Disconnecting the Kaliningrad oblast and new threats from Polish perspective

Andrzej Jarynowski
Infectious Disease Epidemiologist
Aidmed
Gdańsk, Poland

Interdisciplinary Research Institute
Wrocław, Poland

Since the fall of USSR Polish – Kaliningrad region (Oblast) neighbourhood has been very complicated and only very small fractions of border populations actively collaborated in economics, tourism, cultural or scientific aspects. Till the February 2022 (war in Ukraine) majority of inhabitants of Pomerania as well Warmia & Mazur voivodeships associated Kaliningrad region with contrabanda and trade of fuel, alcohol and cigarettes; Russian consumers in shopping malls; and militarised zones i.e. at Vistula Split. Perception of Kaliningrad in the last 30 years for Polish neighbours focus on military rather than other aspects, because trade or socio-cultural connections were relatively weak (with a peak during a short period of local border traffic zone 2012-2016). On the other hand, Kaliningrad-Königsberg-Królewiec has been important for Russian-German-Polish history of science and culture. I am personally using the Euler (famous mathematician) concept of bridges of Königsberg to demonstrate transmission paths in the course of infectious disease. Many researchers from the University of Kaliningrad named after Immanuel Kant (famous philosopher) have moved to Gdańsk or Olsztyn to increase the scientific and teaching potential of northern Poland. However, official scientific collaboration between the Polish research institutions and Kant University was never established in contradiction to Germany where multiple bilateral agreements were signed.  Moreover, cooperation between Pomerania as well Warmia & Mazur voivodeships and Kaliningrad region in public services was also very poor. For instance, there was no coordination in control of ASF (African Swine Fever) and infected wild boars influx into Polish territory from Kaliningrad region in multiple waves.

However, since February 2022 attitude towards the Kaliningrad region among Poles living nearby has changed dramatically. The existing cross-border socio-economic mobility of Russians and Poles was even minimised due to formal and political conditions. Multiple civil (i.e. ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia, oil refinery and Naftoport in Gdańsk, Vistula Split Canal) and military objects (i.e. 22nd Tactical Air Base in Malbork, units in Braniewo or Giżycko of 16th Pomeranian Mechanised Division, 3rd Ship Flotilla In Gdynia) are within range of drones of artillery/short distance missiles from the Russian territory. Kaliningrad region is also an enclave of Kremlin intelligence and could be an operational bases for acts of terrorism on the territory of Poland. Electromagnetic weapons may be used there to disturb communication channels in nearby Baltic regions too. Suwałki corridor is a hypothetical military war theatre as this short strip of land is linking Kaliningrad region (disconnected to a high extent with mainland due to EU sanctions) and territory of Belarus (Russia’s ally). However, the conventional invasion from the Kaliningrad region on Poland is extremely unlikely due to the drastic advantage of NATO (and alliances) in the air, Baltic Sea and cybernetic domains. Thus, short distance missiles or drones with biological and chemical agents (forbidden by international conventions) as well as explosive materials is now the priority of civil and military defence in Northern Poland. Currently food security seems to very important due to perturbation on world’s agricultural markets, thus agroterrorism as possible epizootic or epiphytotic (i.e. Vistula delta area is a fertile land) events need to emphasise in the regional preparedness plans. Due to no export of grains from Ukraine and Russia many countries could be in danger of famine. If the war in Ukraine continues till Summer/Autumn 2022, the risk of intentional introduction of plant or animal pathogens (with an important logistical role of the Kaliningrad region) will be even higher.  During the first two months of war in Ukraine the security of the Pomeranian and Warmia & Mazur regions has been improved in the area of preventing and combating CBRNE threats. Thus regional Sanitary/Veterinary inspections, Internal Security Agency, hospital emergency departments, fire brigades, Military Centres of Preventive Medicine have been trained for instance with portable diagnostic equipment that could detect biological or chemical agents of concern if they were used by Russians. Acts of agroterrorism being part of hybrid war could be difficult to be proved (especially if performed by agents of useful idiots) and they could be below the threshold of invoking NATO’s article 5. For instance Kremlin sponsored ecological or animal right defending organisations can be used to disturb food production or supply chains. Non-conventional act of bioterrorism initiated from Kaliningrad region could implement also so-called “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy too, if Kremlin realises that political aims of war in Ukraine could not be achieved. Considerable concentrated  military potential, including short range modern dual-capable missiles launchers and drones (potentially armed with pathogens) that are very likely to omit anti-missile system in Poland or agents of influence already displaced in Poland, the security of the north-eastern Poland depends to a high extent on Kremlin decisions and the Kaliningrad region could be used to achieve political goals.

Email: ajarynowski@gmail.com

Expert article 3266

>Back to Baltic Rim Economies 3/2022

To receive the Baltic Rim Economies review free of charge, you may register to the mailing list.
The review is published 4-6 times a year.