	53	66	23	11	53
Less use of Internet at CoO&Les	40	15	45	95	45	38	17	89	41	38	21	91	53	26	21	93
Not use of Internet at CoO & Les	25	15	60	20	20	65	15	20	32	41	27	22	40	35	25	20
Total	43	22	35	140	48	33	19	455	51	34	15	487	60	25	15	474

Agr = agree; Dk = don't know; Dis = disagree; N = number of respondents; CoO = country of origin; Les = Lesvos; Life easier = In Lesvos, the use of Internet and/or social media makes my life easier; To come to EU = Information and interaction in social media facilitated my decision to come to Europe; Where to move = Information and interaction in social media facilitates my decision regarding where I will move in Europe; Important dr. journey = During my journey to Europe, the use of social media was important for me

Table 4.22. Social media in the lives of Internet-using respondents (%).

	Life easier*				To come to EU**				Where to move*				Important dr. journey***			
	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N	Agr	Dk	Dis	N
Man	46	19	35	312	46	32	22	293	55	32	13	310	62	22	16	327
Woman	48	21	31	68	49	38	13	87	57	25	18	68	65	29	6	84
15–18 years old	37	19	44	63	47	36	17	72	41	47	12	64	55	29	16	74
19–29 years old	44	22	34	197	40	38	22	194	57	29	14	192	61	25	14	206
30–39 years old	54	19	27	85	56	22	22	78	60	28	12	87	66	21	13	100
40–49 years old	65	15	20	34	60	27	13	30	62	21	17	34	75	16	9	32
50+ years old	43	14	43	7	67	11	22	9	71	15	14	7	83	0	17	6
Urban background	46	20	34	188	41	37	22	184	57	25	18	183	64	22	14	193
Rural background	45	23	32	119	51	30	19	120	55	36	9	123	55	31	14	135
University education	49	19	32	99	47	24	29	106	62	26	12	98	59	24	17	102
No university education	45	20	35	273	46	37	17	263	52	34	14	273	64	23	13	301
Afghan	43	17	40	196	45	37	18	185	51	37	12	200	59	28	13	209
Syrian	55	32	13	75	55	23	22	73	67	25	8	76	80	15	5	85
Somali	36	18	46	39	39	27	34	44	40	24	36	33	54	23	23	35
Other	60	10	30	58	50	30	20	66	70	18	12	60	63	17	20	70
Moria	44	20	36	302	48	33	19	306	56	31	13	296	64	23	13	329
Karatepe	57	22	21	81	46	31	23	70	52	33	15	82	60	26	14	86
Other sites	50	0	50	8	30	30	40	10	50	20	30	10	29	28	43	7
Total	47	20	33	391	47	33	20	386	55	31	14	388	63	23	14	422

Agr = agree; Dk = don't know; Dis = disagree; N = number of respondents; CoO = country of origin; Les = Lesvos; Life easier = In Lesvos, the use of Internet and/or social media makes my life easier; To come to EU = Information and interaction in social media facilitated my decision to come to Europe; Where to move = Information and interaction in social media facilitates my decision regarding where I will move in Europe; Important dr. journey = During my journey to Europe, the use of social media was important for me.

* = answered by those who used the Internet in Lesvos; ** = answered by those who used the Internet in the home country; *** = answered by those who used the Internet during the journey

4.6 Respondents' voices and agencies in Lesvos

As discussed in Section 3.2, asylum-related migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are often portrayed as passive and voiceless recipients of assistance on the margins of human life. It is commonly stated that due to forced migration, they lack a home; nation and citizenship; and proper agency, voice and face (Turner 2016). However, the reception centres for asylum-related migrants (i.e. 'camps') can also be sites of agency, resistance, solidarity and new political identity (Martin et al. 2019). Asylum-related migrants are distant from their previous structures and lack normalized connectedness to new structures. According to Ghorashi et al. (2018), these migrants may not only enable the migrants' reflection and imagination but also provide alternative forms of agency, such as delayed agency and agency from marginal positions, making these sites meaningful for them (see also Triandafyllidou 2017).

During their refugee journeys, these migrants engage into a constant negotiation of identities imposed on them by the mass media and governmental authorities. In Lesvos, one respondent claimed that he did not possess any dis-

tinct identity anymore: “I do not have an identity to start my life”. The migrants were refused to be active, equal participants in events affecting their well-being. However, migrants participated in the improvement of their lives even during tough times of seeking refuge. They created coping strategies to tackle the difficulties of finding refuge through learning, employment and networks.

Emergency situations and the migrants’ practices tend to deny a promising future for asylum-related migrants (Ramadan 2013; Anderson et al. 2019). Trapped in an ongoing but slow emergency, the interviewees in Lesvos expressed dissatisfaction with their current situation. For instance, one interviewee said, “We have no security in Lesvos. The police ignore migrants who are fighting. During the last days, some migrants have been killed, but the police and the government of Greece ignored this problem. I would like to have a comfortable life, [for] which there is no possibility in Greece. Living in Afghanistan is better than [in] Greece”. Another respondent claimed, “We have many limitations here. The camp is like a prison. We migrated to Europe because of the war and miserable life in Afghanistan. We expect[ed] to have a comfortable life in Europe”.

Legal constraints originating from supranational- to local-level authorities were mentioned as the main barrier to normalizing the life of migrants in Lesvos. The EU legislation, the Greek government and local police were often held responsible for restrictions, poor living conditions and unresolved problems in Lesvos. Difficulties related to their own legal status were mentioned as the main constraints to interviewees obtaining their life goals. The respondents specified that “European policies”, “unclear asylum status”, “rejection by European countries”, “restrictive rules”, “official papers”, “closing the borders”, “Greek government” and “lack of freedom” prevented them from employment, family reunion and proper education. In fact, the government of Greece was framed as the one main restricting authority for ignoring the piled-up problems inside and outside the reception centres and the slow asylum process in Lesvos. The migrants evaluated the actions of the Greek government in comparison to other actors. One interviewee stated, “In Lesvos we have no facilities to study or learn the native language, and Greek people do not behave friendly with migrants. We are supported by Germany, the Netherlands, the United States and other countries, but we receive no support from the government of Greece”.

Moreover, inequalities in the treatment of the migrants, as well as ethnic and racial injustice in the asylum process, caused frequent frustration for them. Calling for equality, one interviewee stated that “we are all human and should be equally treated”. Another respondent mentioned universal human rights, saying, “I have had many difficulties in my life. I only like to have human rights and freedom, and achieve my goals”. As Turner (2015) pointed out, it is important that asylum-related migrants imagine a meaningful future for themselves. Imagining a meaningful future is also a way to build a new world

replacing the destructed one these migrants have experienced (see Singh 2020).

As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 4.2, the search for security and protection was the main motivation to migrate to Europe. Nevertheless, the migrants found themselves trapped in a constant state of insecurity, even after having crossed the EU border. One interviewee claimed, “In Lesbos, we have no security and we [are] afraid to be in danger. The cost of living in Lesbos is getting expensive. There is no[t] enough food”. The migrants’ vulnerability to slow emergencies was experienced every day. Having heard prior to migration a lot about equality in European countries, the migrants found themselves the subjects of unequal treatment. One interviewee provided an example, “The doctor is not good. He always gives us some tablet[s], which is not helpful to reduce the pain, or tells us, ‘If you drink some water, you will feel better’”. Another refugee supported this claim, “There is racism in Lesbos, and there is no sufficient support for migrants. Migrants who are living in Lesbos do not have a clear future. Some of the migrants are sick, but there are no health services for them”. As noted from the above-mentioned statements, some interviewees complained about the hostility of locals, racism or favouritism existing within the asylum system. One noticed the following: “Only one thing makes me sad and that is discrimination between nationalities in Lesbos. Arabic and African asylums [asylum seekers] are in priority, and they ignore Afghans. I wonder [if] even in Europe there is discrimination between nationalities”.

As evidenced above, asylum-related migrants often experienced hostility from the police and other local government forces. Moreover, migrants often interpreted the lack of political action as unwillingness to help them. Nevertheless, they actively protested against these behaviours that reduced them to a ‘bare life’ (see Agamben 1998) and to the biogeopolitical mass. The conditions in the reception centres, especially in Moria; the slow and convoluted asylum-seeking process; and the conflicts inside the centres were always considered problems requiring resolutions. In the migrants’ active demands, these were contested against, as we observed during our study in November 2019. Furthermore, in the mundane everyday life practices, asylum-related migrants were able to transform (partially) the top-down (un)organized environment around them into more habitable spaces as visible expressions of human life: by the fireplaces, small kiosks, small public spaces between tents, and other ways of personalization of their environment (see Singh 2020).

The authorities expected that asylum-related migrants would not make political claims. If they did, they would be considered illegitimate political actors (Turner 2016). However, in Lesbos, the migrants did not lack political opinions. They needed to and did evaluate political decisions that would impact their current and future lives. Their migration decisions were political actions indicating

countries and places they did not want to live in and other places and countries they aspired migrating to. The Lesvos survey's open questions and the face-to-face interviews confirmed a multitude of political opinions among the migrants. They evaluated the situation in Greece, the EU, as well as back in their (former) home countries. They also called for action or suggested necessary political involvement in asylum-related matters – speaking and acting for themselves. Having access to the Internet, migrants followed local and global news. They formed their political opinions based on their own experiences, social media and mass media. Many were sure that the stories about them were not told or were being told incorrectly, or as one respondent summarized it, “The media that do not tell the truth about migration”. In conclusion, asylum-related migrants did not just stay silent in how decisions and discourse were made over them but showed activism and agency in their everyday environment.

5. Conclusions

The research project *Asylum Seekers and Migrants in Lesvos, Greece, 2019–2020* focuses on the everyday lives, migration patterns, aspirations and governance of asylum-related migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean island of Lesvos in Greece. The migrants enter the European Union (EU) for various reasons and request asylum as their entry mechanism. The research covers the developments in 2019 and early 2020. The main empirical material consisted of survey responses gathered in November 2019 from 625 asylum-related migrants in Lesvos, whom we also interviewed and observed in the field.

By the end of 2019, more than 20,000 asylum-related migrants were in Lesvos. Their governance is part of broader biogeopolitics: developing the preferred geopolitical order at the EU borderlands by biopolitical (mis)management of this migrant population. The asylum process has been depoliticized, which displaces asylum-related migration and migrants from the political debate. The emergency of asylum seekers has been turned into an ordinary case and normalized. As a result, the migrants' everyday lives in Lesvos have become very challenging. In 2019, unrest frequently took place at the overcrowded and unhygienic reception sites. The migrants do not know when their asylum requests will be processed or what will happen to them.

More than three out of four migrants mentioned leaving their country of origin due to war or serious political or human rights violations. The remainder left due to unemployment, need for better education, family reunification, etc. However, many migrants left due to a combination of reasons. Nearly half of respondents mentioned that information and interaction on social media were important in making their decision to come to the EU. Some made the journey to Lesvos within a few weeks, but the majority spent more than half a year on their journeys—some had even spent several years attempting to reach Lesvos.

Ten kilometers from Turkey's western coast, Lesvos is one of the main gateways for asylum-related migrants to the EU. In 2019, 27,049 asylum-related migrants arrived at Lesvos (81% more than the previous year). Of them, more than two out of three (70%) were Afghans; other large groups included Syrians (12%) and Congolese (6%). In the narrow Turkish waters (just a few kilometers wide), the Turkish authorities intercepted two-thirds of boats (3,124 boats) and people (105,325) aiming to cross the border irregularly from Turkey to the Aegean islands in 2019. On occasion, fewer than 50 migrants a week arrived at Lesvos, whereas at other times more than 1,000 people would arrive in a week. Lesvos housed 45% of all migrants in the Aegean Sea, but some weeks there arrived more than 60% and in other weeks less than 10%. Sending migrants by boat (usually standard dinghies with a small motor and 35–45 migrants onboard) from the Turkish coast to Lesvos created a monthly turnover of millions of euros for

smugglers. They profited particularly well during weeks when the interception activities were less efficient.

In the beginning of 2020, Lesbos had more than 20,800 asylum-related migrants. Of them, 42% were children (29% 0–11 years old and 13% 12–17 years old) and 58% were adults (59% men and 41% women). Afghans were by far the largest group (78%) in Lesbos, followed by Syrians (8%), Somalis (4%), Dominicans (3%), Congolese (1%) and others (6%). Among the surveyed asylum-related migrants in Lesbos, three internally coherent groups were identified: unemployed men with low education levels (28%); urban residents with high education levels (12%); and female students and females with high education levels (9%). The remaining half had diverse backgrounds.

In 2019, most migrants were located in and around the Moria reception and identification center. The center's official capacity is 2,840 persons, but it hosted 18,640 asylum-related migrants. Therefore, up to 15,000 migrants had to be accommodated in an improvised open-air area with smaller and larger tents around the center. The remaining migrants were situated at the Kara Tepe reception center (around 1,200 people) and smaller sites, including squatted buildings.

Most asylum-related migrants are not satisfied with their situation in Lesbos. One out three felt safe and well treated in Lesbos, but the majority did not. Furthermore, one out of three felt discriminated against because of their non-European origins. Comparing the situation in Lesbos between 2016 and 2019, slightly more migrants felt safe (21% vs. 26%), slightly fewer felt well treated (30% vs. 28%) and clearly fewer felt mistreated because of their non-European origins (43% vs. 33%). A small minority learned something useful in Lesbos, mostly English. However, many said that nothing good had come of it and leaving Lesbos would be best. Trapped in an on-going, slow emergency, migrants were being reduced to 'bare life'. However, they also demonstrated agency, viewpoints and actions. Many aspired for a more promising future: two out of three agreed to see their future positively. Most had reached their first main goal (i.e., arriving in the EU), and they expected to gain asylum or residence permits in the EU, which will not happen for many.

A small group of migrants (5%) in Lesbos expressed positive feelings. They consisted of poorly educated young adults who were very social and work-oriented as well as middle-aged men who were active on the Internet and social media. A larger group (14%) was particularly negative. They included: young Afghan men without family in Lesbos and who were very critical of their situation on the island but who saw their future positively in the EU; migrants in the Moria center with families, of whom fewer had Internet access and friends in Lesbos; and mostly young adults who were not employed during the journey to Lesbos, of whom very few learned anything useful there and fewer that usual had a mobile phone with Internet access.

For many migrants in Lesvos, Germany was their aspired destination country in the EU. However, ‘Germany’ also represented the idea of being safe, working and living a normal life. Canada, Finland and the Netherlands were also frequently mentioned as desired destinations. Most migrants wished to work or study in Europe (i.e., most migrants wanted to make an active positive contribution to the EU). Very few (4%) considered returning to their country of origin: one out of seven Afghans (1% for sure and 13% maybe), one out of four Syrians (6% and 18%) and less than one out of five (4% and 14%) people from other nations thought about going home. However, of Somali respondents, the majority planned or considered a return (12% for sure and 44% maybe).

Most asylum-related migrants used the Internet and social media in their country of origin, during their journey and in Lesvos. The longer migrants stayed in Lesvos, the more of them used the Internet, increasingly to learn about European-related issues. More than half of respondents and two out of three Internet users used WhatsApp. Internet and social media users very often sought detailed information to facilitate their asylum-related journey.

The situation of asylum-related migrants in Lesvos became even more aggravated in 2020. They have been misused in political twists and turns between Turkey and the EU. In this process, Greece violated human rights and neglected international and EU asylum principles, however, with the indirect approval by the EU. In the spring of 2020, the acceptance of asylum requests and their processing were (temporarily) suspended and the welfare of these migrants facing COVID-19 and other illnesses was not properly taken care of. Biopolitical actions were imposed over them in Lesvos as well as elsewhere in the Greece–Turkey borderlands.

In all, the poor and inhumane living conditions of the asylum-related migrants in Lesvos must be improved. The number of asylum seekers held in Lesvos must not exceed the island’s reception capacity. The asylum reception facilities need to be enhanced and the asylum process made transparent, faster and just. The migrants’ transfer to mainland Greece and their resettlement to other EU member states needs to be accelerated. A meaningful safe return needs to be provided to those not receiving an EU residence permit. The asylum-related migrants’ complimentary access to the Internet has to be guaranteed during all stages of the asylum process in Lesvos and elsewhere in the EU.

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7. Asylum seekers and migrants in Lesvos, Greece, 2019–2020

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The research project *Asylum Seekers and Migrants in Lesvos, Greece, 2019–2020* focuses on the everyday lives, migration patterns, aspirations and governance of asylum-related migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean island of Lesvos in Greece. The migrants enter the European Union (EU) for many reasons and request asylum as their entry mechanism. The main empirical material consisted of survey responses gathered in Lesvos in November 2019 from 625 asylum-related migrants, whom we also interviewed and observed in the field.

In 2019, more than 20,000 asylum-related migrants in Lesvos were governed with biogeopolitics. The preferred geopolitical order at the EU borderlands was developed with biopolitical (mis)management of this migrant population and displacing them from the political debate. The emergency of asylum seekers' challenging everyday lives was turned into normality. In 2019, unrest frequently took place at the overcrowded and unhygienic reception sites in Lesvos in which the migrants did not know when and how their asylum requests will be processed.

More than three out of four migrants left their country of origin due to war or serious political or human rights violations. These reasons mixed with unemployment, need for better education, family reunification, etc. Some made the journey to Lesvos within a few weeks, but most spent more than half a year, and some even several years.

Ten kilometers from Turkey's western coast, Lesvos is a main gateway for asylum-related migrants to the EU. In 2019, 27,049 such migrants arrived at Lesvos (81% more than in 2018). Of them, 70% were Afghans; other large groups included Syrians (12%) and Congolese (6%). In the narrow Turkish waters, the Turkish authorities intercepted two-thirds of boats (3,124 boats) and people (105,325) before they reached the EU. On occasion, fewer than 50 migrants a week arrived at Lesvos, whereas at other times more than 1,000 people. Sending migrants by standard dinghies (35–45 migrants onboard) from the Turkish coast to Lesvos created a monthly turnover of millions of euros for smugglers.

Of migrants in Lesvos, 42% were children and 58% were adults (59% men and 41% women). Afghans were by far the largest group (78%), followed by Syrians (8%), Somalis (4%), Dominicans (3%), Congolese (1%) and others (6%). Three internally coherent groups were unemployed men with low education levels (28%); urban residents with high education levels (12%); and highly educated females and female students (9%). The remaining half had diverse backgrounds.

In 2019, most migrants were located in and around the Moria reception and identification center. The center's official capacity is 2,840 persons, but it hosted

18,640 migrants. Up to 15,000 migrants were accommodated in an improvised open-air area with smaller and larger tents around the center. The remaining migrants were situated at the Kara Tepe reception center (around 1,200 people) and smaller sites, including squatted buildings.

Most migrants in Lesvos did not feel well. Comparing the situation in Lesvos between 2016 and 2019, slightly more migrants felt safe (21% vs. 26%), slightly fewer felt well treated (30% vs. 28%) and clearly fewer felt mistreated because of their non-European origins (43% vs. 33%). A few learned something useful in Lesvos, mostly English. Trapped in an on-going, slow emergency, migrants were being reduced to 'bare life' but they also demonstrated agency and actions. Two out of three saw their future positively. They reached the EU, however, only a minority will gain asylum or residence permit there.

A small group of migrants (5%) in Lesvos expressed very positive feelings: very social and work-oriented poorly educated young adults as well as middle-aged men who were active on the Internet and social media. Very negatively felt a larger group (14%): very critical young Afghan men without family in Lesvos but who saw their future positively in the EU; migrants with families in the Moria center, of whom fewer had Internet access and friends; and mostly young adults who were not employed during the journey to Lesvos, of whom very few learned anything useful there and fewer had a mobile phone with Internet access.

For many migrants in Lesvos, Germany was their aspired destination in the EU. It represented safety, work and a normal life. Canada, Finland and the Netherlands were also frequently mentioned as destinations. Overwhelming majority of migrants wished to work in Europe. Very few (4%) considered returning to their country of origin: Afghans (1% for sure and 13% maybe), Syrians (6% and 18%) and people from other nations (4% and 14%). Of Somalis, the majority planned or considered a return (12% for sure and 44% maybe).

Most asylum-related migrants used the Internet and social media in their country of origin, during their journey and in Lesvos. The longer migrants stayed in Lesvos, the more of them used the Internet, and to know about Europe. Very frequent Internet and social media users sought broad and detailed information to facilitate their asylum-related journey.

Inhumane living conditions of the asylum-related migrants in Lesvos must be improved, the asylum reception facilities enhanced and the asylum process made faster and just. The migrants' transfer to mainland Greece and their resettlement to other EU member states needs to be accelerated. A meaningful safe return needs be provided to those not receiving an EU residence permit. The asylum-related migrants' complimentary access to the Internet has to be guaranteed during all stages of the asylum process in Lesvos and elsewhere in the EU.

8. Turvapaikanhakijat ja muuttajat Lesboksella Kreikassa vuosina 2019–2020

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Tutkimusprojektissa *Asylum Seekers and Migrants in Lesbos, Greece, 2019–2020* tutkimuksen kohteena on turvapaikkaa hakevien muuttajien arkipäivä, muuttoliike, muuttohalukkuus ja hallinta Lesboksen saarella Kreikassa itäisellä Välimerellä. He lähtivät matkaan monista syistä johtuen ja hakivat turvapaikkaa keinona päästä Euroopan unioniin (EU). Empiirinen materiaali koostuu 625 muuttajan vastauksista kyselyyn Lesboksella marraskuussa 2019, heidän haastatteluistaan sekä havainnoista saarella.

Vuonna 2019 Lesboksella oli yli 20000 turvapaikanhakijaa. Heitä hallittiin osana biogeopolitiikkaa. Siinä pyritään haluttuun geoliittiseen järjestykseen EU:n raja-alueilla. Muuttajia hallitaan biopoliittisesti ja heidät sivuutetaan poliittisissa keskusteluissa. Muuttajien arkielämän hätätila muuttuu jokapäiväiseksi. Ahtaiden vastaanottokeskusten hygieniat on puutteellinen ja niissä on usein levottomuuksia. Muuttajat eivät tiedä milloin ja miten heidän turvapaikkahakemuksensa käsitellään.

Yli kolme neljästä muuttajasta jätti kotimaansa sodan tai ihmisoikeusrikkomusten takia. Monilla nämä syyt sekoittuvat haluun saada töitä, opiskella tai yhdistää perhe. Osa saapui Lesbokselle muutamassa viikossa, mutta useimpien matka kesti yli puoli vuotta, ja joidenkin jopa useita vuosia.

Kymmenen kilometrin päässä Turkin länsirannikosta sijaitseva Lesbos on merkittävä turvapaikanhakijoiden väylä EU:iin. Salakuljettajat lähettävät heidät Turkin rannikolta yleensä kumiveneillä, joissa on 35–45 muuttajaa. Tämä toi salakuljettajille kuukausittain miljoonia euroja. Vuonna 2019 saareen saapui 27049 turvapaikanhakijaa (81% enemmän kuin vuonna 2018). Joinakin viikkoina saapui alle 50 muuttajaa ja toisina viikkoina yli 1000. Saapujista afgaaneja oli 70%, ja muita suurempia ryhmiä olivat syyrialaiset (12%) ja kongolaiset (6%). Turkin viranomaiset pysäyttivät vuoden aikana Turkin aluevesillä kahden kolmesta veneestä (3124) ja muuttajasta (105325).

Vuoden 2020 alussa Lesboksella oli yli 20800 turvapaikanhakijaa. Heistä 42% oli alaikäisiä ja 58% aikuisia (59% miehiä ja 41% naisia). Afgaanit olivat selkeästi suurin (78%) ryhmä. Loput olivat Syyriasta (8%), Somaliasta (4%), Dominikaanisesta Tasavallasta (3%), Kongon Demokraattisesta Tasavallasta (1%) ja muista maista (6%). Saarella oli kolme erityistä ryhmää: työttömät vähän koulutetut miehet (28%), korkeakoulutetut kaupunkilaiset (12%), sekä korkeakoulutetut tai opiskelevat naiset (9%). Loppujen taustat olivat erilaisia.

Vuonna 2019 valtaosa muuttajista oli Morian vastaanottokeskuksessa. Sen virallinen kapasiteetti oli 2840 henkilöä, mutta siellä oli 18640 muuttajaa. Yli 15000 henkilön piti asua ulkoilmassa puutteellisesti varustetuissa pienissä ja

isoissa teltoissa. Loput olivat vastaanottokeskuksessa Kara Tepe (noin 1200 henkilöä) sekä pienemmissä paikoissa, myös vallatuissa hylätyissä rakennuksissa.

Suurin osa muuttajista ei voi hyvin Lesboksella. Vuoteen 2016 verrattuna, vuonna 2019 hieman useammat tunsivat olonsa turvalliseksi (21% vrt. 26%), hieman harvemmat tunsivat tulleen kohdelluksi hyvin (30% vrt. 28%) ja selvästi harvemmat tunsivat tulleen kaltoin kohdelluksi ei-eurooppalaisen alkuperänsä takia (43% vrt. 33%). Harvat oppivat mitään hyödyllistä Lesboksella, joskus englannin kieltä. Jatkuva hidas hätätila työnsi muuttajia paljaaseen elämään, mutta osa pystyi olemaan aktiivinen. Kaksi kolmesta näki tulevaisuutensa myönteisenä. He olivat EU:ssa, mutta vain vähemmistö saa oleskeluluvan sinne.

Lesboksella harvat muuttajat (5%) olivat hyvin myönteisiä; he olivat hyvin sosiaalisia ja työhön orientoituneita matalan koulutustason nuoria aikuisia sekä keski-ikäisiä miehiä, jotka olivat Internetin ja sosiaalisen median aktiivisia käyttäjiä. Hyvin kielteisesti suhtautuvia oli suurempi (14%) ryhmä: hyvin kriittiset nuoret afgaaniaikuiset, jotka olivat Lesboksella ilman perhettä; perheen kanssa Moriaan tulleet muuttajat, joilla oli muita harvemmin ystäviä tai yhteys internettiin; sekä nuoret aikuiset, jotka eivät työskennelleet turvapaikkamatkansa aikana, joilla oli muita harvemmin matkapuhelin internetyhteydellä ja joista harvat olivat oppineet mitään hyödyllistä Lesboksella.

Monille muuttajista Saksa oli kohdemaana EU:ssa. Se merkitsi turvallisuutta, työtä ja tavallista elämää. Myös Kanada, Suomi ja Alankomaat mainittiin usein kohdemaina. Valtaosa muuttajista haluaisi työskennellä Euroopassa. Hyvin harvat (4%) harkitsivat paluuta kotimaahansa: afgaaneista 14% (1% varmasti, 13% ehkä), syyrialaisista 24% (6% varmasti, 18% ehkä), ja muista kansallisuuksista 18% (4% varmasti, 14% ehkä). Somaleista 56% suunnitteli tai harkitsi paluuta kotimaahansa (12% varmasti, 44% ehkä).

Useimmat muuttajista käyttivät internetiä ja sosiaalista mediaa kotimaassaan, turvapaikkamatkansa aikana ja Lesboksella. Mitä kauemmin muuttajat olivat Lesboksella, sitä useammat heistä käyttivät internetiä koskien Eurooppaa. Hyvin monet internetin ja sosiaalisen median käyttäjistä hyödynsivät niitä laajoihin ja yksityiskohtaisiin teemoihin helpottaakseen turvapaikkamatkaansa.

Turvapaikanhakijoiden epäinhimilliset elinolosuhteet Lesboksella tulee korjata, parantaa vastaanottokeskuksia ja tehdä turvapaikkaprosessista nopea ja oikeudenmukainen. Muuttajat tulee siirtää viivyttämättä Lesbokselta Kreikan mantereelle ja muihin EU:n jäsenvaltioihin. Ilman oleskelulupaa jäävien paluun kotimaahan tulee olla turvallinen ja mielekäs. Muuttajille on tarjottava ilmainen internetyhteys turvapaikan haun eri vaiheissa Lesboksella ja muualla EU:ssa.

9. پناهجویان و مهاجران در لسبوس، یونان، 2019-2020

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پروژه تحقیقاتی "پناهجویان و مهاجران در لسبوس، یونان، 2019-2020" بر روی زندگی روزمره، الگوهای مهاجرتی، آرزوها و تمایلات و حکمرانی مهاجران پناهجو در جزیره لسبوس یونان در شرق مدیترانه تمرکز دارد. مهاجران به دلایل مختلفی وارد اتحادیه اروپا شده و درخواست پناهندگی می‌کنند. مواد اصلی این تحقیق شامل پاسخ‌های پیمایش میدانی است که در نوامبر سال 2019 از 625 مهاجر پناهجو در جزیره لسبوس جمع‌آوری شده است که همچنین ما با آنها مصاحبه انجام داده و مشاهدات میدانی در آنجا انجام دادیم.

در سال 2019، بیش از 20 هزار مهاجر پناهجویی در جزیره لسبوس بوسیله بیوزئوپلیتیک (biogeopolitics) مدیریت می‌شدند. نظم ژئوپلیتیکی ترجیح داده شده در مرزهای اتحادیه اروپا از طریق (سوء) مدیریت زیست-سیاستی جمعیت مهاجران توسعه یافته و آنها را از بحث‌های سیاسی کنار گذاشته (دور گذاشته) است. وضعیت چالشی اضطرار (emergency) زندگی روزمره پناهجویان تبدیل به یک امر عادی شده است. در سال 2019، ناآرامی‌ها به صورت مکرر در کمپ‌های (مراکز پذیرش پناهجویان) پر ازدحام و غیربهداشتی در یونان اتفاق می‌افتد که در آنجا مهاجران از زمان و چگونگی بررسی درخواست پناهندگی خود اطلاعی ندارند.

بیش از سه چهارم مهاجران کشور خود را به خاطر جنگ و یا مشکلات جدی سیاسی و یا نقض حقوق بشر ترک کرده بودند. این دلایل با عواملی همچون بیکاری، نیاز به آموزش بهتر، الحاق به خانواده، و غیره ترکیب شده است. برخی از این مهاجران سفر خود به این جزیره را در طی چند هفته انجام داده‌اند، اما اغلب آنها بیش از نصف سال را در این جزیره گذرانده‌اند و تعدادی حتی برای چند سال در این جزیره زندگی می‌کنند.

با ده کیلومتر فاصله از سواحل غربی ترکیه، جزیره لسبوس یک دروازه اصلی برای پناهجویان به اتحادیه اروپا است. در سال 2019، 27049 مهاجر پناهجو به لسبوس وارد شده‌اند (81 درصد بیشتر از سال 2018). از میان آنها (مهاجر وارد شده در این سال) 70 درصد افغانستانی بودند و دیگر گروه‌های عمده مهاجران شامل سوری‌ها (12 درصد) و کنگویی‌ها (6 درصد) بودند. در بخش آب‌های ترکیه، مسئولان این کشور از ورود دو سوم قایق‌ها (3124 قایق) و 105325 نفر قبل از رسیدن به اتحادیه اروپا جلوگیری کرده‌اند. در حالیکه کمتر از 50 مهاجر در هفته به جزیره لسبوس وارد شده‌اند؛ اما در زمان‌هایی بیش از 1000 نفر وارد این جزیره شده‌اند. ارسال مهاجران با قایق‌های استاندارد (35-45 نفر بر روی قایق) از سوی سواحل ترکیه به لسبوس باعث ایجاد حجم معاملات مالی چند میلیون یورویی برای قاچاق‌برها شده است.

از مجموع مهاجران ساکن در لسبوس، 42 درصد کودک و 58 درصد بزرگسال بوده‌اند (59٪ مرد و 41٪ زن). مهاجران افغانستانی با فاصله زیاد بزرگترین گروه (78٪) را تشکیل می‌دادند و پس از آن مهاجران سوری (8٪)، سومالیایی (4٪)، دومینیکن (3٪)، کنگو (1٪) و سایر مهاجران از کشورهای دیگر (6٪) قرار داشتند. سه گروه منسجم داخلی شامل مردان غیرشاغل با سطح تحصیلات پایین (28 درصد)؛ مهاجرانی که در گذشته ساکنان مناطق شهری با سطح تحصیلات پایین (12٪) بوده؛ و زنان با تحصیلات بالا و دانشجویان زن (9٪) مورد شناسایی قرار گرفته شد. باقیمانده نصف دیگر افرادی با پیشینه متفاوتی بودند.

در سال 2019، اغلب مهاجران در مرکز پذیرش و شناسایی موری (Moria) و اطراف آن سکونت داشتند. ظرفیت رسمی این مرکز 2840 نفر است اما میزبان 18640 نفر از مهاجران بود. بیش از 15 هزار نفر از مهاجران در فضای باز خودساخته

با چادرهای کوچک و بزرگ در اطراف این مرکز اسکان داده شده‌اند. باقیمانده مهاجران در مرکز پذیرش کاراتپه (Kara Tepe) با جمعیتی حدود 1200 نفر و دیگر فضاهای کوچک، شامل ساختمان‌های متروکه اسکان یافته‌اند.

اغلب مهاجران در لسبوس حس خوبی نداشتند. در مقایسه با وضعیت لسبوس بین سال‌های 2016 تا 2019، مهاجران کمی بیشتر احساس امنیت می‌کنند (21٪ در مقابل 26٪)، کمتر مهاجران احساس می‌کنند که با آنها برخورد خوبی می‌شود (30٪ در مقابل 28٪)؛ و بطور واضحی تعداد کمتری احساس بد رفتاری بخاطر ریشه غیراروپایی آنها می‌کنند (43٪ در مقابل 33٪). همچنین تعداد کمی احساس می‌کنند که چیز مفیدی در لسبوس یاد گرفته‌اند؛ زبان انگلیسی مهمترین چیزی است که آنها یاد گرفته‌اند. با محبوس شدن در لسبوس و شرایط ادامه‌دار وضعیت اضطرار آهسته (Slow emergency)، مهاجران به زندگی برهنه (Bare life) تنزیل داده شده‌اند اما آنها همچنین فعالیت‌ها و اقداماتی را از خود نشان می‌دادند. دو سوم آنها آینده خود را مثبت می‌بینند. اگرچه آنها به اتحادیه اروپا رسیده‌اند اما تعداد محدودی از آنها موفق به دریافت پناهندگی و مجوز اقامت در آنجا خواهند شد.

گروه کوچکی از مهاجران (5٪) در لسبوس حس بسیار خوبی را از خود نشان دادند: جوانان بالغ با تحصیلات پایین و فعال در کارهای اجتماعی و همچنین مردان میانسالی که در اینترنت و رسانه‌های اجتماعی فعال بودند. گروهی هم حس منفی داشتند (14٪): مردان بسیار منتقد افغانستانی که خانواده‌ای در لسبوس نداشتند اما آینده خود را در اروپا مثبت می‌دیدند؛ همچنین مهاجران دارای خانواده در مرکز پذیرش موری که از بین آنها تعداد کمی دسترسی به اینترنت و یا دوستان خود داشتند و بعلاوه جوانان بالغ که در طول مسیر خود به لسبوس شغلی نداشته‌اند که از بین آنها تعداد محدودی چیز مفیدی در لسبوس یاد گرفته و تعداد کمی دسترسی به تلفن با دسترسی به اینترنت داشتند.

برای بسیاری از مهاجران، آلمان کشور مورد علاقه به عنوان مقصد در اتحادیه اروپا محسوب می‌شد. آلمان به عنوان کشوری امن، دسترسی به شغل و داشتن زندگی عادی بازنمایی شده است. همچنین کانادا، فنلاند و هلند از دیگر کشورهایی بودند که به مقدار زیادی به عنوان کشور مقصد مطرح می‌شد. اکثر مهاجران آرزو داشتند تا در اروپا کار کنند. تعداد کمی (4٪) تمایل به بازگشت به کشور خودشان را داشتند: مهاجران افغانستانی (1٪ بطور قطع تمایل به بازگشت داشتند و 13٪ احتمالاً)، مهاجران سوری (6٪ قطعاً و 18٪ احتمالاً) و مهاجران دیگر کشورها (4٪ قطعاً و 14٪ احتمالاً). از بین مهاجران اهل سومالی اغلب آنها برای بازگشت به کشورشان برنامه‌ریزی داشته و یا این گزینه را مد نظر داشتند (12٪ بطور قطع و 44٪ احتمالاً).

اغلب مهاجران پناهجویی در کشور مبدأ خود، در طول مسیر و همچنین در جزیره لسبوس از اینترنت و رسانه‌های اجتماعی استفاده می‌کردند. هر چقدر مدت زمان سکونت و زندگی مهاجران در لسبوس بالاتر می‌رود تعداد بیشتری از آنها از اینترنت استفاده کرده و شناخت بیشتری در ارتباط با اتحادیه اروپا از طریق اینترنت کسب می‌شود. تعداد بسیار زیادی از کاربران رسانه‌های اجتماعی به دنبال اطلاعات مفصل و گسترده به منظور تسهیل سفر پناهجویی خود بودند.

شرایط زندگی غیرانسانی مهاجران پناهجویی در جزیره لسبوس باید بهبود و تسهیلات مراکز پذیرش پناهجویان باید ارتقاء یابد. همچنین فرایندهای بررسی درخواست پناهندگی باید سریع‌تر و عادلانه‌تر باشد. انتقال مهاجران به سرزمین اصلی یونان و اسکان مجدد آنها در دیگر کشورهای عضو اتحادیه اروپا باید سرعت بخشیده شود. بعلاوه باید شرایط ایمن برای بازگشت آن دسته از مهاجرانی که نتوانسته‌اند مجوز اقامت در اتحادیه اروپا را کسب کنند فراهم گردد. دسترسی مهاجران پناهجویی به اینترنت در مدت زمان بررسی درخواست پناهندگی در لسبوس و سایر مناطق در اتحادیه اروپا باید تضمین گردد.

10. طالبو اللجوء والمهاجرون في ليسفوس، اليونان، 2019-2020

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يهتم المشروع البحثي طالبو اللجوء والمهاجرون في ليسفوس، اليونان، 2019-2020 بالحياة اليومية للمهاجرين طالبي اللجوء، وأنماط هجرتهم وتطلعاتهم المستقبلية وكيفية إدارة ملفاتهم في جزيرة ليسفوس الواقعة شرق البحر المتوسط في اليونان. يتوجه المهاجرون إلى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي (EU) لأسباب عدة طالبين اللجوء بها كآلية لدخولهم. تتألف المواد التجريبية الرئيسية من ردود على استبيانات استطلاع رأي تم جمعها في ليسفوس في شهر تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2019 من 625 مهاجرًا طالبًا للجوء، قد قابلناهم أيضًا وتحدثنا إليهم مباشرة.

في عام 2019، أكثر من 20 ألف مهاجرًا طالبًا للجوء في جزيرة ليسفوس يخضعون للقوانين السياسية الجغرافية الحيوية. إذ إن النظام الجغرافي السياسي ذات الأفضلية في المناطق الحدودية للاتحاد الأوروبي قد تم استحداثه من خلال الإدارة السياسية (الخاطئة) لهؤلاء السكان المهاجرين وإبعادهم من الحوار السياسي. أصبحت حياة طالبي اللجوء اليومية الصعبة أمرًا طبيعيًا بالنسبة لهم. ففي عام 2019، وقعت كثير من الاضطرابات تكررًا في مواقع الاستقبال المكتظة وغير الصحية في جزيرة ليسفوس، إذ إن طالبي اللجوء كانوا لا يعرفون متى وكيف سيتم التعامل مع طلباتهم للجوء.

ثلاثة من كل أربعة مهاجرين غادروا موطنهم الأصلي بسبب الحرب أو بسبب الانتهاكات السياسية والتجاوزات الخطيرة لحقوق الإنسان. وقد اشتركت هذه الأسباب بأسباب أخرى كالبطالة والحاجة إلى تعليم أفضل ولم شمل العائلة وما إلى ذلك. استطاع البعض الوصول إلى جزيرة ليسفوس في غضون أسابيع قليلة، لكن الأغلبية قضاوا أكثر من نصف عام، ومنهم من قضى عدة سنوات.

تقع جزيرة ليسفوس على بعد عشرة كيلومترات من الساحل الغربي لتركيا وتعد بوابة رئيسية للمهاجرين الباحثين عن اللجوء إلى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي. في عام 2019، وصل 27,049 من هؤلاء المهاجرين إلى ليسفوس (81% أكثر ممن وصل في عام 2018). 70% منهم أفغان، ومجموعات كبيرة أخرى سوريين (12%) وكونغوليين (6%). في المياه التركية الضيقة، اعترضت السلطات التركية ثلثي القوارب المغادرة (3,124 قارب) والبالغ عددهم (105,325 شخص) قبل وصولهم إلى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي. في بعض المناسبات، قد يصل إلى ليسفوس أقل من 50 مهاجرًا في الأسبوع، وفي مناسبات أخرى أكثر من 1000 شخصًا. نتج عن عبور المهاجرين بالقوارب العادية (35-45 مهاجرًا على متن القارب الواحد) من الساحل التركي إلى جزيرة ليسفوس إلى إدرار الملايين من اليورو للمهربين شهريًا.

يشكل الأطفال 42% من المهاجرين على جزيرة ليسفوس، و58% من البالغين (59% من الرجال و41% من النساء). ويمثل الأفغان المجموعة الأكبر (78%)، يليهم السوريون (8%) ثم الصوماليون (4%) ثم الدومينيكان (3%) ثم الكونغوليون (1%) وآخرون (6%). ويمثل الرجال العاطلون عن العمل مع مستويات علمية متدنية (28%)؛ ويمثل سكان المدن ذوي مستويات التعليم العالي (12%)؛ وتمثل الإناث المتعلمات تعليمًا عاليًا والطلابات (9%). وأما النصف الآخر من النسبة فكانت له خلفيات متنوعة متعددة.

في عام 2019، تواجد معظم المهاجرين في وحول مركزي الاستقبال ومنح الهوية في موريا. تبلغ السعة الرسمية للمركز 2840 شخصًا، لكنه يستضيف 18,640 مهاجرًا. وقد تم استيعاب ما يصل إلى 15000 مهاجرًا في منطقة مفتوحة في الهواء الطلق حول المركز مهياً بخيام صغيرة وكبيرة. وما تبقى من

المهاجرين الآخرين فقد تم إرسالهم إلى مركز استقبال كارا تيببي (حوالي 1200 شخص) وإلى مواقع أخرى أصغر، بما في ذلك مباني عشوائية.

معظم المهاجرين في جزيرة ليسفوس لا يشعرون بالارتياح. وإذا ما تمت مقارنة الوضع في ليسفوس بين عام 2016 وعام 2019، نجد أن عددًا أكثر بقليل من المهاجرين يشعرون بالأمان (21% مقابل 26%)، ويشعر عدد أقل بقليل بمعاملة جيدة (30% مقابل 28%) بينما يشعر عدد أقل بوضوح بأنه يتعرض لسوء المعاملة بسبب أصولهم غير الأوروبية (43% مقابل 33%).

القليل قد تعلم شيئاً مفيداً في ليسفوس، غالبًا اللغة الإنجليزية. يعيش المهاجرون نمط حياة صعبة تتمثل في توفر الاحتياجات اليومية الأساسية للغاية في حدها الأدنى، وعلى الرغم من تلك التحديات مازالوا قادرين على التعبير عن إرادتهم السياسية والتخطيط لحياتهم المستقبلية. يرى اثنان من كل ثلاثة مهاجرين مستقبلهم بشكل إيجابي. وعلى الرغم وصولهم إلى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي، إلا إن أقلية فقط ستحصل على تصريح إقامة أو حق اللجوء.

عبرت مجموعة صغيرة من المهاجرين (5%) في ليسفوس عن مشاعر إيجابية للغاية: شباب اجتماعي للغاية يميل نحو العمل ذو خلفية تعليمية ضعيفة، وكذلك رجال في منتصف العمر ممن ينشطون على الإنترنت ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي. بينما عبرت مجموعة أخرى أكبر عن ضجرها (14%): شباب أفغاني مستأوون للغاية يعيشون بلا عوائلهم في ليسفوس قد رأوا مستقبلهم إيجابيًا في دول الاتحاد الأوروبي؛ مهاجرون مع عائلاتهم في مركز موريا ممن يمتلكون أصدقاء وبإمكانهم الوصول إلى الإنترنت؛ ومعظمهم من الشباب الذين لم يعملوا خلال رحلتهم إلى ليسفوس، ومنهم القليل من تعلم أي شيء مفيد أثناء تواجدهم هناك، وقليل منهم ممن يمتلكون هاتفًا محمولًا به إمكانية الوصول إلى الإنترنت.

بالنسبة للعديد من المهاجرين في جزيرة ليسفوس، تعد ألمانيا الوجهة المفضلة في الاتحاد الأوروبي. إنها تمثل الأمان والعمل والحياة الطبيعية. كما أنه تم الإشارة إلى كندا وفنلندا وهولندا بشكل متكرر كوجهات مفضلة. الغالبية العظمى من المهاجرين يرغبون في العمل في أوروبا. عدد قليل جدا (4%) يريدون العودة إلى موطنهم الأصلي: الأفغان (1% أجاب بالتأكيد و13% قالوا ربّما) ، السوريون (6% و18%) وبقية المهاجرين من دول أخرى (4% و14%). بالنسبة للصوماليين، ينوي الغالبية أو يطمح العودة إلى بلادهم (12% أجاب بالتأكيد و44% ربّما).

معظم المهاجرين طالبي اللجوء قد استخدموا الإنترنت ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في موطنهم الأصلي وأثناء رحلتهم وأثناء تواجدهم في جزيرة ليسفوس. كلما بقى المهاجرون لمدة زمنية أطول في ليسفوس، زاد استخدامهم للإنترنت وزادت معرفتهم عن أوروبا. بشكل متكرر يسعى مستخدمو الإنترنت وشبكات التواصل الاجتماعي للحصول على معلومات واسعة ومفصلة لتسهيل رحلتهم المتعلقة باللجوء.

يجب تحسين الظروف المعيشية اللاإنسانية للمهاجرين طالبي اللجوء في ليسفوس، ويجب تعزيز وتحسين مرافق استقبال اللاجئين وجعل عملية اللجوء عادلة وأسرع. يجب تسريع عملية نقل المهاجرين إلى البر الرئيسي لليونان وإعادة توطينهم في دول أخرى ضمن أعضاء الاتحاد الأوروبي. يجب توفير عودة آمنة ذات هدف لأولئك الذين لا يتلقون تصريح إقامة في الاتحاد الأوروبي. يجب ضمان قدرة وصول المهاجرين طالبي اللجوء إلى الإنترنت خلال جميع مراحل عملية اللجوء في ليسفوس وفي أي أماكن أخرى في دول الاتحاد الأوروبي.

11. Magangalyo-doonka iyo muhaajiriinta ku sugan Lesbos, Griika, sanadada 2019-2020

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Mashruuca cilmi-baarista Magangalyo-doonka iyo Muhaajiriinta ee ku sugan Lesbos, Griiga, 2019-2020 (*Asylum Seekers and Migrants in Lesbos, Greece, 2019-2020*) wuxuu diiradda saarayaa nolol maalmeedka muhaajiriinta, rabitaanka iyo maamulka magangalyo-doonka kusugan jasiiradda Lesbos ee bariga Mediterranean-ka Waxay usoo tageen oo safarkaan usoo galeen sababo badan awgood waxayna magangalyo u codsadeen sidii ay u gali lahaayeen Midowga Yurub (EU). Habka xog uruurintu waa mid khibrad, indha indheyn ku saleysan, wuxuuna ka kooban yahay 625 jawaabayaal muhaajiriin ah oo ka jawaabaya su'aalo weydiinta kuwaasoo ku sugan magaalada Lesbos bisha Noofembar 2019, wareysiyadooda iyo indha indheynta jasiiradda.

Sanadka 2019, Lesbos waxaa joogtay in kabadan 20000 oo magangalyo-doon ah. Waxaa loo maamulay inay qayb ka yihiin nidaamka Saamaynta juqraafigeedku ku leeyahay siyaasada. Taasina waa nidaamka juqraafi ahaan la doonayo ee gobollada xuduudaha ee Midowga Yurub. Soogalootiga ayaa si dabiici ahaan ah loo xakameeyay oo waxaa la iska indhatiray doodaha siyaasadeed ee ku saabsan soo galootiga. Xaaladaha deg-degga ah ee soogalootigu waxay noqdeen wax caadi ah. Xarumaha qaabilaada ee ciriiriga ah waxay leeyihiin nadaafad xumo waxaana inta badan ka jirta xasilooni daro. Soogalootiga ma yaqaanaan goorta iyo sida codsigooda magangalyo looga baaraandegi doono.

In kabadan sedex afartii muhaajiriin ah ayaa waxay uga soo tageen dalalkoodii hooyo sababo la xiriira dagaal ama xadgudubyo xaga xuquuqul insaanka ah. In badan, sababahan ayaa ku qotoma rabitaan shaqo, waxbarasho, ama isukeenid qoys. Qaarkood waxay ku yimaadeen Lesbos toddobaadyo gudahood, laakiin badidoodu wuxuu safarkoodu kusoo qaatay wax kabadan sanad haafkiis, qaarna xitaa dhowr sano ayuu kusoo qaatay safarku.

Toban kiiloomitir meel u jirta xeebta galbeed ee Turkiga, waxaa ku yaala Lesbos taasoo ah marin magangalyo doon badan oo loo gudbiyo Midowga Yurub. Tahriibiyeyaashu badanaa waxay kasoo diraan xeebaha Turkiga doomo la qaadi karo oo ay wataan 35 ilaa 45 muhaajiriin ah. Tani waxay u keentay malaayiin dhaqaale ah oo tahriibiyeyaasha kasoo gala tahriibinta dadkaas bil kasta. Sanadka 2019, 27049 magangalyo-doon ayaa jasiiradda yimid (81% in ka badan 2018). In ka yar 50 tahriibayaal ah ayaa yimid toddobaadyo qaarkood iyo inka badan 1000 toddobaadyo kale. Kuwa soo galay, 70% waxay ahaayeen reer Afghanistan halka kooxaha kale ee waaweyn ay ahaayeen Siiriya (12%) iyo Kongo (6%). Sanadkan gudihisa, laba ka mid ah seddex doonyood (3124) iyo muhaajiriin (105325) ayaa waxaa joojiyay maamulka Turkiga ee biyaha Turkiga.

Bilowgii 2020, Lesbos waxaa ku sugnaa in kabadan 20800 oo magangalyo- doon ah. Kuwaan, 42% waxay ahaayeen carruur aan qaan gaarin iyo 58% qaangaar ah (59% rag ah iyo 41% haween ah). Afqaanistaan ayaa waxay ahaayeen kooxda ugu badan (78%). Inta soo hartay waxay ka yimaadeen Siiriya (8%), Soomaaliya (4%), Dominican Republic (3%), Jamhuuriyadda Dimuqraadiga ah ee Kongo (1%) iyo dalal kale (6%). Waxaa jasiirada ku sugnaa saddex koox oo gaar ah: rag shaqo hooseeyo oo xirfadlayaal ah (28%), kuwa magaalada deggan oo aqoon sare leh (12%), iyo haween aqoon sare leh ama wax bartay (9%). Inta soo hartay warbixintooda aasaasiga ah waxay ahayd mid kala duwan.

Sanadka 2019, muhaajiriinta badankood waxay joogeen Xarunta Qaabilaada Moria. Awooddeeda rasmiga ahi waxay ahayd 2840 qof, laakiin waxaa ku jiray 18640 tahriibayaal ah. In ka badan 15000 oo qof ayaa ku noolaa teendhooyin yar yar iyo kuwo waaweyn oo si aan ku filayn oo aan dhameystirneyn loogu diyaariyay kuwaas oo ahaa kuwo hawada u furan. Inta soo hartay waxay ku sugnaayeen xarunta soo dhoweynta, Kara Tepe (qiyaastii 1200 oo qof), iyo sidoo kale meelo yaryar, oo ay ku jiraan dhismayaal la dayacay oo ay deganaayeen soogalootiga ama muhaajiriinta.

Intooda badan soogalootiga caafimaadkoodu ma wanaagsaneyn inta ay Lesbos joogeen. Marka la barbar dhigo 2016, sanadka 2019 waxyar ka badan intii hore ayaa aad u dareemayay amaan (21% vs. 26%), waxyar kayar ayaa dareemay in sifiican loola dhaqmay (30% vs. 28%), aad bayna u yareeyeen in si xun loola dhaqmay sababta oo ah asalkooda aan yurub ahayn (43% vs. 33%). Dad aad u yar ayaa ku baranaya wax waxtar u leh Lesbos gudaheeda, mararka qaarkood Ingiriisiga ayey bartaan. Xaalada degdega ah oo joogtada ah ayaa muhaajiriinta ku riixday bannaanka, laakiin qaarkood waxay awoodeen inay weli firfircoon yihiin. Saddex ka mid ah seddex ayaa u arkay mustaqbalkooda mid wanaagsan. Waxay ku sugnaayeen Midowga Yurub, laakiin dad tiro yar ayaa heli doona ogolaanshiyaha joogitaanka.

Lesbon dadka ku sugan ee soogalootiga tira yar (5%) aad bay u fiicnaayeen niyadoodu; Waxay ahaayeen dad aad u furfuran bulshada ka dhex muuqda waxayna u jihaysnaayeen shaqada, kuwaas oo leh heerar waxbarasho oo hooseeya iyo niman da 'dhexe ah oo si firfircoon u isticmaala internetka iyo warbaahinta bulshada. Waxaa jiray koox aad u badan (14%) kuwaas oo ahaa kuwo niyadoodu aad u xumeyd: dhalinyaro aad u yar yar oo reer Afghanistan ah oo aan qoys ku lahayn Lesbos; Soogalootiga qoyska ku leh Moria oo lahaa saaxiibo aad u yar ama marin u hel internet; iyo sidoo kale dhalinyarada waaweyn ee aan shaqeynin inta lagu gudajiray safarkooda magangalyo, kuwaas oo dhif iyo naadir uu ku ahaa taleefanka gacanta ee internetka waxna aan ka baranin waxkasta oo faa iido u leh aan ka baranin Lesbos inta ay joogeen.

Muhaajiriin badan, Jarmalka waxay u ahayd dal bartilmaameed u ah ee Midowga Yurub ay ka doorteen. Waxay ula jeedeen in ay taalo halkaas

nabadgelyo, shaqo iyo nolol caadi ah. Kanada, Finland iyo Nederland sidoo kale waxaa badanaa lagu sheegaa inay yihiin waddammo bartilmaameed ah. Muhaajiriinta badankood waxay jecel yihiin inay ka shaqeeyaan Yurub. Tiro aad u yar (4%) ayaa ka fiirsanayay inay ku laabtaan waddankoodii: 14% reer Afghanistan (1% waa hubaal, 13% malaha), Suuriya 24% (6% waa hubaal, 18% waa laga yaabaa), iyo jinsiyadaha kale 18% (4% hubaal, 14% malaha). 56% Soomaalida waxay qorsheynayeen ama ka fakaraayeen inay ku noqdaan waddankoodii (12% waa hubaal, 44% waa laga yaabaa).

Muhaajiriinta badankood waxay internetka iyo warbaahinta bulshada ka isticmaalayeen waddankooda, muddadii ay ku jireen safarka magangalyadoonka iyo Lesbos intii ay joogeenba. Markii mudda dheer ee tahriibayaashu joogaan Lesbos, wuxuu qofba qofkii uu kasoo horeeyay ka isticmaali ogyahay internetka oo ay ka raadinayeen waxyaabo quseeya Yurub. Tiro aad u badan oo adeegsadaayaasha Internetka iyo warbaahinta bulshada ayaa u adeegsaday mowduucyo aad u faahfaahsan oo baaxad leh si ay u fududeeyaan safarkooda magangalyadoonka ah.

Xaaladda nololeed ee bina-aadamka ee dadka magan-gelyo doonka ah ee ku sugan Lesbos waa in la hagaajiyaa, xarumaha soo-dhowaynta waa in laga wanaajiyo sida ay hadda yihiin geeddi-socodka magangalyocodsigana loo maamulaa si dhakhso ah oo caddaalad ah. Muhaajiriinta waa in lagu wareejiyaa iyaga oo aan la daahin lagana raraa Lesbos loona guuriyaa dhul weynaha Griiga iyo Wadamada kale ee Midowga Yurub. Ku laabashada gurigoodii ama wadankoodii dadka bilaa ogolaanshiyaha joogitaanka ah ama loo diido sharciga, waa inay ahaataa aamin iyo mid si hufan oo macno leh ku dhamaada. Soogalootiga waa in la siiyaa marin internet bilaash ah inta lagu gudajiro heerarka kala duwan ee magangalyocodsiga ee Lesbos gudaheeda iyo meelaha kale ee EU.

12. Demandeurs d'asile et migrants sur Lesbos, Grèce, en 2019-2020

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Dans le projet de recherche *Asylum Seekers and Migrants in Lesbos, Greece, 2019-2020* (*Demandeurs d'asile et migrants sur Lesbos, Grèce, en 2019-2020*), la recherche porte sur la vie quotidienne, le mouvement migratoire, la volonté de déménager et la gestion des migrants demandeurs d'asile sur l'île de Lesbos, Grèce, située dans la partie est de la mer Méditerranée. Ces migrants se sont mis en route pour des raisons variées et ont déposé une demande d'asile afin d'entrer sur le territoire de l'Union européenne (UE). Le matériel empirique comprend les réponses fournies par 625 migrants à une enquête sur l'île de Lesbos en novembre 2019 ainsi que des interviews et des observations de ces personnes sur l'île.

En 2019, il y avait plus de 20000 demandeurs d'asile sur Lesbos. Leur gestion faisait partie de la biogéopolitique, dont le but était d'atteindre un ordre géopolitique dans les régions frontalières de l'UE. Les migrants sont gérés selon un modèle biopolitique et ne sont pas pris en considération dans le débat politique. La situation de détresse quotidienne des migrants devient du quotidien. Dans les camps surpeuplés, l'hygiène est insuffisante et des émeutes éclatent souvent. Les migrants ne savent pas quand et comment leur demande d'asile sera examinée.

Plus de trois quarts des migrants avaient quitté leur pays d'origine en raison de la guerre ou des violations des droits de l'homme. Pour de nombreux, ces raisons étaient combinées à un désir d'obtenir du travail, d'étudier ou de retrouver sa famille. Une partie d'entre eux était parvenue sur l'île de Lesbos en quelques semaines, mais, pour la plupart, le voyage avait pris plus de six mois, voire plusieurs années.

Située à une distance de dix kilomètres de la côte ouest turque, l'île de Lesbos est un point d'entrée important sur le territoire de l'UE pour les demandeurs d'asile. Les trafiquants de clandestins les envoient en route sur la côte turque en général dans des radeaux pouvant porter de 35 à 45 migrants. Cette activité apportait aux trafiquants des millions d'euros par mois. 27049 demandeurs d'asile sont arrivés sur l'île en 2019 (81% de plus qu'en 2018). Il y a eu des semaines où le nombre des personnes arrivées n'était même pas de 50 et d'autres où le nombre dépassait 1000. Parmi les arrivés, 70% étaient Afghans. Les Syriens (12%) et les Congolais (6%) ont formé deux autres groupes de nationalité importants. Au cours de l'année, les autorités turques avaient arrêté dans les eaux territoriales turques deux tiers des navires (3124) et des migrants (105325).

Au début de l'année 2020, il y avait plus de 20800 demandeurs d'asile sur Lesbos. 42% d'entre eux étaient mineurs et 58% majeurs (59% hommes et 41% femmes). Les Afghans formaient nettement le groupe le plus important (78%).

Le reste des migrants étaient originaires de la Syrie (8%), de la Somalie (4%), de la République dominicaine (3%), de la République démocratique du Congo (1%) et d'autres pays (6%). On distinguait trois groupes particuliers sur l'île: hommes chômeurs peu qualifiés (28%), citadins diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur (12%) et femmes diplômées de l'enseignement supérieur ou étudiantes (9%). Le reste avait des antécédents variés.

En 2019, la plupart des migrants se trouvaient dans le camp de Moria. La capacité officielle de ce camp était de 2840 personnes, mais 18640 personnes s'y trouvaient. Plus de 15000 personnes étaient forcées de résider en plein air sous de petites et grandes tentes insuffisamment équipées. Le reste se trouvait dans le camp de Kara Tepe (environ 1200 personnes) et dans des lieux moins importants, y compris dans des bâtiments abandonnés squattés.

La plus grande partie des migrants ne se portent pas bien sur Lesbos. Par rapport à l'année 2016, un nombre légèrement plus élevé se sentait en sécurité (21% vs. 26%), un nombre légèrement moins élevé se sentait bien traité (30% vs. 28%) et un nombre clairement moins élevé se sentait mal traité en raison de son origine non-européenne (43% vs. 33%). Il y avait peu de gens qui avaient acquis des connaissances utiles sur Lesbos, mais parfois des connaissances d'anglais. Un état de détresse continu lent poussait les migrants vers une vie nue, mais une partie d'entre eux réussissaient à rester actifs. Deux tiers d'entre eux avait une vue positive sur l'avenir. Ils se trouvaient sur le territoire de l'UE, mais seule une minorité obtiendrait un permis de séjour.

L'attitude de peu de migrants (5%) étaient très positive sur l'île de Lesbos; il s'agissait de jeunes adultes très sociables et orientés vers le travail dont le niveau d'éducation était bas et d'hommes d'âge moyen qui se servaient activement de l'Internet et des médias sociaux. Le nombre des personnes dont l'attitude était très négative était plus important (14%): les jeunes adultes Afghans très critiques qui se trouvaient sur Lesbos sans leur famille; les migrants arrivés au Moria avec leur famille qui avaient plus rarement que d'autres des amis ou d'accès sur l'Internet; et les jeunes adultes qui ne travaillaient pas durant leur voyage, qui disposaient plus rarement que d'autres d'un téléphone mobile et d'une connexion à l'Internet et parmi lesquels peu avaient acquis des connaissances utiles sur l'île de Lesbos.

Pour de nombreux migrants, l'Allemagne était le pays cible dans l'UE. Ce pays signifiait la sécurité, le travail et la vie ordinaire. Le Canada, la Finlande et les Pays-Bas étaient également souvent nommés comme pays cible. La majeure partie des migrants souhaitaient travailler en Europe. Très rares (4%) étaient ceux qui envisageaient de retourner dans leur pays d'origine: 14% des Afghans (1% certainement, 13% peut-être), 24% des Syriens (6% certainement, 18% peut-être) et 18% des autres nationalités (4% certainement, 14% peut-être). Parmi les Somaliens, 56% projetaient ou envisageaient de retourner dans leur pays d'origine (12% certainement, 44% peut-être).

La plus grande partie des migrants se servaient de l'Internet et des médias sociaux dans leur pays d'origine, durant leur voyage et sur l'île de Lesbos. Plus les migrants passaient du temps sur l'île de Lesbos, plus il y avait de ceux qui cherchaient des informations sur l'Europe sur l'Internet. Très nombreux de ceux qui se servaient de l'Internet et des médias sociaux le faisaient sur des thèmes vastes et détaillées afin de faciliter leur voyage.

Il faudra remédier aux conditions de vie inhumaines des demandeurs d'asile sur l'île de Lesbos, améliorer les camps ainsi qu'accélérer et rendre plus équitable le processus de demande d'asile. Les migrants devront être transférés sans délai de l'île de Lesbos vers le continent grec et les autres Etats-membres de l'UE. On devra assurer un retour sûr et raisonnable dans leur pays d'origine aux migrants qui n'obtiendront pas de permis de séjour. Une connexion Internet gratuite devra être offerte aux migrants durant les diverses phases de demande d'asile sur Lesbos et ailleurs sur le territoire de l'UE.

13. Αιτούντες Άσυλο και μετανάστες στη Λέσβο, Ελλάδα, 2019-2020

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Το ερευνητικό έργο *Αιτούντες Άσυλο και Μετανάστες στη Λέσβο, Ελλάδα, 2019-2020* (*Asylum Seekers and Migrants in Lesbos, Greece, 2019-2020*) εστιάζει στην καθημερινή ζωή, τα μοτίβα μετανάστευσης, τις προσδοκίες και τη διαχείριση των σχετιζομένων με το άσυλο μεταναστών στο νησί της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου, τη Λέσβο, στην Ελλάδα. Οι μετανάστες εισέρχονται στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) για πολλούς λόγους και ζητούν άσυλο ως μηχανισμό εισόδου τους. Το κυρίως εμπειρικό υλικό αποτελείται από απαντήσεις ερωτηματολογίου οι οποίες συλλέχθηκαν στη Λέσβο τον Νοέμβριο του 2019 από 625 σχετιζομένους με άσυλο μετανάστες, από τους οποίους επίσης πήραμε συνέντευξη και παρατηρήσαμε στο πεδίο.

Το 2019, περισσότεροι από 20.000 σχετιζόμενοι με άσυλο μετανάστες στη Λέσβο διέπονταν από τη βιογεωπολιτική. Η προτιμώμενη γεωπολιτική τάξη στα σύνορα της ΕΕ αναπτύχθηκε με βιοπολιτική (έλλειψη) διαχείρισης αυτού του μεταναστευτικού πληθυσμού και αποκοπτόντάς τους από τον πολιτικό διάλογο. Το καθεστώς του επείγοντος για τους αιτούντες άσυλο που αποτελούσε πρόκληση για την καθημερινότητά τους μετατράπηκε σε φυσιολογικότητα. Το 2019, συχνά προκλήθηκαν αναταραχές στα ασφυκτικά γεμάτα και ανθυγιεινά κέντρα υποδοχής στη Λέσβο όπου οι μετανάστες δεν γνώριζαν τότε και πώς θα διεκπεραιώνονταν τα αιτήματα ασύλου τους.

Περισσότεροι από τρεις στους τέσσερις μετανάστες εγκατέλειψαν την χώρα καταγωγής τους εξαιτίας πολέμου ή σοβαρών πολιτικών παραβιάσεων ή παραβιάσεων των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων. Οι παραπάνω λόγοι σε συνδυασμό με ανεργία, ανάγκη για καλύτερη εκπαίδευση, επανένωση οικογενειών, κ.λπ. Κάποιοι έφθασαν στη Λέσβο εντός λίγων εβδομάδων, αλλά οι περισσότεροι χρειάστηκαν πάνω από μισό έτος και κάποιοι, ακόμη και μερικά έτη.

Δέκα χιλιόμετρα από τη δυτική ακτή της Τουρκίας, η Λέσβος είναι η κύρια πύλη εισόδου για σχετιζομένους με άσυλο μετανάστες στην ΕΕ. Το 2019, 27.049 τέτοιοι μετανάστες έφθασαν στη Λέσβο (81% περισσότεροι από το 2018). Από αυτούς, το 70% ήταν Αφγανοί· άλλες μεγάλες ομάδες περιελάμβαναν Σύριους (12%) και Κονγκολέζους (6%). Στα στενά Τουρκικά ύδατα, οι Τουρκικές Αρχές συνέλλεξαν τα δύο τρίτα των πλοίων (3.124 πλοία) και των ανθρώπων (105.325) πριν να φτάσουν στην ΕΕ. Κατά περίπτωση, λιγότεροι από 50 μετανάστες την εβδομάδα έφταναν στη Λέσβο, ενώ άλλες φορές έφταναν περισσότερα από 1.000 άτομα. Η αποστολή μεταναστών μέσω φουσκωτών λέμβων (35-45 μετανάστες σε κάθε φουσκωτή λέμβο) από τα Τουρκικά παράλια προς τη Λέσβο απέφερε στους ανθρωποδιακινητές μηνιαία κέρδη εκατομμυρίων ευρώ.

Από τους μετανάστες στη Λέσβο, το 42% ήταν παιδιά και το 58% ήταν ενήλικες (το 59% άνδρες και το 41% γυναίκες). Οι Αφγανοί ήταν μακράν η μεγαλύτερη

ομάδα (78%), ακολουθούμενοι από τους Σύριους (8%), τους Σομαλούς (4%), τους Δομινικανούς (3%), τους Κονγκολέζους (1%) και άλλους (6%). Τρεις εσωτερικά ομοιογενείς ομάδες ήταν: άνεργοι άνδρες χαμηλού μορφωτικού επιπέδου (28%), κάτοικοι αστικών περιοχών υψηλού μορφωτικού επιπέδου (12%) και φοιτήτριες και γυναίκες υψηλής μόρφωσης (9%). Το υπόλοιπο μισό είχε διαφορετικό ιστορικό.

Το 2019, οι περισσότεροι μετανάστες είχαν εγκατασταθεί εντός ή γύρω από το Κέντρο Υποδοχής και Ταυτοποίησης της Μόριας. Η επίσημη χωρητικότητα του κέντρου είναι 2.840 άτομα, αλλά φιλοξενούσε 18.640 μετανάστες. Έως και 15.000 μετανάστες διέμεναν σε πρόχειρες μικρές ή μεγαλύτερες σκηνές στο ύπαιθρο γύρω από το Κέντρο. Οι υπόλοιποι μετανάστες βρίσκονταν στο Κέντρο Υποδοχής του Καρά Τεπέ (περίπου 1.200 άτομα) και σε μικρότερα μέρη, συμπεριλαμβανομένων και εγκαταλελειμμένων κτιρίων.

Οι περισσότεροι μετανάστες στη Λέσβο δεν αισθάνονταν καλά. Συγκρίνοντας την κατάσταση στη Λέσβο μεταξύ του 2016 και του 2019, ελάχιστα περισσότεροι μετανάστες αισθάνονταν ασφαλείς (21% έναντι 26%), ελάχιστα λιγότεροι αισθάνονταν ότι τους συμπεριφέρονταν καλά (30% έναντι 28%) και ξεκάθαρα λιγότεροι αισθάνονταν ότι δεν τους συμπεριφέρονταν καλά εξαιτίας της μη Ευρωπαϊκής καταγωγής τους (43% έναντι 33%). Λίγοι έμαθαν κάτι χρήσιμο στη Λέσβο, κυρίως αγγλικά. Παγιδευμένοι μέσα σε ένα υφιστάμενο επί του παρόντος, καθεστώς αργού επείγοντος, οι μετανάστες αρκέστηκαν σε «απλή επιβίωση» αλλά επέδειξαν επίσης δραστηριότητα και πράξεις. Δύο στους τρεις έβλεπαν το μέλλον τους θετικά. Έφτασαν στην ΕΕ, παρόλα αυτά, μόνο η μειοψηφία θα λάβει άσυλο ή άδεια παραμονής εκεί.

Μία μικρή ομάδα (5%) στη Λέσβο εξέφρασε πολύ θετικά συναισθήματα: πολύ κοινωνικοί και κατευθυνόμενοι προς την εργασία νεαροί ενήλικες χαμηλής μόρφωσης καθώς και μεσήλικες άνδρες ενεργοί στο Διαδίκτυο και τα Μέσα Κοινωνικής Δικτύωσης. Μία μεγαλύτερη ομάδα αισθανόταν πολύ αρνητικά (14%): πολύ επικριτικοί νεαροί Αφغانοί άνδρες χωρίς οικογένεια στη Λέσβο οι οποίοι όμως έβλεπαν θετικά το μέλλον τους στην ΕΕ, μετανάστες με οικογένειες στο κέντρο της Μόριας εκ των οποίων οι λιγότεροι είχαν πρόσβαση στο Διαδίκτυο και σε φίλους και κυρίως νέοι ενήλικες, άνεργοι ενόσω διέμεναν στη Λέσβο, εκ των οποίων ελάχιστοι έμαθαν οτιδήποτε χρήσιμο εκεί και ακόμη λιγότεροι ήταν κάτοχοι κινητού τηλεφώνου με πρόσβαση στο Διαδίκτυο.

Για πολλούς μετανάστες στη Λέσβο, ο επιδιωκόμενος προορισμός στην ΕΕ ήταν η Γερμανία. Αντιπροσώπευε ασφάλεια, εργασία και φυσιολογική ζωή. Ο Καναδάς, η Φινλανδία και η Ολλανδία αναφέρονταν επίσης συχνά ως προορισμοί. Μία πολύ μεγάλη πλειοψηφία μεταναστών επιθυμούσε να εργαστεί στην Ευρώπη. Ελάχιστοι (το 4%) σκεφτόντουσαν να επιστρέψουν στη χώρα καταγωγής τους: Αφغانοί (το 1% στα σίγουρα και το 13% ίσως), Σύριοι (το 6% και 18%) και άτομα άλλων εθνοτήτων (το 4% και το 14%). Από τους Σομαλούς, η πλειονότητα σχεδίαζε ή σκεφτόταν την επιστροφή (το 12% στα σίγουρα και το 44% ίσως).

Οι περισσότεροι σχετιζόμενοι με άσυλο μετανάστες χρησιμοποιούσαν το Διαδίκτυο και τα Κοινωνικά Μέσα στη χώρα καταγωγής τους κατά τη διάρκεια της πορείας τους και ενόσω διέμεναν στη Λέσβο. Όσο μεγαλύτερο το διάστημα που διέμεναν στη Λέσβο, τόσο περισσότεροι από αυτούς χρησιμοποιούσαν το Διαδίκτυο και για να πληροφορηθούν για την Ευρώπη. Οι πολύ συχνόι χρήστες του Διαδικτύου και των Κοινωνικών Μέσων Δικτύωσης αναζητούσαν ευρύτερη και ενεδεδεχέστερη πληροφόρηση ώστε να διευκολύνουν τη σχετιζόμενη με το άσυλο πορεία τους.

Οι απάνθρωπες συνθήκες διαβίωσης των σχετιζομένων με το άσυλο μεταναστών της Λέσβου πρέπει να βελτιωθούν, οι εγκαταστάσεις υποδοχής ασύλου να ενισχυθούν και οι διαδικασίες ασύλου να γίνουν γρηγορότερες και δίκαιες. Η μεταφορά των μεταναστών στην ηπειρωτική Ελλάδα και η επανεγκατάστασή τους σε άλλα κράτη-μέλη της ΕΕ χρειάζεται να επισπευσθούν. Μία ουσιώδης ασφαλής επιστροφή χρειάζεται να παράσχεται σε όσους δε λαμβάνουν Ευρωπαϊκή άδεια παραμονής. Η δωρεάν πρόσβαση στο Διαδίκτυο των σχετιζομένων με το άσυλο μεταναστών πρέπει να είναι εγγυημένη καθόλα τα στάδια της διαδικασίας (χορήγησης) ασύλου τόσο στη Λέσβο όσο και αλλού στην ΕΕ.



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