



REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN TURKEY, 2018

TÜRKIYE'DEKİ MÜLTECILER VE GÖÇMENLER, 2018

اللاجئون والمهاجرون في تركيا، 2018

PAKOLAISET JA MAAHANMUUTTAJAT TURKISSA VUONNA 2018

پناههندهکان و کوچبهران له تورکيا، ۲۰۱۸

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1. INTRODUCTION

Globally, the Republic of Turkey is among the most significant countries for populations in refugee-type situations. In 2018, Turkey had 4 million foreign people who were officially recognized by the Turkish authorities as in need of special protection. These people are usually called refugees by the media, researchers and common people; however, because of legal particularities, a majority of them are not refugees in the eyes of Turkish and international law. In Turkey, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection differentiates between refugee status, conditional refugee status and subsidiary protection. Those people under temporary protection—such as Syrians in Turkey—are thus technically not refugees (Koca 2016). Nevertheless, this research report uses the term “refugee” for Syrians under temporary protection and for other Syrian migrants in Turkey.

The background of the complexity for defining refugees is based on legal and political issues. Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees (United Nations 1951) and to its 1967 Protocol. However, Turkey maintains geographical limitations to the convention—namely, only European nationals can become refugees in Turkey. Such practices actually took place during the Cold War, when people fled from Eastern Europe and were accepted as refugees in Turkey. Since 1994, people from outside Europe have been allowed to apply for temporary protection in Turkey. In addition, nonrefoulement is being applied; that is, they are not sent back to the country from which they escaped. Non-Europeans, to whom the refugee determination process applies and who were found via the inspection in Turkey to be in need of international protection, are resettled in a third country in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Until the inspection is finished, these people are granted temporary protection in Turkey (Koca 2016; Memisoglu & Ilgit 2017). Meanwhile, they are provided with free health care, other social services and possibilities to obtain a work permit under specific conditions.

For some time, Turkey has been receiving people seeking protection. However, large numbers of protection seekers are a recent phenomenon. Before the initiation of unrest in the Syrian Arab Republic (in the following, Syria) in the spring of 2011, there were 58,000 international protection-claiming status-holders in Turkey (Erdoğan 2017). That number is less than 2% when compared to the situation in 2018. The rapid growth in the number of refugees in Turkey is due to, on the one hand, the war in Syria and, on the other hand, the response of Turkey’s government to the war—that is, to allow Syrians to come freely to Turkey. Now, Syrians constitute 90% of all registered people in refugee-type conditions in Turkey (UNHCR 2018c). Much has happened in the refugee situations in Turkey in recent years that requires analysis.

In 2018, Turkey provided the most significant refuge for fleeing Syrians, at least in terms of numbers. Since 2013, the number of Syrian refugees in Tur-

key has grown each day by the hundreds and thousands. Today, Syrians are the largest refugee population in the world, and half of them now reside in Turkey (UNHCR 2018c). Due to the prolongation of the war and the presence of many Syrians who have been in Turkey for several years, the refugee situation has become a demographic issue. In fact, about every second Syrian refugee (45%) is underage, and one out of five (20%) is a preschool-aged child (Unutulmaz 2017). Currently, demographic developments are influencing more than immigration to increase the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

The national authorities aim to regulate the internal mobility of Syrians in Turkey. Specific identity cards (*kimlik* in Turkish) provide access to social services in the designated province for each registered Syrian (Baban et al. 2017; İşleyen 2018). However, Syrian refugees have different wishes for where they want to stay in Turkey. Those changing their places of residence informed the Turkish authorities and were able to reregister to other locations with a new identity card. Others moved without contacting the authorities. Some wanted to move forward to other countries. As in all countries throughout the world, Turkey has irregular migrants, among whom are Syrians.

Internationally, Turkey has been acclaimed for its decision and practice to host millions of Syrian refugees. For example, Germany and Turkey have nearly the same population sizes, but Turkey has several times more refugees than Germany. In fact, Turkey hosts more Syrian refugees than the total number of all refugees hosted by European Union member states. The role of Turkey in helping fleeing Syrians has prevented the situation from escalating to a humanitarian disaster with a high number of casualties. In addition, the European Union has agreed to contribute financially to Turkey to provide refugee support. However, the aid received from the European Union covers only a small part of the total costs. Some scholars argue that the European Union wants to partially externalize the asylum-seeker and refugee issues and the costs to the countries outside the Union, as implied by the 2016 EU–Turkey agreement (Bialasiewicz & Maessen 2018; Faist 2018).

Nevertheless, there has been criticism about the poor socioeconomic positions of many Syrians in Turkey and their limited political rights (Koca 2016; Yıldız & Uzgören 2016; Baban et al. 2017; İçduygu & Diker 2017). Recently, the presence of Syrians has become increasingly politicized inside Turkey, eliciting various stances and opinions from political parties and stakeholders. The country has experienced challenging periods in recent years, and the presence of millions of refugees has made many issues even more sensitive. One particular forthcoming challenge relates to the situations in northern Syria and the issue of resettling Syrians from Turkey into these territories, in which Turkey seems to have specific interests.

The tightened external border of the European Union has created circumstances in which many Syrians cannot enter the European Union. The EU–Tur-

key agreement of March 2016 states, among other things, that “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey; for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the European Union; Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the European Union” (European Commission 2016).

In addition, the prolonged war in Syria means that Syrians cannot return safely to their country. The short stays and transit travel of Syrians are transforming into longer stays without guarantees of their ending. Therefore, many Syrians have started to consider Turkey as a country in which they will spend the rest of their lives. The vast majority of Syrian refugees have learned Turkish, most children go to Turkish schools and many Syrian men have found employment, though often in precarious conditions and with low salaries. The inclusion and integration processes have started; however, these processes are considered beneficial but also harmful to some refugees from the perspectives of others. The topic of this research report attempts to fulfill the need to better understand the everyday lives of Syrians in Turkey.

1.1. Research project

This research report, which focuses on refugees and migrants in Turkey, belongs to the activities of the research consortium Urbanization, Mobilities and Immigration (URMI, see www.urmi.fi). It was funded by the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland and led by Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen, from the Geography Section at the University of Turku, Finland.

The broader migration-related research project is about the asylum processes in and near the countries of origin of the asylum seekers, refugees and migrants; their asylum journeys toward their destination countries; and their lives in the destination countries (see Jauhiainen 2017a; 2017c; 2017d; Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018; Jauhiainen, Gadd & Jokela 2018; Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2018).

The research reports published earlier have focused on different phases of the asylum journey: life in or near the country of origin, the journey between the origin and the destination and life in the destination countries. The context of the research funding makes Finland a specific country that should be studied as a destination country for asylum seekers in this research project.

In the 2010s, the number of arriving asylum seekers in Finland has been limited and regular, around 5,000–6,000 persons annually. The absolute number is rather small in the context of the European Union. Nationally, this is about 0.1% of the population of Finland. As in many countries, the year 2015 was an exception. The vast majority of asylum seekers came to Europe from southeastern and southern areas, and most presented their asylum applications in one of the countries in southern or central Europe. However, migrants continued to

travel to northern Europe. In 2015, Sweden received 162,915 applications (1.7% of the country's population), and Finland received 32,447 applications (0.6% of the country's population; Finnish Immigration Service 2018).

The number of applications in Finland was only 3% of all applications in Europe. However, the relative growth in Finland was 8 times higher than that of the previous year, and it was the largest in the European Union. In addition, there were particularities among those who arrived in Finland. For example, in the European Union, Finland received the second highest number of Iraqi asylum seekers (Germany received the most). Another particularity in Finland is that the rejection rate of asylum applications has been much higher than in many countries, and only a few asylum seekers have received refugee status in Finland. Nevertheless, though their asylum applications were rejected, thousands of these asylum seekers have remained in Finland as undocumented, "paperless," irregular migrants, an issue that is novel to the country with these numbers (see Jauhiainen 2017a; Jauhiainen 2017b; Jauhiainen, Gadd & Jokela 2018).

Another scope of this URMI research project is to conduct research in asylum-seeker hotspots in the European Union at the external borders of the European Union. Thus far, the two cases for empirical field research have been the islands of Lesbos (Greece) and Lampedusa (Italy). In recent years, Lesbos and Lampedusa have been the key entry points to the European Union for hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers. After 2015, the border control along the external borders of the European Union has become stricter. Accordingly, the most frequently used routes to Europe have changed from the eastern route between Turkey and Greece to the central route between Libya and Italy and further to the western route, from Algeria and Morocco to Spain. Meanwhile, the asylum application processes have become slower. These asylum-seeker hotspots have changed into sites where asylum seekers stay for long periods of time; in Lesbos, some even stay for years (Jauhiainen 2017c; Jauhiainen 2017d). Moreover, an increasing number of migrants remain stuck in transit for years, even decades, as they search for the legal rights to stay in a place that can provide a livelihood for them (see Picozza 2017). For some, the asylum-seeking journey will never end and will start again and again.

Furthermore, our research has targeted those countries where many refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants seek immediate help and consider as starting points to begin their journey to the European Union. Many earlier studies have indicated that when deep political, economic or environmental challenges occur in one country, many people seek immediate safety in neighboring countries. The long-term instability in the country of origin means that many migrants cannot return soon to their countries of origin. Instead, they have to stay elsewhere for years and sometimes even decades. These countries provide at least temporary protection. Some start to integrate into the host soci-

ety, while others try to move further, as our research not only on Syrian refugees and migrants in Jordan but also on Syrians in Turkey has shown (Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2018). The length of an average protracted refugee crisis has grown to decades (Culbertson et al. 2016). In fact, many will never return to their former countries, as indicated by our study about Afghans in Iran (Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018).

This research report about refugees and migrants in Turkey illustrates briefly the general background of the research project, key concepts related to forced migration and the empirical findings from the fieldwork in 2018, as well as the conclusions of the research. However, a more detailed analysis follows. We are grateful to all people who took part in the research. In particular, Dr. Saime Ozcurumez and Özgün Tursun provided crucial assistance in the organization of the fieldwork in Turkey. In addition, a number of research assistants provided invaluable help in the collection, translation and analysis of the material. However, Professor Jauhiainen is solely responsible for the interpretation of the results.

1.2. Research questions

The main research questions in this research report are the following:

1. What kind of Syrian refugees live in Turkey?
2. What are the everyday lives of Syrian refugees in Turkey?
3. What are the migration wishes and plans of Syrian refugees in Turkey?
4. How and for what reasons do Syrian refugees in Turkey use the Internet and social media?

The research questions are answered on the basis of earlier research on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey and especially on the empirical material collected during the field research in the spring of 2018. Migrants and refugees responded according to their own views; the results indicate both their perspectives and our interpretation of them.

1.3. Research material

The background of this research report is based on many earlier studies that provided information about refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Turkey. The original empirical field material was collected in Turkey from April 6, 2018, to May 15, 2018. To conduct the field study and to organize the survey, Özgün Tursun provided invaluable assistance in Turkey. In addition to him, Jussi S. Jauhiainen and local assistants participated in the collection of the field material. We are grateful to all people who assisted the field study.

The main research material is the answers to our survey, which was conducted in Arabic and was taken by 762 persons with Syrian backgrounds. During the field research, the aim of the research was explained to the participants, the consent of each participant was received and their anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed. The survey comprised 96 questions, of which 60 were structural, 11 were semiopen and 25 were open questions.

We collected our sample from areas in which a relatively large and absolute number of Syrians in Turkey live (see UNHCR 2018d). Of the respondents, 246 (33%) lived in the Gaziantep province, 251 (33%) lived in the Istanbul province and 259 (34%) lived in the İzmir province. In each province, we had more specific locations in which we conducted the field research (see Figure 1).

However, it was difficult to determine the precise number of Syrians who were in Turkey in the spring of 2018; in which provinces, towns and villages they lived; and what their gender and age distributions were. Many international organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR, as well as national authorities in Turkey such as the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), provide regular updates about the num-



Figure 1. Study areas in Turkey.

bers of Syrians in Turkey. These sources were used to estimate the situation and how it has changed over time.

However, not all Syrians in Turkey live in the towns, villages or provinces in which they are officially registered. For example, younger unmarried male Syrians often have different living and working preferences than do older female Syrians with children. In specific districts of Istanbul and other major towns, one finds that a higher number of Syrians live there than is officially reported; similarly, fewer Syrians live in those provinces in which Syrians have less preference to stay. It was challenging to take a representative survey of Syrians in Turkey and to know how representative such a survey was.

However, after accounting for the official international and national population statistics about Syrians in Turkey, as well as the local information about the particularities of each study site in terms of the demographics and geographical distributions of Syrians and observations in the field, one can proceed because the sample closely represents the actual situation, as we attempted to do in our research. During the field research, our aim was that the gender and age distributions of our sample would correspond to the real situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey. This meant that we did not have to perform data transfiguration or computational weighting for our sample.

For this study, we did not study all of the provinces in Turkey with Syrian refugees. Instead, we selected three regions—namely, the Gaziantep, Istanbul and İzmir provinces—that accurately represent the major types of regions in which large populations of Syrians live. Such a selection makes it possible to discuss the results of this report in the broader context of Turkey and the Syrians in Turkey.

The gender division of the sample followed exactly the gender division of the registered Syrian refugees in Turkey—namely, 55% were male, and 45% were female (UNHCR 2018b). The age distribution of the respondents was as follows: Of respondents, 50% were between 18 and 29 years old, 41% were between 30 and 49 years old, 6% were between 50 and 59 years old and 3% were 60 years or older.

In the sample, the total portion of respondents who were 60 years old or older was slightly smaller than the official registered number, especially for Istanbul and İzmir. However, in practice the real share of the oldest generation in Istanbul is smaller than the official number. In addition, the number of people who were between 30 and 49 years old was slightly higher than the official number. As previously mentioned, there is no exactly correct information about the demographic backgrounds of the Syrians in the provinces in Turkey. The gender and age distributions of the respondents in our three research areas (the Gaziantep, İzmir and Istanbul provinces) are presented in Table 1 (see Section 4.1.).

Of the respondents, nearly all of them (97%) came to Turkey in 2012 or later (i.e., after the war in Syria had begun). Furthermore, nearly all of them (well

over 99%) considered Syria to be their country of origin. The sample accurately reflected the diversity of Syrians who had fled to Turkey and had become refugees—that is, people with temporary protection status.

During the survey process, we had the opportunity to meet hundreds of Syrians in Turkey. We grasped this opportunity to talk with them and observe relevant issues in their everyday lives. We met people who wanted to share their experiences on the topics we had asked in the survey, and we had shorter talks with many Syrians during our fieldwork. In addition, we had longer and more thematic conversations with 52 Syrians in different sites of the three study areas. The themes connected to the survey facilitated a more in-depth understanding of these issues. We did not tape these conversations but made notes on them during these meetings, which generally took from five minutes to less than an hour. The vast majority of these people spoke to us in Arabic, less than twenty used Turkish and a few spoke in English. In general, these conversations were one on one. Four meetings were in focus groups because this format was the most convenient for the participants, for gender- and family-related reasons. We thanked all of the participants for sharing their views and for helping us.

All survey responses were inserted into the database to be processed with the SPSS program. Before that, the answers to the semiopen and open questions were translated into English, coded in the N-Vivo program and then inserted into the database. Main analytical methods included descriptive statistics, cross tables, cluster analyses and regression. The interviews were analyzed with the help of the N-Vivo program. The main methods included content analysis and descriptive statistics. We thank the research assistants for helping with the analysis.

1.4. Research highlights

- There were almost 4 million people in refugee-type of conditions in Turkey in 2018; among them were over 3.6 million Syrians with specific temporary protection status, so-called Syrian refugees. Besides having an important impact on national and local development, Syrians in Turkey are also a significant community of continued international interest.
- Syrian refugees have an important impact on urbanization in Turkey, in particular, within the largest urban agglomeration, Istanbul, as well as in the border provinces of Gaziantep, Hatay and Şanlıurfa. The official regional distribution of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey is influenced by the specific identity cards (*kimlik* in Turkish). However, the actual amounts and locations where Syrians reside differ from the registered Syrian refugees, especially in Istanbul and other sites hosting many Syrians.
- According to the official UNHCR statistics, of the 3,567,658 registered Syrians with temporary protection status in Turkey in September 2018, slightly

over half (55%) were men and slightly less than half (45%) were women. Almost half of Syrian refugees (45%) were under 18 years old and half (52%) were 18–59 years old; and the remaining few (3%) were 60 years or older. However, the exact number of total Syrians, their demographic backgrounds and their locations are not known in detail.

- The number of Syrians living in refugee camps has diminished over the years. In 2018, a small portion (5%) of Syrian refugees in Turkey lived in these camps, and the majority (95%) lived elsewhere in Turkey, mostly in urban settlements. The largest area is Istanbul, with well over half a million Syrian refugees, followed by Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep provinces, each having several hundred thousand Syrian refugees.
- The sample for this research consisted of adult Syrian refugees in Turkey in the spring of 2018. The respondents lived in the Gaziantep, Istanbul or İzmir provinces rather than in refugee camps. The respondents represent a wide demographic of Syrian refugees in Turkey, ranging from youth to the elderly, those who are unable to read to those with a university degree, from the employed to unemployed and from housewives to students.
- The everyday lives of the Syrian refugees in Turkey vary; some have integrated rather well into Turkish society, but others struggle with day-to-day survival. Almost all Syrian refugee respondents stated that they needed money in order to improve their lives in Turkey. Three out of four (74%) men and one out of four (24%) women were employed. Five out of six (83%) were able to speak some Turkish, and one out of four (26%) spoke Turkish very well.
- Three out of five (61%) Syrian refugee respondents were fully (38%) or partly (23%) satisfied with their current accommodations in Turkey. Slightly more (71%) agreed that they had enough toilets and showers to use.
- The migration wishes and plans of Syrian refugees in Turkey vary. Every second (49%) respondent wished to return to Syria, and slightly more men than women. More than every third (38%) were planning such a return. One third (34%) mentioned that Syria is their most-preferred country in which to live, but another third (34%) said theirs is Turkey. More women (38%) than men (34%) preferred Syria.
- Almost every third (30%) Syrian refugee respondent had definite plans to migrate to the European Union, and fewer (11%) reported that they may migrate. Among the most willing are young male adults, and only very few (6%) of the older respondents (60 years or older) wished to move to the European Union.

- Almost all Syrian refugee respondents use the Internet in Turkey and more often than in Syria. It is very common to have a smartphone with Internet access, although this is less common among female Syrian refugees in Gaziantep.
- Two out of three (67%) Syrian refugees agreed that the Internet and social media have made their lives easier in Turkey. For example, they follow the developments in Syria through the Internet. Two out of three (67%) active users of the Internet also use it to know more about their rights in Turkey. Many Syrian refugees who wish to migrate to the European Union search the Internet for possible travel routes to get there.

2. KEY CONCEPTS

2.1. Refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants

A *refugee* is formally defined by the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol. The convention Article 1(A)(2) states that a refugee is any person who:

“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (United Nations 1951).

Following this internationally agreed-upon definition, all refugees need to be outside of their country of nationality or former habitual residence. In 2018, there were nearly 24.5 million refugees, of whom 20 million were under the mandate of the UNHCR. Over half of them were under the age of 18. There were 6.3 million Syrian refugees (i.e., one out of four refugees in the world is Syrian). Syrians were the largest nationality among refugees (UNHCR 2018c).

The process of becoming an officially recognized refugee is a complex issue. A person can achieve legal status as a refugee by applying for asylum and receiving a positive decision by the authorities of that country. Refugees can also be defined directly by the national authorities. This is done in many countries, especially those that have not signed the 1951 Convention, such as Jordan. In total, 148 countries have signed either this convention or its 1967 Protocol and 144 countries have signed both of them (UNHCR 2015). However, many signatories such as Turkey have enacted temporal, geographical or other restrictions in regards to the implementation of the convention and protocol.

Refugees usually have substantial rights in the country that has given them the status of a refugee. These rights can be (almost) the same as the citizens of that country. However, in several countries, there are substantial limitations in the political, economic and spatial organization of refugees. In fact, international law entitles the state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and who among noncitizens can remain and under which conditions (Goodwin-Gill 2014). The national authorities might want to protect the employment and housing opportunities of the titular nation by setting limitations for refugees in that country.

The categories between refugee, asylum seeker and migrant are being blurred in the everyday lives of people who have escaped from their country of origin. In

fact, often a person who has escaped from his/her country of origin or country in which s/he lived perceives him/herself as a refugee even if s/he has not received the official status. In other cases, s/he may hide his/her refugee status due to its potential stigma. Furthermore, it is common for many people in need of protection to not know their own legal status in a foreign country. They might not even understand the complex and sometimes controversial differences between the notions of refugee, asylum seeker, migrant, temporary resident and so on.

Even authorities and scholars are not always clear on these definitions (Crawley & Skleparis 2018); however, this is also due to increasingly complex political and economic situations in countries from where the refugees originally came or the political situation in the country where they arrive. As FitzGerald & Arar (2018) rightly note, the categorization of refugees is malleable both from above and from below. State labels are not transferable and self-definitions by displaced people vary. The same person who is a “refugee” in Kenya could be a “guest” in Jordan, an “asylum seeker” in Germany, a “migrant worker” in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), an “irregular arrival” in Canada and a “temporarily protected person” in Turkey. The transition from an asylum seeker to a refugee or migrant is not always transparent, nor is the difference it makes in the everyday lives of these people. Faist (2018) points out how the very term “refugee” and its relation to the equally ubiquitous concept “migrant” is a case in point for delimiting legal, political and moral responsibility.

An *asylum seeker* is a person officially seeking asylum, safety and protection outside the country of his/her nationality or habitual residence. A person requesting asylum asks for the right to be protected in another country. Usually asylum is asked on arrival in that country, and later the person also presents a formal written asylum application. While this application is being processed, the person is called an asylum seeker. An asylum seeker is between an ordinary citizen and a refugee. A person can remain in this status for many years—as long as the legal asylum process lasts. According to Faist (2018), the term mixed migration (see van Hear 2014) conceives voluntary and involuntary migration along a continuum by pointing to the changing nature of migration itself. The concept of mixed migration can also forcedly define all individual refugees to a same and internally similar category.

Seeking protection outside one’s country of residence can be considered a human right; however, there are many regulations and restrictions on the official process of asking for asylum. For example, the European Union member states have agreed upon that the asylum application is received and processed only in one of the European Union member states. This principle is called the Dublin process, in which the asylum application of an asylum seeker inside the European Union needs to be processed in the country in which s/he asked for asylum for the first time (Brekke & Brochmann 2015; Picozza 2017). Therefore,

asylum seekers cannot travel inside the European Union from one country to another and seek asylum in each country. In principle, an asylum seeker is returned to the first country in which s/he presented the asylum application.

However, since 2015 when large numbers of asylum seekers came to the European Union, the Dublin process has not been working properly. Many European Union member states have rejected the idea of taking asylum seekers back to their country despite the Dublin principle. Furthermore, during the late 2010s, the Europeanization of migration and asylum policies, of which the Dublin principle is an example, has increasingly changed toward tendencies of renationalization migration and asylum policies (Brekke & Staver 2018). The policies on granting asylum have become stricter, and several European Union member states no longer follow the commonly agreed-upon principles. In fact, after 2015, the acceptance rates for asylum in many European Union countries have fallen. It is not yet entirely clear if it is because the asylum seekers have less asylum-related reasons in their applications or if the authorities are interpreting the reasons differently.

An *irregular migrant*—or undocumented migrant—is a person who stays in a foreign country without the full legal permission of that country. They enter the country without permission or stay in the country after their valid permission has expired. Therefore, despite the potential for well-grounded humanitarian principles of tolerating people fleeing from a human rights perspective, the presence of irregular migrants is against the principle of sovereign states deciding on the rules and presence of noncitizens on its territory (see also Goodwin-Gill 2014). An asylum seeker can become a refugee with a residence permit but also an irregular migrant if s/he does not get a refugee status or residence permit in the asylum process. Asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants have become international migrants by force, moving from one country to another. Irregular migrants hide from authorities and may cross national borders illegally, therefore, it is difficult to know the exact number of irregular migrants in a country (Vogel et al. 2011).

The number of irregular migrants in the European Union have risen to millions of persons after 2015. One reason for growth is because the majority of asylum applications are rejected. In addition, many countries do not give rejected asylum seekers other complementary forms of protection or a temporary or permanent residence permit on other legal grounds (Jauhiainen, Gadd & Jokela 2018). In some European Union member states, irregular migrants are tolerated by the authorities. Irregular migrants may later become legalized, for example, due to being able to show that s/he is integrated in the labor market (Düvell 2006). Nevertheless, after 2015, many national governments of the European Union member states have taken stronger measures against irregular migrants (Brekke & Staver 2018).

International and national authorities play a substantial role in the official reception and legalization of asylum-related migrants. However, migrants, irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are also active agents in their everyday life. They are able to make decisions, influence their trajectories and mobilize various kinds of resources even if they have to face precarious conditions during several stages of their journeys (see Ehrkamp 2017; Triandafyllidou 2017; Baban et al. 2017).

Therefore, the above-mentioned formal definitions of refugee, asylum seeker and irregular migrant fail to recognize the increased complexity related to international (forced) migration (see also Section 2.2.). There are various political, social and economic drivers of migration, and they intertwine and change in the decisions that a person in his/her migration journeys makes. Crawley and Skleparis (2018) have therefore argued that the current definitions of migrants, irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are dichotomized and reinforce the problematic foundations of these categories.

2.2. Asylum-related migration

According to international law and regulations, an asylum seeker needs to leave the country of origin or habitual residence when s/he seeks international protection. Zolberg et al. (1989) are more precise and talk about refugee migration as a flight from political violence, including the threat of violence behind persecution. However, among many current asylum seekers, the motivations are mixed, so many scholars talk about mixed migration.

Instead of leaving one's country, individuals may also change places within one's country of origin to seek security and become internally displaced people. Such necessity to migrate inside the country does not lead to asylum or international protection. Furthermore, a member state of the European Union can implement the internal flight alternative for asylum seekers. The state may refuse protection and return an asylum applicant to the country of origin in cases if parts of that country can be deemed safe even though it is recognized that other parts are not (see Orchard 2018). Such argument of safe places in a less-secure country such as Afghanistan or Iraq often fails to recognize the complexity of threats in these countries. Nowadays, it is more and more difficult to geographically define exactly where insecure and secure places are and, besides, such places change frequently.

In general, an asylum journey by definition means to cross one or many national borders. Often people in peril seek immediate protection in the neighboring country; therefore, there are many asylum-seekers and refugees next to countries in which conflicts are taking place. In this case, one crosses only one border between two countries. For example, in the case of Syria, these neighboring countries are Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan.

However, many asylum seekers need to pass several national borders along their way to seek asylum. For example, in 2015 when many asylum seekers arrived in the European Union, they crossed 1–2 international borders to reach Turkey and then another border to reach Greece in the European Union. From Greece, the majority continued to Central Europe reaching places like Germany after crossing 4–5 additional international borders. Those who arrived in Finland during the autumn of 2015 had crossed 10–12 international borders before reaching their destination. However, for the majority, Finland would not be their final destination because the majority of asylum seekers do not receive refugee status or a temporary residence permit in Finland (Jauhiainen 2017b; Jauhiainen, Gadd & Jokela 2017).

The recent complexity of asylum-related mobility means that instead of a singular, simple, straightforward asylum-related migration, one can talk about plural asylum-related journeys. Nonetheless, asylum-related migration has often been considered a mobility from point A—the country of origin—to point B—the destination country. This is quite clear and a straightforward movement of the people fleeing. Sometimes there have been countries between the departure and arrival countries; however, these have been seen merely as constraints of migration between the origin and destination. In such migration, the migrant is perceived to have a clear goal and the goal does not change.

The straightforward asylum-related migration is true for many people seeking security in the neighboring country just by passing the international border between these two countries. However, after crossing the border, many people do not know their destinies: if they are able and will return to their country of origin, if they stay in the country to which they escaped or if they continue further to another country or countries. Such a lack of clarity in the life and mobility of these persons means that instead of straightforward migration, the notion of journeys better defines the multiplicities these people are facing—regardless of their status as a refugee, asylum seeker or (irregular) migrant. The asylum-related journeys (in plural) are everyday issues for millions of people today.

The journeys do not mean that these asylum-seeking people are on the move all the time. People who are fleeing become voluntarily or involuntarily stuck in one or more countries during their journeys toward their final destination but might still have intentions to continue their journeys. Many spend months, years or even decades in one country or town. These countries can be called transit countries, and such migration can be defined as transit migration.

Transit migration is a concept that has been used differently depending on each scholar's viewpoint. Papadopoulou-Kourkula (2008) uses it to describe when the journey has apparently come to an end. Collyer et al. (2014) stress the importance of the intentions of the migrants to move further but disagree that the concept should be used solely a posteriori. They link the concept empiri-

cally to the European borderlands. They also stress it as transit migrations, in plural. Nevertheless, much research considers countries along the journey as less important locations; it is about the origin and the destination. Transit countries are typically those near the destination countries—for example, Mexico for those trying to reach the United States or Turkey for those aiming to enter the European Union. However, as earlier research has illustrated, a transit country for many people becomes the destination (i.e., the migrant is not able to move forward or return back). In the end, s/he might prefer to stay in the country that was initially just for transit.

One challenge in the definition of a transit country is that a person does not always know if and when s/he will move away from that country. The etymological origin of the Latin word *transire* indicates an active movement, going across or passing through a place, though not necessarily indicating how long such movement takes or how it will end. Therefore, a transit country can ultimately be defined only when the person in question leaves that country to another country or the final destination, if intentions to move are not enough to define something as transit. Asylum-related migration has in fact become asylum-related journeys, with different stages whose length these people cannot know or decide precisely on in advance.

The above-mentioned debate on transit migration has also been challenged because of its visible and material concentration on states and borders. This undermines the constitutive function of daily practices and emerging spatial configurations and their connection to governance processes. İşleyen (2018) noticed that “Turkish transit mobility governance practices not only take place at locations away from the state border, but they are also productive of space through connection, demarcation, transformation, fragmentation and displacement.”

An additional complexity is that some asylum-related journeys never end. Asylum journeys have been seen as a process consisting of different stages. An asylum seeker may fail to receive asylum and a residence permit as the result of migration from the country of origin to the destination country. S/he might therefore return voluntarily or be deported back to the country of origin by the authorities (see Erdal & Oeppen 2017). From there, the person might leave again and try again to reach the destination. It is often a different country than the one s/he was rejected from before. Therefore, for some people fleeing, the asylum journeys are cyclical. The initial destination may also change during these journeys, and it often does due to the changing economic and political situations of the asylum seekers as well as of the destination country. Furthermore, some asylum seekers remain for several years or the rest of their lives in one of the countries along the initial migration route. The asylum journeys have become increasingly complex and diverse.

3. REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN TURKEY

3.1. Refugees and people with temporal protection status in Turkey

Turkey hosts refugees, people with temporal protection status, and irregular migrants from many countries, such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. Syrians comprised 90% of all refugees in Turkey in 2018 (UNHCR 2018b). In the following, we do not discuss the general development of refugees in Turkey. Instead, we focus on Syrians who are the largest and, from this perspective, the most important group of refugees in Turkey. As discussed in Section 1, Syrians were first seen as “guests” arriving in Turkey to stay for a short period. Soon, this type of open-door policy increased the number of Syrians from the thousands to the millions, and their return to their home country became unlikely.

The arrival of Syrians in Turkey is an outcome of the war in Syria. Along the continuation of the war in Syria, the number of Syrians has grown in Turkey from year to year (Figure 2). Turkey has implemented a policy to keep the border to Syria open so that those escaping the war and persecution could come to Turkey, where their basic needs are met. In addition, Turkey has agreed to follow the principle of nonrefoulement; that is, no Syrian would be forcefully returned back to Syria (Erdoğan 2017). As a result, Turkey hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees worldwide. However, during the state of emergency in 2016–2018, there were some exceptional restrictions put in place.

In the early stages of the war, the number of Syrians in Turkey was small. The first larger groups of Syrians, a group of 252 people, fled to Turkey on April 29,




Figure 2. Arrival of Syrian refugees to Turkey, 2012–2018 (UNHCR 2018d).

2011 (Erdoğan 2017). The number of escaped Syrians was 14,237 persons in 2012, then the government decided that Syrians fleeing from the war in Syria can come to Turkey and would be entitled with a temporary protection that would allow them to stay in the country (Koca 2016). Despite not being exactly refugees in the legal sense, they were called refugees. The number of Syrian refugees grew to 224,665 in 2013 (UNHCR 2018d), a staggering relative annual growth of 1,578%. On average, the number of Syrians grew every day by 577 people (in total, 210,428 persons more in a year). Nevertheless, Syrians made up only 0.2% of the total population in Turkey then.

In 2014, Syrians started to arrive in masses. Noting the surge of new arrivals, Turkey adopted the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013 (Law No. 6458) and additional legislation in 2014 with statuses of conditional refugee and temporary protection. Furthermore, the DGMM was established. At the end of the year, Syrian refugees, or registered Syrians with temporary protection status, in Turkey numbered 1,519,286 persons, creating an annual growth of 676% (UNHCR 2018d). The number of Syrians grew by 3,547 people every day (in total, 1,294,621 persons more in a year). This massive arrival made Turkey a significant location for both Syrians and as regards the number of refugees worldwide.

By 2015, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey reached 2,503,549 (UNHCR 2018d). This population reached an annual growth of 65%, comprising in total 3.2% of the population in Turkey. It was also the year from Turkey traveled 885,000 people to Europe to seek asylum there, of them, over half (56%) were Syrians (Katsiaficas 2016). Nevertheless, the arrival of Syrians in Turkey remained high, but the natural increase started to have an impact as well. The average daily growth of the number of Syrians was 2,697 persons (in total, 984,263 persons more in a year).

Geography played a role in the displacement of Syrians. People fleeing a war often seek protection in the immediate vicinity of the country of origin. It is easier to flee to the nearest country than to travel further abroad, but some people may flee directly to more distant destinations if there are functioning ports and airports. By 2015, the main provinces to host Syrians were Istanbul, the country's largest urban area, and the southern border provinces of Hatay, Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep. The smallest population of Syrians resided in eastern Turkey in the provinces most distant from the border.

In 2016, Syrian refugees in Turkey numbered 2,834,441 with an annual growth of 13% (UNHCR 2018d). The number of Syrians continued to grow, but the growth was substantially smaller (907 persons per day, and, in total, 330,892 persons more in a year) than in the preceding year. Later in 2017, 3,424,237 Syrian refugees resided in Turkey (UNHCR 2018d). This signified again a more rapid increase with an annual growth rate of 21% (an average 1,616 persons per day; in total, 592,796 people more in a year).

By September 2018, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey rose to 3,567,658 (UNHCR 2018d). Until that moment, the annual growth rate in 2018 had been 4%. This surge in population indicated an average growth of 525 people per day (in total, 143,421 persons more in January–September 2018), which is the lowest number since 2013. In fact, some observers claimed that during the spring of 2018, it was more difficult than before for new Syrians to obtain the required temporary protection status and the right to stay in Turkey (Human Rights Watch 2018). The natural growth—births exceeding deaths—of Syrians in Turkey was the major reason for the rise in the number of Syrian refugees, thus exceeding that of net migration, the difference between their in-migration and out-migration. In autumn of 2018, Syrian refugees made up 4.3% of the population of Turkey. In other words, one out of twenty-three people in Turkey was Syrian.

In 2018, the locations of officially registered Syrians varied regionally (Figure 3). The provinces with the largest populations of Syrians were Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep. Istanbul is the country’s largest urban agglomeration, so it seems reasonable that the province’s large population of Syrians corresponds to its high concentration of people in general. In fact, many Syrians who fled to Turkey had lived in Damascus and other large cities in Syria. For them, Istanbul is an obvious destination in Turkey. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians reside in some neighborhoods in Istanbul’s urban area. In total, the official number of Syrian refugees in the Istanbul province in the autumn of 2018 was 561,000, around 4% of the total population of the province (DGMM 2018). Realistically, however, there are more Syrian regular and irregular migrants than are accounted for, so the number of Syrians in the larger Istanbul area is closer to one million.



Figure 3. Location of Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2018. Source: UNHCR (2018a).

The next largest areas hosting Syrian refugees are the Şanlıurfa province (469,000 Syrians; 24% of total population), Hatay province (439,000 Syrians; 28% of total population) and Gaziantep province (405,000 Syrians; 20% of total population) (DGMM 2018). These areas border Syria. Many Syrian refugees who initially came to these provinces needed to move only tens of kilometers from their home to the safe Turkish side. Some had previous business and social contacts with these regions, especially Aleppo inhabitants with Gaziantep inhabitants. Provinces with the lowest Syrian refugee populations were in the eastern and central eastern parts of Turkey, far away from the largest urban agglomerations of Turkey and the border of Syria. Each of these provinces had only tens of Syrian refugees (DGMM 2018).

3.2. Refugee situation in Turkey

In the following, we focus on the refugee situation in Turkey to illustrate major developments and current challenges. The main focus is on Syrians in Turkey as it is the focus of this report. As mentioned earlier, a Syrian refugee refers to Syrian migrants in Turkey, most of whom have temporal protection status. In addition, some are on other legal grounds in Turkey and some are irregular migrants.

In the spring of 2011, before the initiation of unrest in Syria, Turkey had 58,000 people with a status of claiming international protection (Erdoğan 2017). This was less than one refugee per 1,200 Turkish citizens. As discussed in Section 3.1., the arrival of Syrians since 2011 have completely changed this situation. In 2018, the number of refugees (i.e., refugees, conditional refugees and people with temporal protection) will make up about 5% of the total population of Turkey (60 people per 1,200 Turkish citizens).

During 2011–2018, certain political developments in Turkey have also impacted how Turkish citizens feel about refugees in Turkey. As Professor Erdoğan (2017) mentions, Syrians in Turkey create a dynamic process with multifaceted impacts on Turkish society. The notions of guests, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have become blurred in the policies and discourses of the authorities dealing with these people who are fleeing, as well as among these people. Crucial concepts to explore are what “Syrian refugee” means in Turkey and what is an individual refugee’s possibility to decide over his/her everyday life and future.

The presence of many Syrians in Turkey has become politicized. Various political parties and stakeholders have different opinions about them. The standpoint of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is pro-Syrian refugee but also allows modest criticism, especially when general public opinion has become more critical. Nevertheless, Altindag & Kaushal (2017) argue that political support for the Syrian refugees have induced only a modest drop in support for the AKP. There have also been speculation that the potential amendment of Turkish citizenship to Syrians would turn many of these ex-Syrians into supporters of the AKP.

In the autumn of 2018, the Turkish government amended the eligibility requirements for foreigners applying for Turkish citizenship. These amendments were targeted mainly toward businesspeople, including Syrians, with considerable investments and activities in Turkey. Even before this amendment, however, Syrians with university degrees and related specialists were allowed to have Turkish citizenship through extraordinary reasons (Al-Khateb 2018). However, less than one percent of Syrians have been naturalized this way. In addition, a substantial number of already naturalized Syrians are either of Turkish descent, like Turkmen Syrians, or married to Turkish nationals (Akcapar & Simsek 2018). Syrian refugees have thus remained Syrian or at least have not become Turkish citizens yet. Koca (2016) claims that control and containment have been essential to the governance of Syrian refugees in Turkey. These include state-centric security concerns for Syrian refugees and other noncitizens of Turkey (Memisoglu & Ilgit 2017).

Akcapar & Simsek (2018) state that citizenship alone is not enough to foster integration or eliminate discrimination and social exclusion in society. Nevertheless, becoming a Turkish citizen has become increasingly attractive for many Syrian refugees who stay in Turkey. Many of them do not see the return to Syria as possible anymore. Furthermore, they cannot or do not want to continue their asylum journeys to other countries. After many years in Turkey, many Syrian refugees consider remaining in Turkey. Therefore, major issues involve what the refugee status implies and how long this refugee status can last.

Initially, Syrians were welcomed as guests. Before their arrival, people of Turkish origin who lived in other countries were invited to Turkey. When it became evident that Syrians would stay indefinitely and would number into the millions, the general attitude toward them began to change. Nevertheless, Turkish society still displays a high level of social acceptance of Syrian refugees. According to Professor Erdoğan's comprehensive survey on the Turkish population in 2017, a majority (58%) see Syrians in Turkey as vulnerable people who escaped from war and persecution. However, around two out of five (43%) argued that they are putting a burden on Turkish people, and almost as many (39%) believed that Syrians in Turkey are dangerous people who will bring trouble to Turkey in the future. In addition, four out of five (80%) argued that Syrians in Turkey are not similar to Turkish people (Erdoğan 2017). Furthermore, Akcapar & Simsek (2018) claim that the reaction of local Turkish people and public opinion in Turkey regarding Syrians are similar in terms of attitudes and popular xenophobic discourses about foreign migrants in most countries such as "they will take our jobs," "the crime rate has increased" and "they will deplete our resources." From the opinions of Turkish people, it seems difficult for Syrians to assimilate to Turkish society. Syrians need to learn the Turkish language and sociocultural habits to integrate, and, in this case, integration would not signify a mutual change in Turkish society. However, Simsek (2018) has noted how some Syrian

refugees are able to negotiate their membership in Turkish society. Some transnational businesses run by Syrians and other attempts to connect Turkey and Syria have created a social and cultural exchange, the emergence of new cultural forms and enhanced social and economic integrations. However, even if there are processes and practices of integration (i.e., many Syrians have learned the Turkish language, many Syrian men are employed and many Syrian children attend Turkish schools), the majority of Turkish people changing their opinions is highly unlikely. Syrians in Turkey remain immigrants, and many people continue to value them less than the members of the host nation, the Turks.

Education is another topic related to the integration and possibilities of Syrians in Turkey. A proper education is needed to build up one's career in society. Syrian refugees possess different educational backgrounds (see Section 4.1. later in this report). Some Syrian refugees lack the ability to read and write; these are usually older generations from peripheral places in Syria. Others have good professional skills and/or the highest education levels with university degrees.

In consideration of the large number of school-aged children and youth with Syrian backgrounds, their education has grown into a pressing public policy domain in Turkey. As this report focuses only on adult Syrians, the education of Syrians in Turkey is mentioned only briefly here. In less than a decade, their education has developed from a *laissez-faire* approach and temporary community-based education to a mixed education model with strict government control and involvement from local, national and international nongovernmental organizations, along with more recent aims to fully integrate all Syrian children into the formal Turkish education system (Unutulmaz 2018). Over the years, many school-aged Syrians have been able to attend school in Turkey. Some special schools feature programs in which the language of tuition is mostly or partly Arabic. Some schools are targeted toward Syrian refugees and teach students in mostly or only Turkish. More recently, school-aged Syrians attending ordinary schools meant for everyone in Turkey has become commonplace. However, many Syrians do not have a proper grasp of the sophisticated language skills of Turkish to be able to follow the curriculum properly yet. The lack of prior Turkish language training and psychological counseling have created additional problems (Aydin & Kaya 2017). The ability to learn fluent Turkish through school helps the integration of Syrian newcomers into everyday life in Turkey. However, losing the ability to write, speak or even understand Arabic would mean that many social ties to family, relatives, friends and life in Syria are broken. This makes returning to Syria later even more difficult even if a proper opportunity to go back arose.

Another key issue regarding the situations of Syrian refugees is financial. This especially regards the participation of Syrians in the Turkish labor market (see Section 4.4. later in this report). Especially to survive in a foreign country, all Syrians and Syrian families require a source of income. Some may receive aid from international and national governmental and nongovernmental organizations,

enterprises and private individuals, whether Turkish or Syrian. For most households, however, at least one of the household members needs to work. Syrian refugees often find it difficult to have good or even decent employment in Turkey. They may encounter language and qualification issues and sometimes need to fulfill substantial legal conditions to find formal employment. Furthermore, employers have to formally declare if they employ Syrians or other foreign nationals, and such employment is not possible in all cases. In addition to this, employers need to pay a fee for employing foreign nationals. İçduygu & Diker (2017) estimate that only 1% of working-aged Syrian refugees have been granted work permits. Despite these barriers, the majority of Syrian working-age men work.

A substantial part of the Turkish economy and labor—around 20% overall and over 50% in the southern border provinces—is unofficial (Tumen 2016). A large number of Syrian people in Turkey work without proper work contracts and regular salaries. İçduygu & Diker (2017) estimate up to one million informally employed Syrians in Turkey in 2017. In addition, Syrians with lower education levels cannot find formal employment. Also, Syrian female participation both in formal and informal employment is low. According to Knappert et al. (2018), gendered cultural roles in Syria and Turkey prevail in the employment of Syrian females in Turkey. In sum, Syrians' access to the labor market is unequal.

Although many people might agree that hosting millions of refugees is an economic burden to Turkey, many enterprises take advantage of them and become profitable by hiring Syrian refugees as cheap labor. This is advantageous for employers because they can pay lower salaries than to Turkish employees. One result of the inflow of Syrian refugees into the informal job market is that consumer prices in Turkey fell by 4% in the informal labor-intensive sector in 2012–2013, creating a general decline of 2.5% in overall consumer prices. The likelihood of a Turkish citizen obtaining an informal job decreased by 2%, but there was no impact on salaries (Tumen 2016). Also, employing Syrians as informal workers has had some push effects. For example, in the seasonal agriculture field, many Kurds have been replaced by Syrians. In the general labor market, the inflow of Syrians into informal jobs has pushed the Turkish to find (better) formal jobs. As a result, competition in the informal job market has created social tension. On another note, some Syrian refugees work in businesses run by Syrians with or without refugee status. In general, the number of foreign-owned enterprises has grown substantially during the 2010s, and Syrians have become the largest group of foreign entrepreneurs in Turkey. From this perspective, hosting refugees is favorable for Turkish firms and the economy (İçduygu & Diker 2017; Akgündüz et al. 2018).

Part of the economic issues attributed to Syrian refugees is the necessity for housing (see Section 4.3. later in this report). All Syrians need some sort of shelter in Turkey. It was initially common to host Syrian refugees in refugee camp situations, where the authorities and related organizations provided basic housing infrastructure and complementary services. As the length of stay be-

came longer, many Syrian refugees wanted and needed to move to an ordinary accommodation that was available either in public or social housing or in the private market. Turkey did not have a public housing infrastructure that could host millions of new people, so many Syrians resorted to renting a house, flat, room or any kind of shelter in the private sector. Syrians refugees' interactions with the Turkish housing market raised demand as well as prices. According to Tumen (2017), Syrian refugees' impact on the housing market caused rentals in lower-quality units to rise by 2% and in higher-quality units by 11%. This suggests that demand for better housing in safer neighborhoods have increased among Turkish people. Increasing housing prices and Syrian refugees' privileged access to public and social housing sometimes created conflict between Turkish and Syrians and between Syrians and other vulnerable groups.

The third key issue regarding the situations of Syrian refugees involves migration. The migration of Syrians within Turkey is a complex topic (see Section 4.5. later in this report). The majority of Syrians enter Turkey directly through the land border between Syria and Turkey. They initially arrive in the southern-most provinces of Turkey. However, as the war in Syria continued and their return to their country became increasingly unlikely, the refugee burden would have grown too heavy to be borne only by Turkey's southern provinces. What is more, the unregulated migration of millions of people inside Turkey could have led to serious challenges in overcrowded areas. National authorities therefore decided to influence the location of Syrians in Turkey. They did so by assigning regionally designated identity cards (*kimlik* in Turkish) that gave Syrians access to certain social services in the regions in which they were designated to live. If a Syrian refugee moved to another province, s/he needed to inform Turkish authorities in advance to reregister in this new location (Baban et al. 2017). However, sometimes such reregistration is not possible in practice.

As a result, registered Syrian refugees can be found in every province in Turkey (see Section 3.1. above). Some provinces are highly urbanized with advanced economic development and easy access to the (informal) labor market, whereas others are mostly rural, less developed and restrictive regarding labor market access. It is impossible for every Syrian refugee to receive in the initial process the most appropriate place to stay as regards his/her educational and professional background, family and other social relations in Turkey, as well as one's individual preferences and wishes for life in Turkey. Many have moved to other places in Turkey, but not all migrations have been welcomed by the local Turkish population, especially when the number of arriving Syrian refugees have been high. The arrival of millions of Syrian refugees have changed and continue to change the political, social, educational and financial situations of many cities, towns and villages in Turkey.

4. MAIN RESULTS

4.1. Background of the Syrian respondents

The survey respondents comprised 762 Syrians living in the Gaziantep, Istanbul and İzmir provinces. Because of a specific status, Syrians who have registered their arrival with the related Turkish authorities and follow the regulations for Syrians in Turkey can live and stay in Turkey. They possess a temporary protection status given by Turkish authorities.

All respondents have a legal right to enter and stay Turkey. However, in this residence-legalization process, authorities influence in which province each Syrian stays. An overwhelming majority of the respondents of this study were living in the province to which their identity card was connected to. However, there were cases in which a Syrian respondent had changed his/her place of residence, either by informing the authorities or by his/her own actions.

All of the respondents (over 99%) considered Syria to be their country of origin, and all of the respondents were Syrians by nationality. However, among the respondents were people who considered that Turkish (3%) or Kurdish (9%) was their mother tongue. Most of them lived in İzmir. Nevertheless, seven out of eight (88%) spoke Arabic as their mother tongue.

Out of all of the respondents, slightly over half (55%) were male, and slightly less than half (45%) were female. As mentioned, this is the share of the officially registered Syrians in Turkey (UNHCR 2018d). The survey was directed at adult respondents, and the age distribution was as follows: 18–29 years (50%), 30–49 years (41%), 50–59 years (6%) and 60 years or older (3%, see Table 1).

Table 1. Demographic background of respondents.

respondent	Gaziantep			Istanbul				İzmir				Total				
	wom-		all	wom-		all	N	wom-		all	N	wom-		all	N	
	man	an		man	an			man	an			man	an			
18–29 years	56	44	30	114	55	45	35	130	48	52	35	133	53	47	50	377
30–49 years	74	26	33	104	45	55	30	95	47	53	37	115	55	45	41	314
50–59 years	73	27	36	16	61	39	53	24	60	40	11	5	65	35	6	45
60+ years	58	42	60	12	50	50	10	2	83	17	30	6	65	35	3	20
Total	65	35	33	246	52	48	33	251	49	51	34	259	55	45	100	756

The education level of the respondents varied (see Table 2). Some persons were without the ability to read and write, and some had university degrees. The gender and age differences were visible in education. Of the young adults (18–29 years old), one out of six (16%) had attended only elementary or lower education levels, and almost one out of three (30%) had attended a university. The

respondents with the highest education (i.e., attended universities) were predominantly males (66%) and single (64%) and had originated from cities (82%); in addition, nearly all of them (95%) had at least some knowledge of English. The largest group of respondents with a higher education consisted of young male adults (18–29 years old).

Of the oldest respondents (60 years or older), two out of five (41%) had an elementary or lower education level, including those with rural backgrounds. Of young adults (18–29 years old), one out of six (17%) had the lowest education levels (elementary or uncompleted elementary education), and one out of four (26%) originated from rural areas. In general, three out of four (75%) had lived most of their life in towns or urban areas. The amount of respondents originating from rural areas in Syria was highest (31%) in Gaziantep.

Table 2. Education level of respondents.

respondent	Elementary and uncompleted			Middle school			High school			University			Total							
	man	woman	all	man	woman	all	man	woman	all	man	woman	all	man	woman	all					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%					
18–29 years	53	47	17	62	38	62	15	55	51	49	37	133	63	37	30	111	53	47	50	361
30–49 years	49	51	29	85	60	40	18	53	52	48	27	80	67	33	27	80	55	45	41	298
50–59 years	47	53	39	16	57	43	17	7	88	11	22	9	90	11	22	9	65	35	6	41
60+ years	57	43	41	7	67	33	18	3	100	0	6	1	83	18	35	6	65	35	3	17
Total	51	49	24	170	50	50	17	118	53	47	31	223	66	34	29	206	55	45	100	717

Larger amounts of Syrians started to arrive in Turkey when stronger conflicts emerged in Syria after 2011 (see Section 3.2). Most Syrians, who lived in the northern Syria, escaped initially to Turkey, where they gained temporary protection permits. As mentioned, the definitions of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are complex. Of the respondents, almost three out of four (71%) defined themselves refugees, one out of six (17%) asylum seekers and the rest (12%) with other categories.

Of the respondents, by the spring of 2018, only a few (7%) had arrived less than one year ago, and very few (2%) had arrived just a few months prior (Table 3). The majority (58%) of the respondents had stayed in Turkey for over three years, but there were regional differences. In general, the respondents in Istanbul had stayed in Turkey for shorter periods of time: Of them, 28% had stayed for less than two years. That amount was smaller both in İzmir (20%) and Gaziantep (11%). Likewise, the amount of those who had stayed in Turkey for over four years was much higher (58%) in Gaziantep than the amounts who stayed in İzmir (31%) and Istanbul (26%).

Table 3. Length of respondents' residence in Turkey.

respondent	Gaziantep		Istanbul		İzmir		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
0-5 months	1	2	1	2	3	6	2	10
6-11 months	3	6	10	25	7	17	7	48
12-23 months	7	15	17	38	12	27	12	80
24-35 months	17	37	25	57	22	51	22	145
36-47 months	14	31	20	45	26	61	20	137
48- months	58	124	26	58	31	71	38	253
Total	100	246	100	256	100	233	100	673

Of the respondents, one out of four (25%) said that s/he was single; almost three out of four (72%) said that they were married; very few said that they were widows (2%) or divorced (1%). Of the male respondents, one out of three (32%) was single, and substantially fewer women—namely, one out of six (17%)—were single. The share of single males was highest in Istanbul, where they constituted half (50%) of the respondents. Istanbul is a particular place for Syrians in Turkey, and it is a very attractive location for young adults, for various reasons. The share of married female respondents was the highest in Gaziantep—five out of six (83%) women. In regard to general family relationships, Gaziantep is clearly more stable than Istanbul.

Having to flee to a foreign country is a challenging issue. However, this situation is even more challenging if one does not have any family or relatives around. Fortunately, this was the case only for a few respondents—namely, eight out of nine (89%) had family or relatives in Turkey (see Table 4). There was considerable variation among the different areas. In Gaziantep, only one out of fourteen (7%) was there without family or relatives, whereas that amount was threefold higher (22%) in Istanbul. Almost every second respondent (45%) had children in Turkey. Every second respondent (51%) in Gaziantep had children in Turkey, which was a higher amount than that in İzmir (44%) or Istanbul (40%). In addition, this indicates that the families in Gaziantep have a more stable situation than do the families in İzmir and especially those in Istanbul. However, stable and tight family relationships and networks exist among the Syrians in Istanbul.

Having family and relatives in Turkey is important for one's social networks; if an individual has close family members nearby, one's sense of feeling at home is likely to increase. However, the presence of such relations can create stress, in the sense of an individual's having to take care of family in precarious conditions. Syrian men in particular are expected to bring financial resources to their refugee families in Turkey.

Table 4. Respondents' family and relatives in Turkey.

	Gaziantep		Istanbul		İzmir		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Spouse	24	50	22	47	29	66	25	163
Children	2	4	3	7	5	11	3	22
Spouse and children	10	20	11	22	10	23	10	65
Spouse, children and relatives	37	77	24	51	28	63	30	191
Spouse and relatives	7	15	4	9	4	9	5	33
Children and relatives	2	4	2	5	1	3	2	12
Relatives	12	24	11	22	12	28	11	74
No family or relatives	7	14	22	46	11	24	13	84
Total	100	208	100	209	100	227	100	644

Many Syrian families were dispersed during the Syrian War. Some fled to neighboring countries (Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2018); others fled to the European Union; some went even further, to more western countries. Especially in 2015, a high number of Syrians fled to the European Union (Eurostat 2017). However, many are still living in Syria.

Three out of five (61%) respondents had family members and relatives in the European Union (see Table 5). Among the respondents, more women (64%) had family or relatives in the European Union than did men (59%). The respondents who were 60 years old or more had the smallest numbers of family in the European Union—namely, two out of five (41%). The respondents did not mention all of the EU member states in which they had family members. Half (51%) of those who had family in the European Union mentioned that those family members were in Germany. Other more commonly mentioned countries were Sweden (9%) and the Netherlands (7%). These were countries in which many Syrians received asylum or other residence permits. Two out of five (40%) respondents did not have any family members or relatives in the European Union. In general, such respondents were younger male adults (18–29 years old) who had been in Turkey for 1–3 years.

Table 5. Respondents' relatives or family members in the European Union countries.

	Yes		No		N
	%		%		
Man	59		41		336
Woman	64		37		249
18–29 years	58		42		286
30–49 years	64		36		250
50–59 years	63		37		35
60+ years	41		59		17
Employed	58		42		272
Inactive	60		40		235
Total	61		40		592

Though millions of Syrians have fled their country of origin, the majority of Syrians still live in Syria. Sometimes, entire families left the country together and at the same time; other times, only some family members left, leaving others behind. In addition, some refugees fled with a group of many friends, while others left their closest friends in Syria. Of the respondents, eleven out of twelve (92%) mentioned in the spring of 2018 that they had family or relatives in Syria (see Table 6). It was more common for men (94%) than for women (90%) to have family or relatives in Syria. Nearly all Syrians are still connected socially to Syria, despite having left the country.

There were small differences in regard to the ages and the places of living of the respondents who were socially connected to Syria via family or relatives. Most of the respondents in Istanbul (93%) had family or relatives in Syria. Nevertheless, the amount was almost the same in Gaziantep (92%) and İzmir (91%). One out of twelve (8%) respondents did not have any family members or friends remaining in Syria. In general, these respondents were middle-aged married women (30–49 years old) who had been in Turkey for more than 4 years and had their children in Turkey.

Table 6. Respondents' relatives or family members in Syria.

	Yes	No	N
	%	%	
Man	94	6	400
Woman	90	10	325
18–29 years	94	6	363
30–49 years	90	10	304
50–59 years	98	2	44
60+ years	79	21	19
Employed	92	8	329
Inactive	93	7	297
Gaziantep	92	8	243
Istanbul	93	7	243
İzmir	91	9	250
Total	92	8	736

It is critical for migrants and refugees to know the language of the country in which they are staying. Turkish is the official language of Turkey, and people need it for various everyday practices and especially for employment. English is more often needed for contact with people from the Western world and especially in the tourism sector, where people often deal with non-Turkish and non-Arab tourists, such as Europeans. Of the respondents, five out of six (83%) knew at least some Turkish, but substantially fewer (65%) knew at least a little English (see Table 7).

In general, the longer a respondent's formal schooling, the more English s/he knew. Of those who had attended universities, nine out of ten (90%) knew at least some English, and over two out of five (43%) said that their knowledge of

English language was good. Of those who had only elementary or uncompleted elementary education, one out of five (19%) knew some English, and practically none (1%) had a solid understanding of English.

In addition, having knowledge of the Turkish language was connected to the education levels but less so than with English. Of those who had attended universities, nearly all of them (98%) knew at least a little Turkish, and even a majority (58%) of those with low education levels (only elementary or uncompleted elementary educations) knew some Turkish. Of those who had attended universities, every third person (34%) said that his/her knowledge of the Turkish language was good; that is, more respondents with higher education levels knew English better than Turkish. Of those who had experienced only elementary or uncompleted elementary education, one out of seven (15%) had a good knowledge of Turkish. That amount was substantially higher than that of those who had a good knowledge of English.

The lengths of stay in Turkey were connected to the knowledge of Turkish. Of those who had been in Turkey for less than 1 year, seven out of ten (70%) knew at least a little of Turkish, and one out of ten (10%) knew it well. Of those who had been in Turkey for over 4 years, six out of seven (86%) knew at a least a little Turkish, and almost two out of five (37%) knew it well. In addition, among the respondents were a few people whose mother tongue was Turkish. Those who knew least Turkish were the oldest (60 years old or older) respondents or had stayed in Turkey for less than one year.

Table 7. Foreign language skills of respondents.

respondent	Elementary and uncompleted				Middle school				High school				University				Total			
	Turkish		English		Turkish		English		Turkish		English		Turkish		English		Turkish		English	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Good	15	25	1	1	23	27	3	4	29	63	15	32	34	69	43	87	26	190	17	126
Moderate	16	27	2	4	27	31	16	18	41	90	31	68	36	74	43	87	31	231	25	183
Little	26	43	16	26	31	36	31	36	24	52	37	82	28	58	10	20	26	195	23	170
Nothing	42	70	81	133	19	22	50	58	7	16	17	38	2	5	5	10	17	126	35	260
Total	100	165	100	164	100	116	100	116	100	221	100	220	100	206	100	204	100	742	100	739

Although family and relatives are usually important social ties for a person, having friends is significant for his/her social life. Often, a person finds friends easily from the same linguistic and ethnic groups. However, having friends among the titular nation, in this case Turks, is a sign of some level of integration into the society.

Of the respondents, slightly over every second one (53%) had Turkish friends in Turkey (see Table 8). Men (62%) had substantially more Turkish friends than did women (42%). This is related to the everyday practices, in which Syrian men more often deal with external social environment than do Syrian women. In general, there were differences among age groups in having Turkish friends. The re-

spondents who were 50 years old or older had (43%) Turkish friends more often than did those younger than 50 years old (30%). Being engaged with working life increases the probability of having Turkish friends; that is, the respondents who were employed had (57%) Turkish friends more often than did the inactive respondents (49%). Of the respondents living in Gaziantep, two out of three (65%) had Turkish friends. That was substantially more than the respondents had in İzmir (49%) or Istanbul (46%). Those who had many Turkish friends in Turkey were generally employed men who had been in Turkey for 4–6 years and had a strong understanding of Turkish. Those who did not have any Turkish friends were most often women who were unemployed and had little or no knowledge of Turkish. Many of them were planning to return to Syria after the war ends.

Table 8. Respondents' having Turkish friends in Turkey.

	Many	Some	No	N
	%	%	%	
Man	36	26	37	386
Woman	23	19	58	317
18–29 years	30	25	46	360
30–49 years	29	22	49	289
50–59 years	45	14	40	42
60+ years	41	18	41	17
Employed	31	26	43	208
Inactive	29	20	51	370
Gaziantep	39	26	35	234
Istanbul	27	19	54	233
İzmir	26	23	51	247
Total	30	23	47	714

In addition, the respondents listed the best and worst aspects of their lives in Turkey. This is connected not only to individual experiences one has encountered in Turkey but also to a broader collective feeling of what it is to be a Syrian refugee in Turkey. Many issues matter here, including the respondents' family, living places, neighborhoods, jobs and social networks. Furthermore, these subjective feelings vary from person to person. What one respondent feels is bad in life is not necessary bad for another respondent.

All of the respondents had to leave Syria. In general, their emigration was due to the war in Syria; however, in a small number of cases, they left because of other political, economic or social reasons. This explains why safety, peace and freedom were most frequently mentioned as the best aspects of life in Turkey (see Table 9). Safety and security are needed for immediate survival. The second most common aspect was about family and other social issues. These were in the same order among the respondents in all of the studied regions, though people in Gaziantep cited more often (49%) safety, peace or freedom than did those living in İzmir (41%) or Istanbul (32%). The respondents in Istanbul and İzmir ac-

tually mentioned “nothing” as the best aspect of their lives in Turkey, which was the third most commonly cited aspect. Fewer respondents were satisfied in their lives in Istanbul and İzmir when compared with the respondents in Gaziantep.

Table 9. Best of respondents’ life in Turkey.

Gaziantep %	Istanbul %	İzmir %
Safety, peace or freedom 49	Safety, peace or freedom 32	Safety, peace or freedom 41
Family and social life 16	Family and social life 17	Family and social life 20
Living, services or structures 12	Nothing 16	Nothing 15
Labor-related 10	Other 11	Living, services or structures 13
Nothing 5	Living, services or structures 10	Labor-related 9
Everything or no problems 5	Labor-related 8	Other 6

% of respondents mentioning the aspect

When respondents addressed the worst aspects of their lives in Turkey, their answers were very diverse in different study areas (see Table 10). In Gaziantep, the most common answer to the worst aspects of respondents’ life was “nothing,” which was mentioned by more than every fifth (22%) respondent. This indicates that a group of respondents is satisfied with their lives in Turkey and, in this particular case, in Gaziantep. This was followed by financial issues (15%) and the respondents’ poor Turkish language skills (11%). For the respondents in Istanbul, the most common answer to the worst aspects of respondents’ lives was work related, and that was mentioned by almost every fifth (18%) respondent. This was followed by life in general (14%) and high prices (13%). In İzmir, the most common answer to the worst aspects of respondents’ lives was discrimination, prejudice or treatment, which was mentioned by every fifth (20%) respondent. Such a negative reason was much less frequent in Istanbul (9%) and Gaziantep (4%). Among respondents in İzmir are also Syrian refugees whose mother tongue is not Arabic. For the respondents in İzmir, also financial issues (17%), high prices and high rent (15%) were the frequently cited worst aspects of life in Turkey. In general, almost all of the respondents (93%) agreed that they needed more money to improve their current situations. Nearly the same percentages of respondents mentioned the same for Gaziantep (94%), Istanbul (93%) and İzmir (92%).

Table 10. Worst of respondents’ life in Turkey.

Gaziantep %	Istanbul %	İzmir %
Nothing 22	Work-related 18	Discrimination, prejudice or treatment 20
Financial issues 15	Life in general 14	Financial issues 17
Poor Turkish skills 11	High prices and rents 13	High prices and rents 15
Other 10	Other 11	Poor Turkish skills 12
Away from home, family and friends 9	Poor Turkish skills 10	Work related 10
Work related 9	Discrimination, prejudice or treatment 9	Away from home, family and friends 9

% of respondents mentioning the aspect

The best and worst aspects of respondents' lives in Turkey relate to individual circumstances and broader issues as well, such as Turkish society. It is also about the mentality and character of individuals. In general, every second (49%) respondent regarded his/her future in a positive light (see Table 11). More men (52%) saw the future positively than did women (47%). The older the respondent was, the lesser s/he regarded the future in a positive light. Of the young adults (18–29 years old), one out of nine (11%) did not regard the future as positive, whereas two out of five (40%) of the oldest respondents (60 years old or more) did. In addition, this is about the perspective of life. For a Syrian refugee who is over 60 years old and living abroad in Turkey, there are fewer options available in life than there are for a person who is 30–40 years younger.

There were three groups in which most of the respondents saw their future in a positive light. The first group comprised men who were married, employed, had been in Turkey for 4–6 years and believed they were treated well. They thought that they would live the rest of their lives in Turkey and did not want to migrate to another country. The second group comprised young men (18–29 years old) who were single, employed, had high education levels (high school or university) and had many friends from Syria in their current neighborhoods or at least some Turkish friends. The third but smaller group comprised women who were married and unemployed. They were divided in their opinion about whether to return to Syria or to stay in Turkey, but most of them answered that they would live the rest of their lives in Turkey. Of the positively oriented subjects, four out of five (82%) were satisfied with their lives in Turkey. Similarly, four out of five (82%) were satisfied with their neighborhoods, but only two out of three (68%) were satisfied with their accommodations. Those with family in Turkey saw more often the future in a positive light.

In addition, there were respondents who did not regard their future in a positive light. Less than half (44%) of the negatively oriented subjects were satisfied with their lives in Turkey, slightly less than half (48%) were satisfied with their accommodations and three out of five (63%) were satisfied with their neighborhoods. Furthermore, among those who did not see their futures positively were three distinct groups. The first group comprised married and employed men who wanted to migrate back to Syria. They were divided on whether they had learned something useful in Turkey. The second group comprised 30–59-year-old men who were employed, had been in Turkey for about 6 years and thought that financial issues were the most significant constraint on their goals in life. The third group comprised married women who were unemployed, had little or no knowledge of Turkish and thought that they were not treated well in Turkey.

Table 11. Respondents seeing the future positively.

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	N
	%	%	%	
Man	52	31	17	369
Woman	47	39	14	312
18–29 years	55	35	11	356
30–49 years	44	36	20	275
50–59 years	44	31	26	39
60+ years	40	20	40	15
Employed	47	34	18	207
Inactive	47	39	14	357
Gaziantep	54	30	16	231
Istanbul	45	40	15	228
İzmir	50	34	16	232
Total	49	35	16	691

In addition, the respondents' sense of the future was linked to their life goals (see Table 12). Of all respondents, seven out of eight (87%) identified the most important goals in their lives. The most commonly expressed goals were related to having children (24%) or a decent or good life (22%) or to the respondents' families having a good life or future (20%). However, there were differences in the goals between men and women, younger and older people and people with and without children. In general, for one out of four men (24%), the most important goal was to have a good, decent life. For nearly one out of three women (31%), the most important goal was related to their children. However, for those respondents having children in Turkey, the most important goals in life were about their children, i.e. both as regards men (25%) and women (38%). For the respondents who were 50 years old or older, the most important goal was to return to Syria. For young adults (18–29 years old), the second most important goal was related to education, knowledge or skills.

Table 12. Most important goals in life for respondents.

	Most common %	Second most common %	Third most common %
Man	A decent good life 24	Own children-related 18	To return to Syria 13
Woman	Own children-related 31	To have a decent good life 18	Good future/life for my family 18
18–29 y.	A decent good life 21	Education, knowledge or skills 20	Good future/life for my family 17
30–49 y.	Own children-related 37	To have a decent good life 22	Good future/life for my family 14
50–59 y.	To return to Syria 29	Own children-related 19	A decent or good life 17
60+ y.	To return to Syria 28	A decent good life 28	Own children-related 17
Employed	A decent good life 25	Own children-related 23	Good future/life for my family 14
Inactive	Own children-related 25	A decent good life 21	Education, knowledge or skills 17
Total	Own children-related 24	A decent good life 22	Good future/life for my family 15

Last, the respondents estimated whether their lives would become better in Turkey in the future. This does not mean that their lives would be fantastic or with-

out problems or even that their lives would be good. This is an expression of how they see their life trajectories in Turkey—that is, whether they will improve. All of the respondents have had unique experiences thus far and they feel where they are, and in consideration of this, they look toward the future. Of the respondents, every third person (34%) stated that his/her life would become better in the future; however, slightly more men (36%) than women (32%, see Table 13) believed this.

However, there was a substantial regional difference regarding this issue. In Gaziantep, every second man (50%) believed that his life in Turkey would become better, but one out of five men (20%) in Istanbul argued like this. It is impossible to know exactly why such different opinions exist. On the one hand, it might be that life is already better in Istanbul, so the male respondents there do not expect much in the way of improvements. On the other hand, many respondents in Istanbul might be realistic and even cynical about their futures and thus do not expect much improvements in their lives.

Those who predominantly believed that their lives in Turkey would improve in the future had lived in Turkey for 4–6 years, were employed, thought that they were treated well and had good or moderate knowledge of Turkish. Moreover, those who did not expect much improvement in their lives had been in Turkey for 4–6 years and had good or moderate knowledge of Turkish; however, they were as likely to be employed as inactive and were significantly more divided on feeling treated well or poorly in Turkey. The majority (55%) of those who regarded their future lives as less promising in Turkey were willing to leave Turkey and migrate to somewhere in the European Union. This belief was substantially rarer (9%) among those who believed their lives in Turkey would improve in the future.

Table 13. Respondents stating that their life in Turkey becomes better in the future.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				İzmir				Total			
	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N
	man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Agree	50	50	50	115	20	29	24	53	33	24	28	64	36	32	34	232
Don't know	32	39	35	79	42	43	43	92	44	47	45	104	39	44	41	275
Disagree	17	11	15	35	38	28	33	71	23	29	27	61	25	24	25	167
Total	100	100	100	229	100	100	100	216	100	100	100	229	100	100	100	674

4.2. Journey from Syria to Turkey

Turkey is close to Syria, and due this geographical reason, it is reachable in a rather limited time, especially from the northern part of Syria. Most Syrians who lived in northern Syria initially escaped to Turkey, whereas those from southern Syria escaped to Jordan (Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2018). Historically, the current southern areas of Turkey, such as Gaziantep, and the northernmost areas of Syria, such as

Aleppo, have had close connections. For centuries, they belonged to the Ottoman Empire and were in the same territory. From such a perspective, the current areal division between Turkey and Syria is a more recent phenomenon.

Practically all (97%) respondents came to Turkey after the initiation of severe unrest and the war in Syria in 2012 (Table 14). More than one out of five (22%) respondents came in 2015. However, many of that cohort continued to the European Union. In general, the acceptance rate of Syrian asylum seekers has been very high (94% in 2017) in the asylum processes in the European Union countries (Eurostat 2018). Only a few (6%) respondents came to Turkey less than 1 year ago.

The respondents' time of migration to Turkey shows similarities with regard to the arrival of the broader Syrian community to Turkey. In both cases, the arrivals dropped substantially from 2016 onward. The very recent arrivals in 2018 have been very limited, as indicated by the survey data and the UNHCR statistics (UNHCR 2018e).

There are, however, some differences between the areas. A third (34%) of the respondents from Gaziantep had arrived in Turkey in 2012, whereas that amount was substantially smaller in Istanbul and İzmir (both 5%). On the contrary, 29% of the respondents in Istanbul had arrived in Turkey between 2016 and the spring of 2018. This amount was smaller in İzmir (22%) and substantially smaller (11%) in Gaziantep. This indicates specific spatio-temporal patterns in the arrivals of Syrians, who lived in Turkey in the spring of 2018. Syrians who remain close to the Syrian–Turkish border area already traveled in large numbers in 2012, and many of them stayed in Gaziantep since that period. The largest group of Syrians, who still stay in the İzmir area, came to Turkey a couple of years later, i.e., in 2014. Furthermore, the largest group of Syrians, who still stay in the Istanbul area, came to Turkey 1 year later, i.e., in 2015. Thus, there is clear regional differences in the arrival times of Syrians in Turkey.

Table 14. Respondents' time of migration to Turkey

	Gaziantep		Istanbul		İzmir		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
1–4 months ago (2018)	1	2	1	2	3	6	1	10
5–16 months ago (2017)	3	6	11	25	7	17	7	48
17–28 months ago (2016)	7	15	17	38	12	27	12	80
29–40 months ago (2015)	17	37	25	57	22	51	22	145
41–52 months ago (2014)	14	31	20	45	26	61	20	137
53–64 months ago (2013)	20	44	18	42	20	47	20	133
65–76 months ago (2012)	34	72	5	13	5	13	15	98
77– months ago (2011-)	4	8	1	3	5	11	3	22
Total	100	215	100	225	100	233	100	673

Information and interaction in social media had an impact for decision to come to Turkey. Nevertheless, over two out of five (42%) of the respondents who

used the Internet daily in Syria disagreed that social information and interaction in social media helped his/her decision to come to Turkey. This suggests that there was biased information and interaction in social media whether to go or not. Another group of whom a large part (50%) disagreed on the helpfulness of social media on the migration decision was those who did not use the Internet at all. The rest of the Internet users had more positive view on social media's role on the decision to migrate to Turkey.

The respondents answered why they decided to come to Turkey instead of other countries. As it is known, many Syrians fled to other nearby countries such as Jordan and Lebanon (Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2018). The most commonly expressed reason for all respondents and their different subgroups was Turkey's geographical proximity. It was mentioned as almost two out of five (38%) of the reasons, and in the closest area to Syria, Gaziantep, it was even more common of a reason (44%) (Table 15). The second and third most common reasons (both 15%) were cultural proximity between Syria and Turkey as well as political or administrative reasons related to the fleeing.

In general, the reasons for coming to Turkey instead of other countries were mostly the same for people with different backgrounds, for example, between men and women. However, cultural proximity was mentioned more often as the reasons for coming to Turkey by the respondents in Gaziantep. As mentioned before, historically the area around Gaziantep and Aleppo belonged to the same region. Even after the formation of the border between Syria and Turkey, people still have relations across both sides of the border. In general, younger adults more often expressed political, administrative and other reasons instead of cultural proximity.

Table 15. Respondents' reasons to come to Turkey instead of other countries.

	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	Geographical proximity 39	Pol. or byr. reasons 15	Cultural proximity 15
Woman	Geographical proximity 38	Pol. or byr. reasons 15	Cultural proximity 14
18–29 years	Geographical proximity 35	Pol. or byr. reasons 17	Other 16
30–49 years	Geographical proximity 43	Cultural proximity 21	Pol. or byr. reasons 15
50–59 years	Geographical proximity 45	Peace and security 24	Cultural proximity 12
60+ years	Geographical proximity 37	Cultural proximity 16	Pol. or byr. reasons 16
Employed	Geographical proximity 41	Cultural proximity 16	Pol. or byr. reasons 15
Inactive	Geographical proximity 36	Pol. or byr. reasons 14	Peace or security 13
Gaziantep	Geographical proximity 44	Cultural proximity 23	Peace or security 16
Istanbul	Geographical proximity 36	Cultural proximity 14	Pol. or byr. reasons 12
İzmir	Geographical proximity 36	Pol. or byr. reasons 20	No other choice 12
Total	Geographical proximity 38	Cultural proximity 15	Pol. or byr. reasons 15

The respondents also answered why they decided to come to their current place of residence in Turkey (Table 16). As mentioned earlier, the location and mobility of Syrians in Turkey are influenced by the Turkish national authorities.

The most often mentioned reason was related to work and the labor market. Of all respondents, this was mentioned by over two out of five (43%). Clear gender differences existed in this. Every second (51%) male respondent mentioned a labor-related reason, whereas only a third (33%) of female respondents did so. In fact, much fewer Syrian women work in Turkey compared to men. For women, the most important reason for over a third (35%) of respondents was family and other social reasons. A majority (54%) of those who were employed in the spring of 2018 mentioned labor-related reasons as the most important reasons for moving, whereas family and other social reasons were the most important reasons for the economically inactive respondents, answered by every third (32%) of them. For all subgroups, work and family were mentioned as the two most important reasons for moving to their current place in Turkey. Among the family-related reasons is also tied migration, in which the rest of the family had to follow the male family head, who usually moved to the current place due to reasons related to work.

Table 16. Respondents' reasons to come to the current place in Turkey.

	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)
Man	Labor-related 51	Family and social 19	Enhanced life conditions 10
Woman	Family and social 35	Labor-related 33	Not moved 22
18–29 years	Labor-related 41	Family and social 24	Enhanced life conditions 11
30–49 years	Labor-related 47	Family and social 26	Other 10
50–59 years	Labor-related 41	Family and social 33	Enhanced life conditions 15
60+ years	Labor-related 33	Family and social 33	Financial issues 10
Employed	Labor-related 54	Family and social 20	Enhanced life conditions 10
Inactive	Family and social 32	Labor-related 30	Not moved 13
Gaziantep	Labor-related 45	Family and social 19	Other 11
Istanbul	Labor-related 41	Family and social 27	Not moved 11
İzmir	Labor-related 44	Family and social 30	Enhanced life conditions 10
Total	Labor-related 43	Family and social 25	Enhanced life conditions 10

More than two out of five (22%) respondents have visited Syria after they left it for Turkey. Their share was highest (38%) in Gaziantep. It is located close in the borderland with Syria and many respondents had lived there for several years. Of the respondents who currently lived in İzmir, one out of five (21%) had visited Syria after they had left it. The amount of these people was substantially lower (8%) among respondents in Istanbul.

4.3. Current living place

Syrian respondents' current living place is both a physical place where they live as well as the social environment related to it. The physical setting is of varied size, consisting of an apartment or house in which the respondent lives and the neighborhood in which the apartment or house is located. The setting continues

to the city or village and up to the broader province. For some respondents, the current place of residence was just Turkey, a collective definition of the living place. Usually the respondents considered the immediate physical surrounding, neighborhood and town in which they lived as their current living place.

Among the respondents, two out of three (67%) had lived their entire lives in Turkey in the same place where they were located at the time of the survey in the spring of 2018. Almost a third (31%) had lived in Turkey in one or two places aside from their current place, but very few (1%) had lived in more than three places, even if they had stayed in Turkey for several years.

On the respondents in Gaziantep, two out of three (69%) had lived in Turkey only in Gaziantep. Of the remaining respondents there, many had lived also in Istanbul. Similarly, two out of three (67%) of respondents in İzmir had lived in Turkey only in İzmir. Some had moved there from Gaziantep or Istanbul. In Istanbul, a larger share (73%) had lived in Turkey only in Istanbul. Those who had lived also elsewhere in Turkey but now lived in Istanbul had stayed in Mersin or Gaziantep.

The face-to-face social relationships are usually the most intensive among the family and relatives in the immediate vicinity and stretch to the neighborhood and beyond. Almost two-thirds (64%) of the respondents had family in their current living place (Table 17). This amount varied substantially between different regions and between men and women. Almost four out of five (79%) female respondents in İzmir had family in their current living place, but this share was more than a half smaller (38%) among the male respondents in Istanbul. In general, much fewer women (16%) were without family compared to men (32%). Typically, those who did not have any family in their current living place lived in Istanbul, were men younger than 30 years old, had been in Turkey for 1–3 years and had moved to their current location because of work.

Table 17. Respondents being in current place with some of the family.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				İzmir				Total			
	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N
	man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Agree	77	74	76	165	38	61	47	92	57	79	67	142	59	72	64	399
Don't know	8	6	7	16	8	21	17	33	7	9	8	16	9	12	11	65
Disagree	15	50	17	37	50	18	36	69	36	12	24	51	32	16	25	157
Total	100	100	100	218	100	100	100	194	100	100	100	210	100	100	100	622

Of the male respondents, four out of five (80%) had Syrian friends in the neighborhood in which they lived (Table 18). This amount was the same in all studied regions. Fewer (70%) women had Syrian friends in the neighborhood in which they lived. This varied between the regions. In İzmir, women had Syrian friends as often as men (79% vs. 80%), but in Gaziantep, fewer (70%) women had

Syrian friends, and even fewer (60%) had Syrian friends in Istanbul. Nevertheless, in all regions, the majority of respondents had Syrian friends in their neighborhood. Men who did not have Syrian friends were characteristically 30–49 years old and living in İzmir. For women without Syrian friends in the neighborhood, it was typical to be a young female adult (18–29 years old) living in Istanbul.

Table 18. Respondents' Syrian friends in current neighborhood.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				İzmir				Total			
	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N
	man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all	
	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
Many	55	42	50	115	47	38	43	100	51	48	50	121	51	43	48	336
Some	25	25	25	57	33	22	28	66	29	31	30	74	29	26	28	197
No	20	33	25	57	20	40	29	68	20	21	20	50	20	31	25	175
Total	100	100	100	229	100	100	100	234	100	100	100	245	100	100	100	708

Slightly over half (52%) of the respondents were clearly satisfied with their current neighborhood, and three out of four (75%) were at least partly satisfied (Table 19). In general, men and women were almost equally satisfied; however, there were regional variations. A minority of women (47%) in Gaziantep and a minority of men (47%) in Istanbul were clearly satisfied. Well over half (56%) of men in Gaziantep and well over half of women (56%) in İzmir were clearly satisfied in their current neighborhood.

Table 19. Respondents' satisfaction with current neighborhood.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				İzmir				Total			
	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N
	man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all	
	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
Yes	56	47	53	124	47	53	50	120	52	56	54	133	52	53	52	377
Partly	24	26	24	57	25	21	23	56	24	21	22	55	24	22	23	168
No	20	27	23	53	28	26	27	65	24	23	23	57	24	25	24	175
Total	100	100	100	234	100	100	100	241	100	100	100	245	100	100	100	720

In general, the respondents' satisfaction with the neighborhood was 10–20 percent units higher than that with their current accommodations (Table 20). Substantially more critical to the current accommodation vs. the neighborhood were female respondents in Istanbul (-24 per cent units), men in Istanbul (-22 per cent units) and women in İzmir (-20 per cent units). For them, the neighborhood is rather satisfactory, but their accommodation has problems in that neighborhood. In Istanbul, every second (50%) male and female respondent expressed that s/he was not satisfied with his/her current accommodations. Even in Gaziantep, which was the best region in this respect, every third (33%) respondent was not satisfied with his/her current accommodation. In general,

the most dissatisfied with their accommodations were those who were not satisfied with their current neighborhood and perceived financial issues as the most significant constraint in achieving their life goal(s). Additionally, compared to those satisfied with their current accommodation, the dissatisfied respondents were less interested in staying in Turkey and were more interested in migrating to Europe or some other country than Syria.

Table 20. Respondents' satisfaction with current accommodation.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				İzmir				Total			
	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N
	man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Fully	42	43	43	100	32	32	32	77	43	34	39	95	39	36	38	272
Partly	25	25	25	58	23	18	21	50	24	23	23	58	24	22	23	166
No	33	32	32	76	50	50	47	112	33	43	43	94	37	42	39	282
Total	100	100	100	234	100	100	100	239	100	100	100	247	100	100	100	720

Satisfaction is related to how a person feels about the availability and quality of physical and social amenities. With regard to physical amenities, almost three out of four (71%) respondents stated they have enough toilets, showers and other facilities for their use (Table 21). The male respondents were more often satisfied with these facilities in all studied regions. It is quite common that refugee men require less from these facilities (Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018; Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2018). The least satisfied were women in Istanbul, of whom a slight majority (52%) agreed to have enough toilets, showers and other facilities; however, almost a third (31%) were unsure about this. In general, those who did not have sufficient facilities were more likely to be dissatisfied with their current accommodations. In fact, almost one out of four (22%) of those not satisfied with their current accommodations did not have enough toilets, showers and such for their use.

Table 21. Enough toilets, showers and other facilities in use for respondents.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				İzmir				Total			
	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N	wom-			N
	man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all		man	an	all	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Agree	78	72	76	163	66	52	60	114	76	75	76	159	74	67	71	436
Don't know	8	10	9	19	17	31	23	43	13	15	14	30	12	19	15	92
Disagree	14	17	15	32	17	17	17	33	11	10	10	21	14	14	14	86
Total	100	100	100	214	100	100	100	190	100	100	100	210	100	100	100	614

Almost three out of four (73%) respondents agreed they felt safe in Turkey in their current place, and this feeling was almost equal between men (74%) and women (72%) (Table 22). Of those not feeling safe, two out of five (42%) were sat-

isfied with their lives in Turkey, and less (40%) were satisfied with their neighborhoods. There was not a clear pattern regarding how age is related to feeling safety. However, of the youngest respondents (18–29 years old), one out of six disagreed that they felt safe in their current place in Turkey. This was the highest percentage among all age groups. Those who were not feeling safe in their current place in Turkey were usually young single male adults (18–29 years old) who did not have Turkish friends. Another group not feeling safe consisted of women with high education levels (high school or university education) who strongly disagreed with the statements that they are treated well in Turkey or that their treatment is better in Turkey than in the European Union. However, regional variation is strong here. In Istanbul, only slightly over half (55%) of respondents expressed feeling safe, whereas feeling safe was expressed in Gaziantep by over four out of five (83%) respondents.

Table 22. Respondents' feeling safe in Turkey in the current place.

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	N
	%	%	%	
Man	74	12	14	358
Woman	72	16	12	272
18–29 years	69	15	16	326
30–49 years	78	12	10	259
50–59 years	63	26	11	35
60+ years	80	7	13	15
Employed	77	11	12	196
Inactive	72	15	13	326
Gaziantep	83	10	7	222
Istanbul	55	22	23	201
İzmir	79	10	11	217
Total	73	14	13	640

Feeling safe and being treated well are connected. Of those who felt safe in Turkey, four out of five (81%) also felt they were treated well. On the other hand, of those who did not feel safe in Turkey, one out of eight (13%) felt they were treated well in Turkey. Again, here one finds regional variations, namely in Istanbul, where only every second (51%) respondent felt treated well. Two out of three (65%) respondents in İzmir and almost four out of five (78%) respondents in Gaziantep felt they were treated well.

A difference in gender and age exists among those who felt they were treated well. Slightly over two out of three (68%) male respondents said they were treated well, but fewer women (61%) did so (Table 23). The older a respondent is, the more often s/he experiences being treated well in Turkey. In general, the cultural traditions in Turkey mean that older people are usually respected more and treated well among both Syrians and Turkish. Also, older refugees are not exposed as often to societal issues in Turkey and spend more time

with persons they know and who eventually get along well with them. Another major difference was between employed and inactive respondents. Of the employed, three out of four (74%) felt they were treated well in their current place in Turkey. Of the inactive, only slightly more than half (57%) felt they were treated well.

Table 23. Respondents feeling well treated in Turkey in the current place.

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	N
	%	%	%	
Man	68	12	21	364
Woman	61	16	23	274
18–29 years	62	14	24	324
30–49 years	68	14	18	266
50–59 years	71	10	18	38
60+ years	73	7	20	15
Employed	74	10	16	330
Inactive	57	16	27	220
Gaziantep	78	11	12	227
Istanbul	51	18	32	205
İzmir	65	12	23	217
Total	65	13	22	649

4.4. Employment

Employment is a key issue for Syrians in Turkey. One needs money for everyday survival and to enhance his/her position and that of his/her family, if s/he has one. In general, employment is also an issue according to which many Syrians and other refugees are in more marginalized and precarious positions and feel exploitation. Based on the respondents, one out of three (32%) adult Syrians in Turkey work full time, about one out of five (22%) work part time or irregularly and almost every second (47%) does not work at all (Table 24). However, employment among Syrians in Turkey varies greatly.

Of the respondents who came to Turkey, over half (56%) were employed in Syria prior to leaving for Turkey, a few (9%) were job seekers, one out of five (20%) were at home as a housewife and one out of three (35%) were students. Only a few (3%) respondents did not an answer for this. Of those who were employed in Syria before leaving for Turkey, almost every second (45%) was employed full time in Turkey in the spring of 2018. Of those respondents who were inactive in Syria, only one out of ten (10%) worked full time in Turkey. The full-time employment in Turkey for those in Syria who were employed or students is practically the same (45% vs. 44%). However, former students were much more often (40%) without employment in Turkey compared to those (23%) who had worked in Syria before.

An especially huge gender bias is in the active labor force participation among Syrians. Of the male respondents, every second (50%) worked full time, whereas one out of nine (11%) of the female respondents worked full time. Likewise, of men, one out of four (24%) did not work at all, and of the women, three out of four (74%) did not work at all. The reasons for such a huge difference vary. Some reasons relate to traditions in which it is expected that the “head of the family” is a man who should be responsible for the family’s necessary income generation. Women are expected to take care of the home and the children, if there are any. In addition, women are discouraged from spending their days outside the apartment. The younger adult respondents (18–29 years old) were more often employed compared to other age groups.

The respondents’ language skills are associated with the respondents’ active engagement in their working life. Two out of five respondents worked full time and had good or moderate skills with regard to the Turkish (40%) or English (41%) language. For those without these language skills, their participation in their working life was about half of that. Under one out of five (18%) non-Turkish speakers and slightly over one out of five (22%) non-English speakers worked in the spring of 2018. Of those respondents who did not work at all, almost two-thirds (65%) did not know the Turkish language at all, and over half (56%) did not know English. Again, much fewer of those who knew Turkish (36%) or English (39%) well or moderately were without employment.

Another impact on employment is respondents’ education levels and previous work experiences. When the education level is higher, the respondent more often works full time. Likewise, when the education level is lower, more respondents are not working at all in Turkey. There were also regional variations in the employment. Of the respondents in Gaziantep, two-thirds (66%) worked at least irregularly, and every second (52%) respondent in İzmir and slightly over two out of five (43%) respondents in Istanbul worked irregularly. The amount of irregular workers was highest in Gaziantep, and that is also linked to the situation in which many Syrians usually work in Gaziantep (Balkan & Tumen 2016). The lowest amount of irregular workers was among the older people and the respondents in Istanbul.

Of all employed respondents in Turkey, over two out of five (42%) were employed in enterprises, one out of five (20%) were self-employed with their own businesses, one out of ten (10%) had a combination of mixed employment and self-employment and over one out of four (28%) had other types of employment. Those self-employed in their own businesses were often men under 50 years of age, working typically in crafts or trade. Those working in enterprises were often highly educated (high school or university level educations) men and women under 50 years in various fields of employment.

Table 24. Respondents' employment in the spring of 2018.

	Full-time		Part-time		Irregularly No
	%	%	%	%	N
Man	50	9	17	24	335
Woman	11	5	11	74	302
18–29 years	36	8	14	42	336
30–49 years	29	6	15	51	251
50–59 years	10	15	15	61	41
60+ years	43	0	0	57	14
Gaziantep	38	9	19	34	196
Istanbul	30	5	8	57	226
İzmir	27	9	16	48	225
Family in Turkey	30	9	14	47	482
No family in Turkey	45	5	13	36	75
Good or moderate Turkish	40	7	17	36	345
No command of Turkish	18	5	13	65	120
Good or moderate English	41	9	12	39	253
No command of English	22	5	17	56	232
Elementary or lower school	23	5	14	58	151
Middle or high school	30	6	14	50	299
University	45	13	11	31	164
Student in Syria	44	5	11	40	145
Employed in Syria	45	14	18	23	175
Inactive in Syria	10	6	10	73	115
Total	32	8	14	47	647

The respondents mentioned the best and worst aspects of their current employment (Table 25). Among all employed respondents, one out of five (20%) said the work is enjoyable, and one out of six (16%) mentioned that social relations were the best aspects of their current work. One out of seven (15%) did not find anything positive in their current job.

With regard to the worst aspects in their current employment, two out of five (41%) respondents mentioned difficult working conditions. It is common for many Syrians to search for any kind of job in Turkey. Many jobs are those for which there is less demand among the titular nation. It is also common for the revenues gained to be small, and sometimes salaries are not paid as agreed (İçduygu & Diker 2017). The second most often (16%) mentioned worst aspect in their current employment was low salary. One out of ten (10%) mentioned injustice in the working place. However, one out of nine (11%) did not find anything negative in their current employment. Typically these respondents were men under 50 years old with high education levels (high school or university) and employed in diverse fields of employment.

Among the employed respondents, the median income in the spring of 2018 was 1200 Turkish lira per month which is equivalent of 210 EUR per month. Among the full-time workers, the median salary was 1300 Turkish lira per month, equivalent to 225 EUR per month. Those mentioning low salary as the

worst aspect of their current employment earned on average 1300 Turkish lira per month, equivalent to 210 EUR per month, i.e., 7–10 EUR per one full working day. Less than one out of five (18%) respondents was able to save money in Turkey. Very few of those who earned less than 2000 Turkish lira (350 EUR) per month was able to save money. Another challenge is that the value of Turkish lira against euro dropped almost 40% from May until September 2018. Those respondents who were able to save some money were some of those who had no dependent children in Turkey or who earned more than 2000 Turkish lira (350 EUR) per month.

Table 25. Best and worst in respondents' current work.

Best in current work %	Worst in current work %
Work is enjoyable 20	Hard working conditions 41
Social relations 16	Low salary 16
Nothing 15	Nothing 11
Illegible answers 13	Injustice in the work place 10
Voluntariness or helping 9	Other 6
Being able to support myself 8	Everything 4
N = 327	N = 324

The survey contained an open question to determine if the respondents had learned something useful for their future in Turkey (Table 26). One out of three (33%) answered yes, one out of five (19%) answered no and almost half (48%) did not answer this question. Of those who had learned something useful for their future, two out of five (41%) mentioned learning the Turkish language. The next most common things were related to working skills, as expressed by almost one out of five (18%) respondents, and to survival as such, as mentioned by one out of eight (12%) respondents. Of the employed, substantially more (65%) had learned something useful compared to the unemployed respondents (45%). Also, the employed mentioned the Turkish language (41%) twice as often compared to the next common issue related to work (21%). Men (63%) and women (66%) almost equally expressed having learned useful things.

Table 26. Respondents' learning useful things in Turkey for the future.

Yes %	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third most common (%)	N
Man 63	Turkish language 35	Work skills 21	Values 12	139
Woman 66	Turkish language 58	Survival 18	Work skills 10	50
18–29 years 68	Turkish language 42	Work skills 19	Values 12	110
30–49 years 63	Turkish language 42	Work skills 13	Survival 13	77
50–59 years 56	Work skills 67	Turkish language 33	–	3
60+ years 27	Work skills 33	Survival 33	Societal knowledge 33	3
Employed 69	Turkish language 41	Work skills 21	Survival 11	140
Inactive 45	Turkish language 47	Survival 16	Values 16	19
Total 64	Turkish language 41	Work skills 18	Survival 12	195

Learning something useful in Turkey for their future is connected to the respondents' education levels (Table 27). Of those who had learned something useful in Turkey, two out of five (41%) had attended university, and one out of eleven (9%) only had elementary or lower education levels. Of those who said they had not learned anything useful for their future in Turkey, about one out of four (27%) had attended university, and another one out of four (24%) only had elementary or lower education levels. With a different perspective, the respondents with a university education background, over three out of four (77%) had learned something useful in Turkey, whereas clearly less than half (44%) of those had elementary or lower education levels. The respondents' education background at high school or higher levels usually facilitated to learn something useful for the future in Turkey.

Table 27. Learning something useful according to the respondents' education levels.

Education	Elementary	Middle school	High school	University
Learning something useful	9%	10%	40%	41%
Not learning anything useful	24%	18%	30%	27%

Over four out of five (82%) respondents who worked in the spring of 2018 had fellow coworkers (Table 28). To have fellow Turkish coworkers is less common than having fellow Syrian coworkers. Of the employed respondents, every second (49%) had both Syrian and Turkish fellow coworkers, one out of five (20%) had only fellow Syrian coworkers and one out of nine (9%) had only fellow Turkish coworkers. Most often a respondent had fellow Turkish coworkers if s/he worked in mining, construction, elementary occupations or as teachers. There were small differences among males and females with regard to their fellow coworkers. Employed men (64%) had slightly more fellow Turkish coworkers than women (60%), and fewer men (70%) had fellow Syrian coworkers than women (86%).

In general, employed Syrians in Turkey most often have fellow Turkish coworkers in Gaziantep, slightly less in İzmir and even slightly less in Istanbul. In Gaziantep, employed respondents more often had many Syrian (53%) and/or many Turkish (42%) fellow coworkers compared to Istanbul (47% and 34%) and İzmir (43% and 38%). Similarly, slightly fewer employed respondents in Gaziantep were without fellow Syrian coworkers (24%) compared to the situation in Istanbul (26%) and İzmir (28%). Regarding fellow Turkish coworkers, the differences were larger. Slightly fewer than one out of three (32%) employed in Gaziantep were completely without fellow Turkish coworkers, whereas that amount was slightly over one out of three (35%) in İzmir and over two out of five (44%) in Istanbul.

Five out of six (84%) of those who solely had fellow Turkish coworkers knew at least some of the Turkish language, and almost one out of three (30%) had a good command of Turkish. Of those who had both Turkish and Syrian fellow coworkers,

eight out of nine (89%) knew at least some of the Turkish language, and one out of three (33%) had a good command of Turkish. Those who solely had Syrian fellow coworkers knew at least some of the Turkish language; similarly, almost the same amount (80%) knew some Turkish and have a good (27%) command of Turkish.

Table 28. Respondents with Syrian and Turkish fellow workers in current work.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				İzmir				Total			
	Syrian		Turkish		Syrian		Turkish		Syrian		Turkish		Syrian		Turkish	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Many	53	82	42	65	47	55	34	40	43	60	38	54	48	197	38	159
Some	23	35	26	40	27	31	22	26	24	34	28	39	24	100	25	105
No	24	37	32	50	26	30	44	51	33	47	35	49	28	114	36	150
Total	100	154	100	155	100	116	100	117	100	141	100	142	100	411	100	414

4.5. Migration wishes and plans

All respondents had experienced migration because they had to migrate from Syria to Turkey. However, not all want to migrate any further. Nevertheless, some wanted to change their place of living in Turkey, and others wanted migrate to further abroad.

4.5.1. Return migration from Turkey to Syria

The Syrian refugees' desires and plans to return to Syria varied. This is evidenced by their responses regarding their wishes and plans to return to Syria (Table 29). In general, every second (49%) respondent wished to return to Syria. Fewer respondents, about two out of five (39%), planned to return to Syria. One out of four (25%) clearly expressed s/he did not wish to return to Syria. One out of three (33%) clearly mentioned that s/he was not planning to return to Syria.

Four out of five (80%) of those who wished to return to Syria also planned to return to Syria. The vast majority of them mentioned that they could return only when the war would be over. Only a couple of respondents wished to return there soon. However, different people with different motivations wished and planned to return to Syria. Most (93%) had family in Turkey: a spouse, children and/or relatives. Over two out of three (71%) were currently together with at least some of their family. These respondents typically disagreed or were unsure if their children could have a good life in the European Union. Those who wished to return to Syria often felt that Syrian people received better treatment in Turkey than in the European Union.

Of those who did not wish to return to Syria, fewer, but still three out of four (77%), planned to return to Syria. Most had high education levels (high school or university). Despite the fact that many planned to return to Syria, almost every second respondent planned to migrate to another country, typically to Europe

or North America. The majority felt the Syrian people received better treatment in the European Union than in Turkey. Every second respondent felt his/her children could have a good life in the European Union.

There were differences in respondents' desires to return to Syria. The older one is, the more one wishes to return to Syria. Of the young adults (18–29 years old), every second (49%) wished to return, as did almost two out of three (63%) of the oldest respondents (60 years old or more). However, among the oldest respondents, almost one out of three (31%) was clear s/he did not wish to return. Only 6% did not know if they wished to return to Syria. Two groups were also more reluctant to return to Syria: Those who had come to Turkey less than one year ago and those who had been in Turkey for more than six years.

In general, slightly more than every second woman (52%) wished to return to Syria. This amount is a little higher than that of men (46%). However, almost a third (31%) of men were uncertain about whether they wished to return. This amount is substantially higher than that among women (22%). Among those who wish to return, almost all (93%) missed the landscape of their former home region.

The highest share of those who wished to return to Syria are among the oldest respondents (63%) and those not having family in the European Union (61%). The fewest wishing to return to Syria are those who did not have family or relatives in Syria (36%) and those living in Istanbul (39%). Nevertheless, from Istanbul, unemployed people and young adults (18–29 years old) in particular wished to return to Syria. Of them, three out of five (60%) disagreed that they viewed their future positively or were unsure about it. However, in general, few respondents in Istanbul wanted to return to Syria.

Those planning to return have kept the contacts to Syria active. Every second (51%) of those respondents who plan to return to Syria have visited it after they left the country for Turkey. Of those who do not plan to return to Syria, one out of six (16%) have visited Syria after migrating from there to Turkey.

When asking an open question about what country the respondent prefers the most, over a third (37%) mentioned Syria. There are thus more Syrian respondents in Turkey who would like to return to Syria compared to those Syrians who actually prefer Syria among all countries. For many, returning to Syria does not mean returning to a country they like the most. It is about returning to the country of origin or that of their parents, relatives and friends. This is something that no other country can provide. Of young Syrian adults (18–29 years old), over two out of five (44%) prefer other countries than Syria and Turkey. Of them, fewer (37%) wish to move back to Syria, and less than one out of three (29%) prefer to stay in Turkey.

There were also regional differences in the plans to return to Syria or not. In Gaziantep, almost every second (45%) respondent planned to return, and slightly more than one out of four (27%) respondents did not. In İzmir, these numbers

were 39% and 34% and 29% and 40% in Istanbul. The amount of respondents uncertain about whether to return was highest in Istanbul, where almost a third (31%) did not know.

Table 29. Respondents wishing to and with plans to return to Syria.

	Wishing to return to Syria				Planning to return to Syria			
	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	N	Yes	Maybe	No	N
	%	%	%		%	%	%	
Man	46	31	23	367	36	34	30	379
Woman	52	22	27	304	40	22	38	299
18–29 years	49	29	22	346	39	32	29	343
30–49 years	45	27	28	276	32	27	41	281
50–59 years	61	18	21	38	55	17	29	42
60+ years	63	6	31	16	53	24	24	17
Employed	47	26	28	314	39	27	34	311
Inactive	52	25	23	279	40	24	36	280
Gaziantep	53	25	22	229	45	28	27	230
Istanbul	39	33	28	218	29	31	40	221
İzmir	53	24	24	234	39	27	34	238
Family in Syria	50	28	22	623	39	29	32	635
No family in Syria	36	16	49	45	25	25	51	49
Family in the EU	41	28	31	331	30	33	37	338
Not family in the EU 61	20	20	210	48	22	30	220	
Family in Turkey	51	26	24	504	41	28	31	507
No family in Turkey	41	32	27	75	29	38	34	77
Total	49	27	25	681	38	29	33	689

4.5.2. Migration from Turkey abroad to elsewhere than Syria

The respondents expressed their most preferred countries to live in (Table 30). In general, Syria and Turkey received equal preference by all respondents: One third (34%) stated that Syria was their most preferred country, and another third (34%) stated that Turkey was their most preferred country. There was practically no difference between men and women in their first and second most preferred countries to live in. Two groups preferred Syria much more than Turkey, namely young adults (18–29 years old; 36% vs. 28%) and those living in İzmir (39% vs. 29%). Also, two groups preferred Turkey much more than Syria, namely 30–49 years old respondents (36% vs. 29%) and those living in Gaziantep (48% vs. 39%).

Almost one third (30%) of the respondents preferred a country other than Syria or Turkey. However, many countries were mentioned. The third most preferred country was usually Canada or Germany, but with a much lower preference than Syria or Turkey. Nevertheless, in Istanbul, almost one out of five (18%) respondents preferred Canada, and every second (50%) preferred a country other than Syria or Turkey. Of the young adult (18–29 years old) respondents in Istanbul, every third (34%) preferred countries other than Syria or Turkey.

Table 30. Respondents' most preferred countries to live.

	First	Second	Third
Man	Turkey 34	Syria 33	Canada 14
Woman	Syria 37	Turkey 37	Germany 11
18–29 years	Syria 37	Turkey 29	Canada 9
30–49 years	Turkey 42	Syria 31	Canada 12
50–59 years	Turkey 45	Syria 39	Germany 8
60+ years	Turkey 56	Syria 50	Germany 6
Employed	Turkey 38	Syria 35	Canada 9
Inactive	Syria 36	Turkey 31	Germany 10
Gaziantep	Turkey 49	Syria 40	Canada 5
Istanbul	Turkey 26	Syria 24	Canada 18
İzmir	Syria 42	Turkey 30	Germany 11
Total	Turkey 35	Syria 35	Canada 10

Answers "Turkey or Syria" are included to both Turkey and Syria categories

Almost one third (31%) of the respondents in Turkey had definite plans to migrate abroad to elsewhere than Syria (Table 31). One out of ten (10%) considered migrating, and three out of four (59%) did not plan to move abroad. Canada was mentioned most often (29%) as a destination country. It was followed by Germany (19%) and, more broadly, "Europe" by one out of ten (10%) respondents. Nevertheless, the preferences differed between men and women. Of these respondents, over half (57%) had relatives or family in Germany, one out of four (26%) in another country in Europe and fewer (7%) in Canada. Among men, about one out of three (35%) mentioned Canada as the country to which to migrate. The second was, more broadly, Europe (12%), and the third was the United Kingdom (10%). For the female respondents, Germany (33%) was mentioned as the country to which to move. Of these women, nearly all (90%) answered that they have relatives or family in Germany. Canada (21%) was second, and Europe (9%) was the third most common.

Table 31. Respondents' plans to migrate to a country outside Turkey but not to Syria.

	Yes	Maybe	No	Most common (%)	Second most common (%)	Third common (%)	N
Man	31	12	58	Canada 35	Europe 12	UK 9	124
Woman	32	9	60	Germany 33	Canada 21	Europe 9	92
18–29 years	32	11	57	Canada 23	Germany 15	Europe 13	112
30–49 years	33	10	56	Canada 27	Germany 21	Netherlands 7	94
50–59 years	18	5	76	Germany 30	Canada 20	Europe 20	10
60+ years	6	0	94	Germany 100			1
Employed	31	12	58	Canada 26	Europe 14	Germany 13	108
Inactive	33	8	59	Canada 30	Germany 28	Europe 8	90
Total	31	10	59	Canada 29	Germany 19	Europe 10	219

The respondents also mentioned if they were planning to move to the European Union (Table 32). Three out of ten (30%) answered yes, about one out of ten (11%) said maybe, and about six out of ten (59%) said no. More female (32%)

than male (28%) respondents were planning to move to the European Union. In general, the younger the respondent were, the larger was their share of those planning to move to the European Union. On the other hand, the lower was the education level of the respondent, the less eager s/he was to move out of Turkey.

The most likely to plan to move to the European Union, almost every other person, were those living in Istanbul (48%) or who did not have family or relatives in Syria (47%). More specifically, the largest share who planned to move to the European Union was respondents who had family or relatives in Europe (83%). However, of the respondents only one out of twelve (8%) said that they have enough money to travel to the European Union. That share was not much higher among employed (10%) or those who were actually planning to move to the European Union (11%). Majority (56%) of those respondents in Istanbul who planned to move to the European Union aimed to work in Europe.

On the contrary, the oldest respondents (6%), those living in Gaziantep (11%) and those who did not have family in the European Union (13%) had the lowest share of people planning to move to the European Union. Of those few who both lived in Gaziantep and planned to move to the European Union, the majority were married employed men under 50 years old. Those who did not have family in the European Union but still planned to move there were typically young adults (18–29 years old) with high education levels (high school or university), or respondents who believed that their children could have a good life in the European Union. In general, having family in the European Union had an important influence on planning to move to the European Union and eventually also migrating there. The Internet and social media are actively used in planning the migration to the European Union (see Section 4.6.).

Table 32. Respondents with plans to move to the European Union.

	Yes	Maybe	No	N
	%	%	%	
Man	28	12	60	394
Woman	32	10	58	291
18–29 years	28	14	58	342
30–49 years	32	10	58	288
50–59 years	33	0	67	42
60– years	6	0	94	18
Employed	27	12	61	321
Inactive	34	9	57	271
Gaziantep	11	10	79	230
Istanbul	48	13	39	225
İzmir	30	11	59	241
Family in Syria	28	12	60	637
No family in Syria	47	4	49	49
Family in the EU	44	14	42	340
No family in the EU	13	8	78	225
Family in Turkey	28	11	61	518
No family in Turkey	36	16	49	76
Total	30	11	59	696

A separate question was asked about whether the respondent would seek a residence permit in Finland (Table 33). One out of five (20%) respondents agreed on this, two out of five (42%) did not know, and one out of four (24%) disagreed; one out of seven (14%) did not answer. Based on this, rather few Syrians in Turkey think of Finland as an option for migration. The most common to consider Finland as a destination to search for a residence permit were those who were planning to move to the European Union. However, even among them, slightly over one out of three (36%) agreed to consider Finland, and almost one out of five (18%) would not consider Finland. Slightly over one out of three (35%) were uncertain about it, and one out of nine (11%) did not answer.

The typical people to respond in the affirmative regarding seeking a residence permit in Finland were young adults (18–29 years old) or those whose preferred country of migration was either the United Kingdom, Germany or Canada. Of those who answered that they would potentially seek residence permission in Finland, almost two out of three (63%) hoped to work in Europe. In addition, three out of four (75%) had at least some command of English, and a third (33%) had studied at the university level. Nearly all (91%) used the Internet, and almost three out of four (72%) used it on a daily basis. The majority (55%) searched the Internet for information about routes to reach Europe or about places to live there. Those who did not consider seeking a residence permit in Finland were generally over 30 years old with spouses, children and other relatives in Turkey (Table 27).

During the fieldwork, we met only a few people who had family members or friends living in Finland. They were in contact with these residents through social media. There were also cases of family reunification applications and cases in which the Finnish authorities had rejected these applications. Having a son or daughter with a residence permit in Finland and the rest of a broken Syrian family living in precarious conditions in Turkey caused huge stress, to the family in particular but also to relatives and friends.

Table 33. Finland is a country in which the respondent might to seek a resident permit

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	No answer	N
	%	%	%	%	
Man	22	41	25	12	413
Woman	18	44	23	16	337
18–29 years	20	44	25	11	377
30–49 years	22	39	22	17	314
50–59 years	13	42	33	11	45
60+ years	5	35	30	30	20
Employed	20	44	26	10	344
Inactive	19	43	24	15	303
Plan to move to the EU	36	35	18	11	206
No plans to move to the EU	27	52	13	8	77
Total	20	42	24	14	762

4.5.3. Migration inside Turkey

Of all respondents, slightly less than two out of five (37%) were affirmative that they would most like to live the rest of their lives in Turkey (Table 34). Slightly more than two out of five (42%) answered “maybe” to this, and one out of five (21%) answered “no.” The viewpoints on staying in Turkey were thus divided.

Respondents with different backgrounds had different opinions on whether they would live in Turkey for the rest of their lives. The geographical location of respondents’ families had particular significance. The share of those who thought that they would most likely live in Turkey for the rest of their lives was lowest among those who did not have family in Turkey (22%) or had family in the European Union (28%). The share of those who thought that they would most likely live in Turkey for the rest of their lives was higher than those mentioned above but similar if the respondents had family in Turkey (38%), family in Syria (37%) or did not have family in Syria (38%). Almost every second person (48%) of those who did not have family in the European Union thought that they would most likely live in Turkey for the rest of their lives. Another major difference was that in Gaziantep, over half (52%) thought about living in Turkey in the future, whereas that share was substantially smaller in Istanbul (29%) and İzmir (29%). Those who were most certain that they would not stay in Turkey for the rest of their lives were those who did not have family in Turkey (28%), who had family in the European Union (27%) or who lived in Istanbul (27%).

Table 34. Respondents most likely live in Turkey for the rest of life.

	Yes	Maybe	No	N
	%	%	%	
Man	41	35	25	372
Woman	32	51	17	312
18–29 years	32	44	24	347
30–49 years	40	41	19	286
50–59 years	51	29	20	41
60+ years	36	50	14	14
Employed	42	37	21	320
Inactive	29	48	23	279
Gaziantep	52	35	13	232
Istanbul	29	48	27	226
İzmir	29	46	25	236
Family in Syria	37	42	21	632
No family in Syria	38	38	25	48
Family in the EU	28	45	27	334
Not family in the EU	48	33	19	218
Family in Turkey	38	40	22	513
No family in Turkey	22	49	28	81
Total	37	42	21	694

In an open question, we asked where the respondents would like to live in Turkey (Table 35). In general, the current location of the respondents was clearly related to the locations they preferred. Of those who lived in Istanbul, five out of six (83%) preferred to live in Istanbul, and of those who lived in İzmir, almost four out of five (78%) wanted to live in İzmir. However, in Gaziantep, less than half (45%) wanted to live in Gaziantep. Istanbul was mentioned as the second preferred living place in Turkey among respondents in Gaziantep (28%) and İzmir (10%). One out of six (16%) respondents mentioned other places as their most preferred locations to live in Turkey. However, in Gaziantep, the respondents mentioned several places in Turkey where they would prefer to live. This was at least partly related to the locations in which their relatives and friends lived in Turkey and in which some also had business-related connections.

Table 35. Respondents' most preferred places to live in Turkey.

Gaziantep %	Istanbul %	İzmir %	Total %
Gaziantep 45	Istanbul 83	İzmir 78	Istanbul 41
Istanbul 28	Ankara 3	Istanbul 10	İzmir 28
Ankara 4	Bursa 2	Gaziantep 4	Gaziantep 15
Bursa 3	Antalya 2	Mersin 2	Ankara 3
Kahramanmaraş 3	Konya 1	Antalya 2	Bursa 2
N = 168	N = 195	N = 194	N = 557
% of respondents mentioning the place			

We also listed a number of large and other Turkish cities and asked in which of them the respondent would definitely like to live, which would be considered an option and in which the respondent would definitely not like to live (Table 36). It is rather difficult to make a generalization about the location preferences of all Syrians in Turkey because they differed very much according to the current place of residence and selected background variables of the respondents. Based on the respondents' answers in the studied regions of Gaziantep, Istanbul and İzmir, the majority of Syrians in Turkey would prefer to stay where they are now. Istanbul was the top location among all sites. Other large cities such as Ankara and İzmir were also rather popular, but for more select subgroups of Syrians.

There are, however, regional differences. Almost all (95%) respondents who were living in Istanbul in the spring of 2018 wished to live in Istanbul. Only one percent did not wish to live in Istanbul. From this perspective, it is not likely that Syrians in Istanbul would move to other places in Turkey. Ankara could be an option for one out of four (25%) respondents because they mentioned that they could live there. Locations close to the Syrian border, namely Gaziantep, Hatay and Urfa, were possible sites for only a few (3–4%) respondents. Therefore, without major structural problems in their everyday life or obligations by the authorities, Syrians living in Istanbul would like to and will remain there if they stay in Turkey.

The situation in İzmir is quite similar to that in Istanbul. The difference is that fewer respondents, but still eight out of nine (89%) wished to live in İzmir, and one out of twelve (8%) would not like to live there. Istanbul was preferred by more than one out of four (29%) respondents. In particular, employed young adults (18–29 years old) with higher education levels (high school or university) preferred Istanbul as a place to live. Another difference is that despite Hatay and Urfa being preferred by equally few (3–4%) respondents, almost one out of five (18%) respondents stated that they could live in Gaziantep. In particular, employed 30- to 40-year-old respondents with family (spouse and children) in İzmir preferred Gaziantep as a place to live. The situation in Gaziantep is different from that of Istanbul and İzmir.

Fewer respondents, three out of four (76%), wished to live in Gaziantep, and one out of nine (11%) would not like to live there. Those who would not like to live there were usually over 30-year-old unemployed married women from Gaziantep or Istanbul or employed young male adults (18–29 years old) with higher education levels (high school or university) currently living in Gaziantep or Istanbul. Istanbul was preferred by almost two out of three (62%) respondents and not by one out of five (20%) respondents. Those from Gaziantep who would not like to live Istanbul were usually married women with low education levels or people who never used the Internet and had little or no English language skills. Another difference is that many other locations in Turkey were preferred by some respondents from Gaziantep, including Hatay (14%) and Urfa (11%). İzmir (30%) and Ankara (29%) were also mentioned as preferred places to live in Turkey by fairly equal numbers of respondents from Gaziantep. There is thus potential for Syrians’ outmigration from Gaziantep, up to one out of four current Syrian residents, in particular to the largest urban agglomeration Istanbul. There is very little potential for them to move to other border regions in southern Turkey.

Table 36. Respondents’ wishes to live in selected cities in Turkey.

	Gaziantep					Istanbul					İzmir					Total				
	y	m	n	d	N	y	m	n	d	N	y	m	n	d	N	y	m	n	d	N
	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	
Istanbul	62	16	20	3	146	95	3	1	1	218	29	20	44	7	135	67	11	17	3	499
Ankara	29	26	38	7	111	25	27	38	10	78	10	16	60	13	116	21	23	46	10	306
İzmir	30	18	43	8	109	11	24	49	16	70	89	3	8	1	214	59	11	25	5	393
Gaziantep	76	9	11	3	177	3	13	70	15	69	18	11	59	11	114	44	11	38	8	360
Hatay	14	14	62	11	104	3	9	72	16	68	3	10	76	11	114	7	11	70	12	286
Urfa	11	13	69	7	100	4	10	69	16	68	4	12	75	9	114	6	12	71	10	282
Bursa	21	16	52	11	103	15	21	50	14	66	8	16	63	13	105	15	17	56	12	274

y = yes; m = maybe; n = no; d=don't know; N = amount

To consider one more aspect of the migration wishes of the respondents, we asked in an open question about where the respondents would like to be 3 years from now (i.e., in 2021). This was a question about their near-term futures. Of all Syrians who responded to this question, approximately one out of five (21%) mentioned a locality in Turkey. Two out of five (40%) respondents answered that they wished to be back in Syria. Of the respondents from Istanbul who answered this question, one out of seven (14%) mentioned a location in Turkey, and for almost all (93%), it was Istanbul, where they currently lived. Of those respondents who answered this question, one out of nine (11%) mentioned a location outside of Istanbul, either Ankara or Antalya, equally.

Of the respondents from İzmir who answered to this question, one out of five (20%) mentioned a location in Turkey, and for nine out of ten (90%), it was İzmir, where they currently lived. Other places mentioned in Turkey were Istanbul (11%) and Gaziantep (3%). Of those respondents who answered this question, almost one out of four (23%) mentioned a location outside İzmir, in total six locations because some named more than one location.

Of the respondents from Gaziantep who answered this question, almost a third (30%) mentioned a location in Turkey, and for every second (50%), it was Gaziantep, where they currently lived. Other places mentioned in Turkey were Istanbul (23%) and Kahramanmaraş (7%). A majority (56%) of respondents who answered this question mentioned a locality outside Gaziantep, and some named more than one location. In total, 13 locations were mentioned.

For some respondents, these mentioned locations were where they would like to be in 3 years. However, not all would take steps to realize these wishes, and several issues could also influence their wishes during the coming 3 years. Other respondents may take action to make these dreams to stay in Turkey and its specific locations a reality in the coming years.

4.6. Internet and social media

Nowadays, the Internet and social media are everyday tools for many refugees around the world (Dekker & Engbersen 2014; Alan & Imran 2015). Often, they are the only possible access to broader information about the situation in the former home country and the potential destination countries. However, above all, they are tools to get along in the place in which one stays for a longer time. For those who flee from a country of conflict to a more stable country, such as Syrians to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, the use of the Internet and social media becomes more common among the whole refugee population (see, for example, Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2018). Therefore, one can claim that the Internet and social media are integral to the refugees' lives. One can obviously survive without the Internet and social media, but this would make it more difficult to know what is going on the country of origin and the current country in which one

lives; to maintain often dispersed social networks among family, relatives and friends; and to be engaged with work life.

Among Syrians in Turkey, it was very common to own a mobile phone with Internet access; five out of six (84%) respondents agreed on this (Table 37). Men (87%) had such devices slightly more often than women (80%). Such a gender-based digital divide was the most pronounced among the respondents in Gaziantep, in which clearly fewer (73%) women compared to men (87%) had their own mobile phone with Internet access. In Istanbul, this digital divide was much smaller (91% of men vs. 85% of women). In total, the oldest respondents possessed a smartphone with Internet access less often (71%) than the rest of the age groups, as well as those who were inactive (77%) compared to employed (87%). The groups among which owning a mobile phone with Internet access was highest were young (18–29 years old) male adults in Istanbul (96%) and employed in Istanbul (93%). The groups who most often did not own a mobile phone with Internet access were the oldest respondents in İzmir (40%) and women in Gaziantep (22%). A digital divide existed among Syrians in Turkey; however, it was very specific and did not follow universal gender, age or geographical patterns (see also Alan & Imran 2015).

Table 37. Respondents having own mobile phone with Internet access.

	Gaziantep				Istanbul				izmir				Total			
	A	DK	D	N	A	DK	D	N	A	DK	D	N	A	DK	D	N
	%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	
Man	87	9	4	148	91	3	5	116	83	3	15	109	87	5	8	373
Woman	73	5	22	79	85	8	8	107	80	3	17	122	80	5	15	308
18–29 years	83	6	12	109	90	5	5	120	78	4	17	116	84	5	11	345
30–49 years	86	6	8	97	86	5	9	78	85	2	13	108	86	4	10	283
50–59 years	67	27	7	15	76	10	14	21	80	0	20	5	73	15	12	41
60+ years	70	20	10	10	100	0	0	2	60	0	40	5	71	12	18	71
Employed	83	8	9	125	93	3	3	89	86	1	13	106	87	4	9	320
Inactive	71	11	18	63	83	8	9	118	73	6	21	99	77	8	15	280
Total	82	8	10	231	88	5	7	226	81	3	16	235	84	5	11	692

A = agree; DK= don't know; D = disagree; N = amount

In Turkey, two out of three (68%) respondents used the Internet daily, over one out of ten (10%) many times a week, one out of nine (11%) less often and one out of ten (10%) never (Table 38). In general, younger Syrian respondents used the Internet more often than the older respondents. Of those 18–29 years old, three out of four (75%) used the Internet daily and only one out of fourteen (7%) did not use the Internet. Of the respondents 60 years or older, over half (56%) used the Internet daily, and slightly more than one out of five (22%) did not use the Internet at all. Other groups that did not use the Internet were respondents with only elementary or lower education levels (22%) and those 50–59 years old (24%).

The most frequent users of the Internet were respondents with university degrees living in Istanbul. Every one of them used the Internet, and almost all (94%) used it daily. There was also a gender division in the use of the Internet. In general, men used the Internet more frequently than women. Three out of four (75%) men and three out of five (61%) women were daily Internet users. The largest gender-based difference among the daily users was in Istanbul, in which five out of six (84%) men used it daily versus two out of three (68%) women. However, the share of non-users of the Internet was the smallest in Istanbul, among both men (3%) and women (5%). The largest gender-based difference in the non-use of the Internet was in Gaziantep, in which one out of fourteen (7%) men and one out of six (17%) women did not use the Internet at all. Being employed was connected to use and more frequent use of the Internet. Of all employed respondents, three out of four (74%) used the Internet daily; that share was much lower (57%) among the inactive respondents. Furthermore, of the employed, one out of fourteen (7%) did not use the Internet; the amount was over two times more (16%) among the inactive respondents. In particular, among female respondents not participating into working life and with low education levels in Gaziantep and İzmir, as well as people with little or no English knowledge or no plans to migrate to a third country, the non-use of the Internet was common.

Table 38. Respondents' frequency of the Internet use in Turkey.

	Gaziantep					Istanbul					İzmir					Total				
	A	B	C	D	N	A	B	C	D	N	A	B	C	D	N	A	B	C	D	N
	%	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	%	N	%	%	%	%	N
Man	73	9	12	7	153	84	8	5	3	126	66	9	13	12	113	75	8	10	7	392
Woman	63	5	15	17	78	68	14	13	5	112	54	15	11	20	127	61	12	13	14	317
18–29 years	78	5	11	6	111	85	5	11	0	124	62	13	10	15	123	75	8	10	7	358
30–49 years	63	11	15	11	99	67	18	7	8	87	61	13	12	15	110	63	14	12	12	296
50–59 years	60	0	3	3	15	61	9	4	26	23	25	0	50	25	4	57	5	14	24	42
60+ years	70	0	10	20	10	100	0	0	0	2	17	0	50	33	6	56	0	22	22	18
Employed	71	6	15	8	125	85	4	9	2	91	68	11	11	10	110	74	7	12	7	326
Inactive	60	8	15	17	65	68	15	8	9	124	43	16	15	25	104	57	14	12	16	293
Elementary school	56	0	16	28	25	44	22	11	22	18	58	6	17	19	36	54	8	15	23	79
Middle or high	63	16	14	7	97	73	15	10	2	130	59	14	14	14	104	66	15	12	8	331
University	89	3	7	1	75	94	3	3	0	65	81	7	7	5	59	88	4	6	2	199
Total	70	7	13	10	235	76	11	8	5	241	60	12	12	16	244	68	10	11	10	720

A = daily; B = many times a week; C = less often; D = never; N = amount

Many Syrians were not frequent Internet users in Syria before the war. Of all respondents, almost a third (30%) used the Internet in Syria daily, one out of five (21%) weekly, one out of six (16%) less often and one out of three (32%) never (Table 39). In general, the younger the respondent was, the more frequent was his/her use of the Internet in Syria. Similarly, the older was the respondent, the more likely s/he had not used the Internet. Some Syrians back in Syria

did not need the Internet for work or to receive information. Furthermore, they were able to maintain social networks in other ways, for example, because they lived next to relatives and friends and could call those living farther away on the phone.

Of those who used the Internet at least weekly in Syria, almost all (95%) used it with almost equal frequency in Turkey. Looking at the change in respondents' frequency of Internet use in Turkey compared to Syria, one can see that for every subgroup related to gender, age and employment, the share of daily users of the Internet rose substantially in Turkey, from 34 to 45 percent units (Table 39). For the respondents 60 years or older, the amount of daily users more than doubled. Because of the large increase of daily users, the amount of weekly Internet users declined, except for those 50 years or older. The number of less frequent Internet users diminished in Turkey in all categories. The number of non-users of the Internet declined substantially in all broader respondent subgroups.

Table 39. Change in respondents' frequency of Internet use in Turkey compared to Syria (%).

Internet use in Syria	Daily	Weekly	Less often	Never
Man	+36	-10	-6	-20
Woman	+40	-4	-11	-25
18–29 years	+42	-13	-9	-19
30–49 years	+34	-4	-7	-23
50–59 years	+34	+4	-5	-34
60+ years	+45	0	-5	-39
Employed	+35	-9	-6	-19
Inactive	+41	-8	-9	-24
Total	+38	-7	-8	-22

+ = growth; - = decline

Those respondents who had not used the Internet in Syria were, in the spring of 2018 in Turkey, typically over 30-year-old married women with middle school or lower education levels, or men in Gaziantep with low education levels and living with relatives in Turkey. Those respondents who had been the most frequent Internet users in Syria were slightly more often young adult males with university education and who currently had relatives abroad or young adult women with high school or higher education levels who had relatives abroad and who worked in Turkey.

There was a particularly small group (8%) of respondents who had not used the Internet in Syria and did not use it in Turkey either. Of them, one out of three (35%) did not have a mobile phone with Internet access in Turkey. This group consisted of people over 30 years old (67%), married (87%) and with children (64%). Three out of four (76%) had middle school or lower education levels, two out of three (67%) were inactive in Turkey in the spring of 2018 and three out

of four (76%) did not know English at all. Every second person (51%) had family, relatives or friends' relatives abroad.

Almost every third person (30%) used the Internet on daily basis in Syria and kept doing so in Turkey. These people originated from cities in Syria (88%). Practically all (92%) had at least some knowledge of English, and five out of six (85%) had high education levels (high school or higher education). Almost three out of four (72%) were working in the spring of 2018. Almost four out of five (77%) had relatives in Turkey, and slightly fewer (72%) had relatives in the European Union.

In Turkey, Syrian Internet users used it for various purposes. Two out of three (66%) agreed that they used it to follow the current situation in Syria (Table 40). It is rather difficult to know the details of the changing situation in Syria by just following traditional media or television news. Also, the majority (59%) agreed that they used the Internet to search for information about their rights in Turkey. The older the respondent was, the less s/he searched from the Internet information about his/her rights in Turkey. Those who thought perhaps to live for the rest of his/her life in Turkey searched from the information about their rights in Turkey more often (69%) than those did not think to stay in Turkey (42%). Every second person (51%) searched the Internet for information about places in which they could live in Turkey.

Those who were users of the Internet in both Syria and Turkey used the Internet often to follow the current situation in Syria (68%), to learn about their rights in Turkey (67%) and to get information about places in which they could live in the future in Turkey (60%). Those who only started to use the Internet in Turkey used it slightly more often to follow the current situation in Syria (73%) but substantially less often to search for information about their rights in Turkey (49%) and about the places in which they could live in the future in Turkey (46%).

Those who used the Internet to learn about the situation in Syria were usually also keener to return to Syria. Those who used the Internet to learn about their rights in Turkey were often respondents with university education or people with family in Turkey.

In general, fewer respondents, almost one third (28–31%), searched the Internet for practical information about Europe: how to reach it, where to live and work there and what rights one would have in Europe. However, those who searched the Internet for possible future travel routes in Europe were also often (69%) keen to move to the European Union, less likely (36%) to consider staying in Turkey for the rest of their lives and preferred Syria as a living place. In addition, of those who searched for travel routes to Europe, two out of five (40%) mentioned that they would like to be in Europe in 3 years (i.e., by the spring of 2021). In addition, of those who planned to move to the European Union, over

two out of three (69%) searched from the Internet about the rights in the European Union. That share was very little (9%) among those who did not plan to move to the European Union. Similarly, almost three out of four (72%) of those who planned move to the European Union searched from the Internet about places in Europe as did much fewer (11%) of those who did not plan to migrate to the European Union.

Table 40. Respondents using the Internet and searching from the Internet information about

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	N
	%	%	%	
places where s/he could live in Turkey	51	27	22	566
his/her rights in Turkey	59	24	16	564
places where s/he could live in Europe	31	30	39	564
his/her rights in Europe	28	31	41	559
work opportunities in Europe	28	32	40	553
his/her future travel routes in Europe	30	31	39	550
the current situation in Syria	66	20	14	584
Total	42	28	30	563

Among the Internet users, many were social media users. Respondents used social media to keep in contact with relatives and friends in Turkey, Syria and in countries to which their family members, relatives and friends had migrated. The most common applications used in Turkey were WhatsApp (79%), Facebook (55%), YouTube (38%) and Instagram (20%). Only 7% of the respondents used Twitter, Snapchat (6%), Viber (5%), Skype (5%) and LinkedIn (4%). Young adults (18-29 years old) had small differences in the use and frequency of the most common programs. They used YouTube much more (47%) than the rest of the respondents (28%). Furthermore, majority (55%) of those with higher education levels agreed that social media helps in their decision making in Turkey.

Among all respondents, about two out of three (70%) agreed that Internet and/or social media use made their lives in Turkey easier (Table 41). Logically, of those who had the opportunity to use the Internet, more (73%) agreed on this issue. In general, people with different backgrounds tended to respond similarly to this issue. One slightly larger difference in this regarded the language skills of the respondents. Much more of those who knew good or moderate English (77%) or Turkish (72%) agreed that social media made their life easier in Turkey compared to those who did not know any English (64%) or Turkish (60%). In all, regardless of the background variables, social media made life easier in Turkey for the majority of the respondents. Those one out of seven (14%) who disagreed on this were typically unhappier in general; almost every second person (46%) was not satisfied with his/her accommodations, only one out of three (35%) saw his/her future positively, and only fewer than one out of five (18%) believed that

if they stayed in Turkey, their life would become better. Of these respondents, 45% lived in İzmir and 35% in Istanbul.

Table 41. Social media makes respondent's life easier in Turkey.

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	N
	%	%	%	
Man	74	15	11	331
Woman	65	22	13	253
18–29 years	67	19	14	314
30–49 years	71	18	10	230
50–59 years	83	13	3	30
60+ years	83	8	8	12
Gaziantep	74	17	9	201
Istanbul	70	18	12	206
İzmir	65	18	17	184
Family in Turkey	70	18	12	429
No family in Turkey	72	12	16	74
Good or moderate Turkish	72	15	13	358
No command of Turkish	60	28	12	65
Good or moderate English	77	12	12	270
No command of English	64	23	14	170
Elementary or lower school	66	20	14	105
Middle or high school	67	21	12	282
University	78	13	10	184
Total	70	18	12	591

5. CONCLUSIONS

The Republic of Turkey in the 2010s became one of the most significant countries for refugee-type situations globally. However, Turkey maintains geographical limitations to the 1951 convention related to the statuses of refugees, namely that only European nationals can become refugees in Turkey. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection differentiates between refugee status, conditional refugee status and subsidiary protection in Turkey. Those people under temporary protection – such as Syrians in Turkey – are thus not legally refugees. However, in common language, they are called refugees, as is done here as well. The situation in Turkey shows how today, the concepts and situations of guests, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees blur.

In 2018, Turkey had about four million refugees, of whom 3.6 million were Syrians. The rapid growth of the number of refugees in Turkey is, on the one hand, due to the continuation of the war in the Syrian Arab Republic. On the other hand, it is due to the response of the Government of Turkey to the war, for example, to allow Syrians to come freely to Turkey. The Turkish authorities have granted a protection status for fleeing Syrians who have registered themselves accordingly in Turkey. Refugees and people with temporal protection status now constitute almost 5% of the population in Turkey.

This research report is mostly based on fieldwork conducted in Turkey in the spring of 2018. During the field research in April and May, 756 persons with Syrian backgrounds responded anonymously to the survey in the provinces of Gaziantep, Istanbul and İzmir. We also had longer conversations with 52 Syrian refugees in these provinces and shorter talks with many other Syrians.

Syrian refugees in Turkey have varied backgrounds. They range from the youth to the old generation, from people who are unable to read to those with university degrees, and from the unemployed to the employed. Almost every second Syrian refugee in Turkey is less than 18 years old. In 2018, around 100,000 babies from Syrian refugees were born in Turkey. The demographic increase of Syrian refugees in Turkey is larger than their immigration. The working aged (18–59 years old) make up half of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Among them are almost 250,000 more men than women. The share of the older generation (60 years or older) is very small (3%). Among them are more women than men.

A particular geography of Syrian refugees exists in Turkey. A major concentration of refugees are in the border provinces Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep together hosting more than 1.3 million Syrian refugees. Another site is the larger Istanbul area, in which the number of Syrians is unknown but could reach almost one million, which includes irregular Syrian migrants. In eastern and north-eastern Turkey, far away from Syria and large cities are provinces that have under 100 Syrians each.

Many Syrian refugees prefer to live in areas and neighborhoods with other Syrians. Three out of four Syrian refugee respondents are satisfied with their current neighborhoods. In fact, almost all Syrian refugees nowadays live outside of the refugee camps, so housing is a significant everyday issue. Two out of five Syrian refugee respondents are fully satisfied and one out of five is partially satisfied with their current accommodations.

The national authorities of Turkey intend to regulate the location and migration of Syrian refugees inside Turkey. This is related to the governance of refugees, sharing more equally the costs related to refugees and providing better security. Nevertheless, refugees move to places they prefer, often legally but also without giving information to the authorities. The daily practices of Syrian refugees produce special spatial configurations. Many younger Syrian refugee men prefer Istanbul. Syrian refugee families prefer more often the border provinces closer to their former homes in Syria. In general, the respondents usually want to live in their 2018 province. However, especially younger Syrian refugee men want to move from Gaziantep to elsewhere in Turkey, if that is viable according to the authorities. Less than half of Syrian refugees in Gaziantep mentioned it as their most preferred place.

According to our study, half of Syrian refugees in Turkey clearly wish to return to Syria, and slightly over a third are planning to do this. Another third plan to move elsewhere abroad, typically to the European Union, such as to Germany or further away in Canada. Those having family and/or friends in the European Union are especially eager to move there. However, since the EU-Turkey agreement in 2016, it is difficult for these Syrians to travel from Turkey to the European Union. In all, four out of five respondents think that they will perhaps live the rest of their lives in Turkey. This would mean that millions of Syrians would remain in Turkey. In 2018, a third of the Syrian refugee respondents said that Turkey is their most preferred country in which to live worldwide.

Many of the Syrian refugees have stayed in Turkey already for years. Of the respondents, five out of six are able to speak Turkish, and one out of four very well. Those knowing the Turkish language are usually more satisfied with their lives in Turkey. Integration processes have begun. However, it is still challenging for many Syrian refugee children to attend school due to their low financial resources and poor Turkish language skills. The lack of Turkish language skills among adults means more often staying outside of the labor market.

The Government of Turkey has provided substantial help for Syrian refugees in Turkey. The aid received from the European Union covers these costs only partially. Nevertheless, according to our survey, almost all Syrian refugees in Turkey need more money to improve their lives. To be employed is crucial for improving one's financial situation. A strong gender division exists in employment. With regard to the respondents, three out of four Syrian refugee men

work, whereas only one out of four women do. The latter is partly due to cultural traditions in both Syria and Turkey. It is difficult for a Syrian to obtain a formal work permit. The vast majority of employed Syrian refugees work in the precarious low-paid informal sector without proper contracts. The inflow of Syrian refugees into these low-paid jobs have made the informal sector in Turkey more profitable. As a consequence, consumer prices have slightly fallen in Turkey. Some Turkish have also moved from the informal to the formal labor market or have been pushed out of work.

Syrian refugees in Turkey are very active users of the Internet and social media, as nowadays, refugees are located in many parts of the world. Information and communication technologies are ways in which to remain in contact with friends and relatives who are still in Syria but also with those who stay in Turkey or who have moved elsewhere. The Syrian refugee respondents have become more frequent users of information and communication technologies in Turkey compared with in Syria. It is very common for Syrian refugees to have smart phones with Internet access. A gender-based digital divide exists in Gaziantep, where having a smart phone with Internet access is less common among Syrian refugee women. In addition, those not knowing Turkish or English at all or those knowing only a little of one or the other use the Internet less.

Does the Internet and social media, then, make the life of a Syrian refugee easier in Turkey? Two out of three Syrian refugees agree with this. They usually follow developments in Syria through the Internet, and they use social media to stay in contact with friends and relatives. The most frequent users of the Internet oftentimes have higher education and better language skills. They also use the Internet to search for more specific information, such as information about their rights in Turkey. If a Syrian refugee wishes to migrate to the European Union, s/he then oftentimes uses the Internet to search for possible travel routes there. The Internet and social media are integrated parts of refugees' everyday lives. Access to the Internet and social media should be a fundamental right, among other important rights for refugees.

Many challenges exist when it comes to knowing more about Syrian refugees in Turkey. It is not easy to access detailed, correct and representative information about their everyday lives. In addition, the research articles that often appear in international journals have a two- to three-year time lag, which is lengthy in dynamic situations, such as the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is important to conduct academic research about Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey. Research-based results help with designing evidence-based policies that are efficient and that have planned impacts on individuals, communities and society as a whole in Turkey.

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REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN TURKEY, 2018

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Since 2010, the Republic of Turkey has been one of the most significant countries for refugees globally. The national authorities in Turkey have granted a special protection status not only for Syrians who come to Turkey because of the war in Syria but also for those who have accordingly registered themselves in Turkey. In 2018, the Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey numbered over 3.6 million. They have an important effect on the social and economic development of many cities, towns and rural areas in Turkey. In addition, they are a significant community of international interest.

This research report, “Refugees and Migrants in Turkey, 2018,” focuses on the Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey. It is part of a broader research project about the asylum processes in and near the countries of origin of the migrants, the asylum seekers and refugees, their asylum journeys toward their destination countries and their lives in those countries. This research belongs to the activities of the research consortium Urbanization, Mobilities and Immigration (URMI, see www.urmi.fi), and it was funded by the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland and led by Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen, from the Geography Section at the University of Turku, Finland.

This report is based predominantly on fieldwork conducted in Turkey in the spring of 2018. In total, 762 persons with Syrian backgrounds responded anonymously to the survey in the provinces of Gaziantep, Istanbul and İzmir. In addition, we conducted interviews with some of the respondents. Research assistants helped to collect and analyze the research material. We are grateful to everyone who participated in the research. The main researcher responsible for this report is Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen.

The first research question is, “What kinds of Syrian refugees live in Turkey?” Syrian refugees in Turkey range from the youths to elderly, from people not being able to read to those with university degrees, from the employed to the unemployed and from housewives to students. Almost every second (45%) Syrian refugee in Turkey is less than 18 years old. The people at a working age (18–59 years old) constitute half (52%), and the older generation (60 years or older) constitutes a small portion (3%). Istanbul has the largest amount of Syrian refugees, and especially young adult Syrian men prefer it. The border provinces Gaziantep, Hatay and Şanlıurfa—each of which has several hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees—are other major sites where Syrian families in particular settled many years ago. The İzmir province, which is on the western coast, is an important site for tens of thousands of Syrian refugees. The national authorities of Turkey regulate the location and migration of Syrians inside Turkey.

The second research question is, “What are the everyday lives of Syrian refugees like in Turkey?” In essence, the everyday lives of Syrian refugees are diverse. According to our research, almost all Syrian refugees in Turkey need more money to improve their lives. In regard to the respondents, three out of four adult men (74%) were working, as well as only one out of four (24%) women. Female Syrian refugees were more engaged with the family because many had small children. For many Syrian refugees, the working conditions are precarious; usually, work is available only in the informal sector, without contracts. For the employed respondents, the average monthly salary in the spring of 2018 was 1,200 Turkish lira (210 EUR).

Housing is another significant everyday issue for Syrian refugees. Many Syrian refugees prefer to live in neighborhoods that have many Syrians. Of our sample, three out of four (74%) Syrian refugees were at least partly satisfied with their current neighborhoods; fewer were fully (38%) or partly (23%) satisfied with their current accommodations. Nevertheless, many Syrian refugees had integrated themselves into Turkish society. One out of four (26%) had a very good command of the Turkish language, and five out of six (83%) knew the language at least a little. In general, those with a strong understanding of the Turkish language were more satisfied with their lives in Turkey.

The third research question is, “What are the migration wishes and plans of Syrian refugees in Turkey?” In 2018, different Syrian refugees had different migration wishes and plans. Every second (49%) respondent clearly wished to return to Syria, but fewer (38%) were planning it. Almost every third (31%) respondent planned to migrate to somewhere other than Syria, most preferably to Canada or Germany. The Syrians with family or friends in the European Union were especially eager to move there. The wishes to migrate elsewhere were the highest among the Syrian refugees in Istanbul, where every second (48%) refugee, especially in the younger male adults, was thinking about moving to the European Union. On the contrary, very few older Syrian refugees wished to migrate there. Turkey was the most preferred country to live in for a third (34%) of the respondents.

Despite migration wishes, four out of five (79%) Syrian refugees believed that they might live the rest of their lives in Turkey. In Turkey, the respondents generally wanted to live in the provinces where they were in 2018. However, less than half (45%) of the Syrian refugees in Gaziantep mentioned that Gaziantep was their most preferred place. Every fourth Syrian refugee considered moving from Gaziantep to elsewhere in Turkey, if doing would be permitted by the authorities; in particular, the younger adults wanted to move to Istanbul.

The fourth research question is, “How and for what do Syrian refugees in Turkey use the Internet and social media?” Almost all Syrian refugees were using the Internet in Turkey and more often than they had in Syria. It was very common to

have a smartphone with Internet access, though it was less common among female Syrian refugees in Gaziantep. Two out of three (67%) Syrian refugees agreed that the Internet and social media made their lives easier in Turkey and that they followed the developments in Syria via the Internet. Of the active users of the Internet, two out of three (67%) used it to learn more about their rights in Turkey. Many Syrian refugees who wished to migrate to the European Union mentioned that they used the Internet to determine possible travel routes to get there.

It is important to conduct academic research about Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey. The research-based results can help to design evidence-based policies that have a planned and efficient effect on individuals, communities and society as a whole in Turkey.

TÜRKİYE'DEKİ MÜLTECİLER VE GÖÇMENLER, 2018

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Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 2010 yılı itibariyle mülteciler açısından dünyanın en önemli ülkelerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Türkiye devleti Suriye'deki savaştan dolayı Türkiye'ye gelen ve kendilerini kayıt ettiren Suriyelilere özel bir koruma statüsü vermiştir. 2018 yılı itibariyle Türkiye'de 3.6 milyonun üzerinde Suriyeli mülteci ve göçmen bulunmaktadır. Suriyelilerin, Türkiye'deki birçok şehir, kasaba ve kırsal bölge üzerinde sosyal ve ekonomik gelişim açısından önemli etkileri vardır. Ayrıca, Suriyeliler uluslararası toplum içinde önem taşıyan bir topluluktur. "Türkiye'deki Mülteciler ve Göçmenler, 2018" isimli bu araştırma raporu Suriyeli mülteci ve göçmenlere odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırma, göçmenlerin menşei ülkede ve yakın ülkelerdeki sığınma süreçlerine ek olarak, mülteciler ve sığınmacıların sığınma hedefiyle çıktıkları yolculuk ve hedef ülkedeki süreçleri de analiz eden kapsamlı bir araştırma projesinin bir parçasıdır. Bu araştırma, Finlandiya Akademisi Stratejik Araştırmalar Konseyi tarafından fonlanan ve Turku Üniversitesi Coğrafya Bölümünden Profesör Jussi S. Jauhiainen tarafından yönetilen URMI (Kentleşme, Hareketlilik ve Göç, bkz. www.urmi.fi) araştırma konsorsiyumunun aktivitelerine aittir. Bu rapor çoğunlukla 2018 baharında Türkiye'de yapılmış olan saha çalışmasına dayanmaktadır. Gaziantep, İstanbul ve İzmir'de toplamda 762 Suriyeli anonim olarak anket çalışmasına katılmıştır. Ayrıca bazı katılımcılar ile mülakat yapılmıştır. Bu rapordan sorumlu olan ana araştırmacı Profesör Jussi S. Jauhiainen'dir. Dr. Saime Özçürümez ve Özgün Tursun, Türkiye'de yapılan çalışmasının organizasyonunda ve sahanın düzenlenmesinde çok önemli katkılarda bulunmuşlardır. Araştırma asistanları araştırma datalarının toplanması ve analizine yardım etmişlerdir. Araştırmada katkısı olan herkese minnettarız.

Araştırmanın ilk sorusu 'Hangi özellikteki Suriyeli mülteciler Türkiye'de yaşamaktadır?' olmuştur. Türkiye'de bulunan Suriyeli mülteciler gençten yaşlıya, okuma yazma bilmeyenlerden üniversite diploması olanlara, iş sahibi olanlardan işsizlere ve ev kadınlarından öğrencilere değişiklik göstermektedir. Neredeyse Türkiye'de bulunan Suriyeli mültecilerin her ikincisi (45%) 18 yaşından küçüktür. Çalışabilir (18-59) nüfus, toplam nüfusun yarısı (52%) iken daha yaşlı nüfusun oranı (3%) azdır. Araştırma yapılan iller arasında İstanbul, en kalabalık Suriyeli mülteci nüfusuna sahip olandır ve özellikle genç yetişkin erkek Suriyeliler tarafından tercih edilmektedir. Her biri yüzbinlerce Suriyeli mülteci barındıran sınır şehirleri Gaziantep, Hatay ve Şanlıurfa, Suriyeli ailelerin yıllar önce yerleştikleri diğer önemli yerleşim yerleridirler. Batı sahilinde bulunan diğer bir önemli yerleşim yeri olan İzmir şehrinde de on binlerce Suriyeli mülteci bulunmaktadır. Türkiye devletinin yerel kurumları Türkiye'de yerleşik Suriyelilerin ülke içindeki yerleşim ve göç hareketlerini düzenlemektedir.

İkinci araştırma sorusu ‘Türkiye’deki Suriyelilerin günlük yaşamları nasıldır?’ olmuştur. Suriyeli mültecilerin günlük yaşantıları çok yönlüdür. Araştırma sonuçlarına göre, Türkiye’deki Suriyeli mültecilerin neredeyse tamamı yaşam kalitelerini arttırmak için daha fazla paraya ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Katılımcılar arasında dört erkekten üçü (74%) çalışırken, bu oran kadınlarda dörtte birdir (24%). Kadın Suriyeli mülteciler aileleriyle daha çok ilgilenmektedir ve birçoğunun küçük çocuğu vardır. Birçok Suriyeli mülteci genellikle kayıt dışı ve sözleşmesiz çalıştıkları için çalışma koşulları güvencesizdir. 2018 baharı itibariyle çalışan katılımcıların ortalama aylık maaşları 1200 Türk lirasıdır (210 EUR). Barınma, Suriyeli mülteciler için bir diğer önemli günlük problemdir. Suriyeli mültecilerin birçoğu Suriyelilerin kalabalık olduğu muhitlerde yaşamayı tercih etmektedir. Örneklemeimize göre, dört Suriyeli mülteci üçü (74%) şu anda yaşadıkları muhitten kısmen memnundur. Az bir kısmı (38%) tamamen veya kısmen (23%) şu andaki yaşam alanlarından memnundur. Bununla birlikte, Suriyeli mültecilerin çoğu Türk toplumuna adapte olmaya çalışmaktadır. Her dört kişiden biri (26%) çok iyi derecede Türkçe bilirken, altı kişiden beşi (83%) çok az dahi olsa Türkçe bilmektedir. Türkçe bilenler genelde Türkiye’deki yaşantılarından daha memnundur.

Üçüncü araştırma sorusu “Türkiye’deki Suriyeli mültecilerin tür istek ve planları nedir?” olmuştur. 2018 yılında yapılan bu araştırma çerçevesinde farklı Suriyeli mültecilerin farklı istekleri ve göç planları vardır. Katılımcıların yarısı (49%) açıkça Suriye’ye dönmeyi arzularken, daha azı (38%) bunu planlamaktadır. Her üç katılımcıdan biri (31%) Suriye dışında bir yere, tercihen Kanada ve Almanya’ya, göç etmeyi planlamaktadır. Özellikle Avrupa Birliği’nde aile ve/veya arkadaşları olan Suriyeliler buraya göç etmeye isteklidir. Dışarı göç etme arzusu en çok İstanbul’da yaşayan Suriyeli mültecilerde göze çarpmaktadır. Her iki katılımcıdan birisi (48%), özellikle de genç yetişkin erkekler, Avrupa Birliği’ne gitmeyi düşünmektedir. Buna karşılık çok az sayıda yaşlı Suriyeli mülteci buraya göç etmeyi arzulamaktadır. Türkiye, katılımcıların üçte biri (34%) tarafından yaşamak için en çok tercih edilen ülke konumdadır. Başka yerlere göç etme arzularına rağmen, her beş Suriyeli mülteci dördü (79%) muhtemelen hayatlarının kalanını Türkiye’de yaşayacaklarını düşünmektedir. Katılımcılar çoğunlukla Türkiye içinde 2018 yılı itibariyle yaşadıkları şehirde yaşamak istemektedir. Fakat, Gaziantep’te bulunan Suriyeli mültecilerin yarısından azı (45%) için Gaziantep en çok tercih edilen yaşam alanı olmuştur. Her dört Suriyeli mülteci den biri eğer yetkililerden izin alabilirlerse Gaziantep’ten Türkiye’deki herhangi başka bir yere, özellikle daha genç yetişkinler tarafından tercih edilen İstanbul’a taşınmayı düşünmektedir.

Dördüncü araştırma sorusu “Türkiye’deki Suriyeli mülteciler ne için ve nasıl internet ve sosyal medya kullanmaktadır?” sorusudur. Türkiye’deki Suriyeli mültecilerin neredeyse tamamı internet kullanmakta ve Suriye’de kullandıkları

rından daha sık kullanmaktadır. İnternete erişim olan bir akıllı telefon sahibi olmak çok yaygın olmasına karşın Gaziantep'te yaşayan Suriyeli kadın mültecilerde bu oran daha düşüktür. Her üç Suriyeli mülteçiden ikisi (67%) internet ve sosyal medya kullanımının hayatlarını kolaylaştırdığını ve Suriye'deki gelişmeleri internet üzerinden takip ettiklerini belirtmiştir. Buna ek olarak, aktif internet kullanıcılarından üçte ikisi (67%) interneti, Türkiye'deki hakları ile ilgili daha çok bilgi almak için kullanmaktadır. Avrupa Birliğine göç etmek isteyen Suriyeli mültecilerin çoğu, internetten olası seyahat rotaları aramaktadır. Bu araştırmaya sonucunda ortaya çıkmıştır ki, Türkiye'de Suriyeli mülteciler ve göçmenler ile ilgili akademik araştırmalar yapmak önemlidir. Araştırmaya dayanan sonuçlar kanıt odaklı politikaların dizayn edilmesine yardımcı olarak bireyleri ve Türkiye'deki toplumun tamamını verimli bir şekilde etkileyecektir.

اللاجئون والمهاجرون في تركيا، 2018

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باتت جمهورية تركيا عالميًا واحدة من أكثر البلدان أهمية بما يخص اللاجئين في العقد الحالي منذ عام 2010. لقد منحت السلطات الوطنية في تركيا قانون حماية خاصة للسوريين الذين قدموا إلى تركيا بسبب الحرب القائمة في سوريا وقد سجلوا أنفسهم في تركيا وفقًا لذلك. في عام 2018، بلغ عدد اللاجئين والمهاجرين السوريين أكثر من 3.6 مليون لاجئ في تركيا. وإنّ لديهم تأثير بارز على التنمية الاجتماعية والاقتصادية في العديد من المدن والمناطق الريفية في تركيا، وإنهم أيضًا يحظون بعناية دولية كمجتمع ذي أهمية.

يتمحور هذا التقرير البحثي "اللاجئون والمهاجرون في تركيا، 2018" حول اللاجئين والمهاجرين السوريين في تركيا. وهو جزء من مشروع بحثي أوسع حول عمليات اللجوء في البلاد التي تتمركز فيها الهجرة، وحول المناطق التي يتواجد فيها طالبو اللجوء والمهاجرين وحول رحلاتهم في اللجوء إلى محطاتهم الأخيرة. ينتمي هذا البحث إلى أنشطة الجمعية البحثية URMI (المدنية والتنقل والهجرة، انظر www.urmi.fi) الذي يموله مجلس البحوث الاستراتيجية في أكاديمية فنلندا ويقوده البروفيسور يوسي س. ياهويياينين من قسم الجغرافيا في جامعة توركو في فنلندا.

يستند هذا التقرير بشكل أساسي إلى العمل الميداني الذي أجري في تركيا في ربيع عام 2018. وإجمالاً، استجاب 762 شخصًا مجهول الهوية ذو خلفية سورية إلى الدراسة في مدن غازي عنتاب واسطنبول وإزمير. وأجرينا أيضًا مقابلات مع بعض المستجوبين. قام مساعدو البحث في جمع وتحليل المواد البحثية، وإنّا ممتنون لجميع المشاركين في هذا البحث. الباحث المسؤول عن هذا التقرير هو البروفيسور يوسي س. ياهويياينين.

السؤال الأول في البحث يسأل ما هو نوع اللاجئين السوريين الذين يعيشون في تركيا؟ يتراوح أعمار اللاجئين السوريين بين الفئة الشابة حتى المتقدمين في العمر، وبين أولئك الغير قادرين على القراءة إلى الحاصلين على شهادات جامعية، ومن الموظفين إلى العاطلين عن العمل، ومن ربات المنزل إلى الطالبات. تقريبًا (45%) من اللاجئين السوريين أعمارهم تحت الـ 18 عام، ونسبة (52%) يتراوح أعمارهم بين الـ 18 والـ 60 عام، وأخيرًا فقط (3%) هم فوق الـ 60 عام. تعد اسطنبول هي الحاضن الأكبر للاجئين السوريين، وخاصةً الفئة العمرية من الشباب. أما المقاطعات الحدودية مثل غازي عنتاب وهاتاي وسانليورفا، كلّ منهم يضم مئات الآلاف من اللاجئين السوريين، إذ أنها تعتبر مواقع رئيسية أخرى استقرت بها العائلات السورية منذ سنوات عديدة. وتعد محافظة إزمير على الساحل الغربي موقعًا مهمًا لعشرات الآلاف من اللاجئين السوريين. تقوم السلطات التركية بتنظيم وضبط مواقع تواجد السوريين داخل تركيا.

السؤال الثاني في البحث يسأل ما هي الحياة اليومية للاجئين السوري في تركيا؟ الحياة اليومية للاجئين السوريين في تركيا متنوعة. وفقاً لأبحاثنا، فإنّ تقريباً كل المهاجرين السوريين في تركيا بحاجة للمال لتحسين أوضاعهم. وفيما يتعلق بالمتسجوبين، ثلاثة من أربعة رجال (74%) عملوا بالمقابل واحدة من أربعة سيدات (24%) عملن. السيدات السوريات اللاجئات أكثر تواجد مع أهاليهن، إذ أنّ كثير منهن لديهن أطفال صغار. بالنسبة للعديد من اللاجئين السوريين، فإن ظروف العمل محفوفة بالمخاطر، عادة في القطاع غير الرسمي دون عقود. بلغ متوسط الراتب الشهري 1200 ليرة تركية (210 يورو) بين المستجوبين العاملين في ربيع عام 2018.

تعد مسألة السكن قضية أخرى يومية و هامة يعاني منها اللاجئون السوريون. الكثير من اللاجئين السوريين يفضلون العيش في أحياء تضم سوريين آخرين. من العينية التي تمتلكها، ثلاثة من أصل أربعة (74%) من اللاجئين السوريين راضون جزئياً على الأقل عن مكان إقامتهم الحالي. وأقل بنسبة (38%) راضون بشكل كامل و بنسبة (23%) راضون بشكل جزئي بمساكنهم الحالية. ومع ذلك، الكثير من السوريين يحاولون الاندماج مع المجتمع التركي. واحد من أربعة (26%) يتقنون اللغة التركية بشكل جيد، وخمسة من كل ستة (83%) يعرفون على الأقل القليل من التركية. أولئك الذين يتقنون اللغة التركية في العادة هم راضون عن حياتهم.

السؤال الثالث في البحث يسأل ما هي رغبات الهجرة وخطط المهاجرين السوريين في تركيا؟ في عام 2018، كان لدى المهاجرين السوريين رغبات وخطط مختلفة للهجرة. واحد من كل اثنين (49%) من المستجوبين يرغبون بوضوح العودة إلى سوريا، وأقل بنسبة (38%) يخططون لذلك. تقريباً ثلثهم (31%) يخططون للهجرة إلى أماكن أخرى غير سوريا، والوجهة المفضلة هي كندا أو ألمانيا. على وجه الخصوص أولئك السوريون الذين يمتلكون عائلة أو أصدقاء في دول الاتحاد الأوروبي يرغبون بالانتقال إلى هناك. ويعد اللاجئين السوريين في اسطنبول هم الأكثر رغبةً في الهجرة، إذ أنّ نصفهم بنسبة (48%) يرغبون بالهجرة إلى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي، وبالأخص الفئة الشبابية. وعلى النقيض، القليل من اللاجئين السوريين الأكبر سناً يرغبون بالرحيل. تعد تركيا الدولة المكان المفضل لثلث من المستجوبين بنسبة (34%).

رغم رغبات الهجرة ، يعتقد أربعة من أصل خمسة (79%) من اللاجئين السوريين أنهم ربما يعيشون بقية حياتهم في تركيا. داخل تركيا ، أراد المستجوبون عادة العيش في تلك المقاطعة التي كانوا فيها عام 2018. لكن أقل من نصف اللاجئين السوريين (45%) في غازي عنتاب ذكروا أن غازي عنتاب هي المكان المفضل لديهم. كل رابع لاجئ سوري يفكر بالانتقال من غازي عنتاب إلى أي مكان آخر في تركيا ، إذا سمحت السلطات بذلك ، خاصة الشباب يفكرون بالانتقال إلى اسطنبول.

السؤال الرابع في البحث يسأل كيف ولماذا يستخدم اللاجئون السوريون الإنترنت ومواقع التواصل الاجتماعي في تركيا؟ تقريبًا جميع اللاجئين السوريين يستخدمون الإنترنت في تركيا وأكثر مما هو عليه الحال في سوريا. ومن الشائع توفر الهواتف الذكية مع إمكانية الوصول إلى الإنترنت في البيئة، على الرغم من أنه أقل شيوعًا بين اللاجئين السوريين في غازي عنتاب. اثنان من كل ثلاثة لاجئين سوريين (67%) أشاروا إلى أن الإنترنت جعل حياتهم أسهل في تركيا وأنهم يتابعون آخر التطورات في سوريا خلال الإنترنت. من بين المستخدمين النشطين للإنترنت، يستخدم اثنان من كل ثلاثة (67%) الإنترنت أيضًا لمعرفة المزيد عن حقوقهم في تركيا. والعديد من اللاجئين السوريين الذين يرغبون في الهجرة إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي يبحثون في الإنترنت عن طرق السفر الممكنة.

من المهم أن يتم إجراء بحث أكاديمي حول اللاجئين والمهاجرين السوريين في تركيا. تساعد النتائج المبنية على الأبحاث في تحديد سياسات مبنية على أدلة ذات خطة وتأثير فعال على الفرد والجماعات والمجتمع ككل في تركيا.

PAKOLAISET JA MAAHANMUUTTAJAT TURKISSA VUONNA 2018

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Turkin tasavallasta on tullut 2010-luvulla yksi globaalisti merkittävimmistä maista pakolaisille. Turkin valtion viranomaiset ovat myöntäneet suojeluaseman syyrialaisille, jotka ovat paenneet Turkkiin sodan takia ja jotka ovat rekisteröityneet Turkissa määräysten mukaisesti. Vuonna 2018 Turkissa oli yli 3,6 miljoonaa syyrialaispakolaista. Heillä on tärkeä vaikutus monien kaupunkien ja maaseutualueiden sosiaaliseen ja taloudelliseen kehitykseen Turkissa. He ovat myös tärkeä yhteisö, johon kohdistuu kansainvälinen mielenkiinto.

Tutkimusraportti ”Refugees and migrants in Turkey, 2018” keskittyy syyrialaisiin pakolaisiin ja maahanmuuttajiin Turkissa. Raportti on osa laajempaa tutkimushanketta turvapaikkaprosesseista muuttajien, turvapaikanhakijoiden ja pakolaisten lähtömaissa ja niiden lähellä, heidän matkoillaan kohti kohdemaita ja kohdemaissa. Raportti on osa tutkimuskonsortion URMI (Urbanization, Mobilities and Immigration, www.urmi.fi) toimintaa. Konsortiota rahoittaa Suomen Akatemian Strategisen Tutkimuksen Neuvosto ja sitä johtaa professori Jussi S. Jauhiainen Turun yliopiston maantieteen osastolta Suomesta.

Raportti perustuu suureksi osaksi kenttätutkimukseen, joka tehtiin Turkissa keväällä 2018. Yhteensä 762 syyrialaistaustaista henkilöä vastasi nimettömänä kyselyyn Gaziantepin, Istanbulin ja Izmirin provinseissa. Teimme myös haastatteluja joidenkin vastaajien kanssa. Tutkimusavustajat auttoivat tutkimusmateriaalin hankkimisessa ja analysoinnissa. Olemme kiitollisia kaikille, jotka osallistuivat tutkimukseen. Päättäjänä oli professori Jussi S. Jauhiainen, joka vastaa tästä raportista.

Ensimmäinen tutkimuskysymys kuuluu minkälaisia syyrialaispakolaisia asuu Turkissa? Syyrialaispakolaisia on nuorista vanhoihin, lukutaidottomista yliopistotutkimuksen suorittaneisiin, työllisistä työttömiin ja kotiäideistä opiskelijoihin. Lähes joka toinen (45%) syyrialaispakolaisista Turkissa on alaikäinen. Työikäisiä (18–59 vuotta) on puolet (52%) ja iäkkäitä (60 vuotta tai enemmän) on vähän (3%). Eniten syyrialaispakolaisia on Istanbulissa, ja se on erityisesti nuorten miesten suosima kohde. Rajaseudun provinseissa Gaziantep, Hatay ja Sanliurfa on kussakin satoja tuhansia syyrialaispakolaisia. Ne ovat alueita, jonne erityisesti syyrialaisperheet ovat muuttaneet vuosia sitten. Izmirin provinssi länsirannikolla on tärkeä alue kymmenille tuhansille syyrialaispakolaisille. Turkin viranomaiset säätelevät syyrialaisien asuinpaikkoja ja muuttoliikettä Turkissa.

Toinen tutkimuskysymys kuuluu mitä ovat syyrialaispakolaisten arkipäivät Turkissa? Syyrialaispakolaisten arkipäivät ovat monenlaisia. Tutkimuksemme mukaan lähes kaikki syyrialaispakolaiset tarvitsevat lisää rahaa parantaakseen elämäänsä. Kyselyyn vastanneista miehistä kolme neljästä (74%) oli töissä ja

naisista joka neljäs (24%). Naiset ovat usein tekemisissä perheen kanssa ja heillä on yleensä useita lapsia. Useiden syyrialaispakolaisten työolot ovat kurjat, ja he työskentelevät usein epävirallisesti ilman työsopimuksia. Töissä käyvien kyselyyn vastanneiden keskimääräinen kuukausipalkka vuoden 2018 keväällä oli 1200 Turkin liiraa (210 euroa).

Asuminen on myös tärkeä arkipäivän seikka syyrialaispakolaisille. Useat syyrialaispakolaiset haluavat asua alueilla, joissa on useita syyrialaisia. Kolme neljästä (74%) kyselyyn vastanneista syyrialaispakolaisista oli vähintään osittain tyytyväinen asuinalueeseensa. Harvemmat olivat täysin (38%) tai osittain (23%) tyytyväisiä nykyiseen asuntoonsa. Tästä huolimatta syyrialaispakolaiset yrittävät integroitua turkkilaiseen yhteiskuntaan. Yksi neljästä (26%) osaa erittäin hyvin turkkia ja viisi kuudesta (83%) osaa turkkia ainakin jonkin verran. He, jotka osaavat turkkia, ovat yleensä tyytyväisempiä elämäänsä Turkissa.

Kolmas tutkimuskysymys on mitkä ovat syyrialaispakolaisten muuttohalukkuus ja muuttosuunnitelmat Turkissa? Vuonna 2018 erilaisilla syyrialaispakolaisilla oli erilainen muuttohalukkuus ja suunnitelmat. Joka toinen (49%) vastaaja selkeästi halusi palata Syyriaan, mutta harvemmat (38%) suunnittelivat paluuta. Lähes joka kolmas (31%) halusi muuttaa muualle kuin Syyriaan, useimmin Kanadaan tai Saksaan. Ne syyrialaispakolaiset, joilla oli perhettä tai ystäviä Euroopan unionissa olivat erityisen halukkaita muuttamaan sinne. Muuttohalukkuus oli suurinta Istanbulissa. Siellä joka toinen (48%) kyselyyn vastanneista syyrialaispakolaisista, erityisesti nuoret miehet, harkitsi muuttoa Euroopan unioniin. Toisaalta vain hyvin harvat iäkkäät syyrialaispakolaiset haluavat muuttaa sinne. Turkki oli kaikkein halutuimman paikka asua joka kolmannelle (34%) vastaajista.

Huolimatta muuttohalukkuudesta neljä viidestä (79%) syyrialaispakolaisesta arvioi, että he ehkä elävät elämänsä loppuun asti Turkissa. Turkin sisällä he haluavat usein asua siinä provinssissa, jossa he vuonna 2018 asuivat. Sen sijaan alle puolet (45%) Gaziantepissä asuvista pitää sitä halutuimpana asuinpaikkana. Joka neljäs syyrialaispakolainen, erityisesti nuoret miehet, harkitsee muuttavansa pois Gaziantepistä muualle Turkkiin, mikäli viranomaiset tämän sallivat.

Neljäs tutkimuskysymys on miten ja mihin syyrialaispakolaiset Turkissa käyttävät internetiä ja sosiaalista mediaa? Lähes kaikki syyrialaispakolaiset käyttävät internetiä Turkissa ja useammin kuin he käyttivät sitä Syyriassa. On hyvin tavallista omistaa älypuhelin, jossa on internetyhteys. Se on harvinaisempaa Gaziantepissä asuvien syyrialaispakolaisnaisten keskuudessa. Kaksi kolmesta (67%) syyrialaispakolaisesta oli sitä mieltä, että internet ja sosiaalinen media ovat tehneet heidän elämänsä helpommaksi Turkissa. He seuraavat internetistä Syyrian tilanteen kehittymistä. Aktiivisista internetin käyttäjistä kaksi kolmesta etsii internetistä tietoa oikeuksistaan Turkissa. Useat syyrialaispakolaiset, jotka haluavat muuttaa Euroopan unioniin, etsivät internetistä tietoja mahdollisista matkareiteistä.

On tärkeää, että tehdään akateemista tutkimusta syyrialaispakolaisista ja maahanmuuttajista Turkissa. Tutkimusperusteiset tulokset auttavat muotoilemaan tuloksekkaita politiikkoja, joilla on suunniteltu ja tehokas vaikutus yksilöihin, yhteisöihin ja yhteiskuntaan kokonaisuutena Turkissa.

پهناهنده‌کان و کوچ‌بهران له تورکیا، ۲۰۱۸

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کۆماری تورکیا له سالی ۲۰۱۰ به‌دواوه بووته یه‌کێک له گرینگترین وڵاتان بۆ په‌نابهران. ده‌سه‌لآتداری ده‌ولته‌ی تورکیا پینگه‌ی پاریزگاربیان به‌و سووریانه به‌خشیه که به‌هۆی جهنگه‌وه هه‌لاتوون بۆ تورکیا و له‌وئ به‌ینی مه‌رجه‌کانی تورکیا ناویان تۆمار کراوه. له سالی ۲۰۱۸ دا زیاتر له ۳،۶ ملیۆن په‌نابهری سووری له تورکیا بووه. نه‌و خه‌لک‌ه‌ش کارگه‌ریه‌کی گرینگیان هه‌یه بۆ سه‌ر باری کۆمه‌لایه‌تی و گه‌شه‌کردنی ئابووری چهن‌دین شارو ناوچه‌ی لادئ نشین له تورکیا. هه‌روه‌ها نه‌و خه‌لکانه جه‌ماوهریکی گرینگن که بایه‌خی نیونه‌ته‌وه‌یی له‌سه‌ریانه.

ر‌اپۆرتی لیکۆلینه‌وه "Refugees and migrants in Turkey, 2018" ته‌رکیز ده‌کاته سه‌ر په‌نابهره و کوچ‌بهره سووریه‌کان له تورکیا. ر‌اپۆرت‌ه‌که به‌شیکه له پ‌روژه‌یه‌کی لیکۆلینه‌وه‌ی گه‌وره‌تر له‌سه‌ر پ‌روژه‌کانی په‌نابهری له وڵاتانی ره‌سه‌ن و نزیکه کوچ‌بهران و داواکارانی په‌نابهری و په‌نابهره‌کان، هه‌روه‌ها له‌سه‌ر گه‌شته‌کانیان به‌ره‌و وڵاتانی مه‌به‌ست و دوا‌یی له وڵاتانی مه‌به‌ستدا. پ‌روژه‌که بریتیه له به‌شیک له چالاکیه‌کانی یه‌کێتی لیکۆلینه‌وه‌کانی URMI (Urbanization, Mobilities and Immigration, www.urmi.fi). خه‌رجیه داراییه‌کانی یه‌کێتی‌ه‌که له‌لایه‌ن نه‌جومه‌نی نه‌کادیمیای لیکۆلینه‌وه ستراتیجیه‌کانی فینه‌لنده‌وه دا‌بین ده‌کریت و پ‌روفیسسۆر یوسسی س. یاوهیاینن Jussi S. Jauhiainen له به‌شی جوگرافیای زانکۆی تورکو له فینه‌لنده سه‌رپه‌رشتی ده‌کریت.

ر‌اپۆرت‌ه‌که به‌شیکه زۆری له‌سه‌ر به‌مه‌ی نه‌و لیکۆلینه‌وه مه‌یدانیه نوسراوه که له به‌هاری ۲۰۱۸ له تورکیا نه‌جام درا. سه‌رجه‌م ۲۷۶ که‌سی به ره‌گه‌ز سووری به‌ی ناو له پاریزگاکی غازی نه‌ته‌پ و نه‌سته‌نبوول و ئیزمیر وه‌لامی په‌سیار مه‌کانیان دا‌وته‌وه. هه‌روه‌ها له‌گه‌ل هه‌ندیک له‌وانه‌ی که وه‌لامه‌کانیان ده‌دایه‌وه چهن‌دین چاوپنیکه‌وتنه‌مان نه‌جام داوه. یارمه‌تیده‌رانی لیکۆلینه‌وه‌که له په‌یداکردنی مه‌واده‌کانی لیکۆلینه‌وه و شیکاریکردندا هاوکاربیان ده‌کرد. ئیمه سوپاسی هه‌موو نه‌وانه ده‌که‌ین که له لیکۆلینه‌وه‌که‌دا به‌شداربیان کردوه. لیکۆله‌ری سه‌ره‌کی پ‌روفیسسۆر یوسسی س. یاوهیاینن بوو، که به‌رپرسی نه‌م ر‌اپۆرت‌ه‌یه.

یه‌که‌مه‌ین په‌سیاری لیکۆلینه‌وه سه‌بارته به‌مه‌یه که چی جوهره په‌نابهرانیکی سووری له تورکیا ده‌ژین؟ په‌نابهره سووریه‌کان پیکه‌اتوون له مندا‌له‌وه تا پیر، له نه‌خوینده‌واره‌وه هه‌تا‌کو ده‌رچووی زانکۆکان، له‌وه‌که‌سه‌نه‌وه که کار و فه‌رمانیان هه‌یه هه‌تا‌کو بی‌کارمه‌کان و له دایکانی ماله‌وه تا‌کو قوتابی و خویندکار. نزیکه‌ی یه‌ک له‌سه‌ر دوو (۴۵٪) په‌نابهره سووریه‌کان له تورکیا له خوار ته‌مه‌نی هه‌ژده سالاندان. نه‌وانه‌ی که له ته‌مه‌نی کارکردندان (۱۸- ۵۹) نیوه‌ی (۵۲٪) خه‌لک‌ه‌که‌ن و به‌ته‌مه‌نه‌کان (۶۰ سال یان به‌سه‌ره‌وه) ر‌یژه‌یه‌کی که‌مه (۳٪) دان. زۆرت‌رینی په‌نابهره سووریه‌کان له نه‌سته‌نبوول ده‌ژین، به‌تایبه‌تیش بیاوه گه‌نجه‌کان حه‌زیان له‌وه شوپنه‌یه. له پاریزگاکی ده‌وربه‌ری سنوور وه‌کو غازی نه‌ته‌پ و هاتای و سانلی ئورفه له هه‌ر یه‌که‌یان به‌سه‌دان هه‌زار په‌نابهری سووری له ده‌ژیت. نه‌و شوپنه‌یه زیاتری خه‌زانه سووریه‌کان سال به‌سال

روویان تی کردوه. کەنار مەکانی رۆژاوا ی پارێزگای ئیزمیریش شوینیکی گرینگه بۆ دەیان هەزار پەنابەری سووری. دەسەلاتدارانی تورکیا شوینەکانی نیشتهجێبوونی سووریەکان و جوولەکانی گواستەمیان لە تورکای تەنزیم دەکەن.

پرسیاریکی تری لیکۆلینەمە سەبارەت بەو مێهە کە ژیانی رۆژانە پەنابەرە سووریەکان لە تورکیا چۆنە؟ ژیانی رۆژانە پەنابەرە سووریەکان جۆراو جۆرە. بەپێی لیکۆلینەمە کەمان نزیکە ی هەموو پەنابەرە سووریەکان پێویستیان بە پارە ی زیاتر هەمە بۆ باشترکردنی ژیانی خۆیان. ئەوانە ی کە وەلامی پرسیار مەکانیان داوتەوه لە پیاو مەکاندا سێ لەسەر چواریان (٧٤٪) ئەو کەسانەن کە کاریان دەکرد و لەژنانیشدا یەک لەسەر چواریان (٢٤٪). ژنەکان زیاتر کاروباری خیزان بەرپۆه دەبەن و زۆربەیان مندالیان زۆرە. بارو دۆخی کارکردنی زۆربە ی پەنابەرە سووریەکان سەختە، زۆرتیش بەشپۆه ی نا فەرمی کار دەکەن بەپێی بەلێننامە ی کارکردن. سەر جەمی ناو مەندی مووچە ی مانگانە ی ئەوانە ی کە کار دەکەن و وەلامی پرسیار مەکانیان داوتەوه لە بەهاری ٢٠١٨ ١٢٠٠ لیرە ی تورکی بووه (٢١٠ ئیورۆ).

هەر و هە مائێشینی خالێکی تری گرینگی ژیانی رۆژانە ی پەنابەرە سووریەکانە. زۆربە ی پەنابەرە سووریەکان حەز دەکەن لەو ناوچانەدا بژین کە خەلکی سووری زۆری تێدا یه. سێ لەسەر چواری (٧٤٪) ی ئەو پەنابەرە سووریانە ی کە وەلامی پرسیار مەکانیان داوتەوه هیچ نەبێت کە مێک لە شوینی نیشتهجێبوونە کە میان رازی بوون. بەشپێکی کە میان بەتەواو ی (٣٨٪) یان کە مێک (٢٣٪) لەو مائە ی کە تێیدا دەژیان رازی بوون. سەر مەرای ئەو مەش پەنابەرە سووریەکان هەوڵ دەدەن لەگەڵ کۆمەلگە ی تورکیدا بگونجین. یەک لەسەر چواریان (٢٦٪) یان زۆر بەباشی زمانی تورکی دەزانن و پێنج لەسەر شەش یان (٨٣٪) لایەنی کەم هەندێک تورکی دەزانن. ئەوانە ی کە تورکی دەزانن بەگشتی زیاتر لە ژیانی خۆیان رازین لە تورکیا.

پرسیاری سێهەمی لیکۆلینەمە سەبارەت بەو بوو کە ئارەزووی گواستەوه و پلانی گواستەوه ی پەنابەرە سووریەکان چیه لە تورکیا؟ لە سالی ٢٠١٨ پەنابەری جۆراو جۆری سووری ئارەزوو و پلانی جۆراو جۆری گواستەمیان هەبوو. نیو مەیان (٤٩٪) بە روونی وەلامی داوتەوه کە حەز دەکات بگەرێتەوه بۆ سووریا، بەلام بەشپێکی کە میان (٣٨٪) پلانی دادەنا بۆ گەرانهوه. نزیکە ی یەک لەسەر سێ (٣١٪) حەزی دەکرد بگۆزێتەوه بۆ ولاتیکی تر نەک سووریا، زیاتریش بۆ کەنەدا یان ئەلمانیا. ئەو پەنابەرە سووریانە ی کە کە سوکار یان برادەریان لە ولاتانی یهکیتی ئەوروپا هەبوو زیاتر حەزیان دەکرد بۆ ئەو ی برۆن. زیاتری ئارەزووی گواستەوه مەکان لە ئەستەمبوول بوو. لەو ی نیو هە ی (٤٨٪) ی ئەو پەنابەرە سووریانە ی کە وەلامی پرسیار مەکانیان داوتەوه، بەتایبەتیش پیاوه گەنجەکان بیریان لە گواستەوه دەکردوه بۆ ولاتانی یهکیتی ئەوروپا. بەلام بەشپێکی زۆر کەمی پەنابەرە سووریە بەتەمەنەکان حەزیان دەکرد بۆ ئەو شوینانە بگۆزێنەوه. بە بۆجونی یەک لەسەر سێی (٣٤٪) ئەو خەلکە تورکیا باشترین شوین بووه بۆ ژیانیان.

سەر مەرای ئەو ئارەزووی گواستەوه مەش کە هەمە، چوار لەسەر پێنجی (٧٩٪) پەنابەرە سووریەکان هەلسەنگاندنیان وابوو کە ئەوان هەتا کۆتایی ژیانیان هەر لە تورکیا دەمێننەوه. لەناو تورکیاشدا زیاتر حەزیان دەکرد لەو پارێزگایانەدا بژین کە لە سالی ٢٠١٨ لێی بوونە. بەلام کە مەتر لە نیو مەیان

(%٤٥) لەوانەى كە لە غازى ئەنتەپ دەژيان ئەو شۆينەى خۆيان بە پەسەندترين شۆين دەزانى. يەك لەسەر چواری پەنابەرە سووریەكان، بەتایبەتیش پیاوہ گەنجەكان، بىر لەوہ دەكەنەوہ كە ئەگەر كار بەدەستان رینگا بدەن لە غازى ئەنتەپ دەر بچن و بگۆيزنەوہ بۆ شۆينىكى ترى توركييا.

پرسیارى چوارەمى لىكۆلینەوہ كە سەبارەت بەوہ بوو كە چۆن و بۆچى پەنابەرە سووریەكان ئىنتەرنىت و سۆشیال میدیا بەكار دەهینن؟ شتىكى زۆر ئاسایىه كە كەسێك تەلەفۆنى زىرەكى ھەبىت و پەيوەندى ئىنتەرنىتى تیدا ھەبىت. بەلام ئەو شتە لای ئەو پەنابەرە سووریانەى كە لە غازى ئەنتەپ دەژين كەمترە. دوو لەسەر سێى (%٦٧) پەنابەرە سووریەكان پىيان وابوو كە ئىنتەرنىت و سۆشیال میدیا ژيانى ئەوانى لە توركييا ئاسانتر كردوہ. ئەوان لە ئىنتەرنىتدا بەدواداچوون دەكەن بۆ پىشەوچوونى رووداوەكانى سووریا. لەو كەسانەشدا كە چالاكانە ئىنتەرنىت بەكار دەهینن دوو لەسەر سىيان لە ئىنتەرنىتدا بەدواى مافەكانى خۆيان دەگەڕین لە توركييا. بەشێكى زۆر لە پەنابەرە سووریەكان، ئەوانەى كە ھەز دەكەن بگۆيزنەوہ بۆ ولاتانى يەكێتى ئەورویا، لە ئىنتەرنىتدا بەدواى زانیارى رینگاكانى گەشت كردن دەگەڕین.

شتىكى گرینگە كە لىكۆلینەوہى ئەكادىمى ئەنجام بەریت لەسەر پەنابەر و كۆچبەرە سووریەكان لە توركييا. ئەو ئەنجامانەى كە لەسەر بنەماى لىكۆلینەوہ كە دەست دەكەون یارمەتیدەر دەبن بۆ گۆرىنى ئەو سىاسەتمەدارە خاوەن ئەنجامانەى كە كارىگەرى پلان بۆ دانراو و بەھێزىان ھەيە بۆ ژيانى تاكەكان، كۆمەلە خەلكەكان و كۆمەلگا بەگشتى لە توركيادا.

پناهندگان و مهاجران در ترکیه، 2018

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جمهوری ترکیه از دهه 2010 به یکی از مهمترین کشورهای جهان برای پناهندگان تبدیل شده است. مسئولان ملی ترکیه حمایت‌های خاصی را برای پناهندگان سوری که به سبب جنگ به ترکیه می‌آمدند و بعنوان پناهنده در ترکیه ثبت نام می‌کردند در نظر گرفته است. در سال 2018 تعداد مهاجران و پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه بیش از 3.6 میلیون نفر بوده است. این مهاجران و پناهندگان تأثیر زیادی بر توسعه اجتماعی و اقتصادی بسیاری از شهرها و روستاها در ترکیه دارند. این جامعه همچنین در سطح بین‌المللی نیز مورد توجه بسیاری بوده است.

گزارش تحقیق "پناهندگان و مهاجران در ترکیه، 2018" بر پناهندگان و مهاجران سوری‌ای در ترکیه تمرکز دارد. این گزارش بخشی از پروژه تحقیقاتی گسترده در ارتباط با فرایندهای پناهندگی، پناهندگان و پناهجویان در کشورهای مبدأ پناهندگان و یا کشورهای همجوار با آنها و همچنین سفر پناهجویان تا رسیدن به کشورهای مقصد است. این تحقیق متعلق به فعالیت‌های کنسرسیوم تحقیقاتی URMI (شهرنشینی، جابجایی، و مهاجرت؛ به www.urmi.fi مراجعه کنید)، است که توسط شورای تحقیقات استراتژیک در آکادمی فنلاند حمایت مالی شده و توسط پرفسور یوسی اس. یاوهیاینن در دپارتمان جغرافیا دانشگاه تورکو فنلاند هدایت و انجام شده است.

این گزارش عمدتاً براساس کار میدانی که در بهار 2018 در ترکیه انجام گرفت تهیه شده است. در مجموع 762 پاسخگوی سوری به سوالات پرسشنامه بصورت بی‌نام در استان‌های قاضی‌انتپ، استانبول و ازمیر پاسخ داده‌اند. ما همچنین مصاحبه‌هایی را با تعدادی از پاسخگویان انجام دادیم. همکاران تحقیق در جمع‌آوری و تحلیل داده‌های تحقیق کمک کردند. ما از تمام افرادی که در این تحقیق همکاری کرده‌اند سپاسگزاری می‌کنیم. مسئول اصلی این تحقیق پرفسور یوسی اس. یاوهیاینن است.

سوال اول تحقیق این است که چه نوع از پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه زندگی می‌کنند؟ پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه از جوانان تا سالمندان و از افراد فاقد توان خواندن و نوشتن تا افراد دارای تحصیلات دانشگاهی و از افراد بیکار، خانه‌دار و دانش‌آموزان تا افراد شاغل متغیر می‌باشد. تقریباً نصف (45 درصد) پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه کمتر از 18 سال سن دارند. افراد در سنین کار (18 تا 59 سال) 52 درصد جمعیت پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه را شامل می‌شوند. سهم افراد سالمند (60 سال و بیشتر) پایین (3 درصد) است. شهر استانبول بیشترین تعداد پناهندگان سوری را در خود جای داده است؛ بخصوص جوانان سوری مرد که ترجیح می‌دهند در این شهر زندگی کنند. استان‌های مرزی قاضی‌انتپ، هاتای، و شانلی‌اورفا دیگر مناطقی هستند که هر کدام صدها هزار نفر از پناهندگان و خانواده‌های سوری را از سال‌های گذشته در خود جای داده‌اند. استان ازمیر در سواحل غربی یکی از مناطق مهم برای ده‌ها هزار نفر از پناهندگان سوری است. مسئولان ملی ترکیه مکان و قوانین جابجایی و مهاجرت پناهندگان را در داخل ترکیه تنظیم می‌کنند.

سوال دوم تحقیق به این صورت مطرح شده است که زندگی روزمره پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه به چه صورت است؟ زندگی روزمره پناهندگان سوری متنوع است. براساس تحقیق ما، تقریباً تمام پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه به پول بیشتری برای بهبود زندگی خود نیاز دارند. براساس نظر پاسخگویان، سه چهارم (74 درصد) مردان بالغ سوری مشغول به کار بوده و تنها یک چهارم (24 درصد) آنها زن هستند. پناهندگان سوری زن اغلب مشغول کارهای خانواده بوده و اغلب آنها دارای فرزندان خردسال هستند. از نظر بسیاری از پاسخگویان شرایط کار در ترکیه بی ثبات بوده و اغلب آنها در بخش غیررسمی و بدون قرارداد مشغول به کار بوده‌اند. میانگین درآمد ماهانه پاسخگویان شاغل در بهار 2018 در حدود 1200 لیر ترکیه (210 یورو) بود.

موضوع مسکن یکی دیگر از مسائل روزمره پناهندگان سوری است. بسیاری از پناهندگان سوری ترجیح می‌دهند تا در مناطقی زندگی کنند که پناهندگان سوری بیشتری در آنجا سکونت دارند. در مطالعه ما، سه چهارم (74 درصد) پناهندگان سوری حداقل تا حدودی از همسایگان خود رضایت داشتند. در حدود 38 درصد پاسخگویان بصورت کامل و حدود 23 درصد نیز تا حدودی از مسکن خود رضایت داشتند. در هر صورت، بسیاری از پناهندگان سوری در تلاش هستند تا در جامعه ترکیه ادغام شوند. یک چهارم (26 درصد) تسلط بسیار خوبی به زبان ترکی داشته و پنج ششم (83 درصد) آنها حداقل تا حدود کمی زبان ترکی را می‌دانستند. آن دسته از پاسخگویانی که زبان ترکی را می‌دانستند اغلب بیشتر از دیگر پاسخگویان از زندگی در ترکیه رضایت دارند.

سوال سوم تحقیق این است که برنامه‌ها و تمایلات مهاجرتی پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه چیست؟ در سال 2018، پناهندگان سوری تمایلات مهاجرتی متفاوتی را داشته‌اند. نصف پاسخگویان (49 درصد) بصورت مشخص تمایل به بازگشت به کشور سوریه را داشته‌اند اما تنها 38 درصد آنها برنامه‌ریزی برای این کار کرده‌اند. تقریباً یک سوم (31 درصد) برنامه‌ای برای مهاجرت به دیگر کشورها بجز کشور سوریه دارند که اغلب کشورهای کانادا و آلمان را ترجیح می‌دهند. آن دسته از مهاجران سوری که دارای خانواده و یا دوستانی در اتحادیه اروپا بودند اغلب تمایل دارند تا به آنجا مهاجرت کنند. آن دسته از پاسخگویانی که تمایل به مهاجرت به خارج از ترکیه دارند اغلب در استانبول ساکن هستند. در این شهر نصف پاسخگویان (48 درصد)، بخصوص مردان جوان در نظر دارند تا به اتحادیه اروپا مهاجرت کنند. در طرف مقابل، تعداد اندکی از پناهندگان سوری مسن تمایل به مهاجرت به اتحادیه اروپا دارند. کشور ترکیه مناسب‌ترین کشور برای زندگی از نظر یک سوم (34 درصد) پاسخگویان بوده است.

علی‌رغم تمایلات مهاجرتی، چهار پنجم (79 درصد) پناهندگان سوری فکر می‌کنند که احتمالاً تا آخر عمر خود در ترکیه زندگی خواهند کرد. در داخل ترکیه، اغلب پاسخگویان تمایل داشتند تا در استان‌هایی زندگی کنند که در سال 2018 در آن زندگی کرده‌اند. در هر حال، کمتر از نصف پاسخگویان سوری (45 درصد) در استان قاضی‌انتپ اعلام کرده‌اند که این استان منطقه مورد ترجیح آنها برای سکونت است. یک چهارم پناهندگان سوری در نظر دارند تا از قاضی‌انتپ به مناطق دیگر در ترکیه جابجا شوند و بخصوص جوانان که تمایل دارند به استانبول جابجا شوند؛ البته در صورتی که مسئولان مجوز آن را بدهند.

سوال چهارم نیز به این صورت مطرح شده است که پناهندگان سوری چگونه و برای چه دلایلی از اینترنت و رسانه‌های اجتماعی استفاده می‌کنند؟ تقریباً تمام پناهندگان سوری در ترکیه از اینترنت بیشتر از زمانی که در سوریه بوده‌اند استفاده می‌کنند. داشتن تلفن هوشمند با قابلیت اتصال به اینترنت در میان پاسخگویان رایج بوده است اگرچه این موضوع در میان پناهندگان سوری زن در استان قاضی‌انتپ کمتر متداول بوده است. دو سوم (67 درصد) پناهندگان سوری معتقد هستند که اینترنت و رسانه‌های اجتماعی زندگی آنها را در ترکیه آسان‌تر کرده و آنها را از طریق مسائل کشورشان را از طریق اینترنت دنبال می‌کنند. از میان کاربران فعال اینترنت و رسانه‌های اجتماعی، دو سوم (67 درصد) از اینترنت برای شناخت حقوق خود در ترکیه استفاده می‌کنند. بسیاری از پناهندگان سوری که تمایل به مهاجرت به اتحادیه اروپا را دارند از اینترنت برای جستجوی مسیر سفر خود استفاده می‌کنند. انجام مطالعات دانشگاهی در ارتباط با پناهندگان و مهاجران سوری در ترکیه اهمیت زیادی دارد. نتایج حاصل از تحقیقات در تدوین سیاست‌های مبتنی بر شواهد و واقعیات موثر بوده که اثرات مشخص و کارآمدی را بر روی افراد و جامعه ترکیه بطور کلی خواهد داشت.



**TURUN YLIOPISTON MAANTIETEEN JA GEOLOGIAN LAITOKSEN JULKAISUJA
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- No. 1. Jukka Käyhkö and Tim Horstkotte (Eds.): Reindeer husbandry under global change in the tundra region of Northern Fennoscandia. 2017.
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