Security implications of the Baltic Pipe Construction Project
Andrzej Fałkowski
Dr., Lt. Gen. (Ret.), Former Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCHoD) of the Polish Armed Forces
Senior Fellow
Casimir Pulaski Foundation
Poland
The Baltic Pipe is a strategic infrastructure project aimed at creating new gas supply opportunities on the European market. It will enable the transmission of gas directly from deposits located in Norway to Denmark and Poland, as well as to customers in the neighboring countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Baltic Pipe will also enable bi-directional gas transmission from Poland to Denmark.
Baltic Pipe is 900 km of the estimated total length of gas pipelines, including 4 gas compressor stations, which will give approx. 10 billion m 3 of gas pipeline capacity. According to estimates, this year’s gas consumption in Poland is 18 billion cubic meters. The total volume of signed contracts is 2.4 billion m 3 gas per year for 10 years.
The investment runs from the North Sea, where it is connected to the Europipe II gas pipeline, thus ensuring access to gas from Norwegian fields. Then, by building infrastructure in Denmark and at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, the gas pipeline will connect to the Polish transmission system. The project is being implemented by the Polish GAZ-SYSTEM (a strategic company for the Polish economy, operating gas pipelines) and the Danish Energinet.
The task was carried out in two countries and on two seas in the exclusive economic zones of three countries. Thanks to the Baltic Pipe, it will be possible to become independent from Russian gas. When Russian aggression against Ukraine continues and gas cannot be bought in Russia (embargo), this is especially important. The Baltic Pipe and the LNG Terminal in Świnoujście make Poland an important natural gas distribution center in this part of Europe. As other countries will also be able to use natural gas, the European Commission has identified the Baltic Pipe as a project of common interest.
Gas from a different direction could be an alternative to Europe. For example, Turkey is considering three options for the supply of Turkmen gas (Turkmenistan has the fourth largest gas reserves in the world). Gas from this republic could become another alternative for Europe to unreliable Russia. Moscow does not like these plans because they would directly affect its interests.
Officially, Moscow does not comment on these plans. However, the act of sabotaging Nord Stream 2 in the Baltic Sea proves that Russia does not intend to passively follow the events. Detecting the cause of an attack is very difficult and almost impossible to prove to anyone, but it makes us think about securing this extremely important critical infrastructure. The damage to the Nord Stream 2 has made it clear that critical infrastructure, including underwater installations, is highly vulnerable not only in war, but even in peacetime.
It is crucial to prepare for their protection, even in international and domestic territorial waters. Their location must be kept secret. The mere fact of their location at the bottom of the sea and great depth is no longer enough. Controlling the activities of surface vessels may also prove ineffective in the context of current technological possibilities, such as sonars, underwater robots or unmanned underwater vehicles. Nowadays, there is no need to take advantage of humans and put them in danger if the underwater tasks can be performed perfectly without their physical presence under water.
Interestingly, the same underwater pipeline protection systems as underwater robots, optoelectronic and acoustic systems, and underwater cables can be used simultaneously to detect and destroy underwater infrastructure. Thus, paradoxically, they have the feature that they can be used both to identify a threat and to cause it, because they can sabotage, inter alia, by placing an appropriate explosive near or on an underwater installation.
It is necessary to build a protective installation on pipelines and their passive protective functions, including observation and warning functions, as well as active ones, capable of “self-defense” with the appropriate use of monitoring centers. It may be futuristic, but maybe not that much. The type of protection always depends on the rank of the object and even the depth at which the underwater installation is located. Naval aviation will also be useful for observation, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles with listening devices, radars and even satellites. The case of Nord Stream 2 shows that the attack can be carried out safely with total impunity for the attacker. However, the attack required skills that only the state actor possesses.
The way to carry out such an attack is theoretically simple. After locating the installation, and it can be done, for example, under the pretext of oceanographic research, placing the explosive itself will not be difficult. Properly equipped drones will not only prove themselves, but also camouflage the charge.
Protection of the gas pipeline also means protection of the natural environment of the Baltic Sea. Therefore all countries of the basin must be involved. It can be done by the Navy, but not by itself. Safety is a multidisciplinary activity: the Police, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Border Guard, Seismological Institutes, institutions implementing modern technologies, etc. should be involved. Specialized companies responsible for controlling the condition of underwater pipelines using drones are no longer sufficient. All these institutions need to build the resilience of this critical infra.
Summary
Putin’s war with European energy is not over yet. For years, Europe has been at the mercy of Russia’s geopolitical energy blackmail. Since the Kremlin’s re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Moscow has been keen to play the energy card in the hope of scaring Kiev away from the West and the West from Kiev. The recent Nord Stream explosions could mark a point of no return in energy relations between Russia and Europe. Russia wanted to demonstrate its ability to destroy Europe’s energy infrastructure, which it is currently doing in Ukraine. Will the Nord Stream attack be one of many on Europe’s energy infrastructure? The sabotage on the Nord Stream gas pipeline was Putin’s warning shot. The West should prepare for the next insidious actions by Russia.
Russia is signaling to the West that it has a whole set of unconventional tools that it can use if it continues to support Ukraine. It was a relatively inexpensive way to send a very informative signal. Russia is weakened and will rely all the more on unconventional tools. These include cyber warfare, chemical, biological and even tactical nuclear weapons and acts of sabotage.
The explosions heightened fears in Europe about the coming winter, suggesting that other critical continental energy infrastructure could also be attacked in the future, including the Baltic Pipe linking the Norwegian Continental Shelf with Denmark and Poland, which officially opened on the days when the first reports were made about problems with Nord Stream. Legal regulations are urgently needed to protect this type of infrastructure.
The sabotage against Nord Stream 2 and the war in Ukraine have shown how vulnerable the energy infrastructure is. Infrastructure stress tests should be carried out. International cooperation is needed to identify weaknesses and prepare responses to sudden disruptions. This should be accompanied by procedures to minimize the effects of spills and contamination of the environment and other high-risk sectors, such as e.g. maritime digital and electricity infrastructure.
The article does not raise the importance of the Baltic Pipe for the energy security of Europe. This may be the subject of a separate study.
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